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Thesis Abstract
This thesis engages the issue of personhood, arguing that persons are both
analogical and dialogical beings. I look at personhood first, from the
standpoint of the slandered and 'accused' person. Beginning with the scene of
Christ before Pilate, I show that the logic of accusation is unassailably
couched within the grammar of testimony or of bearing witness (Chapter 1).
Next, I treat the Dreyfus Affair and the contrast of mystique and politique in
the writings of Charles Peguy (Chapter 2). Here I tum to the 'accusation in the
accusative' logic of Emmanuel Levinas, demonstrating that within an
approach of radical alterity to the exclusion of other grammatico-ontological
cases, the person becomes lost without some sort of original, analogical case
of 'giving' (Chapter 3). In response to extreme accounts slander and of the
heterogeneity of the person, this thesis, secondly, proposes that the person
should be understood first analogically, and secondly, as an analogical
extension, dialogically. To this end I examine the debate concerning analogy
in Thomas Aquinas and the tradition that followed him. I explore both the
metaphysical path of resolutio, perfection, and theological recapitulation
(Chapter 4), and then look to the debate on analogy itself arguing that it is best
understood as pointing toward an analogia entis that is coextensively an
analogia personae (Chapter 5). Finally, I conclude with an articulation of the
person as dialogical. I look first to the form of dialogue in Plato, then I
conclude with three sections enacting a 'call and response' of the divine
persons speaking 'to the creature through the creature', where I end with an
account of persons living a dialogically ensouled life within the communio
personarum (Chapter 6). I finish with a brief conclusion recapitulating the
argument with a Christie entreaty toward the neighbor.
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Part I: The Person Accused
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE ACCOSTED PERSON
a. Who is Truth?
'In question is the whole of man; it is not in thought alone that we must
seek him out. It is into action that we shall have to transport the center
of philosophy, because there is also to be found the center of life '.
- Maurice Blondell
'We will have access to the truth of Being only if we are willing to
receive it with the whole of our Being. At some point, we will be faced
with a truth that asks everything of us, the whole of ourselves, without
remainder. But should we be surprised? What sort of truth would it be
if it did not demand, and promise, everything? If truth called on only a
part of ourselves, only temporarily-what would we do with the rest?
What use would it be?
- D. C. Schindler'
'Christ is the only one who can make his life a test for all people '.
- Anti-Climacus'
It is not out of the ordinary to ask one another questions concerning truth.
Is this or that pronouncement true? Nor is it alien in philosophical and
theological discussions to ask such things as, 'does this obtain?', 'is this state
of affairs or prepositions true?', or even, 'what is the nature of truth?' What,
indeed, is truth?'
IMaurice Blondel, Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice, trans.
Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1984), 13.
2 D. C. Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth: A
Philosophical Investigation, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy 34 (New York, NY:
Fordham University Press, 2004), 347.
3 Seren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings XX (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991),202.
4 See, e.g., Peter Vardy, What Is Truth?: Beyond Postmodernism and Fundamentalism
(Alresford: John Hunt Publishing Ltd, 2003); John M. Rist, What Is Truth?: From the
Academy to the Vatican (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andrew Shanks,
What Is Truth?: Towards a Theological Poetics, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2001); Richard
Schantz, ed., What Is Truth?, vol. 1, Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy (Berlin and
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001).
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In this thesis I will push such a question along the lines of the notion of
persons and personhood. I will suggest that there is something inherently
'personal' about asking questions of truth but also that the truth, to be truth,
must be lived and embodied in a Life. In other words, personhood is the truth
of things because a person is the truth, or put in another way, the substance of
things is personal? Before proceeding with the outline of my project, I must
address what is at stake in the concept of outlining the concept of personhood.
Above all, this means that while this thesis is about persons and personhood, it
does not intend to define persons in any comprehensive manner. The very
'nature' of the person in fact prohibits such an enterprise. The reason for this
is double. First, because this thesis works within a conception that derives its
concept of the person from an ever-greater God (in the sense of a major
dissimulitudoi, as Hans Urs von Balthasar says, 'we can never catch up with
him. Accordingly, we who are his "image and likeness" do not despair
because of our inability to arrive at a definition; instead, we are aware of a
comparative dimension: man is more than what can be included in a
conceptually clear definition'." This first rejection of a conceptually clear
definition is based upon the positive mystery of the person whose depth points
beyond him- or herself. A second rejection stems from the 'dignity' of the
person which prevents, in a kind of negative manner, the ability to define a
person based on a set of criteria. 7 Robert Spaemann is instructive here, for he
says, 'the independence of the person hinges on the fact that no one is allowed
to decide whether or not another human being bears the fundamental features
5 Technically, these are two different questions and will be considered separately at different
stages throughout this thesis. However, insofar as being is convertible with truth, goodness,
and beauty, these two questions coincide.
6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Thea-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: The Dramatis
Personae: Man in God, trans. Graham Harrison, vol. II (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press,
1990), 345, emphasis Balthasar's.
7 For an excellent treatment of human dignity as told from a critical realist approach to
personalism, see Christian Smith, What Is a Person?: Rethinking Humanity. Social Life. and
the Moral Goodfrom the Person Up (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 434-
90. Specifically, Smith emphasizes 'critical realism's concepts of stratified reality and
emergence to shift the source of dignity from specific capacities operating at the middle level
to emergent personhood existing at the highest level of personal being. Dignity is a proactive
emergent property of personhood as a whole, not a result of the possession or exercise of some
specific given human capacities' (Ibid., 479).
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of personhood'. 8 If this were the case, just who would have the right and
power to make such definitions? Who would judge? Before us unfolds a
familiar scene.
When Christ was taken before Pilate to be prosecuted on behalf of his
fellow Jews, Pilate questions them and Jesus in order to determine what
sentence should be passed. Christ informs Pilate that his kingdom is not of this
world and that, as a king of this kingdom, he comes to testify to the truth.
Here, Pilate asks Christ the famous question: 'What is truth?' ('rL Eunv
Mr18El.a;V Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Practice in
Christianity, dramatically describes the scene: 'For what is truth, and in what
sense was Christ the truth? The first question, as is well known, was asked by
Pilate, and another question is whether he really cared to have his question
answered; in any case in one sense his question was altogether appropriate,
and in another sense it was as inappropriate as possible. Pilate asks Christ the
question: What is truth? But Christ was indeed the truth; therefore the question
was entirely appropriate. Yes, and in another sense, no'." To explore this
latter, negative sense, Pilate's question assumes that truth can only be a kind
of neutral 'what' (rt) as opposed to the gendered 'who' ("[L~).When the truth 11
8 "Human Nature", in Robert Spaemann, Essays in Anthropology: Variations on a Theme,
trans. Guido de Graaff and James Mumford (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 22.
Spaemann has in mind here such thinkers as Peter Singer in his well-known and controversial,
Practical Ethics, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). To this can be
added, amongst others, Daniel C. Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood," in What Is a Person?,
ed. Michael F. Goodman (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1988), 145-{)7. 'Philosophy does not,
and cannot, declare human beings to be persons. It has to recognize them because they are
already persons. This is why the fact that a person is a person does not depend upon the
philosopher's insight and argumentation: personhood is an "unpreconceivably" given reality.
The status of a person, he argues, is "the only status, indeed, that we do not confer, but acquire
naturally [natiirlicherweise]." This is why the person always already has a particular dignity
in Spaemann's view'. Holger Zaborowski, Robert Spaemann's Philosophy of the Human
Person: Nature, Freedom, and the Critique of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 55 and see 198: "Things and animals 'are' their nature, but persons are preceded by
their nature and 'have' their nature in freedom." The quotation above (Zaborowski, p. 55)
comes from Robert Spaemann, Persons: The Difference Between "Someone" and
"Something", trans. Oliver O'Donovan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.
9 John 18:38, NRSV. This and all following Scriptural citations will be from this translation.
10 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 203; Andrew T. Lincoln, The Gospel According to St
John, Black's New Testament Commentary (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 129.
On its face, it may indeed be the case that the question is 'inappropriate', but as will become
apparent, that is no reason not to explore the implications of the question asked in light of the
height of the drama of this scene within the narrative, just as Anti-Climacus himself does.
11 John 14:6.
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confronts Pilate, he does not realize that 'Christ's life was in fact the truth'."
While Christ stands on trial in this scene, it is also Pilate who simultaneously
stands accused, 'for in questioning Christ in this way he actually informs
against himself and thus 'makes the self-disclosure that Christ's life has not
explained to him what truth is' 13-{)r, as I shall be arguing below in the course
of this thesis, 'who' the truth is. For it is my contention that the person is the
truth-that the person of Christ, fully human and fully divine, is the truth.
Thus, the substance of things is personal, in the sense that 'all things have
been created through him and for him' such that 'in him all things hold
together' .14This is the great irony of Pilate's question: that the person who
stands accused before him holds all things (Ta 7l£lVTa) together.
Pilate's question to Christ comes at the end of a series of 'I am' (£yw dfll)
statements scattered throughout the fourth gospel. 15While many of the 'I am'
statements of Christ employ various themes, what unites them is that they all
witness to the life that Christ has in the Father." Most pointedly, these can be
summed up when Christ says, 'I am the way, the truth, and the life' CEyw dfll
~ oooc Kai ~ M~eHa Kai ~ 'W~).17 The initial emphasis that is on the
'way' (~ abo.;) is a response to Thomas' question, 'how can we know the
way?,18 Christ uses this opportunity" to speak not only of himself as the
'way', but here he also announces that he is the way of truth to Ilfe2°-that is
the life of the living Father. As the way, truth, and life, Christ points to himself
12 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 203.
13 Ibid.; Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), 1113; Lincoln, The Gospel According to St John, 463. Cf.
Matthew 23:31.
14 Colossians I:16-17; John 1:3; cr. Romans 11:36.
15For two studies on this topic see David Mark Ball, "I Am" in John's Gospel: Literary
Function. Background and Theological Implications, Journal for the Study of the New
Testament 124 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996); Philip B. Hamer, The "I Am" of
the Fourth Gospel: A Study in Johannine Usage and Thought, Facet Books 26 (Philadelphia,
PA: Fortress, 1970).
16 Thompson says, 'John Ashton calls "life" the core or central symbol, around which all other
symbols cluster'. Marianne Meye Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2001), 77n.33; John Ashton, Understanding the Fourth Gospel
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 219n.28.
17 John 14:6.
18 John 14:5.
19 Ball, "I Am" in John's Gospel, 124-8.
20 Cf. John 11:25 where he says he is the resurrection (rl avaamm.:;) and the life.
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as the person who embodies this life: 'If you know me, you will know my
Father also. From now on you do know him and have seen him'." This life is
distinctly personal, and is focused on the very person of Christ. As Thomas
Brodie says, connecting the terms way, truth, and life with that of 'person',
'But Jesus uses [the designation 'way'] of himself, and this indicates that,
above all, it is by focusing on the human person that one discovers the reality
of God .... Focusing on the human person is a way to the truth, and even
though aspects of the truth may be frightening, the acceptance of it finally
leads to greater freedom and vitality, in other words, to life'." All of these
predicates are both summed up in the person of Christ as well as in the Father
to whom Christ points through the Spirit."
This life of Christ in the "I am" statements recapitulates Exodus 3: 14 when
Moses is told by God that God himself is to be called "I am who 1am" ( 'ehyeh
'aser 'ehyeh). This personal God who is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob," tells Moses, 'Thus you shall say to the Israelites, "I am has sent me to
you." ,25 Matthew Levering argues that this 'sheer infinite existence, the one
who is and who thus has the power to redeem Israel':" is not a mere
metaphysical abstraction; on the contrary, not only does this name properly
belong to God,27but this name, as theological and metaphysical, is a name that
stands to critique all of our 'idolatrous conceptions of the divine being, a
history that flows through the inspired contemplative practices of the
prophets'." What's more, Levering (following Thomas Weinandy) points out
that the 'I am who I am' translation of the Septuagint, in signifying the
fullness of God's being, 'does not render God immutably "lifeless," but
21 John 14:7.
22 Thomas L. Brodie, The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),461-2.
23 Cf. Ball, "I Am" in John's Gospel, 127.
24 Exodus 3:15.
25 Exodus 3:14. Hamer says that while Exodus 3:14 should be ruled out as a direct source for
the "I am" sayings in John's Gospel, they shouldn't be fully ruled out as an indirect source.
That is, John's Gospel may have drawn on the Greek of the Septuagint renderings of the
Tetragrammaton and Second Isaiah. See Harner, The "I Am" of the Fourth Gospel, 17, and
57,60-2.
26 Matthew Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics: Aquinas and the Renewal of Trinitarian
Theology, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 62.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. English Dominican Fathers, 2nd revised, 1920,
I, q. 13, a. II (hereafter ST).
28 Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 65.
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immutably "life-full." ,29 It is this 'life-fullness' to which Christ points when
in John 8:58 he says, 'Very truly, 1 tell you, before Abraham was, 1 am'.
Marianne Meye Thompson clarifies: 'It is not until [Christ] makes the claim
"to have seen Abraham," that is, to share in an eternal kind of life, that the
people react: now he is claiming to have what God alone has. Thus the link
between Jesus' statement and the divine OT "I am" is through the middle
term, life. Jesus claims to share in God's kind of existence, eternal existence,
existence that does not "come into being" but that simply "is" (8:35; 1:2,2).
This life he has from the living Father (6:57; 5:26; 10:18)'.30 Christ's person is
identified with the person of the God of the 'I am', in the life that he has in the
Father." For, as Dionysius the Areopagite asks, 'And if they do not accept that
the whole Godhead is life, what truth can there be in the holy words, "As the
Father raises the dead and gives them life, so also the Son gives life to whom
he will," and "It is the Spirit that gives life"?':" Aquinas argues that because
the 'what' and 'how' (the 'whereby' it is) are the same in God, even if one
were to abstract away all the personal properties in the Godhead then the
divine nature would still be 'subsisting and as a person', for the Jews also
29 Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 77;
Levering, Scripture and Metaphysics, 61.
30Thompson, The God of the Gospel of John, 91-2; Ball, "I Am" in John's Gospel, 282-3.
31 'As in [John] 13:19, the absolute ego eimi in 8:58 expresses the unity of the Father and the
Son' (Hamer, The "I Am" of the Fourth Gospel, 39). Richard Bauckham highlights the
repetition of the 'I am' statements in the Gospel of John as culminating in an emphatic climax
that becomes increasingly unambiguous as the narrative proceeds. 'More than that, they
identify Jesus as the eschatological revelation of the unique identity of God, predicted by
Deutero-Isaiah'. See God Crucified in Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God
Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament's Christology of Divine Identity (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), I-59, here at 37-40.
Additionally, see the illuminating discussion in Thomas Joseph White, OP, '''Through Him
All Things Were Made' (John I :3): The Analogy of the Word Incarnate According to St.
Thomas Aquinas and Its Ontological Presuppositions," in The Analogy of Being: Invention of
the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White, OP (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 246-79 at 261-4, where White, following
Aquinas' commentary on the Gospel of John, shows that these "I am" statements in John 8
also serve to distinguish the kind of being Jesus Christ shares with the Father as one who is
ipsum esse, in distinction to creation, who has its existence by participation.
32 Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, ed. Paul Rorem, trans. Colm
Luibheid, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), 59 [PG
3:637AB). The Scriptural references are to John 5:21 and 6:63. Fran O'Rourke shows how
Thomas Aquinas is indebted to Dionysius in most matters, including being part of the same
tradition which, 'In naming God as Being, i.e. 6 WV, or "Qui est', both [Thomas Aquinas and
Dionysius] refer to Exodus 3, 14'. Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of
Aquinas, Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters 32 (Leiden: Brill, 1992),
130-32, here at 131.
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consider God in this way, as one personality." For both Christians and Jews
alike, then, God is seen as a person, and never as an abstract, unreachable
unmoved mover, unconcerned with Creation and its continued existence."
Christ stands accused, both by his fellow Jews, and also by Pilate. Yet, 'the
one who is on trial is at the same time the real judge, ,35 for the way, truth, and
life of the living Father stands before them, placing all of their conceptions of
truth and life into question. The issue here is not whether there is a truth
'about' or 'concerning' the person of Christ," nor is the issue whether Jesus
'has' life;" rather, the person of Christ is the truth, placing all of our truths
into question" (similar to the bracketing of a phenomenological epochei, and
this same person is the life of the Father given for the life of the world,
unashamedly in servant form." When Pilate, Christ's fellow Jews, and us as
the reader of these Scriptures arrive at the scene of Christ before his imminent
33 ST, III, q. 3, a. 3 ad 1-2.
34 For a recent account of Exodus 3: 14-15 in connection with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo
in both Jewish and Christian traditions, see Janet Soskice, "Creatio Ex Nihilo: It's Jewish and
Christian Foundations," in Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. David B. Burrell et a1.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24-39. 'God's undivided presence to
everything in particular is in sharp contrast with what "divine eternity" meant for classical
Greek philosophy" (ibid., 30).
35Andrew T. Lincoln, Truth on Trial: The Lawsuit Motif in the Fourth Gospel (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson Publishers, 2000), 33.
36 This would lapse into 'onto-theology', a phrase often used by Heidegger but coined by
Immanuel Kant. On this see Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-Theological Constitution of
Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, IL: University Of
Chicago Press, 2002), 42-74. For Kant's coinage where he differentiates cosmotheology from
ontotheology under the header of transcendental theology, see Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 584. Cf. Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of
Nothing and the Difference of Theology; Radical Orthodoxy (London: Routledge, 2002), 134.,
where, discussing Heidegger, Cunningham remarks, 'For the starting point of the
metaphysical (ontotheological) question is "what"? This reduces Being to a matter of
thinghood and so excludes any possibility of articulating a "why" is there Being'. This thesis
attempts to reformulate a Heideggarian approach by re-introducing theology into such a
debate by virtue of pushing toward the 'who', albeit not in a univocal sense, but considered
analogously. This will be explored in detail in chapters 4 and 5 below.
37 Although of course Christ 'has' life, but only because and insofar as he is this own life
(s(j)~),the one who is ipsum esse.
38 Cr. 1 Corinthians 8:23 and 1:23. This does not mean, contra many theologians writing
today, that we must replace all reason with a kind of dialectical evacuation of all thought with
a desire to erase all humanly reason; instead, all our reason only is and can be articulated
insofar as it participates in the very A6yo~ of the the Son. Only because of Christ's person
(who is reason) can we have any reason at all. Stanley Grenz seemed to take this route in his
very instructive (but flawed due to its being overdetermined by an Heideggerian analysis)
analysis in Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God and the Question Of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-
Ontology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
39 Matthew 12:18; Matthew 20:26-28; Mark 10:45; Philippians 2:6-7.
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trial, we find out that the truth and life of the Father are this incarnation, fully
human, fully divine, and it is only in this person that truth and life begin at all.
Because the person of Christ recapitulates (avuKE<puAulWaL~) all human and
divine truths in himself and does so in a triune 'personal' way as he witnesses
(f.1UQ'WQElV) to the Father in the giving of the Spirit who is also truth and
life" - the 'effect' of this truth upon creation is that we now must experience
and conceive of truth and life not only first and primarily as the person of
Christ, but also of the human person first and perfectly revealed in the person
of the absolute paradox, as Kierkegaard (as Climacus) called him." For if God
reveals true humanity to men and women," then analogously, the second
person of the Trinity must also therefore reveal to us persons what it means to
be a person. As the second Adam, Christ reveals himself in his recapitulatory
logic to be the first Adam; the last will be first and the first shall be last. 43
b. The Plan of this Thesis: The Contested Person
An exploration of the person and the personal truth of things in modernity's
(and post-modernity's) wake faces severe challenges. No longer does the term
40 For the truth as appropriated to the Son, see Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, trans.
Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, and Robert W. Schmidt (Chicago, IL: Henry
Regnery Company, 1952), I, q. 7 (hereafter De Ver.); ST, I, q. 39, a. 8. Also see the excellent
discussion in Gilles Emery OP, "Trinity and Truth: The Son as Truth and the Spirit of Truth in
St. Thomas Aquinas," in Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, Faith & Reason: Studies in
Catholic Theology & Philosophy (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University,
2007),73-114.
41 Soren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M. G. Piety, Oxford
World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 111-20.
42 Gaudium et Spes, §22 in Austin Flannery OP, ed., Vatican Council II: Volume 1: The
Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, New Revised (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing
Company, 1998), 922.
43 Matthew 19.30, 20.16; Mark 10.31. See the excellent discussion of this in Conor
Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It
Wrong (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 392-400. See also the illuminating
discussion of Irenaeus on this point in Peter C. Bouteneff, Beginnings: Ancient Christian
Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 77-
85, esp. 81-82, where Boutneffcomments, "In the divine scheme of things, Christ comes first,
then Adam. This is not to be mistaken for another assertion that the 'preexisting Logos' was
the agent of the creation of the cosmos, including Adam. In effect, the crucified and risen Lord
comes first, and Adam is made with reference to him. The nature of the recapitulation, which
puts Christ at the center of the human trajectory from creation to salvation, is therefore such
that Irenaeus can speak of Adam as being made in the image of the incarnate Christ (AH
4.33.4)."
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'person' refer to a subsistent reality possessing of a rational nature (not that
such a designation is sufficient); but furthermore, no longer is the person even
seen as a dialogical reality wherein one relates to others and others relate to
the self precisely because the person possesses an incommunicable dignity.
Michel Foucault's comments on the disappearance of man are well-known."
The person has seemingly disappeared, and in its wake are, on the one hand,
various Romantic existentialisms (e.g., Jean- Paul Sartre) where one must
create oneself ex nihilo, or, on the other, what is left in the disintegrated
aftermath is the tragic embrace of persons as 'nothing but' a mere collection of
atoms, processes, or psychological drives. The following passage from Philip
Roth's novel The Counterlife deserves to be quoted at length, for it captures
this tragic spirit:
There is no you, Maria, any more than there's a me. There is only this
way that we have established over the months of performing together,
and what it is congruent with isn't "ourselves" but past
perfonnances-we're has-beens at heart, routinely trotting out the old,
old act. What is the role I demand of you? I couldn't describe it, but I
don't have to-you are such a great intuitive actress you do it, almost
with no direction at all, an extraordinarily controlled and seductive
performance, Is it a role that's foreign to you? Only if you wish to
pretend that it is. It's all impersonation-in the absence of a self, one
impersonates selves, and after a while impersonates best the self that
best gets one through. If you were to tell me that there are people, like
the man upstairs to whom you now threaten to tum yourself in, who
actually do have a strong sense of themselves, I would have to tell you
that they are only impersonating people with a strong sense of
themselves-to which you could correctly reply that since there is no
way of proving whether I'm right or not, this is a circular argument
from which there is no escape.
All I can tell you with certainty is that I, for one, have no self, and that
I am unwilling or unable to perpetrate upon myself the joke of a self. It
certainly does strike me as a joke about my self. What I have instead is
a variety of impersonations I can do, and not only of myself-a troupe
of players that I have internalized, a permanent company of actors that
I can call upon when a self is required, an ever-evolving stock of
pieces and parts that forms my repertoire. But I certainly have no self
44 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York:
Vintage Books, 1970), 342: "It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void
left by man's disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency; it does not constitute a
lacuna that must be filled. It is nothing more, and nothing less, than the unfolding of a space
in which it is once more possible to think."
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independent of my imposturing, artistic efforts to have one. Nor would
I want one. I am a theater and nothing more than a theater."
These words from the character Nathan Zuckerman admit not only to a
'circular argument'-and thus the entire mood is self-consciously question-
begging-but these words also betray a sense of constant collection of 'pieces
and parts' that reduces one to 'nothing more than a theater' where what is
played out is anything but the life of a person. It is fashionable to reduce the
human person to 'merely' this or that, 'only really' this, or 'nothing but' some
smaller part. This approach has become so wide-spread that those who offer
more unifying accounts of the person such as G. K. Chesteron, C. S. Lewis,
and Donald McKay have disparaged this reductionism-and rightly so-as
'Nothing Buttery'. 46
The truth is that there never was a stable and universally-agreed-upon
conception of the person, as its meaning was always worked out amidst
struggles with competing theologies and philosophies. We cannot simply
defend the integrity of the person with trite formulae, as such an endeavour
would itself be a reduction of the person. Nor can we simply point to the
person of Jesus as a pat answer; a fuller Christological account is needed,"
which takes into consideration the life of the Trinity as manifested in the
person of Christ within a Creation that is held together in and through the
same person without which nothing was made." Such a challenge is
articulated in the following remarks made by Graham Ward: 'beginning with
the human body, even if it belongs to Jesus of Nazareth, capitulates, to some
extent, to modem individualism'. Even taking the person of Jesus Christ as
one's theological and philosophical starting point does not grant one a free
pass to overcome this individualism, for, '[t]o focus... simply on Christ
isolates once more this body as the object under investigation and prevents an
understanding of the body as multiple, the body as belonging to, and
45 Philip Roth, The Counterlife (London: Penguin Books, 1986), 324-5, emphases in the
original.
46 lowe the discovery of this designation to Smith, What Is a Person?, 37 and 37n.15.
47 See, e.g., the work of Aaron Riches, Christ. the End of Humanism (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013). Much of the present thesis is indebted to
the insights of Riches' research.
48 John 1:3.
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participating in, numerous corporations, the body as enacted within a diverse
range of scenarios, each of which stages different meanings and values that
transcend the modem atomized individual who is set adrift on a sea of
choices' .49 Ward refers here to the human person's idea of the self shaped in
the aftermath of a whole host of modem thinkers who isolate the person from
its participation in realities beyond itself. Truly, the modem conception of the
self is one that is no longer 'porous' but what Charles Taylor has called the
'buffered self. 50
Similarly, from a systematic theological perspective, Karl Rahner in his
work The Trinity has raised similar concerns regarding the use of 'person' as a
sufficient designation for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of the Trinity."
Rahner notes that when today we use the word 'person', it is always to
designate 'several spiritual centers of activity, of several subjectivities and
liberties' .52 While this is not the place just yet to get into a detailed
examination of language used to refer to the persons, hypostases, or, as Rahner
proposes, 'distinct manners of subsisting' ,53 the crux of the issue for Rahner is
that previously, before the 'anthropcentric tum', 'person' used to mean the
particular subsistence (primarily) of a rational nature (secondarily), whereas
now 'modem times requires that the spiritual-subjective element in the
concept of person be first understood'." Accordingly, as Lewis Ayers notes,
'Modem notions of personhood ... do not simply introduce too much division
into the Trinity, they run the risk of corrupting the basic pro-Niecene sense of
the mysterious and incomprehensible union of the Godhead'." Abuse does not
constitute use, and so Rahner, wisely, does not want to jettison the use of
person completely. He thus realizes it needs to be defended from
49 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens, The Church
and Postmodem Culture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 225-6.
50 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2007),37-42, 134--42,262-4,300-7; See also Taylor's earlier study, Sources of the
Self' The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
51 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel, Mysterium Salutis (London: Burns &
Oates; Herder and Herder, 1970), 103-15.
52 Ibid., 106.
53 Ibid., II 0-11.
54 Ibid., 108.
55 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 412; on this Ayres cites John Milbank, The Word
Made Strange: Theology, Language and Culture (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996), 174ff.
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misunderstandings but also continually clarified In light of the above
challenges. 56
While Rahner's concerns are merited, the situation is far worse than that of
an opposition between modern subjectivism on the one hand and classical
persons-as-subsistent-entities on the other. In fact, the levels of antipathy
towards entire groups of persons has reached a feverish peak in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries with a number of horrific genocides, and while racism
and war are nothing new, the sheer numbers of the dead in the wars from the
twentieth century seem to surpass anything that has come before. Persons of
all types do not stand merely accused, but they all too often fall under the very
real threat of slander: one is told, 'you are merely your genes', 'you are
nothing but your race', etc.
In light of this situation, in Chapter Two below, I take a look at an account
of accusation regarding the status of the person in recent history. This involves
the case of Alfred Dreyfus and the subsequent 'Dreyfus Affair' that took place
in Paris in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At issue here are
two kinds of accusation: the first against Dreyfus, but also the logic of
accusation in that leveled by Emile Zola' s 'J'Accuse ... !' article. There I
attempt to untangle the deeper form of accusation at work in both of their
cases. The affair proves enlightening on multiple levels for the purposes of
this thesis. First, it shows the stark reality of the slandered person of Alfred
Dreyfus in light of his attackers. He was reduced to his Jewish race in such a
way that his personhood was cast aside. Secondly, the importance of this case
also reveals a deeper nuance in the logic of accusation itself-that of
testimony. For accusation itself may not always be synonymous with slander
(as in the situation of Zola). In light of the Dreyfus Affair, therefore, I also
look at the writings of Charles Peguy, whose language of 'mystique' in
contrast to that of 'politique' provides the beginnings of the analogical shape
of this thesis: that of an animated, life-full existence suspended between the
temporal and the eternal.
56 Rahner, The Trinity, 108-9.
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Chapter Three substantially explores the ethics of accusation in Levinas,
for he alone in the twentieth century has so closely tied a personal ethic of
alterity (of 'the Face') with that of accusation of the other. Levinas ties his
claim of the Other that accuses to the grammatical case of the 'accusative' in
such a way that it escapes Being (which for him is anything in the
'nominative' case). I unpack the moves that Levinas makes with reference to
his grammar and ontology, where I close by contrasting him to the thought of
Franz Rosenzweig and Michel Henry, who also make uses of the accusative
case, not by disavowing Being, but by radically affirming it. Here I show how
the 'accusative' that Levinas inscribes into persecution does not of necessity
entail the radical rupture that he intends it to, but, when considered rightly,
actually witnesses to a further, primary truth, remarkably similar to the logic
of testimony traced out from the chapter on Dreyfus.
If rupture and radical heterogeneity vis-a-vis 'the other' characterize the
path of modem and post-modem metaphysics, then it will be argued that a
proper response to this will not involve a retreat into personal identity as such,
for this would be to oppose equivocity with univocity; rather, in Part II, I will
be arguing that persons are inherently analogical. Chapter Four begins by
summarizing a crucially-missing aspect of the proper understanding of
adequation in Levinas and then begins the process of a constructive analogical
account of the person. Before turning to the debate surrounding analogy itself
in Chapter Five, this fourth chapter is devoted to the path of the analogical act
of judgment: first, I proceed philosophically in the path of resolution
(resolutio) in order to arrive-simultaneously-at Being and the person in a
reflexive moment of judgement that views the latter as the primary analogate
of the former; second, the person as we understand it cannot be accounted for
univocally in God, and so here I take a look at the analogical distance between
human and divine persons in the latter's highest perfection; lastly, I turn to the
logic of recapitulation as articulated in St Irenaeus of Lyons, for it is here that
we can finally 'arrive at the arrival' of the person. Thus the shape of the
chapter proceeds first philosophically, but as such, the act of analogical
judgment affirms in faith that the person is revealed truly and utterly first as
the person of Christ.
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Chapter Five turns to the much disputed question of analogy in Thomas
Aquinas, who is covered in the chapter's first two sections. In in the third
section of the chapter I turn to the work of Erich Przywara. In detail, the
chapter is as follows: Section a) outlines the logic of analogy in Thomas with
regard both to being and to the person. Analogy provides not only a middle
way to articulate persons, but also shows that, properly conceived, there can
ultimately be no other way as creatures to speak about persons. Section b) of
this chapter is substantially a response to the critiques of the Eastern Orthodox
philosopher Christos Yannaras against the notion of analogy in Thomas
Aquinas and 'the West'. Here I show that Yannaras' polemics, while
appropriate when aimed at certain forms of neo-Scholasticism, fall flat when
Thomas' work is properly understood as involving an analogy of judgment-
not that of concepts. The final section of this chapter turns to Erich Przywara
and his work on the Analogia En tis. Przywara extends and updates Thomas'
logic for the twentieth century in ways that complement the existential
rhythms of the creaturely. I do not go into the literature concerning the debate
between Przywara and Karl Barth, but instead, the scope of this section is to
show that Przywara's Analogia Entis, and especially his later work, are not
only Christologically- and Incarnationally-focused, but finally come together
as coextensively an analogia entis and an analogia personae. Revealed here is
a concomitant focus upon the form of service, both in the philosophical
adequation to the object, but also and more primarily in its theological shape
as affirmed in the person of Christ.
The sixth and final chapter of this thesis extends the analogy of the person
into the dialogue between the person, creation, and the Triune God, which
culminates in that claim that, by analogy to the inter-personal nature of God,
persons are inherently dialogical beings. The argument of this chapter is not
aimed primarily at the level of 'conversation', but that of the personal form
and constitution of humans as dialogical persons who themselves exist in and
through (dia) the logos of Christ (the Logos), and that of creation who acts as
the second term in the dialogue. The chapter first outlines the Socratic-
Platonic form of dialogue which answers the question, 'Why did Plato write
dialogues?' The dialogical form bears witness to the shape of reason in that
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the truest form of reason is that which is Life. In this respect, the next section
looks at the dilemma of aporia in the Socratic dialogues, confronting the
impasses that arise not only in the Socratic dialogue itself, but in the work of
Heidegger and Derrida, the latter of whom makes especial use of the aporetic.
Derrida's aneconomic use of the aporia serves as the backdrop for his guiding
logic behind the gift, friendship, and hospitiality, but here I look at his aporia
of death and contrast it with that of Soren Kierkegaard's discourse 'At a
Graveside' in conjunction with the theology of the Eastern Orthodox
theologian John Behr to show that the truest aporia is the earnest life
following the path of the crucified Christ-that is, living a 'life in death'. The
final sections of this chapter proceed into an analogy of 'call and response' in
three sections. The first looks at the work of Jean-Louis Chretien and Johann
Georg Hamann to illustrate the call of beauty to the creature enacted in the
beginnings of a dialogical response in and through creation. Next, before
attending to the 'response', I illustrate how Christos Yannaras' account of
dialogue as dia-logos provides an analogy for the 'reflexive reversal' of the
metaphysical via resolutionis of the analogical act of judgment. Finally, the
response of the person, which comes too late, is itself a response to the person
of Christ. These final pages show that a continued struggle against univocity-
here described as 'monologue'-remains a perpetual temptation in providing
an account of the person as dialogue. Hans Drs von Balthasar, Mikhail
Bakhtin, and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II provide crucial resources in this
regard toward the fruitfulness of a communio personarum.
This thesis provides a look at the person as primarily analogical and
dialogical. As accused and slandered amidst the mob, or amidst the attempts to
account for humans within the logics of radical heterogeneity, to that end I
claim that such attempts ultimately bear false witness to the person. In other
words, they are complicit in a lie about who persons are and the depth of the
mystery that is each one of us. To the extent that one upholds the logic of the
person in its richness, one may still be 'accused', but they would be accused
only insofar as they still bear truthful witness to the person of Christ. Bearing
truthful witness to the person of Christ requires patiently tarrying with the
richness of the person in all its analogical and dialogical splendor. But, I argue
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below that, in order to do so, this journey, in order to be truthful, must affirm
that the prime analogate of Being is the human person. As Gaudium et Spes
puts it, 'all things on earth should be ordained to man as to their center and
summit' .57 Moreover, without the person as ordered to the Logos that calls him
or her, one is left amidst the babble of monological boredom.
A dialogical existence in Christ must, therefore, participate in the same
event of the person of Christ in his life, death, and resurrection. Human
persons thus 'stand accused' by participating in the same Passion of Christ
during Holy Week. Yet, 'standing accused' is not the final resting place of
Christ (for this is at the right hand of the Father), but in these pages I show that
the logic of analogy and dialogue illustrate the beauty and manifold truth in
the original gift of the Son in which we analogically participate by faith in in
which human persons become sons and daughters of God through adoption.
To bear witness to the truth of the Son is a risk, for mere human language
alone does not have the same power and authority that Christ himself
possessed in his divine-human ability to testify to himself. We meet Christ in
the 'accusative', and participate in Christ's own testimony, in the dialogical
regard for the neighbor, not only outside the city gates, hung on a tree to die,
but more truly in the communio personarum. It is here where we look back
toward the life, death, and resurrection of Christ, nourished; thus may we look
forward in anticipation toward an analogical participation through him in the
Father by the gift of the Spirit.
57 Gaudium et Spes §12 in Flannery OP, Vatican Council II, 913.
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CHAPTER2
THE SLANDERED PERSON AND THE MYSTIQUE OF THE DREYFUS AFFAIR
'I swear on the head of my children that] am innocent. If] were
shown the incriminating items, Imight perhaps understand. For eleven
days, I have been kept in secrecy, and] still don't know of what] am
accused'
- Alfred Dreyfus I
'l argue this from the fact that though] am accused of something, I
cannot recall the slightest offence that might be charged against me.
But that even is of minor importance, the real question is, who accuses
me?'
- Joseph K. in The Triar
'If we put bits into the mouths of horses to make them obey us, we
guide their whole bodies. Or look at ships: though they are so large
that it takes strong winds to drive them, yet they are guided by a very
small rudder wherever the will of the pilot directs. So also the tongue
is a small member, yet it boasts of great exploits. How great a forest is
set ablaze by a small fire! And the tongue is afire. '
- James 3:3-6
a. The Dreyfus Affair and Bearing Witness
The case of Alfred Dreyfus' and the larger and explosive 'Dreyfus Affair"
is instructive for our purposes of further delineating the stakes and grammar of
I Minutes of October 24, 1894, cited in Jean-Denis Bredin, The Affair: The Case of Alfred
Dreyfus, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987), 71.
2 Franz Kafka, Franz Kafka; The Trial/America / In The Penal Settlement / Metamorphosis /
The Castle / The Great Wall of China / Investigations of a Dog / Letter to His Father / The
Diaries 1910-23 (Norwich: Seeker & Warburg/Octopus, 1976), 18.
3 For the standard historical accounts, see Joseph Reinach, Histoire De I 'Affaire, 7 vols. (Paris:
La Revue Blanche and Fasquelle, 1901); Bredin, The Affair; Ruth Harris, The Man on Devil's
Island: Alfred Dreyfus and the Affair That Divided France (London: Allen Lane, 2010);
Albert S. Lindemann, The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank)
1894-1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Leslie Dertler, The Dreyfus
Affair, Greenwood Guides to Historical Events, 1500-1900 (Westport, CT and London:
Greenwood Press, 2002); Stephen Wilson, Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France
at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (London: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982); Owen
Morgan, '''J'accuse ... !': Zola and the Dreyfus Affair," in The Cambridge Companion to Zola,
ed. Brian Nelson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),188-205.
4 Lindemann attempts to temper assumption that the Affair was a universal French
phenomenon: 'Recent scholarship has ... shown rather conclusively that the Dreyfus Affair
has been overdramatized, its long-rage significance exaggerated. Its immediate impact
throughout France was less extensive than once believed. Captain Dreyfus's story has been
too tempting, too appealing to the popular vulgarizing kind of historian, and too appealing to
various political agendas, such as those Zionist interpretations of modem history that
emphasize European decadence, ineradicable Jew-hatred, Jewish self-hatred and
inauthenticity, and the need for the Jews to leave Europe. Intellectuals have been especially
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the debate which follows. In December 1894 in Paris, Captain Alfred Dreyfus,
a Jew of Alsatian descent, was falsely convicted of treasonously betraying
military secrets to Germany and was soon thereafter sentenced to life on
Devil's Island. The entire Affair was constructed on myriad false premises,
and over the course of the ensuing years, Dreyfus's family, the public, and
members of the military would be fighting for both his innocence (the
'Dreyfusards') and his guilt (the 'anti-Dreyfusards'). Despite the fact that the
real culprit of the crime was Major Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, the Parisian
General Staff, backed by a largely anti-Semitic public, did their best to
promote Dreyfus's guilt at all costs.
While anti-Semitism is most likely not to blame for the initial suspicions
around Dreyfus, it is clear that it became not only a major factor in his
incarceration but in Dreyfus's subsequent public dishonouring and the events
that followed over the course of the next decade.' In the dishonouring before a
large blood-thirsty and anti-Semitic public, Dreyfus's insignia were tom from
his uniform and his sword broken. The crowd shouted cries of 'Death! Death
to the Jew!', 'Death to Judas!' and 'Coward! Judas! Dirty Jew!" Written
accounts of the event reveal the utter dehumanization on display: 'Meanwhile,
he approached, between his guards, a walking corpse, a zombie on parade,
frail to all appearances, but magnified by the overwhelming shame and hatred
that he evoked. Not far from us, he managed to find the energy to cry out
"Innocent!" in a toneless and precipitous voice. And there he was before me,
at the instant of passing, his eyes dry, his gaze lost in the past, no doubt, since
the future had died with his honour. He no longer had an age, a name, a
complexion."? Leon Daudet and especially Maurice Barres both emphasized
drawn to the story; it has been hard for them to accept that most people in France, who were
not intellectuals, in spite of the unusual prestige ofintellectuaIism in parts of the country, were
not as drawn to the Affair as much as they. Recent studies have shown how little the peasantry
and the population of small towns, still a majority of the population of France, were touched
by the Affair' (Lindemann, The Jew Accused, 125). While Lindemann's warnings are sound, I
see no reason to assume that the Affair need be totally widespread in France for it to be at
least instructive, let alone of utmost continuing importance.
sSee Ibid., 97.
6 See the account in Bredin, The Affair, 4-5.
"Leon Daudet, "Le chatiment," Le Figaro, January 6, 1895, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 5-6.
This is echoed by other reports: 'Dreyfus is no longer a man; he is a number in a chain gang'
(on the pages of Le Petit Journal, January 6, 1895, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 109). And also
the anti-Semitism of Maurice Barres: 'Dreyfus is the representative of a different
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Dreyfus's 'foreign physiognomy' and Barres would even go so far as to
announce: 'That Dreyfus is capable of treason I deduce from his race'." These
racist remarks continued to pepper the public landscape throughout the
Dreyfus Affair. France was obsessed with not only the constant threat of
treason, but now that it was able to direct its energies on a chosen culprit, it
was evident that '[t]he obsession with treason was inseparable from the thirst
for revenge'."
By most accounts, the height of the Dreyfus Affair took place with the
publication of Emile Zola's "J'Accuse ...!" on 13 January 1898.10 Three days
earlier, the real author behind the sole piece of evidence entitled the' bordeau'
that was used to convict Dreyfus-Major Esterhazy-was taken to trial and
acquitted. In Zola' s 'J' Accuse ...!', he set out to correct the public record
regarding the Affair, which culminated in a litany of 'I Accuse' (J'Accuse)
statements against all those who were at fault in the fiasco. II The final litany
turned out to be so incendiary that Zola himself stated in the final paragraphs
of the piece itself that he knew full well that he was committing the crime of
libel.I2 Bredin, a historian of the Affair, describes the 'entire text of J'Accuse
[as] an indictment of the forces and virtues of traditional France, its religious
species ... The problem of race has been raised' (Maurice Barres, Scenes et doctrines du
nationalisme [Paris: Felix Juven, 1902], 130, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 296).
8 Barres, Scenes et doctrines du nationalisme, 152, cited in Bredin, The Affair, 6.
9 Bredin, The Affair, 42.
to Published in Le Aurore, which, on that day, had a circulation of over 300,000, ten times the
normal distribution. This fact alone provides some evidence against Lindemann's warning
cited above in fn. 4. See Emile lola, "Letter to M. Felix Faure, President of the Republic
CJ'Accuse'), Le Aurore, 13 January 1898," in The Dreyfus Affair: "J'Accuse" and Other
Writings, ed. Alain Pages, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1998), 43-53, for the full English text.
II As both Bredin and Pages note, there were in some items that lola got wrong in his
accusations, but based on the information available to him, he could not have known
otherwise, and did not deter from the overall point he was making. Pages lists these as 'the
excessive role attributed to du Paty de Clam, whereas [Commandant] Henry is not mentioned,
and the unduly heavy accusations leveled at de Pellieux and the handwriting experts' (Alain
Pages, 'Introduction' in Emile lola, The Dreyfus Affair: "J'Accuse" and Other Writings, ed.
Alain Pages, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), xxxiv).
Bredin, The Affair, 249, adds: '[lola] minimized the role of General Gonse. He did not see the
essential responsibility of General Mercier .... He was mistaken about the hierarchy of their
roles'.
12 'In making these accusations, I am fully aware that my action comes under Articles 30 and
31 of the law of 29 July 1881 on the press, which makes libel a punishable offence. I
deliberately expose myself to that law' (Zola, '''J' Accuse ... !'," 53). And Bredin, The Affair,
247 states, 'Zola knew the risks he was taking. He saw the crimes and misdemeanors in
writing his text and also the hatred and resentment it would unleash' .
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passion, military spirit, and hierarchies, which required Dreyfus's conviction
and then Esterhazy's acquittal'."
The forces in question that Zola put to the fire were the strong tendencies to
abstraction which subjects the truth to utilitarian ends and at its worst
dehumanises people for the aims of bloodlust and revenge." In a piece written
prior to 'J'Accuse ...!', Zola made the following astute observation: 'Captain
Dreyfus was convicted of the crime of treason by a court martial. From that
instant he ceased to be a man and became The Traitor, an abstraction
embodying the idea of the fatherland slain and delivered over to a conquering
enemy. He stands not only for present treason and future treason but for past
treason as well, for our old defeat is blamed on him by those who stubbornly
cling to the notion that only because we were betrayed were we beaten' .15 Zola
clearly saw, in a kind of pre-Girardian analysis, that Dreyfus was no longer
simply a man, being reduced to any number of abstractions to hide their own
insecurities and failures." In an effort to tum the tables on the debate, Zola, in
his numerous newspapers articles and pamphlets, recast the terms of the Affair
as one that announced: 'It is anti-Semitism itself that is on trial'. 17 When Zola
published 'J' Accuse ...!', in reprimanding the General Staff for sending an
innocent man to prison as a traitor, he remarked, 'Truth itself and justice itself
have been slapped in the face'." Zola's personification of truth and justice"
13 Bredin, TheAffair, 251.
14 'The truth! What do you think the truth can be in an affair such as this, which is shaking an
entire venerable organization to its very foundations? Do you suppose the truth is some simple
object that you can carry about at will in the palm of your hand and casually place in other
people's hands, like a little stone, an apple?' Emile Zola, "'The Minutes', Le Figaro, 5
December 1897," in The Dreyfus Affair: "J'Accuse" and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pages,
trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998),25.
15 Emile Zola, '''The Syndicate', Le Figaro, 1 December 1897," in The Dreyfus Affair:
"J'Accuse" and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pages, trans. Eleanor Levieux (New Haven, Cl':
Yale University Press, 1998), 14.
16 On the concepts of the scapegoat, violence, and mimetic desire, see the following texts of
Girard: Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory, New Ed, Continuum
Impacts (London: Continuum, 2005); Rene Girard, The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero
(Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986); Rene Girard, I See Satan Fall Like
Lightning, trans. James G. Williams (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001).
17 Zola, '''The Minutes'," 24, emphasis mine.
18 Zola, '''J'Accuse ... !','' 43.
19 Indeed, on the other side of the debate, as Griffiths notes, 'As the passions of the Affair
became even more heated ... the words 'justice' and 'verite' in public pronouncements became
increasingly terms of abuse in themselves. From concern at the supposed deformation of the
concepts, the anti-Dreyfusards arrived at the hatred of the words themselves'. Richard
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make the vivid point that the trial of anti-Semitism and hatred must
commence, and, with the publication of 'J' Accuse ...!' itself becoming the
apogee of the Affair's drama, Zola would even go so far as to incriminate
himself libellously-all this for the sake of the tarnished face of truth and
justice.
It is at this point that it is opportune to analyze the 'logic' of personhood in
light of the logic of accusation.
Alfred Dreyfus is wrongfully accused as a traitor and subsequently,
continually tarred as a 'Judas' and dehumanized in an overtly racist manner.
While the angry mob took to the streets and committed mass acts of violence
all over France" and in the violent rhetoric in the newspapers, the minority of
Dreyfus's defenders had to resort to a few newspaper editorials in his defence
and through means outside the courts." Thus filled with righteous anger, Zola
publishes 'J'Accuse ...!' two days after Esterhazy's acquittal, whose tone is
that of a 'scarcely contained fury' .22 The level of passion might have attained
to the same heights as the rhetorical violence in the other newspapers, but the
logic at work in 201a's 'J'Accuse ... !' bears witness to the truth from within an
economy of veracity that should not be lost sight of amidst these passions.
Zola accuses the perpetrators of the Affair, one after the other, for their
various misdeeds and conspiracies, and, for the most part, he is correct. 23
Hearkening back to our earlier conversation, does not Zola implicate himself
in the economy of accusation? We know he does, and he admits to his crimes
of libel. But who is 201a accusing? 201a answers, 'As for the persons [gens] I
Griffiths, The Use of Abuse: The Polemics of the Dreyfus Affair and Its Aftermath, Berg
French Studies (New York: Berg, 1991), 28-9 and see 37.
20 See Harris, TheMan on Devil's Island, 118-20, 125-28.
21 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd ed. (Cleveland and New York:
Meridian Books, 1962), 115: 'The disturbing thing about the Dreyfus Affair is that it was not
only the mob which had to work along extraparliamentary lines. The entire minority, fighting
as it was for parliament, democracy, and the republic, was likewise constrained to wage its
battle outside the Chamber. The only difference between the two elements was that while the
one used the streets, the other resorted to the press and the courts. In other words, the whole of
France's political life during the Dreyfus crisis was carried on outside of parliament'. Arendt's
large point here is correct, but seems to miss the continual racist and vitriolic drumbeat
sounded in the anti-Dreyfusard press by the likes of Maurice Barres and others.
22 Griffiths, The Use of Abuse, 136. Griffiths even seems to lament that Zola had resorted to
the same level of dirty polemics as those of the anti-Dreyfusards; see Ibid., 141.
23 See fn. II above.
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have accused, I do not know them; I have never seen them; I feel no rancour
or hatred towards them. To me, they are mere entities, mere embodiments of
social malfeasance. And the action I am taking here is merely a revolutionary
means to hasten the explosion of truth and justice' .24 Anti-Semitism is on trial,
Zola tells us earlier, so it is in keeping with this sentiment that he accuses the
people involved in the cover-up of truth and justice. Yet Zola's goal is not to
condemn them personally, but ultimately to show how these people serve as
stand-ins or 'entities' that embody this 'social malfeasance' of anti-Semitic
hatred. At this juncture it appears that Zola, however, may be guilty of
personal abstraction as well-and this is just what some anti-Dreyfusards
alleged." Are Zola and the anti-Dreyfusards employing the same logic of
dehumanization and reduction?
While the difference may at first seem negligible, the fact that Zola is
'right' in his Dreyfusard stance while the accused are 'wrong' in their anti-
Dreyfusard vitriol-this fact does not suffice to legimate Zola's 'correct'
stance in the end, in and of itself (suspending for a moment that such an 'ends
justifying the means' methodology would ever be acceptable). Rather, there is
actually a correctness of means as well at work in Zola's accusatory logic. To
make sense of what is at work in Zola's accusations, we note here that the
logic of accusing is in fact not diabolical in and of itself, viz., diabolical
(buX~oAo~) in the sense of slandering and thus falsely accusing. It is true that
the word for the devil in the Old Testament is the Hebrew word for accuser
(satan), but the word for 'accuser' in the New Testament has a wider semantic
range, instead referring to the devil by the specific terms buX~oAo~ a total of
37 times and aa'[ava~ 36 times. Only once in the New Testament is accuser
used in its Greek equivalent to mean the same thing as that in the Old
24 Zola, '''J'Accuse ... !','' 53. I have modified the translation to read 'explosion' [I'explosion]
rather than the given 'revelation', as explosion works more coherently with the previous
statement in 'J'Accuse ... !' which reads, 'if the truth is buried underground, it swells and
grows and becomes so explosive that the day it bursts, it blows everything open along with it.
Time will tell; we shall see whether we have not prepared for some later date, the most
resounding disaster' (Ibid., 52).
25 'The intellectuals supporting Dreyfus's case were dividing France and in judging
"everything abstractly," understood nothing of the true nation: "I am not an intellectual,"
proclaimed Barres, "and I desire above all that people speak in French." Bredin, The Affair,
296 citing Barres, Scenes Et Doctrines Du Nationalisme, 40fT.
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Testament, found in Revelation 12:10. In John 5:45-7 we see 'accuser' used in
a different sense than that of devil or slanderer: that of one who accuses
rightly. Here the figure of Moses acts as the 'accuser' of Christ's fellow Jews.
Christ says, 'Do not think that I will accuse you before the Father; your
accuser is Moses [6 KaTllyoQwv u~wv MwiiOTJ~],on whom you have set
your hope. If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote about
me. But if you do not believe what he wrote, how will you believe what I
say?' For the Scriptures testify [~taQ'wQouaaL] on behalf of Christ (John
5:39), and it is within their testimony that Christ says they will be found
accused. In sum, such an accusation falls within the economy of bearing
truthful witness.
True, the scribes and Pharisees who accused the woman caught in adultery
in John 8:2-12 were consumed with accusations of the diabolical, but for this
reason: they had forgotten that they were just like her, that is, not without sin
['0 ava~aQT11'ro~]. They had reduced her to a 'not other' and ultimately not
to a someone but a something. Thus, the accusers had to put down their
stones-both literal and figurative-for love itself had stooped down in order
to erase her sins by writing in the sand." The logic of the accusation at work
here is one that removes oneself from the economy of implication. (The irony
here is that the only one even 'allowed' to accuse the adulterous woman
because he had no sin-the Jewish God-man-in fact forgives the woman, and
the rest of us, all together.) To provide a summary of such a logic of
accusation which ultimately bears the form of slander, it would be that such a
reduction bears false witness to the truth of Christ, and in turn, to the truth of
the human person. At odds, therefore, are two different kinds of bearing
witness, or testifying.
The previously-mentioned kind of accusatory logic which does implicate
oneself in the economy of sin and wrong is a kind of 'symbolic' accusation in
the literal sense of a 'bringing together' of the desired ends of personhood.
Moses can act as an 'accuser', as one who also testifies to the person of Christ
26 See the beautiful discourse 'Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins' in Seren Kierkegaard,
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong,
Kierkegaard's Writings V (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990),55--68.
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(John 5:39); that is, Moses stands in as one who 'accuses' only to testify to the
truth, as one who calls for those in question to be truer persons themselves by
realizing that their own Scriptures have written about and testified to the true
human and true God in one person of Christ. Moses does not accuse for the
sake of tearing down, but for that of building up - yet the building up involves
a moment of judgment as well within the economy of grace." Moses and the
Law 'accuse' because they are not focused upon convicting the people in
question, for that is not Moses' final target: in witnessing to the truth of the
person of Christ (and Christ himself in turn witnesses to the truth of himself
and the Father in the Spirit, as in John 18:37 where he is standing before
Pilate), Moses implicates and includes Christ's fellow Jews by pointing to
Christ himself.
With this logic of symbolic accusation in mind, implicating as it does
Christ's fellow Jews in and through its act of testimony, we can see now how
Zola operates within an analogous framework. Zola's real aim is, in putting
anti-Semitism on trial, to 'hasten the explosion of truth and justice', and, as he
says at the end of'J'Accuse ... !', 'I have but one goal: that light be shed, in the
name of mankind which has suffered so much and has the right to
happiness'." The 'light' in 'the name of mankind' can be read as an invitation
to the truth of personhood which the anti-Dreyfusards have been at pains to
deny not only in the person of Dreyfus himself, but also the other French Jews,
as well as Protestants, Masons, and other targets of this hateful nationalism.
Zola implicates himself in his accusations, knowing he has committed libel:
'Let them dare to summon me before a court of law! Let the inquiry be held in
broad daylight!':" Of course, Zola knew that by implicating himself, the details
27 Richard Bell makes a similar link between the Law and the accuser. See Richard H. Bell,
Deliver Usfrom Evil: Interpreting the Redemptionfrom the Power of Satan in New Testament
Theology, WUNT 216 (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 239~1. But Bell on pp. 240-1 also
quotes George Caird who says, 'Provided that the law is understood in relation to God's
purpose of grace, Paul is prepared to ascribe to it a positive value. . .. But when the law is
isolated and exalted into an independent system of religion, it becomes demonic. This
corruption of the law is the work of sin, and in particular the sin of self-righteousness'
(George B. Caird, Principalities and Powers: A Study in Pauline Theology [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1956], 41).
28 Zola, '" J'Accuse ...!'," 53.
29 Ibid.
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of the Dreyfus case would have to be reviewed again in court," and so his own
act of self-implication was to testify not only to the truth of Dreyfus's
innocence, but also to the truth of the dignity of the French Jewish people.
The anti-Dreyfusards, beginning as they did with the kind of slanderous
approach described above, are far afield from truthfully testifying to the
dignity of the person. Indeed, it is their own accusatory logic which testifies
against them in their self-removal from any implication that they too are at
fault. On the contrary, by implicating himself in his 'symbolic' accusations,
Zola is calling for all of France, and especially all those involved in the Affair
to become more realized persons by testifying to the dignity of Dreyfus and, I
would argue, secondarily to Dreyfus's innocence, even though this is of course
just as important for Zola as for us after him. Just as Moses can testify to
Christ and secondarily accuse Christ's fellow Jews for not paying heed to this
testimony, we see also how Zola aims to testify to truth and justice and thus
must also resort to accusations in order to build others up toward this truthful
and just explosion."
b. Peguy and the Mystique of the Person
To conclude this analysis, I tum to Charles Peguy, who was very active as
a socialist Dreyfusard during the Affair, and continued to write about the crisis
for the rest of his life-including after his conversion to Christianity-until his
death in the First World War. Peguy helps us clarify the terms of the debate by
employing the designations of' mystique' and 'politique', Mystique stands for
30 Although the General Staff was intent upon only focusing on lola himself, constantly
appealing to les raisons d'etat to make the case that whatever the court had previously decided
was sacrosanct. At first, lola's verdict would be overturned on 2 April 1898, but then he was
retried on 18 July. lola would be found guilty of libel and sentenced to one year in prison.
However, he fled to London for eleven months to wait out his sentence. Bredin, The Affair,
301 and 321.
31 lola's own writings seem to testify to this wider logic insofar as 'J'Accuse ... !' is not the
first but the sixth public writing in a series of newspaper editorials and pamphlets which from
the beginning aimed to defend the humanity of the accused, both in Dreyfus and in defending
the rest of the French Jews. See Emile lola, '''A Plea for the Jews', Le Figaro, 16 May 1896,"
in The Dreyfus Affair: "J'Accuse" and Other Writings, ed. Alain Pages, trans. Eleanor
Levieux (New Haven, C'T: Yale University Press, 1998),2-7. And see the rest of the articles
and interviews leading up to 'J'Accuse ...!' in Ibid., 8-42.
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a kind of fervent mysticism" which gives life to all politics and lives on a kind
of suspended plane as distinct from the devices of politique. Mystique is lived
and embodied and, even though its origin is the eternal, mystique is not
opposed to the temporal and is its very possibility. As Peguy says in
'Memories of Youth', explaining that the religious movement of the
Dreyfusards embodied something 'essentially Christian', 'The Justice and the
Truth that we loved so much, ... to which we gave ourselves completely
during the whole of our youth, were not an abstract, conceptual Justice and
Truth, they were not a dead justice and a dead truth, the justice and truth found
in books and libraries, a notional, intellectual justice and truth, the justice and
truth of the intellectual party; they were organic, Christian, in no sense
modem, they were eternal and not temporal only, they were Justice and Truth,
a living Justice and Truth'." It is because of this that the Peguy scholar Hans
A. Schmitt gets everything backwards: 'Peguy's eyes are riveted on Dreyfus,
who emerges in his prose as an ideal rather than as an existence'. 34 Schmitt
fails to understand the logic of suspension in the writings of Peguy on la
mystique. The 'mysticism' that Peguy writes about is ultimately a kind of
mystique of the person, the one entity that cannot be pinned down and
abstracted in any way whatsoever, for persons are each unique, unrepeatable,
and uncommunicable in ways that can never be traded nor can be dealt with by
way of propositional or utilitarian logics: this, however, is the ambit of
politique.
Marjorie Villiers describes politique thus: 'By politique [Peguy] meant the
sacrifice of the [moral] absolutes [of mystique] to les raisons d'etat, the
compromises made to secure power or maintain it by an individual, a class, a
party, an institution, in their own interests or even in those of the nation itself,
if these were seen outside the context of the interests of humanity'. 35 The
immediate price exacted from all such sacrifice is one of abstraction. Because
the State is the ultimate reality in the case of the anti-Dreyfusards, those
32 Charles Peguy, "Memories of Youth," in Temporal and Eternal, trans. Alexander Dru
(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2001), 17.
33 Ibid., 3~0.
34 Hans A. Schmitt, Charles Peguy: The Decline of an Idealist (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 1967), 94.
35 Marjorie Villiers, Charles Peguy: A Study in Integrity (London: Collins, 1965), 48.
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arguing within the logic of politique are able to denounce Dreyfus as a 'Jew',
a 'Judas', or 'traitor' and therefore reduce him to these things, preferring not
to acknowledge his humanity. Against the parsimonious nature of politiques,
Peguy argued that 'mystiques are far less inimical to each other than
politiques, and in quite a different way .... Because unlike politiques, they do
not invariably have to divide the temporal world, temporal matters, limited
temporal power, between themselves'. 36 There is thus a liberality at work in
mystiques, one that allows for dialogue, and can even work within the confines
of the State, as Peguy saw himself doing." Politique, when taken on its own, is
all too quick to sacrifice everything to abstractions and to see all as
abstractions in kind; a self-enclosed politique abhors the concrete. Rowan
Williams sees a similar logic at work in the diabolical logic of the Devil in
Dostoevsky'S writings: 'the demonic always "de-realizes" or "disincarnates,"
distracts us from the body and the particular'. 38 Politique on its own would
rather not have the incarnate, so its ethos at every tum is deracination and
disincamation: all enemies within the State are no longer persons at fault, but
they are now merely 'traitors', de-rooted and alienated.
One can see this abstraction in play enacted in the use of the epithet 'Judas'
which was leveled against Dreyfus. Beyond the literal connection to Judas
Iscariot as the person who betrayed Christ, the slander functions here as an
'anti-type' (not to be confused with 'antetype,' viz., prototype, but rather
understood with the connotation of a "contrasting" type )-but this only
ironically so. It is an anti-type in contrast to the kinds of symbolic typology
where Christ is spoken of by Paul as a 'type' ('t"1)7tO~) of Christ." That is,
Dreyfus is not spoken of in his dignity as a person, but rather is reduced in an
anti typic representative in the sense of the diabolical mode of accusation
discussed above. What's more, at least as far as the Christians who engaged in
this derogatory practice are concerned, they reveal their own betrayal of Christ
as in this slanderous speech act, the betrayer is abstracted away from the very
36 Peguy, "Memories of Youth," 30.
37 'We were the last generation with a Republican mystique. And our Dreyfus Affair will have
been the last operation of the Republican mystique' (Ibid., 7).
38 Rowan Williams, Dostoevsky: Language. Faith and Fiction (London: Continuum, 2008),
82.
39 Cf. Romans 5:14.
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person in whom the betrayal is made both simultaneously intelligible and
unintelligible. In other words, without the innocent One there could have been
no betrayal, but those engaged in this economy of accusation miss both the
dignity of the person as well as the One in whom such dignity is found-and
hence the irony."
This logic also 'de-names' the person, as we saw above when Daudet
remarked that Dreyfus, in his public humiliation, 'no longer had ... a name' .41
Maurice Blanchot remarks that within an abstract universal, all particular
thoughts and wills apart from this abstraction fall under suspicion, and that
what is truly frightening is that 'being suspect is more serious than being
guilty (hence the seeking of confession),. But Blanchot also adds that' [t]he
suspect is this fleeting presence that does not allow recognition, ,42 for it seems
that such suspicion (i.e. of the traitor) within an abstraction disincamates by
first de-naming, by refusing to recognize the person without even realizing
that they de-name within a abstracting logic that also therefore de-names
themselves as well. 43 Politique therefore lends itself much more readily to
diabolical accusation within such presumed abstraction, and is carried out
unilaterally, without seeing oneself implied within one's own accusations."
For to disincamate, to de-name, and to therefore no longer recognize one who
has a name involves a prior naming and recognition itself; in other words, how
does one know that one is first disregarding a person if they do not first
acknowledge at some prior level that they are in fact a person? Why not
suspect inanimate objects? Even the most genocidal of logics involves a prior
40 I am indebted to John W. Wright for these points regarding Judas and Christ.
41 Daudet, "Le Chatiment." Cited in Bredin, The Affair, S-{).
42 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 238. Blanchot is remarking upon Hegel's discussion of
the abstract universal.
43 For a fascinating metaphorical account of this logic inscribed into the very constitution of a
city itself, see China Mieville, The City & The City (London: Pan Macmillan, 2009) where the
citizens of Beszel must "unsee" the citizens and architecture of Ul Qoma (and vice versa),
even though they often share the same "cross-hatched" geography.
44 For an analogous case, see Gillian Rose on what she calls 'Holocaust piety' in Gillian Rose,
Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge University Press,
1996), 41-{)2. We can see one 19th-century attempt to circumvent these inclinations in the
work of Soren Kierkegaard who says, 'Most people are subjective toward themselves and
objective toward all others, frightfully objective sometimes--but the task is precisely to be
objective toward oneself and subjective toward all others' (Journals and Papers IV 4542
[Pap. VIII A 165] n.d., 1847).
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acknowledgement of personhood, and thus a prior testimony to truth's
personhood.
Where politique inscribes itself within monologicallogics, mystique, on the
other hand, lends itself always to the dialogical. The dialogical is animated by
living forces and persons, whereas the monological, as we have just seen, is
the (faceless) face of de-realization and disincarnation and thus, death.
Something akin to this is found in Peguy's comments on the Dreyfus Affair
when he remarks, 'It lived by its mystique. It died of its politique' .45 Mystiques
will always give rise to politiques, as they always need mechanisms to keep
certain parts of its life going-an accountant or managers to keep track of and
pay the bills, for example. But Peguy was passionate that these things maintain
a certain ordering, or else the mystique will die from a kind of managerial ism
or utilitarianism: 'Everything begins as a mystique and ends as a
politique .... The important point is not that such and such a politique should
triumph over another such and such, and that one should succeed. The whole
point (what matters), the essential thing, is that in each order, in each system,
THE MYSTIQUE SHOULD NOT BE DEVOURED BY THE POLITIQUE TO WHICH IT
GAVE BIRTH'. 46 Peguy saw this devolution and devouring again and again
throughout the Dreyfus Affair, and especially embodied in Action Francoise
and the efforts of his one-time friend Jean Jaures." Actual evolution,
movement, repetition, and dialogue are enabled within a mystique. Therefore,
because its logic is one of openness, suspension, and action, it is by its nature a
personal mystique. Or again, following the logic we are setting forth, because
a mystique is personal, it has a nature at all.
45 Peguy, "Memories of Youth," 33.
46 Ibid., 17, emphasis Peguy's, For a recent example of this phenomenon, see John Caiazza,
"The Evolution Versus Religion Controversy: How Two Mystiques Devolved Into Politics,"
Modern Age 47 (2005): 104-12.
47 On Action Francaise, see Peter J. Bernardi SJ, Maurice Blondel. Social Catholicism. &
Action Francoise: The Clash over the Church's Role in Society During the Modernist Era
(Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 89-118 and 208-11. On
Jaures, see Charles Peguy, Temporal and Eternal, trans. Alexander Dru (Indianapolis, IN:
Liberty Fund, 2001). For the portrait of Jaures in Charles Peguy, Men and Saints: Prose and
Poetry, trans. Anne Green and Julian Green (New York: Pantheon Books, 1944), 142-59.
Peguy, amidst words of affection for his old friend, also makes this harsh observation: • A man
who is so gifted for the explanation of everything is ripe for all surrenders. A surrender is
essentially an operation by which one settles down to explain instead of to act. And cowards
are people crammed with explanations' (Ibid., 149).
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It is for these reasons that Schmitt's critique about Peguy's idealism falls
far short of the mark. Peguy's description of mystique is the utmost
concretization of the logic of the person, of the ineffable mystery of
personhood and therefore why all of Dreyfus's detractors stand accused by
their own words. The personal mystique of the Dreyfus Affair convicts
because it discerns, keeping truth at the level of the personal and not at the
abstracting, disincarnating level of politique.
It may be objected that pointing to the person in making a truth claim such
as this is an attempt at positivism: we know what the person is, and this is the
end of the story, one might say. If this were the case, then the person would
fall prey to all sorts of positivistic criteria which actually evacuates and
ultimately abolishes the person, for this is not how we approach persons in the
every day, nor how the theological tradition to which I will look addresses
personhood." Indeed, the only way many have pinpointed the person is to
'nail' the person down to the point of not being a person at all." That is, there
4H See Timothy Chappell, "On the Very Idea of Criteria for Personhood," The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 1 (March 2011): 1-27. Chappell asks, 'When we come across
any being we have never met before, are we supposed to first see whether it satisfies our
criterion for personhood, and then, if it does, start treating it as a person?' (p. 5) And Chappell
rightly shows how the criterialist approaches of, e.g., Singer, et aI., actually treat people very
inhumanly. By beginning with Donald Davidson's 'principle of charity' (p. 10), Chappell
convincingly allows for persons to withdraw from the need to fulfill a 'complete' set of
criteria: 'all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever does everything
she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are just too many things she
could do). In one way or another, all of us are less than fully free to pursue happiness;
everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, or just plain ill, in some respect'
(p. 22). However, the goal of this thesis is not merely to point to group membership as
constitutive of personhood-although this is a good beginning-but that in pointing to a very
particular confession of the person of Christ, the human person is only starting to see the truth
of her or his participation in this person who is truth itself. Robert Spaemann is clear:
'Belonging to the human family cannot depend on empirically demonstrated properties. Either
the human family is a community of persons from the word go, or else the very concept of a
person as "someone" in his or her own right is unknown or forgotten'. Spaemann, Persons,
240.
49 To take one famous recent example, Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model
Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), 1., says, 'no such things as selves
exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever existed were conscious self-
models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a
process-and the subjective experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-
processing system operates under a transparent self-model'. For a condensed version of
Metzinger's argument, see Thomas Metzinger, "The No-Self Alternative," in The Oxford
Handbook of the Self, ed. Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 279-96.
While I will not disagree that a process is involved in being a person, process is not all that
persons are. See Norris Clarke's critique of being solely constituted by relationality in W.
Norris Clarke, "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," Communio 19, no. 4 (1992): 601-18; W.
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is a desire of certainty and possession which ironically disposes of the subject
matter. Accordingly, Hannah Arendt remarks that 'the most radical and the
only secure form of possession is destruction, for only what we have destroyed
is safely and forever ours'. 50 The aim of this study, on the contrary, is to mark
out an alternative path: we do not know what the person is at all, but the
Christian tradition has continually borne witness to the mystery of the person
as bearing truth-if not the truth itself personified in Christ-such that
perhaps we can now finally begin to speak of truth at all.
As an example of a prefiguring of the Christian, the case of Socrates IS
instructive. We have his self-conscious ignorance ('I know that 1 do not
know'") in contrast with his Sophist interlocutors, but Socrates's self-avowed
ignorance is not the end of philosophy, but the possibility of its beginning. The
irony is that it is the Sophists, all too-eager to provide ready-made and pure
answers (at a fee, no less") who foreclose on inquiry. Because the Sophists
already possess the answers, there is nothing left to investigate. Socrates, on
the other hand, owed his own skills and gifts to others, so he admitted that he
Norris Clarke, Person and Being, The Aquinas Lecture 1993 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette
University Press, 1993).
50 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 145.
51 See Apology 21d.
52 On this see the excellent D. C. Schindler, "Why Socrates Didn't Charge: Plato and the
Metaphysics of Money," Communio 36, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 394~26. On the 'purity' of one's
answers, witness the analogous case of J. G. Hamann criticizing Immanuel Kant: 'The other
[Kant] would like to play the role of universal philosopher and competent Warden of the Mint
just as Newton did. No part of analytical chemistry is more certain than that which has been
invented for gold and silver. Hence, the confusion in regard to coinage in Germany cannot be
as great as that which has crept into the textbooks which are current among us. We do not
have proper conversion tables to determine what alloy content an idea may have it is to pass
for truth, and so forth' (James C. O'Flaherty, Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia: A Translation
and Commentary (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1967), 141). Dickson
provides the following helpful gloss on this passage: 'One of Newton's tasks as Warden of the
Mint was to test the alloy content of the coins. This aspect of "criticism" or "critique"
however, is the one which is the most discriminating and developed; what we lack is a critique
of ideas that has advanced to a comparable level. It is then a Warden of this '''Mint'' that Kant
presumably seeks to be: one who can tell us whether an idea is pure and unalloyed, and
weighty enough to be considered a truth. This observation is a striking one, coming as it does
twenty-two years before the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason' (Gwen Griffith
Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metaschematism, Theologische Bibliothek
Topelmann 67 [Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995],36). The idea here is thus
that in becoming the Warden of the Mint himself in regard to truth, Kant himself has
determined what is pure and impure, yet, as he would later do in his first Critique and beyond,
Kant's purification process tends to evacuate language and the person completely. On this see
Johann Georg Hamann, Writings on Philosophy and Language, trans. and ed. Kenneth
Haynes, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 210-11. See also Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 74-99, esp. 90-94.
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proceeded on a philosophical mission in service to the god," that he learned
his dialectic from Diotima, and so because the truth was not capital to be
traded, did not charge to teach or philosophize. Socrates saw himself not as
dispensing answers, but being in service to one whose answers possessed him
in a sense. 54
For our purposes, it is the person of Christ who will ultimately guide our
study. It is here also that we can only point, gesture, or in the tradition of
Nicholas of Cusa, make conjectures. Because the 'nature' of the truth of
Christ's person is one we can never possess or grasp, as we will continually
articulate throughout this study, it is in fact Christ's person who possesses US.55
Our personhood only is as it participates in the one person (in two natures,
fully human, fully divine) of Christ. To speak of the one who speaks us, and to
attempt a theology of the truth of the person of Christ in whom the truth,
goodness, and beauty of all human personhood is revealed is never to
articulate the logic of finality. The human person, in being confronted with the
revelation of the person of Christ, is now tasked with learning how to begin. In
other words, the person is not the end of inquiry, but the very mystique of its
beginning.
53 Apology 2Ia-22a, 23b.
54 Cr. The daimon in the Phaedrus 242b-d.
55 Similarly, Pope Benedict XVI has recently remarked that 'we never have the truth; at best it
has us'. Pope Benedict XVI, Light of the World: The Pope, the Church, and the Signs of the
Times: A Con versa/ion with Peter Seewald, trans. Michael 1. Miller and Adrian J. Walker
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2010), 50.
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CHAPTER3
STANDING ACCUSED: GRAMMAR AND ONTOLOGY
'Without ever having done anything, I have always been under accusation: I
am persecuted'
_Emannuel Levinas 1
'May my accusers be clothed with dishonour;
may they be wrapped in their own shame as in a mantle. '
- Psalm 109: 29-31
'Come to terms quickly with your accuser while you are on the way to
court with him, or your accuser may hand you over to the judge, and
the judge to the guard, and you will be thrown into prison. Truly I tell
you, you will never get out until you have paid the last penny. '
- Matthew 5:23-26
'For really, contrary to what unbelief unceasingly maintains with
empty and prideful obstinacy, the name is not sound and smoke, but
word and fire. '
- Franz Rozenzweig"
In the first two chapters I have approached the concept of the 'accused'
from different theological and historical perspectives: Christ standing accused
before Pilate and his fellow Jews; the accusations leveled against Alfred
Dreyfus by the anti-Semitic military, public, and press of late 19th-century
Paris; the logic of Emile Zola's 'J'Accuse ...!'; and what I called the
'symbolic' accusations of Moses that stand within a prior account of testifying
to the person of Christ. One final, but substantial note on the 'accused' is in
order. What I have thus far been exploring with regard to the logic of
accusation concerns a certain juridical concept of accusation, but also that of
slander. Such slander betrays a truly diabolical logic that desires destruction
before all else, including the denial of entry into any economy of law-that is,
if such slander had its way. This chapter expands upon the examination of the
t Emmanuel Levinas, "Substitution," in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. Adriaan T.
Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1996), 89.
2 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI:
University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 202.
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slanderous denial, but this time with reference to the accusatory denial of
being itself.
Now, I want to address a slightly different kind of accusation that, on the
one hand, is related to the accusation of accusing another person, but on the
other hand, also relates to the grammars and ontologies that structure the
person in language, and the ontologies and grammars in which persons inhabit
and create for themselves. Any theologically playful turning of the logic of
accusation need also pay heed to the various attempts made in philosophy in
the twentieth century that also consider the accusative case, all of which find
themselves amidst a continual 'linguistic turn' to language.' However, the
turn to language that I will explore in the figures below should not be
considered to be of a piece with the realm of late 19th_and 20th-century
epistemology and logic, which attempts to carve up of all reality only in terms
of what one can 'know'." Namely, for our purposes here, I will be addressing
the thought of Emmanuel Levinas in his Otherwise than Being regarding the
language of the 'accusative'." In addition, I will turn to the issues he raises
regarding the concepts of Creation and of asymmetry to the other with
reference to the thought of Martin Buber and Jacques Derrida. Exploring the
topic of Creation will serve as a way to address the nature of created existence
itself, whereas looking at Levinas will serve as an inroad into discussions of
relationality, incommunicability, particularity, law, and ethics. In other words,
3 See the essay 'The Linguistic Tum as Theological Tum' in Milbank, The Word Made
Strange, 84-120 which argues that the linguistic turn was first made in the 18th century in,
e.g., the work of J. G. Hamann.
4 Cf. Robert B. Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas (Princeton, N.J: Princeton
University Press, 1992), 59, where Gibbs likewise distances Rosenzweig from the "purely
epistemic. "
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1998). I will also initially be referring to the text
of the earlier essay entitled 'Substitution'. Levinas himself describes this as the central
chapter upon which Otherwise than Being is based (this article originally appeared as
Emmanuel Levinas, "La Substitution," Revue Philosophique De Louvain 3 (August 1968):
487-508). More than mere suggestions of the kind of substitutionary and accusatory thought
are already found in Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans.
Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne Studies. Philosophical Series 24 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969). However, Levinas radicalizes this thinking in very traumatic
(literally) ways in Otherwise than Being. Jacques Derrida seems to get the impression of
accusatory thinking when he says, commenting upon Totality and Infinity, 'And if we must,
for once, have faith in him who stands most accused in the trial conducted by this book, the
result is nothing without its becoming' (Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An
Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass,
2nd ed. [London: Routledge, 1978],84).
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these topics act as routes toward issues of nature and grace, of the humanity
and divinity that ultimately make up a person. Finally I will offer brief
corrective accounts of the issues raised by reference to the writings of Jean-
Luc Marion, Michel Henry, and Franz Rosenzweig.
a. Levinas and the Accused in the 'Accusative' from the Very Beginning
To begin, I will briefly mention Levinas' thematic" of the 'accusative' and
then provide a short grammatical primer in order to get up to speed with what
Levinas is doing before turning back to a fuller treatment of his thought.
Levinas is primarily focused upon the Other (Autrui), and the radical otherness
of the Other in all its heterogeneity. In Otherwise than Being, Levinas works
his argument around this alterity by concerning himself with an ethics opposed
to ontology, or as he puts it, a 'Saying' opposed to a 'Said'. 7 All synchrony of
a structuralism is thwarted by the 'absolute diachrony" of the (non-
intentional) thought of the Other. The absolute diachrony, however,
unwittingly becomes the synchrony of the abyss, as I will show below. For
Levinas, the alterity of the Other can never be thematized, and so Levinas
attempts to proceed always an-archically-against an aQX~ (arche) that
includes both a meaning of beginning and of ruling. Moreover, Levinas'
6 Of course, however, Levinas endlessly reminds us that this is umthematizable. Just one
example: 'Here what is essential lies in the refusal to let oneself be domesticated or subdued
by a theme' (Levinas, "Substitution," 80).
7 'Saying on the side of ethics, the said on the side of ontology'. Paul Ricoeur, "A Reading of
Emmanuel Levinas's 'Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence'," trans. Matthew Escobar,
YaleFrench Studies 104 (2004): 82.
8 Levinas, "Substitution," 89. 'When, against the structuralist's stressing of synchrony,
Levinas emphasizes diachrony, he means that every moment of the recollectable time of my
going forward toward my own death is cut through (dia) by the interlocution of other mortal
human beings' (John Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," in Cambridge Companion to
Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002], 136). The 'dark diachronicity' that Edith Wyschogrod speaks about clearly
seems, while still having undergone trauma (which to some extent is inescapable for
everybody), to intend a more healing gesture: 'the dark diachronicity of saintly life
circumvents time's arrow and time's cycle even if, superficially, it appears to fall on the side
of time's arrow. Saintly existence ... differs within itself, is fissured by a lapse and loss that
are "structurally" rather than continugently irrecoverable by memory. Saints are also expert in
"reversing" time's arrow in phenomena such as apology and repentance' (Edith Wyschogrod,
Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy, Religion and Postmodernism
[Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990], 108).
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argument culminates in a chapter entitled 'Substitution" which, because of an
ultimate responsibility, places the human person on the side of the accused.
The Other obsesses over the 'Same' in a persecution" which reconfigures how
the self is constituted:
Obsessed with responsibilities which do not result from decisions
taken by a "freely contemplating" subject, consequently accused of
what it never willed or decreed, accused of what it did not do,
subjectivity is thrown back on itself - in itself - by a persecuting
accusation. Concretely, this means to be accused of what others do
and to be responsible for what others do. It is to be pushed to the limit,
responsible for the very persecution undergone. Subjectivity is subject
to the limitless passivity of an accusative that is not a mere declension
derived from a nominative. Everything here begins in the accusative.
Such is the exceptional condition - or noncondition - of the Self (even
in our Latin grammars)."
The logic of accusation, the play upon the accusative case, and the theme of
'Illeity' dominate the rest of Otherwise than Being. Before exploring Levinas'
thought further on this matter, however, the terms used regarding the
nominative and accusative case requires a brief grammatical excursus which
will help illuminate what is at issue in Levinas' thought, but I will explore the
grammar also for the sake of my own argument in an attempt to disentangle a
different kind of' accusative'.
Most English speakers do not need to concern themselves with becoming
accustomed to case in language. Modem English as an Indo-European
language is a syntactically accusative language, as are about three-quarters of
the world's languages (although many others like German, Latin, and Greek
do explicitly use the other cases)." Aside from such pronouns as him, her,
them, and whom however, Modem English no longer pays attention to case
systems," using primarily word order and prepositions to indicate linguistic
function, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon, which was a case language but whose
9 Levinas calls this chapter the 'genn' of the book. See Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 193-
4n.1.
10 Levinas, "Substitution," 81-2.
11 Ibid., 88.
12 Robert M. W. Dixon, Ergativity, Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 70 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), chap. I.
13 Barbara A. Fennell, A History of English: A Sociolinguistic Approach, Blackwell Textbooks
in Linguistics 17 (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 200 I), 172.
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case forms we no longer use." So, in the sentence, 'The girl kicked the
football,' 'girl' is the nominative or subject of the sentence, and 'football' is in
the accusative position as the direct object of the verb 'kicked'. In languages
such as Greek and German, the case of the words (or articles) themselves
change according to their nominative or accusative attribution, but in English,
as mentioned, we generally indicate meaning by word order. Thus, in
languages with a richer case system such German, Greek, and Latin, the cases
used are the nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative." Barry J. Blake
describes case as stemming from the 'Latin casus, which is in turn a
translation of the Greek ptosis "fall". The term originally referred to verbs as
well as nouns and the idea seems to have been of falling away from an
assumed standard form, a notion also reflected in the term "declension" used
with reference to inflectional classes'. 16 Regarding the nominative, Blake says,
'The nominative was referred to as the orthe "straight", "upright" or eutheia
"straight", "direct" form and then as the ptosis orthe, ptosis eutheia or later
ptosis onomastike "nominative case." ,17 Latin translations of oblique cases are
as follows: genikii for the genitive; dotike for the dative; and aitiatike for the
accusative. However, the label 'accusative' is a mistranslation into Latin 'of
the Greek aitiatike ptosis which refers to the patient of an action caused to
happen (aitia "cause")' .18 While genitive primarily functions as the case of
possession, elsewhere Blake says regarding the dative that it 'was the ptosis
dotike, the "giving" case, because it encoded the recipient of the verb didiimi
"to give". In fact the dative had a variety of functions including a locative
function, though mostly when governed by a preposition, and marking the
14 Howard Jackson and Peter Stockwell, An Introduction to the Nature and Functions of
Language (Cheltenham: Stanley Thomes, 1996), 77.
IS Latin also has the ablative case, which does not exist in Greek but whose directionality is
covered by the genitive.
16 Barry J. Blake, Case, 2nd ed, Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 18.
t? Ibid.
18 Ibid., 19. Blake adds that 'Varro (116 BC-27?BC) is responsible for the term and he appears
to have been influenced by the other meaning of aitia, namely "accusation" , (Ibid). He
follows Robins and Calboli here: R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, Longman's
Linguistics Library (London: Longmans, 1967), 35; Gualtiero Calboli, La Linguistica
Moderna E II Latino: I Casi, Testi e Manuali Per L'insegnamento Universitario Del Latino 10
(Bologna: R. Patron, 1972), 100. This notion of accusative in its original, causal sense will be
explored in depth below.
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complement of various verbs indicating aid, trust, pleasing, and the like.,,19
Notably, the aforementioned mistranslation of 'accusative' from the original
Greek causally-inflected aitiatike as a grammatical (let alone metaphysical)
point never seems to arise in Levinas, nor in his commentators such as Derrida
and Marion. Instead, the Latin mistranslation comes into play providing
Levinas grist for his juridical mill of accusation. He never appears to take
notice of this ancient mistake.
This grammatical background can now help us to decode what is at work in
Levinas' remarks on what he calls 'obsession'. He says, 'Obsession is a total
passivity, more passive still than the passivity of'things'." Within the world of
'things', every-thing is under the reign of the logos as 'prime matter'. It is
underneath this logos that things 'fall', and, recalling the discussion of case
(ptosis) as fall above, Levinas states, 'This fall (or case), this pure submission
to the logos, without considering the proposition whereby the thing becomes a
narrative to which the logos belongs, is the essence of the accusative' .21
However, because obsession is anarchic and does not therefore fall under the
rule of the £xQXrl,obsession 'accuses me on the hither side of prime matter
seized by the category'. 22 Thus, the accusation of obsession is 'transformed
into an absolute accusative' and this constitutes the subject 'in the accusative,
without recourse in being, expelled from being, that is to say, in itself. 23 The
subject is therefore held responsible for all, and finds itself in a situation where
it must substitute itself for all other persons: 'The word "I" means to be
answerable for everything and for everyone' .24
When Levinas says, as quoted above, 'Subjectivity is subject to the
limitless passivity of an accusative that is not a mere declension derived from
a nominative'", he plays on this 'undeclinability' as an 'inability to decline' a
19 Barry J. Blake, "History of the Research on Case," in The Oxford Handbook of Case,
Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15.
20 Levinas, "Substitution," 87.
21 Ibid., emphasis mine.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 88. See also Levinas, Otherwise ThanBeing, 196n.21.
24 Levinas, "Substitution," 90. Further, 'It is this responsibility for the creature that constitutes
the "self' , (Ibid., 94). Also: 'To be a "self' is always to have one degree of responsibility
more' (Ibid., 91).
25 Levinas, "Substitution," 88.
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debt preceding a loan from the obsessive persecution of the Other." On the
one hand, grammatically Levinas is referring to the fact that personal pronouns
do not 'decline' in most languages: whereas the Greek accusative for human
declines as av8Qw71oV from the nominative av8Qw71o~, in nearly all
languages it does not work like this for pronouns (also especially the irregular
verb 'to be'). For example: the nominative 'I' in contrast to the accusative
'me'. They do not look like each other at all, being 'irregular', and here for
Levinas, indeclinable grammatically, and undeclinable ethically. From this
grammatical point of departure Levinas derives his ethics of obsession, which
for him means that the obsession of the other is undeclinable, that is,
inescapable. The self is always constituted by the responsibility for the Other
and thus must substitute itself for the Other. There is nothing 'behind' this
transcendental substitutability, for it is the condition of all selfhood." For
Levinas, inescapability stems from a radical passivity before all freedom:
'Substitution is not an act; it is a passivity inconvertible into an act, the hither
side of the act-passivity alternative':" where 'the distinction between being
accused and accusing oneself is effaced."
In sum, Levinas appears to isomorphically derive his ethics of accusation
as 'indeclinable' from the fact that the personal pronouns in the accusative
case do not 'decline' from an original nominative. The nominative 'I' exists
only insofar as it is addressed-accused-as a 'you' or a 'me'. While Levinas
is conscious enough of the Greek ptosis to work a 'fall' into his metaphysics,
there is no conscious reference to the original Greek meaning of the case of
the aitiatike, that is, 'the patient of an action caused to happen'.
26 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 112, 121.
27 Robert Bernasconi, "What Is the Question to Which 'Substitution' Is the Answer?," in
Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 250.
28 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 117.
29 Ibid., 125.
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b. The Passivity of Creation
What's more, Levinas ties this transcendental accusatory-substitution to the
passivity found in concept of creation itself. Arguing against a Western
philosophy that only knows the eternality of a preexisting matter," Levinas
contrasts the idea of creation which entails an 'absolute passivity, this side of
activity and passivity'. 31 The noninstant of creation itself, in its absolute
diachrony further suggests 'the total passivity of the self ... [which] is a
recurrence to the self, on this side of the self'." In fact, the accusation of
subjectivity is a heightened sense of the responsibility for creation: 'The self,
the subjection or subjectivity of the subject, is the very over-emphasis of a
responsibility for creation'. 33 For Levinas, however, this aspect of creation
should neither be seen as a mistake inherent to creation nor as a fall; on the
contrary, he states, 'The self involved in the gnawing away at oneself in
responsibility, which is also incarnation, is not an objectification of the self by
the ego. The self, the persecuted one, is accused beyond his fault before
freedom, and thus in an unavowable innocence. One must not conceive it to be
in the state of original sin; it is, on the contrary, the original goodness of
creation'." The goodness of creation thus entails persecution, accusation,
subjection, trauma, obsession, and being held hostage-indeed, no light claim
to make.
In this situation of being held hostage in persecution, which Levinas insists
is 'good', the accused self stands bare, stripped of its imperialistic ego, and
announces (in the accusative): 'Here I am' (me void). 'The subjectivity of the
subject, as being subject to everything, is a pre-originary susceptibility, before
30 Such a claim must, of course, insist on refusing to acknowledge the 'Western' philosophy
written by Christians themselves from the very beginning of Christianity, not to mention such
Jewish thinkers as Philo.
31 Levinas, "Substitution," 87-8. Levinas clarifies this: 'in the concept of creation ex nihilo, if
it is not a pure nonsense, there is the concept of a passivity that does not revert into an
assumption. The self as a creature is conceived in a passivity more passive still than the
passivity of matter, that is, prior to the virtual coinciding of a term with itself (Levinas,
Otherwise Than Being, 113-14).
32 Levinas, "Substitution," 89. For a further analysis that takes Levinas' passivity to a further
extreme, making the Other even more anonymous than perhaps Levinas himself intended, see
Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1999), 31--64, esp. 4~6.
33 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 125.
34 Ibid., 121, emphasis Levinas'.
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all freedom and outside of every present. It is accused in uneasiness or the
unconditionality of the accusative, in the "here I am" (me void) which is
obedience to the glory of the Infinite that orders me to the other'. 35 Levinas
goes on to cite Dostoyevsky in Brothers Karamazov: 'Each of us is guilty
before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others'. 36 This is the final
place that Levinas leaves the traumatized subject in Otherwise than Being,
uttering 'me, that is, here I am/or the others, to lose this place radically, or his
shelter in being, to enter into ubiquity which is also a utopia'. 37 It is precisely a
u-topia, a no place, because, as Edith Wyschogrod says in commenting upon
these passages, 'To say me voici in this context is not to designate spatial
coordinates but rather to place oneself at the disposal of another' .38
c. Radical Asymmetry
Before moving onto my attempt to make sense of Levinas on the accused
and the accusative, I tum to Levinas' account of the radical asymmetry of the
person. From the very beginning, because Levinas' 'ethics' come from the
Platonic 'Good beyond being' in a way that strictly opposes any ethics to be
found within being whatsoever, at the very heart of his project beats a radical
heterongeneity always lurching against, disturbing, and unsettling the 'Same'.
Levinas began his asymmetrical ethics-before-ontology in Totality and Infinity
first as a critique of the Husserlian ego which he saw as a Hegelian totalizing
of the Same of every other ego as an 'alter ego' within its own analogy of
apperception." This is because, as Levinas asks, 'how can the same, produced
35 Ibid., 146.
36 Ibid. The Dostoyevsky reference is to Brothers Karamazov, Book VI, Ha. Levinas in a
footnote cites Isaiah 6:8: "'Here I am! Send me." Isaiah, 6:8. "Here I am!" means "send me"
(Ibid., 199n.ll).
37 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 185.
38 Edith Wyschogrod, "Language and Alterity in the Thought of Levinas," in Cambridge
Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 201.
39 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 67. He is commenting upon the Fifth Cartesian Meditation of
Husserl found in Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to
Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1999), 108-120 [§50-§54]. For a recent treatment of the Fifth Cartesian
Meditation, see "Reflections on Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation" in Michel Henry,
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as egoism, enter into relationship with an other without immediately divesting
it of its alterity?,4o Indeed, Western philosophy for Levinas is entirely
constituted of introducing a neutral tertium quid into the relationship between
the 'other' and the 'same' for the sake of comprehension." Thus for Levinas,
'Philosophy is an ego logy' .42 Against such an egology which subsumes and
sublates (Aufheben) all otherness into itself, Levinas argues for an asymmetry
on two accounts: the first being the plain experience of intersubjectivity (i.e.
'the radical impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and of speaking in
the same sense of oneself and of the others"), and the second being the theme
of alterity itself in the I's relation to the Other, which is always a 'more' or a
'less' in response to the orphan and the widow. With regard to seeing the I as
'more' than the Other (this is given less emphasis, and hence the asymmetry),
this stems from the resources found within oneself to be true to his or her
responsibility to the other; and with respect to seeing the I a 'less' than the
Other, this is rooted in the obligation and judgment placed upon the I by the
face of the Other, which emphasizes the transcendent 'height' of the Other's
alterity. Because the height of the Other is a transcendence and not an
oppositional immanence, the Other for Levinas can appear as a stranger and
not an enemy."
In Otherwise than Being, Levinas, as with all his ('non-')thematics, pushes
the heteronomy further. Levinas qualifies and goes beyond Heidegger's
being-toward-death and displaces the 'in each case mine' (Jemeinigkeit) of
Dasein with an originary substitutability: 'In proximity the other obsesses me
according to the absolute asymmetry of signification, ofthe-one-for-the-other:
I substitute myself for him, whereas no one can replace me, and the
substitution of the one for the other does not signify the substitution of the
other for the one. The relationship with the third party is an incessant
Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008),101-117.




44 See the section entitled 'The Asymmetry of the Interpersonal' in Ibid., 215-16.
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correction of the asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at' ,45
Indeed, as Paul Davies says, 'The relation of asymmetry in which I find
myself always already opened to the Other is written, in Otherwise than Being,
in such a way that it can never be undone or reappropriated by a higher or
more fundamental intersubjectivity', 46 Asymmetry is never secondary to an
original symmetry; on the contrary any possible symmetry between persons (if
there is any at all) is only made possible by this fundamental, anarchic,
asymmetry of the accusation: the commonplace moral reciprocal relations are
founded in a metaphysical asymmetry" because 'no matter which reciprocal
relations I can discern between others and me, it is to me that these relations
are presented as such'." To help illustrate this asymmetry in the form of an
imperative, Jean-Francois Lyotard thus remarks that the whole discourse of
Levinas can be expressed in the following meta-prescriptive command:
'That I Thou I shalt never be I I I!'
d. Relating Asymmetrically or Symmetrically?
'All the classical concepts interrogated by Levinas are thus dragged
toward the agora, summoned to justify themselves in an ethico-political
language that they have not always sought-or believed that they
sought-to speak, summoned to transpose themselves into this
language by confessing their violent aims '.
-Jacques Derrida"
In this section, regarding the issue of a radical asymmetry, I will address
the issues Levinas raises with reference to the work of Jacques Derrida and
45 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 158. This is essentially the same kind of Levinasian move
that Simon Critchley makes against Heidegger in Simon Critchley, 'Originary Inauthenticity:
On Heideger's Sein und Zeit', in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Peter M Candler, Jr.
and Conor Cunningham (London: SCM Press, 2007), 21-49.
46 Paul Davies, "A Fine Risk: Reading Blanchot Reading Levinas," in Re-Reading Levinas, ed.
Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1991),215.
47 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 53.
4H Seren Overgaard, "In Defense of Subjectivity: Husserl, Levinas, and the Problem of
Solipsism," in Subjectivity and Transcendence, ed. Arne Gren, Iben Damgaard, and Seren
Overgaard, Religion in Philosophy and Theology 25 (Ttibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 95-
114, here at 105.
49 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 97.
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Martin Buber. As the issue here concerns the modality of relationality around
the theme of personality incommunicability, Thomas Aquinas will be brought
in briefly as well to shed a light on the mode of this communication. If, as
Derrida states in the epigraph above, Levinas drags classical concepts to the
agora" in order to confess their violence, I propose here to summon classical
concepts-as well as Levinas' own ethics-to see the face of the 'other' in the
wider traditions of the gathering of the ekklesia (both inside and outside,
before and after)." This assembling of 'wherever two or three are gathered'
compels not just an upholding of the economy of relationality, but it also
draws upon the reality of the mystery of personal encounter such that where
we speak of the name of the other, we do not capture them in a concept, but
point one another toward the more original gift of their very being, ultimately
to the 'name above all names,.52 What I will show below is that, in
approaching personhood's truth, there is an intuitive, surface 'sense' in which
Levinas is correct regarding the passivity of creation and the 'accusative'
status of persons; however, to the extent that he inherits these concepts from
others in the tradition of thought he speaks truly, but to the extent that he
abandons the truths of the tradition and inscribes the Other within an utterly
heterogeneous, an-archic, and traumatic aIterity as the 'goodness' of Creation
and persons themselves, he completely loses and therefore abandons the
person altogether within a radical equivocity.
Levinas' ethical hyper-asymmetry poses two problems (at least). The first
are its own logical and ethical implications, and the second regards the loss of
the person itself. To the first, the logical and ethical implications of Levinas'
radical anarchic heteronomy are as follows: because the other always places
an accusatory claim and obligation upon any self (the 'Same'), in order to
understand this (Le. 'obey'), one must never interpret Levinas in the same way
50 Is there not a further exchange of capital implied in Derrida's mention of the agora? For this
was not a place of confession but a place of speaking publically in the political sphere and also
an open area for the marketplace. On related themes critiquing Derrida's understanding of
capital and writing, see Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Cosummation of
Philosophy, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 7-33.
51 That is, I will be appealing to philosophers and theologians, Atheist, Christian and Jewish,
the latter of whom represent both a 'before' the Church temporally as well as an
eschatological 'after' indicated by the language of 'grafting' found in Romans 11:23-24.
52 Matthew 18:20; Philippians 2:9, respectively.
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that he intends. Indeed, throughout Otherwise than Being, he constantly
expresses his worry that he is still using the language of the 'Said' to give
expression to the 'Saying', as he perceives that he is always under the threat
using 'ontology' to talk about 'ethics' (this, of course, being a bad thing for
Levinas). So, if Levinas is philosophy's Super-Ego of alterity, should we not
become obedient by continuing to interpret him otherwise? Lyotard wonders
the same thing: 'The more, as aliens to Levinas, we speak of Levinas, the
more we conform to his precept-and also, the more Levinas will be bound to
welcome the commentary'. 53 Lyotard goes on to look at what an alterity-as-
first-principle entails, and comes to the conclusion that this rule 'necessarily
authorizes retortion, enabling the same to be drawn from the other and the
other from the same. If this amounts to persecution, it is the fault of the
persecuted alone; he suffers only from his own law and refutes himself. 54 Or,
put another way, Levinas invites a kind of belligerent misunderstanding of his
own text in order to fully command a respect for the other's desire not to be
reduced to the same." In his book The DifJerend, Lyotard phrases it this way:
'The irony of the commentator easily goes as far as persecution: the less I
understand you, he says to the Levinassian (or divine) text, the more I will
obey you by that fact; for, if I want to understand you (in your tum) as a
request, then I should not understand you as sense'. 56 The misunderstanding
cannot even be seen as a mere implication here, for Levinas is always arguing
within the contours of a command, being indebted to a Kantian imperative,
and thus Lyotard argues that we 'should' misunderstand him."
53 Jean-Francois Lyotard, "Levinas' Logic," in The Lyotard Reader, ed. Andrew E. Benjamin
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 275.
54 Ibid., 276.
55 James Williams, Lyotard: Towards a Postmodern Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998),125.
56 Ibid., citing. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. George Van
Den Abeele (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 115. John Milbank also notes
this in his Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford and Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell, 1993), 318.
57 Aside from all the language of 'imperative' which shares a fairly explicit connection to the
Kantian Sol/en, Levinas says as much at the end of his chapter on substitution: 'we would
think here of Kantism, which finds a meaning to the human without measuring it by ontology
and outside of the question "What is there here ...?" that one would like to take to be
preliminary, outside of the immortality and death which ontologies run up against. The fact
that immortality and theology could not determine the categorical imperative signifies the
novelty of the Copernican revolution: a sense that is not measured by being or not being; but
being on the contrary is determined on the basis of sense' (Levinas, Otherwise Than Being,
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Consequently, such an onginary heteronomy will inhabit a perpetual
equivocity, forming a subject, a person that is always divided and tom by a
traumatic and heteronomous command. Commenting on this aspect, Simon
Critchley benignly remarks, 'the subject is also divided by this demand, it is
constitutively split between itself and a demand that it cannot meet, but which
is that by virtue of which it becomes a subject. The ethical subject is a split
subject.?" In an earlier essay, Critchley goes further to say that the Levinasian
'ethical subject is a traumatic neurotic' .59 William Desmond deduces that such
an equivocity stems 'generally [from] a tendency to dualistic thinking in
Levinas, for example, ontology versus metaphysics, being versus the good'."
Desmond goes on to describe how this dualism and inherent equivocity works
129). Levinas is more explicity when he says: 'it is towards a relationship of this kind [with
the other placed right at the beginning] that Kant hastens, when he formulates the second
version of the categorical imperative by a deduction - which may be valid or not - from the
universality of the maxim. This obedience, which finds its concrete realization in the
relationship with the Other, points to a reason which is less nuclear than the reason of the
Greeks, which is seen from the outset as the correlative of stability, the law of the Same
(Meme),. Emmanuel Levinas, "Revelation in the Jewish Tradition," in The Levinas Reader,
ed. Sean Hand, trans. Sarah Richmond (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 206.
58 Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding; Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance
(London and New York: Verso, 2007), 62-3 emphasis in original. Critichley goes on to
connect this aspect to the thought of Jacques Lacan. This Levinasian 'split subject' is radically
different from the 'split' spoken about in Philipp Rosemann's work, indebted as it is to
Thomas Aquinas: 'Being a creature means, above all, being split'. This is because, he
continues, 'The first and fundamental split is the one between esse and ens. Although creation
originates in this split, the entire dynamics of creaturely existence is, paradoxically, directed
toward the goal of overcoming it. Thus, essences exteriorize themselves as causes, and human
beings act, ultimately out of a profound tendency towards self-unification, which, were it
realized, would be tantamount to self-annihilation. If ever the circle were to be closed, the
"clearing" of being would vanish'. Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A
"Repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 338,
emphasis Rosemann's. Cf. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas
Aquinas, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1995),
278-9. Because we are creaturely, we can never close this circle ourselves, but as creatures we
participate in that eminent reality which is the closed circle-without reserve-of the triune
processions of Father, Son, Holy Spirit (Ibid., 344-52). In sum, for Rosemann, this split is
merely a description of our status as creatures, which presumes a higher unity in the one
Triune God who is uncreated. For Critchley, following Levinas, there is no unity, for the self
as self is originarily a traumatic sundering.
59 Simon Critchley, "The Split Subject," in Emmanuel Levinas: Philosophy, Theology,
Politics, ed. Adam Lipszyc (Warsaw: Adam Mickiewicz Institute, 2006), 67.
60 William Desmond, "Philosophies of Religion: Marcel, Jaspers, Levinas," in Emmanuel
Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout, vol. 3:
Levinas and the Question of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 115
emphasis in original. David Bentley Hart remarks that Levinas is accurately described as
'Manichean, Orphic, or gnostic'. David Bentley Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite: The
Aesthetics Of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2004), 75. Hart is backed up (see Ibid., 75n.56) by Gillian Rose who describes Levinas' vision
as 'Buddhist Judaism' in Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, 37. She also calls this stance
'Judaic Manichaeism' in GiIIian Rose, "Shadow of Spirit," in Judaism and Modernity:
Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993),43.
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against his own best intentions regarding the irreplaceability the self. For, if
the self is irreplaceable, Desmond asks, 'how can the irreplaceable be
substituted? There cannot be a replacement for the non-substitutable, nor a
substitute for the irreplaceable. The concept of hostage carried the idea of
equivalence: one for the other, a tooth for a tooth. But the concept of
equivalence is impossible without the idea of identity, and Levinas's whole
discourse of the irreplaceable claims to be prior to the idea of identity and its
cognate concepts like equivalence'." Desmond does not intend some kind of
static identity here, but on the contrary, he is gesturing toward an analogous
logic which founds the difference between one or more in an originary way
towards a prior similarity of a 'towards one' (1tpo<; Ev}-otherwise substitution
would be impossible against a ruptured 'irreplaceable' self. This brings me to
the recognition of a prior mutuality and reciprocity found in the constitution of
persons, most poignantly expressed in the work of Martin Buber.
For Buber, his seminal I and Thou is based upon a priority of relation
that--even though it did not attempt to denigrate the particularity and
singularity of individual persons in any way-is a relation that is always
symmetrical. 'Relation is mutual. My Thou affects me, as I affect it. We are
molded by our pupils and built up by our works .... We live our lives
inscrutably included within the streaming mutual life of the universe'. 62
Relation's symmetry is made possible not by a primal heteronomy, but by the
very fact that it is relation which founds everyone and everything. In a
sentence that Levinas himself seemed to overlook, Buber says, 'In the
beginning is relation-as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould
for the soul; it is the a priori of relation, the inborn Thou'. 63 If there was not
61 Desmond, "Philosophies of Religion: Marcel, Jaspers, Levinas," 115 emphasis in original.
Desmond continues: 'This is a logical problem with substitution, but it points to a tension that
is not merely logical. If we privilege the irreplaceable, there must be a limit to human
substitution; by contrast, if we privilege substitution, we compromise the absolute singularity
of the irreplaceable. How then can we affirm substitution and the irreplaceable both together?
Put this way: Job's second set of children seemed to be replacements for the first dead
children, they seem to be substitutes. But the whole thrust of Levinas's thought must be that
there can be no replacement for the first irreplaceable children; there are no human substitutes'
(ibid).
62 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum,
2004),20.
63 Ibid., 28, emphasis in original. For Levinas' main critique of Buber outside of the scattered
references found in Totality and Infinity, see Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the
Theory of Knowledge," in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. Paul Schilpp and Marucie
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this equivalent basis for relation, how could Levinas say that we are even able
to substitute for one another if, as Desmond reminds us, Levinas points to the
irreplaceability of the self? Even if we grant some sort of degree of absence of
the other or even an inability to say 'Thou' for any number of reasons (what
Levinas and Derrida call the 'trace'), is it not the case that because the other,
while unique and incommunicable, is also 'just like me' and someone to
whom I may give myself?" Instead, Levinas is bent on making assertions such
as the following: 'It is thus the Blbeing in me, the fact that I exist, my existing,
that constitutes the absolutely intransitive element, something without
intentionality or relations' .65 'Utterly to the contrary', objects Lorenz Puntel,
who rightly argues that 'the most radical and fundamental "element" that I
share with others is precisely my Being/existence' .66 No matter how different
each member of the community may be from one another, 'the simplest fact is
that every member in the community nevertheless shares at least one thing,
namely his own existence/Being, with other human beings'." When Buber
Friedman, Library of Living Philosophers 12 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1967), 133-50;
reprinted in Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," in The
Levinas Reader, trans. and ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 59-74. For
Buber's response see Martin Buber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin
Buber, ed. Paul Schilpp and Marucie Friedman, Library of Living Philosophers 12 (La Salle,
IL: Open Court, 1967), 689-744. On this topic and Levinas' relationship with Buber's
thought, including Buber's own responses to Levinas, see the following helpful article: Robert
Bernasconi, '''Failure of Communication' as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue
Between Buber and Levinas," in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed.
Robert Bernasconi (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 100-135. The crux of the
matter regarding Levinas' rejection of the symmetry found in Buber's thought comes down to
Levinas assimilating Buber into trends in recent thought, 'specifically Husserl and Heidegger,
where the substantiality and independent reality of the self is denied'. Bernasconi continues,
'Had Levinas read Buber's 1957 Postscript to I and Thou-or indeed had he been more
attentive to the third part of I and Thou instead of focusing largely, like most readers, on the
first part-he might not have gone on to ask whether Buber had been aware of "the logical
originality of relation". Appealing to the notion of an absolute Person, Buber had in the
Postscript explicitly embraced the contradictory nature of the relation as arising out of the
supra-contradictory nature of God. This contradiction is met by the paradoxical designation of
God as the absolute Person, that is one that cannot be relativized' (Ibid., 111).
64 Cf.: 'All suffering is unique-and all suffering is common. I have to be reminded of the
latter truth when I am suffering myself-and of the former when I see others suffering' (Henri
de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith [San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1987], 171).
65 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA:
Duquesne University Press, 1987),42, emphasis mine. Cf.: 'Solitude thus appears as the
isolation which makes the very event ofBlbeing' (Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity,
trans. Richard A. Cohen [Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1985], 57-8).
66 Lorenz B. Puntel, Being and God: A Systematic Approach in Confrontation with Martin
Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean-Luc Marion, trans. Alan White (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 2011), 293.
67 Ibid.
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therefore says, 'Between you and it there is mutual giving: you say Thou to it
and give yourself to it, it says Thou to you and gives itself to you, ,68 Buber is
making an implicit connection between the nature of creation-'in the
beginning was relation' which engenders 'the mutual life of the universe'-
and the very nature of the human persons themselves who have a share in this
Being to which we have a relation. In other words, it is not accidental that we
bear an intrinsic relation to one another within 'the heavens and the earth'
whose essence it is to relate; on the contrary, our inner relation to one to
another within creation is the very nature of things.
Derrida's essay 'Violence and Metaphysics'-his first response to Levinas'
work in general and to Totality and Infinity in particular-provides an
occasion to critique Levinas' asymmetricality in relation to Husserl in light of
what we have said regarding Buber." Derrida mainly restricts his criticisms to
Levinas' interpretation of Husserl, but he does offer some brief comments
regarding Levinas' conceptual relationship to Buber-namely, that Levinas
opposes 'the magisterial height of the You to the intimate reciprocity of the
Me-Thou' and then goes on to show how Levinas offers up a philosophy of
the 'He (If)' which, while it would seem at first glance to be impersonal,
Derrida sees this as the transcendence of the personal Other which absconds in
absence." While the description of this Other as personal is wholly
debatable," for now I will confine my line of exposition to what is at hand in
Derrida's defense of Husserl.
68 Buber, I and Thou, 31.
69 Martin Hagglund argues that Derrida's thought is inherently violent and atheistic, especially
as he draws out his argument in dialogue with various thinkers, including Levinas. On this see
the chapter 'Arche-Violence: Derrida & Levinas' in Martin Hagglund, Radical Atheism:
Derrida and the Time of Life, Meridian, Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CaA: Stanford
University Press, 2008), 76-106. While I would tend to agree with this kind of reading, Steven
Shakespeare does in fact raise some important points in response in Derrida and Theology,
Philosophy and Theology (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2009), 204-8.
70 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 105. Also, see Ibid., 314n.37. Derrida goes on to say
in this footnote, 'Levinas, in substance, reproaches the I-Thou relationship (I) for being
reciprocal and symmetrical, thus committing violence against height, and especially against
separateness, and secretiveness; (2) for being formal, capable of "uniting man to things, as
much as Man to man"; (3) for preferring preference, the "private relationship," the
"clandestine nature" of the couple which is "self-sufficient and forgetful of the universe"'.
71 For more on this, see below where I examine the extent to which 'personal' for Levinas is
actually otherwise than personal, against his own intentions.
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In question here is Levinas' critique of Husserl's ego in the fifth of his
Cartesian Meditations. Levinas rejects the Husserlian ego precisely at the
point where Husserl discusses the recognition of other egos within the
analogical apperception, seeing others as 'alter egos'. Graham Ward notes
here that Levinas' rejection of Husserl is actually a reversal of Husserl's
analogy of apperception: 'the Ego is now a modification of the infinitely
other' which gives rise to the radical dissymmetry.f As Levinas himself sees
it, the ego in Husserl's version of the analogy of apperception goes awry
because the ego acts in a Hegelian fashion, totalizing and sublating all other
egos into itself, such that all other egos are really a modification of my own
ego, similar to a kind of Spinozistic modification of the one same substance.
According to Derrida, however, this is exactly the opposite of how Husserl
actually expresses the analogical apperception. For,
If the other were not recognized as a transcendental alter ego [in
Husserl], it would be entirely in the world and not, as ego, the origin of
the world. To refuse to see in it an ego in this sense is, within the
ethical order, the very gesture of all violence. If the other was not
recognized as ego, its entire alterity would collapse. Therefore, it
seems that one may not suppose that Husserl makes of the other an
other like myself (in the factual sense of the word), or a real
modification of my life, without misconstruing his most permanent and
openly stated intentions. If the Other was a real moment of my
egological life, if 'inclusion of an other monad within my own'
(Cartesian Meditations) was real, I would perceive it origin aliter.
Husserl does not cease to emphasize that this is an absolute
impossibility."
Likewise, Ward remarks that '[w]ithin Husserl's thinking there is no room for
an absolutely other that can be recognized as such'. 74 Because the other has an
'egoity' about which I can speak, similar to how I speak of and understand my
own ego, this allows me to speak of him or her as an Other-at all-as
opposed to a table or a stone. This allows for recognition within the economy
72 Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 152.
73 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 125. Bernasconi makes an astute observation at this
point: 'There is some curiosity in finding Derrida, albeit in 1964, apparently according a
special privilege to whether an author recognizes himselfin an interpretation of his works. Did
Levinas recognize himself when he read Derrida's interpretation and would it have posed a
problem for Derrida's reading had he not done so? Did not Derrida himself in the same place
insist on the difference between Levinas's "intentions" and his "philososphical discourse"?'
Bernasconi, "'Failure of Communication as a Surplus'," 107.
74 Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 152.
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of the transcendental ego. Derrida emphasizes that' [d]issymmetry itself would
be impossible without this symmetry, which is not of the world, and which,
having no real aspect, imposes no limit upon alterity and dissymmetry-[it]
makes them possible, on the contrary'. 75 While Derrida would later go on to
critique most forms of thought and being that fall within an economy," here he
defends this dissymmetry as 'an economy in a new sense; a sense which would
probably be intolerable to Levinas'. 77
Particularly enlightening is Derrida's next statement: 'Despite the logical
absurdity of this formulation, this economy is the transcendental symmetry of
two empirical asymmetries' .78 The complexity of this statement
notwithstanding, what I want to argue is that Derrida is correct to argue this,
for it seems to accord with everyday experience. For example, a common
expression, often uttered in a semi-cynical tone, goes like this: 'You are
unique ...just like everybody else!' The 'just like everybody else' refrain is
most often added as if to take back with the left hand what the right hand has
given, as if to say, 'actually, because you are unique just like everybody else,
that makes you not very unique after all!' But, to consider the original phrase
for a moment ('you are unique just like everybody else'), this is exactly what
the advent of describing the incommunicability of the person is supposed to
intend in the first place." Thomas Aquinas expresses the exact same logic in
the Summa Theologica when he is asked whether the term 'person' is common
to all three persons of the Holy Trinity: for it would seem that, following
Richard of St Victor, because persons are incommunicable, all three could not
be persons. Thomas responds, saying, 'Although person is incommunicable,
yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many'. 80
If the mode of incommunicability was not common to all, then the
consequence of this would be that there could only be one person in existence,
75 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 126.
76 See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
77 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 126, emphasis in original.
78 Ibid., 126, emphasis mine.
79 For helpful accounts on incommunicability, see John F. Crosby, The Selfhood a/the Human
Person (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996),41-81; Hans
Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," Communio 13, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 18-26 at
18.
80 ST, I, q. 30, a. 4 ad 2.
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just like Spinoza's one substance with many modifications. In this case there
would be only one person of the Trinity, and what then are the rest of us
humans? To this, as Adrian Pabst remarks in a strikingly similar way to
Derrida above, 'there is an asymmetrical relation between unity and diversity
which is grounded in a symmetrical relation within the triune Godhead and
which provides the foundation for peaceful practicing relations across
creation'." How would we appear to each other and how would we ever
recognize ourselves without some sort of Husserlian analogy of the ego--or
some other philosophically and theologically worthy equivalent?"
Because Levinas rejects the analogous vision of Husserl, what In fact
happens is that the person in Levinas' ethics actually vanishes altogether. And
it does this by precisely falling prey to his own critique of Husser! with the
following logic: the only real person is the Other who accuses us from the
hither side of being, beyond essence, and this Other we never actually
encounter at all in any particular way, so, we are thus left to be accused
violently on this side of being. That is, the real self is really the Illeity of the
third (whom we never meet), and because Levinas denies the analogy, which
implies that we can never recognize the Other (for anytime we speak of
content this falls into that which is 'thematizable' and the 'Same' for Levinas),
let alone ourselves. Even though Levinas almost inchoately accepts the
analogy when he says, '[a]1terity is only possible starting from me,'83 and even
81 Adrian Pabst, "The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological
Metaphysics," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81, no. 4 (2007): 553-78 at 577.
82 W. Norris Clarke, "The 'We Are' of Interpersonal Dialogue," in Explorations in
Metaphysics: Being-God-Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994),
31-44. Here Clarke makes a similar argument to my own except Clarke is responding to the
anti-Realism found in Kant and his heirs. In this enlightening article, he helpfully
compliments Thomas's esse commune with the existential findings of Twentieth-century
phenomenlogists. Clark moves from the aspect of epistemologically perceiving others as "like
me" (p. 38) to the recognition of a metaphysically-shared, and common existence of the "we
are" (p. 40) Additionally see John Crosby, "The Empathetic Understanding of Other Persons,"
in Personalist Papers (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 33-
63. For an account which critiques what he considers analogical reasoning, see the chapter
'The Perception of Other Minds' in Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 238-64. Crosby, in the chapter
mentioned above, offers a critique of Scheler. I would add that it seems that because Scheler is
operating under the assumption that such 'mediation' is a bad thing, that is is
misunderstanding the real kind of personal analogy which Thomas Aquinas argues for, and for
which I am arguing in this thesis which does not subsume two things (or people) to a third
concept.
83 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 305.
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though Bettina Bergo insists that '[t]he encounter with a face is inevitably
personal.l" there is a real problem here, as David Bentley Hart avers: 'the
other-to remain truly other--cannot in any way actually appear: neither by
way of phenomenology's analogies and reductions, nor by way of any prior
understanding of being and beings, nor within the reach of simple recognition
(in every case, one remains within the confines of the Same). Rather, alterity is
intimated solely in moments of rupture or discontinuity; the otherness that
makes demands of us is alien to us, from beyond the totality'. 85 The Other
never actually appears in Levinas because he continually denies context, place,
any sort of features whatsoever. Besides 'the countenance,' says John
Llewelyn commenting in a positive fashion on Levinas, 'the face has no
features or properties or substance, no ousia. The significance of the face is
abstract [emphasis mine], but its abstractness is prior to the abstractness
defined by the structuralist as the separability of the intersubstitutability of
propositional signs from a given empirical embodiment'." How does one
recognize an abstract significance of the face, let alone anything or anyone at
all that possesses no substance? When Hart remarks that 'the other is always
the same, always nothing but the infinite orientation of my ethical adventure,
my flight of the alone to the alone, secure in my purity of intention, ,87 what he
is indicating here is that the denial of the analogy-an analogy which can only
be the form of charity-means that Levinas' real person in the (non-)form of
the Other is only one, same, un-communicable person. How would the Other
R4 Bettina Bergo, "The Face in Levinas: Toward a Phenomenlogy of Substitution," Angelaki
16, no. I (20 II): 17.
85 Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 77. For a discussion of this text, see the symposium in
New Blackfriars vol. 88 in the following articles: James K. A. Smith, "Questions About the
Perception of 'Christian Truth': On the Affective Effects of Sin," New Blackfriars 88, no.
1017 (2007): 585-93; Lois Malcolm, "On David Hart's The Beauty of the Infinite," New
Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 594-99; Gerard Loughlin, "Rhetoric and Rhapsody: A
Response to David Bentley Hart's The Beauty of the Infinite," New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017
(2007): 600--609; David Bentley Hart, "Response to James K. A. Smith, Lois Malcolm and
Gerard Loughlin," New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 610-23.
86 Llewelyn, "Levinas and Language," 120. To this kind of thinking, Hart, "Response to James
K. A. Smith, Lois Malcolm and Gerard Loughlin," 616. says, 'At least, in the thought of
Levinas and the later Derrida, "others" are nowhere to be found. Instead, one encounters only
the Other, who-as far as I can tell-is obligingly devoid of an identity, a faith, an address, or
any stated opinion regarding the designated hitter rule (a reference I fear only American
readers will understand). In fact, the most attractive quality of the Other, I suspect, is his or
her or its absolute purity from any of the obnoxious traits of others: convictions, prejudices,
and customs; passions, discontents, and aspirations; and so on'.
87Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 82.
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even know how to recognize the Same to accuse him or her if there was not
some way to charitably say, 'This person seems like another person, although
they're obviously not me, but because I recognize that they are like me, then
they must be an other person'?
With an absolute accusation, an absolute an-archic heteronomy which
means that asymmetry comes first and foremost as rupture, Levinas could only
ever say within the boundaries he has set for his ethics: 'The obsessing Other
is unique'-full stop: not like everybody else, at all. Buber, in his reply to
Levinas' criticism of his own emphasis on the symmetry of relation, rightly
said, 'The asymmetry that wishes to limit the relation to the relationship to a
higher would make it completely one-sided: love would either be
unreciprocated by its nature or each of the two lovers must miss the reality of
the other'. 88 By its nature, the accusation of the obsessive Other must remain
unreciprocated, for if it was reciprocated, it would seem that Levinas would
lose all 'height' of the Other. But Levinas cannot conceive of a transcendence
that is not purely negative, and thus this 'height' always shows itself as
alienating. On this matter, Puntel remarks, 'Real, genuine transcendence is
within the sphere of (subjective genitive!) absolute infinity, not outside of it.
God as the absolutely transcendent, as the "absolute Other" in Levinas's sense,
is a relativized God, a God who stands in a negative relation to an X, i.e.,
finite being(s). This is the most central error in Levinas's conception of God
as absolutely transcendent'. 89 Buber and Derrida correctly perceive that
beginning from an originary asymmetry with the Other beyond Being simply
cannot work, for this presumption loses the other person either by command
(as Lyotard saw), or it brings one to a contradictory standstill of not knowing
whether one can substitute oneself for another because they are originally
'irreplaceable' (as Desmond showed), or it denies all commonsense
88 Bernasconi, 'Failure of Communication as a Surplus', 112, citing Buber in Martin Buber,
Philosophical Interrogations: Interrogations of Buber, Wild, Wahl, Blanshard, Weiss,
Hartshorne, Tillich, ed. Sydney Chester Rome and Beatrice K. Rome (New York: Harper and
Row, 1964), 28. Indeed, Bernasconi adds, 'It is necessary to consider whether Levinas's
account does have that implication' (Bernasconi, '''Failure of Communication as a Surplus',"
112).
89 Puntel, Being and God, 299, emphasis in original.
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relationality to Being and to one another (Buber and Puntel)," or finally, as I
have just demonstrated, altogether persons are lost in that they miss the reality
of each other. If there is more than one person at all, there must be
something---or someone-that makes this analogy subsist.
e. Persons: Communing in the Accusative of Creation
To conclude this exploration of the accusative, I return now to the focus
upon the nature of the 'accusative' with reference to the grammatical-ethical-
ontological insights of Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, and Franz
Rosenzweig in order to help illuminate what is at stake for gesturing towards a
fuller account of the human person. Above, I have shown that the otherness of
persons requires some sort of 'symmetry', a transcendental something
(someone?) that makes all of our radical uniqueness possible in the first
instance; that is, the necessity for some kind of 'analogy' has emerged." In the
grammatical sections before that, I showed how the grammar of the accusative
in Levinas' thought functions, on the one hand, in relation to the persecution
by the Other, and on the other hand, in relation to the passivity of creation
which also appears to exist in the accusative. It is true, as J. Aaron Simmons
and David Wood comment, that '[ w]hen Levinas distinguishes between the
vocative (accusative) and the constative (nominative) elements in language, he
90 While it is outside of the scope of this analysis, Puntel also highlights another crucial error
in Levinas: 'Levinas falls victim to an absolutely elementary confusion-s-one between
knowledge and a practical attitude or practical act. He fails to find in knowledge something
that belongs not there, but instead in the domain of practical behavior and action. When he
maintains, "The most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in communion with
the truly other; it does not take the place of sociality," he reveals his deep confusion. It is of
course the case that "the most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us in communion
with the truly other," if the sense of communion in question is one that belongs in the domain
of practical action. Knowledge is not practical action, is not (practical) recognition of the
other, is not (practical) respect of the other, is not real love of the other, or anything of the
sort. But on the theoretical level the other is known, is articulated, precisely as the other. It is
of course the case that sociality does not have the same structure that knowledge has. That
Levinas does not see this as obvious reveals the depth of his confusion' (Ibid., 287).
91 To be sure, Levinas himself constructs a kind of analogy between the other (I 'autre) and the
Other (I 'Autre), but what is gestured toward here in his thought still remains within a kind of
radical heterogeneity which always arrives violently.
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does so with an eye toward human relationships and not simply a concern for
the philosophy of language"." While this may have been Levinas' intent, as I
have shown above, not only do relationships become impossible within such a
radically asymmetrically heteronomous ethics, but moreover, the person itself
disappears into a Spinozan One which is not immanently and pantheistically
here, but somehow lives 'beyond essence' on the hither side of being (even
Buber, who originally disallowed any kind of mediation in his original I-Thou
schema recognized the importance of an original, analogous 'Absolute
Person '). 93 Yet at the same time, Levinas' grammatical focus also intends to
say something ontological about the passivity of creation." Levinas is actually
correct to argue that creation is passive in the accusative sense and that at
times we can be accused, and even stand accused in front of our Creator, but
this is not the last, nor especially the first word. To emphasize the accusative
and turn the pun of the accusation by the Other into the primary way that the
self can exist is in fact an extremely impoverished way to approach not only
language, but also the mutuality of existence itself. The grammar here is
important, as it indicates and signifies realities beyond mere descriptive
grammars and 'thick descriptions, ,95 however much these grammars may be
helpful as limiting prologemena to analogical speech."
92 1. Aaron Simmons and David Wood, "Introduction: Good Fences May Not Make Good
Neighbors After Ali," in Kierkegaard and Levinas: Ethics. Politics. and Religion
(Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 2. To be precise here, however, the
vocative is actually a separate case than the accusative, one which would come 'before' the
accusative in the dative sense of giving, address, and supplication.
93 See the afterword at Buber, I and Thou, 101.
94 Although, of course, he would reject the designation of the 'ontological', opting instead (in
Totality and Infinity) for 'metaphysics'.
95 For example, that of Clifford Geertz and some within the theological sensibility dubbed
'Post-Liberal' associated with George Lindbeck and Hans Frei of the Yale School. However,
it must be noted that the arguments of Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and
Theology in a Postliberal Age (London: SPCK, 1984) have often been misconstrued in an
over-excitement to focus upon the "grammar" aspect forgetting that this can only be made
sense of within Lindbeck's original ecumenical concerns. For more on this, see chapter 3, "'I
Pray That They Might Be One as We Are One": An Interview with George Lindbeck' of John
W. Wright, ed., Postliberal Theology and the Church Catholic: Conversations with George
Lindbeck. David Burrell. and Stanley Hauerwas (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2012).
96 These concerns can be seen most astutely in the work of David Burrell, C.S.C., who follows
the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Victor Preller to construct a 'Wittgensteinian-
Thomism'. See Victor PreIler, Divine Science and the Science of God: A Reformulation of
Thomas Aquinas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967); David B. Burrell,
Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven, C'F: Yale University Press, 1973); David
B. Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action (Scranton and London: University of Scranton Press,
2008), 63-81, 97-100, e.g., "determine what must be stated grammatically, so that we can
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The grammatical preliminaries in the previous sections were necessary for
my argument, because at stake here is what it means to 'stand accused':
standing accused always means standing within a further witness to the truth,
and thus the grammar here also indicates that the accusative only ever makes
sense within an originary dative, a giving," a vocative calling of Creation out
of nothing and giving the gift of existence and redemption itself. To exist as a
person means always to first be given (dative) that personhood, standing under
(hypostasis) the relation of the First Person in which all of creation itself is
held together (Coli: 17). But it also means that being a person is to be at the
same time one who is named.
Derrida had similar misgivings of reducing everything to the accusative at
the expense of all else, as early as his 'Violence and Metaphysics' essay.
Wondering what the encounter with the absolutely-other actually entails, he
says, 'the concept (material of language), which is always given to the other,
cannot encompass the other, cannot include the other. The dative or vocative
dimension which opens the original direction of language, cannot lend itself to
inclusion in and modification by the accusative or attributive dimension of the
object without violence'." For Derrida this is in fact an inescapable violence,
but it is the only way to precede (in contrast to Levinas' later Gnostic attempt
to escape all being). So for now, in the meantime, Derrida insists on not
speaking of the other in the accusative, as this in fact makes the other an
object. Rather, as Derrida intones, 'I can only, 1 must only speak to the other;
that is, 1 must call him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of
recognize what sort of things cannot be asserted of God" (Ibid., 97); and the essays in Jeffrey
Stout and Robert MacSwain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations of Aquinas and
Wittgenstein (London: SCM Press, 2004).
97 Robert B. Gibbs, "Substitution: Marcel and Levinas," in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical
Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky,
vol. 3: Levinas and the Question of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 159-
60, originally printed in: Philosophy & Theology 4 (Winter 1989): 171-85: "Absolute
passivity taken grammatically is being absolutely in the accusative case, to be the object. This
allows Levinas the pun on an indeclinable case-s-one which cannot be declined through the
cases to become a subject of action (nominative), nor an indirect object (dative), nor a
possession (genitive)." The problem with passages like this is that it overlooks that the dative
does not merely act as indicating a direct object, but comes primarily, as stated above, from
giving, which then can also include other functions as indicating a direct object, or the subject
to whom one addresses or gives supplication.
98 Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," 95, emphasis Derrida's.
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speech, but, rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech' .99 That is,
the least violent way one can call upon the other is by calling (vocative) the
name of the other. The name itself need not be a totalizing 'theme' as Levinas
constantly insists, but rather, it is the spring of language itself, and more
importantly, the only truly personal way to address other persons.
Giving also implies, one may always hope, a welcoming, a reception. Jean-
Luc Marion, writing on very Levinasian themes in an essay entitled 'The Final
Appeal of the Subject,' also gives voice to the fuller picture of the canvas of
language.
It is no longer a question of comprehending this giving according to
the nominative case (Husserl) or according to the genitive case (of
Being: Heidegger) nor even according to the accusative case (Levinas),
but rather according to the dative case-I receive myselJfrom the call
or appeal which gives me to myself. It would almost be necessary to
suppose that this strange dative case was not here distinguished from
the ablative case (as in Greek), since the myselj7me accomplishes,
insofar as it is the first gift which derives from the appeal or call, the
opening of all other donations or gifts and particular givens, which are
possibly ethical. As a given dative, an ablative giving, one might say
that the myselj7me is played out in the manner of the oblative.
Receiving itself from the call or appeal which summons it, the
myselflme undergoes an interlocution-defining the fact of its pure
donation-by reducing every other possible phenomenon to pure
donation according to interlocution. Interlocution thus marks the
ultimate phenomenological reduction.!"
More cognizant of language's own reciprocity, Marion appears here to reduce
Levinas' absolute accusative (and obsessive accusation) to the
'interlocutionary'. By itself this move allows for reciprocity, the give-and-take
of gifts and the mutual supplication expected of one another (i.e. 'I expect to
99 Ibid., 103.
lOO Jean-Luc Marion, "The Final Appeal of the Subject," in The Religious, ed. John D. Caputo
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 140. Prior to this article, see also Jean-Luc
Marion, "A Note Concerning the Ontological Indifference," in Emmanuel Levinas: Critical
Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara Trout, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky,
vol. I: Levinas, Phenomenology, and His Critics, 4 vols. (London and New York: Routledge,
2005), 312-25. And see the similar claim made of 'a more original dative' in Jean-Luc
Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 249. For a recent critical account, see the
chapter 'Marion's Dative Subject and the "Principle of Principles'" in Ian Leask, Being
Reconfigured (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 25--43 and 125-
6. On the (direct and indirect) debate with Levinas, see Christina M. Gschwandtner, "The
Neighbor and the Infinite: Marion and Levinas on the Encounter Between Self, Human Other,
and God," Continental Philosophy Review 40, no. 3 (2007): 231--49.
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tell you when I am wrong'), but it also allows for the very receiving of one's
own personhood in and through the other, the interlocutor. A feast, a
communion, can only be possible in such a picture of reception. Yet, because
Levinas excludes this from the start with a wholly anonymous other, it seems
that there can be no feasting: 'The relationship with the other is not an idyllic
and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we
put ourselves in the other's place ...the relationship with the other is a
relationship with a Mystery' .101 While it is true that relating to the other is
relating to a mystery, Levinas' assumptions concerning this relation are
entirely negative; that is, on the flip side, there is still a possibility that
positively, the person is both a mystery and that moreover, a relationship of
communion may very well be possible precisely because the other still has a
name-the nominative need not be ruled out. Simply because the person is a
mystery does not mean that one cannot relate to them, unless, of course, from
the start one rules out the assumption that the other might be 'like' me, in the
sense of a simile or an analogy.
I will address one further attempt that has been made to soften the
terrorizing language of Levinas. Robert Bernasconi has written an essay
connecting Levinas with Augustine entitled 'The Truth that Accuses:
Conscience, Shame, and Guilt in Levinas and Augustine' .102 In some ways his
attempt to connect Levinas and Augustine are very laudable, and the
connection is more than implicit. For example, Bernasconi finds evidence to
compare Levinas with Augustine playing on an ambiguity between a truth that
also calls one into question: 'In this lecture [called "Notes sur le sense"] from
1979, that was first published in 1981, and reprinted in a revised version in De
Dieu qui vient a I 'idee the following year, Levinas offered two translations of
the phrase veritas redarguens. It is both the truth which accuses and the truth
which puts in question.'?" The effect of this historical connection is an
attempt to temper the connotations of legal accusation and moreover, against a
1111 Levinas, Time and the Other, 75; cited in Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 78.
1112 Robert Bernasconi, "The Truth That Accuses: Conscience, Shame and Guilt in Levinas and
Augustine," in The Ethics of Postmodernity: Current Trends in Continental Thought,
Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1999), 24-34.
1113 Ibid., 26.
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daily legalism of telling one to do this and that. 104 The conscience that
Levinas describes, beyond making one guilty-for this is what an accusation
implies-is meant to induce shame as well as a kind of anxiety.!" But the
primary argument that Bernasconi makes is that by subordinating the
ontological order to the ethical in this way, 'it points to his attempt to free
ethics from its dependence on a legalistic model'. 106
At first blush, this is an extremely odd claim to make. Is not the opposite
exactly the case? Is it not the pure imperative of the ethical that comes before
any consideration of the beauty, truth, and goodness of existence the very
basis for the worst legalisms? Moreover, does not the reduction of all personal
address to the accusative sound like the most juridical nightmare? That is, to
constantly be told that' You are to blame', 'You are the one who did this',
etc.-how is this accusation not legalistic, let alone condemning? As
mentioned, Levinas does tell us that alterity begins from a 'me', and that his
ethical response is to announce (always in the accusative) a denuded-by-the-
other 'Here I am' (me voici). But as Marion and the early Derrida have pointed
out, this cannot be primary. One must first give the gift of the other by calling
upon their name, even if in the worst tum of events you are guilty for any
number of wrongs. The supplication to forgive always first responds back in
the dative calling upon a nominative in the vocative, that is, an address to
someone with a name in the mode of address; otherwise, responding in the
accusative'" in kind is what leads to escalation and ultimately, against all of
Levinas' intentions, to war.
For a positive account of the accusative within the larger economy of the
giving of creation, I now turn to the thought of Franz Rosenzweig and Michel
Henry. These two thinkers have extremely divergent approaches to thinking




107 One can think of any number of arguments one has had or witness where two people
constantly exchange an accusatory You. Forgiveness never begins here. Another kind of
'You', similar in kind to Buber's 'Thou', is found in the thought of Eugen Rosenstock-
Huessy. On this more unifying and revelatory dimension of the soul, see Gibbs, Correlations
in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 64-7, esp. 66.
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largely responding to the idealism of the 'all' in Hegel,ID8 and Henry is
articulating his philosophy to a great extent by reacting against Heidegger's'"
concept of the manifestation of truth.!" Both thinkers, however, share an
attentiveness to language that includes significant references to the accusative
aspect of grammar, not merely for grammar's sake, but to indicate a deep
ontological aspect of the person and of creation.
Rather than primarily structuring his work around grammatical cases,
Rosenzweig traces the contours of his theological concepts around
grammatical moods, and around the concepts of the call."! Particularly, he
orders the concepts of Creation, Revelation, and Redemption respectively
around the three moods of the indicative, the imperative, and cohortative,
which themselves correspond to the three tenses of past, present, and future.
While I will not explore the details of these grammatical moods here.!" I will
address his work insofar as it does refer to the same cases of grammar
addressed above.
Under a threatening Idealism that attempted to sublimate all particulars into
an 'all' without language, Rosenzweig, much like Kierkegaard and especially
Hamann before him, turned to language to embrace the particular.!" One of
IOH His main work being The Star of Redemption.
109 For a helpful comparison of Heidegger and Rosenzweig, see Richard A. Cohen, "Selfhood
in Hcidegger and Rosenzweig," Human Studies 16, no. 1/2 (1993): 111-28. While they share
many concerns, one of their main differences is that Rosenzweig upholds the notion of the
soul [Seele] in his thought (see pp. 121-3).
Ito For Henry, see Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1973); Michel Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity,
trans. Susan Emanuel, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press,2003).
III 'The point of departure for [Eugen] Rosenstock[-Huessy],s grammar is that the second
person (the "you") is originary: a child begins to become conscious of itself through the
commands addressed to it; and a person becomes a person by responding when addressed and
thereby discovering the "I" of the first person. The "you" is the experience of being called; the
"I" of answering; the 'he, she, it' of what cannot give an answer, and therefore of what cannot
be addressed. The soul thus becomes aware of itself first from outside, finding itself
something other. The child discovers its "I" as the ability to answer, to say "yes" or "no", to
that call from the other' (Ibid., 64; citing Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "Angewandte
Seelenkunde," in Die Sprache Des Menschengeschlects, vol. 2 [Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert
Schneider, 1963], 754). For more on the connection between Rosenzweig and Rosenstock-
Huessy, see Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 59, 62-7.
112 For an overview on this, see Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 67-79. For
Rosenzweig's own grammatical introduction to book II, see Rosenzweig, The Star of
Redemption, 118-21.
113 On Hamann, see the excellent John R. Betz, After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision
of J. G. Hamann, 1st Edition, Illuminations (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), esp. 89-164.
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Rosenzweig's tactics was to emphasize the named quality of language,
something with which German Idealism could not cope: 'for even if
everything in it [Idealism] could be translated into the universal-there
remained the fact of having a first and last name, the most personal thing in
the strictest and narrowest sense of the word, and everything depended
precisely on that personal reality, as the bearers of these experiences
asserted' ,114 Idealism cannot ultimately account for the particular of the name
for, if it is especially of the Hegelian type of Idealism which begins bathed in
the aether of Spinozism.!" then the subjectivity of the person tends to get lost.
Michael Mack points out that the immanent production of transcendence in
Idealism is really that of an 'anti-creaturely theology', which for Rosenzweig
means that it does 'away with its contingent, "bodily" foundation' ,116 If
Idealism does away with bodily realities, then what, or more precisely who is
saved in a theology of redemption? Rosenzweig's describes his approach:
'From Creation, we had sought the path to Revelation'."? Mack articulates the
movement of the argument thus: 'Rosenzweig ,., affirmed the independence
of God, world, and man, only to prepare the ground for their correlation, in
which, thanks to the distance between these three entities, love of one for the
other becomes possible' ,118
The call of the proper name, for Rosenzweig, opens the world of
Revelation up into genuine dialogue, and like Buber's l-Thou in contrast to the
I-It relation, 'a breach is opened in the fixed wall of thingliness".'" What's
114 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 13.
115 'When one begins to philosophize one must be first a Spinozist. The soul must bathe itself
in the aether of this single substance, in which everything one has held for true is submerged'
(Hegel, Werke XX, 165, as cited in Frederick C. Beiser, 'Introduction: Hegel and the Problem
of Metaphysics', in Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C, Beiser [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993],5).
116 "Franz Rosenzweig, or The Body's Independence from the Body Politic," in Michael
Mack, German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German
Jewish Responses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003),120-1.
117 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 202-3. 'Von der Schopfung hatten wir den Weg zur
Offenbarung gesucht' (Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern Der Erlosung [Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1990], 209).
118 Mack, German Idealism and the Jew, 121.
119 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 201. This is not to overlook the disagreements
between Buber and Rosenzweig. On debates concerning issues of translation and the law, see
respectively, Leora Batnitzky, Idolatry and Representation: The Philosophy of Franz
Rosenzweig Reconsidered (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), I05~ I; idem,
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more, as in the case of Adam naming the creatures in Genesis, 'The proper
name lays claim to names beyond itself. 120 That is, Adam is not merely
naming by his own human fiat, but is himself taking part in the reception of
revelation, of uncovering. There is an analogy to be drawn here to Balthasar's
understanding of truth: 'truth is always an opening, not just to itself and in
itself, but to further truth. It dis-covers being and thus the rich coherence of
being. It opens up the prospect of hitherto unknown territory. It contains
within itself a movement toward further truth'. 121 This means that for
Rosenzweig, the experience that is lived personally shares in existence with
others in a particular place, which 'demands being founded in Creation
[ ... ]'.122 The warp and woof of language can only be woven into a particular
place in Creation, for it is the very clay that grammar molds, and only in such
a place does language move and have its being. Thus, it is in such a place that
Rosenzweig describes the cases of grammar:
It is only as object that it travels through the "cases"; as nominative in
a passive sentence, it is only a camouflaged accusative or, in any case
and more accurately: a prediction of the subject still veiled in the form
of the object. In the genitive, the possessive form, there flows together
a double current that came from the nominative and the accusative;
after the confluence, they assume, in the dative, their own name and
their own direction. But the dative, the form of belonging, of offering,
of thanking, of both surrendering and making an effort, goes beyond
the mere object and the mere point of departure; in the dative, subject
and object meet.!"
Because he is not fearful of Creation, of Being, Rosenzweig is able to think
the full fabric of being, and express its full texture with an entire grammar. He
does not reduce everything to the accusative like Levinas, but can still use it to
describe Creation. Moreover, divine and human freedom are never at odds in
his thought, for the grammar seems to give a way to freely talk about these
two agencies: 'The nouns of this chapter, due to the fact that God alone takes
the place of the active subject, are objects in the accusative, objects created by
"Revelation and Neues Denken - Rethinking Buber and Rosenzweig on the Law," in New
Perspectives on Martin Buber, ed. Michael Zank (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 149-64.
120 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 201.
121 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Truth of the World,
trans. Adrian J. Walker, vol. I (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2000), 39.
122 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 202.
123 Ibid., 140, emphasis mine.
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God; or again, as things become, in the passive nominative case: "the"
heavens and "the" earth' .124 The 'otherwise' of which Levinas speaks can only
result in a non-place, a 'world [that] remains in the night of the absence of
names' .125 There is no need for the rupture of the nominative by the accusative
in Rosenzweig's thought, because his use of the nominative case need not be
'thematizing' in a totalizing sense, for Rosenzweig is also against such
Hegelian totality. Names can be 'in' the nominative, but also the accusative,
and they signify not themes but persons. Spoken more precisely, the name
(nominative) reveals a person in that it names a person.
The nominative and accusative are never rigid in Rosenzweig, because of
the fact that they only refer to a person who experiences life but may also refer
to the Creator. Here he speaks of 'two kinds of subjects, two kinds of
nominatives; likewise that which he possesses and that which he sees is
separate from that which the world possesses and sees; these are two kinds of
objects, two kinds of accusatives' .126 And because the one to whom the
creature gives thanks is not an 'object' in the strict sense but is 'the very one to
whom the whole world gives thanks', this signifies the reality of the lived
relation which he describes as the dative:
In the dative, which transcends all, there are hidden the voices of the
hearts separated here below. The dative is that which joins, that which
gathers together; he who receives, for example the act of thanks as is
the case here, does not for this reason become the property of what is
given to him; he remains beyond the one who gives, and because he
remains beyond the singular giver, he can become the point where all
can be united; the dative which truly joins can be that which truly
unties every bond knotted beyond the truth, every inessential bond, can
be that [which] re-deems-Iet us give thanks to God.127
Commenting upon Rosenzweig's understanding of the dative, Robert Gibbs
remarks, 'the dative case structures the unity of the cohortative singing of
124 Ibid., 164.
125 Ibid., 202. This phrase seems to parody Hegel's critique of F. Schelling in which
subjectivity is lost in a 'night in which all cows are black'. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 9 [§ 16].
For a detailed discussion of this fraught relationship between Hegel and Schelling on this
matter, see Jason M. Wirth, The Conspiracy 0/ Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003),12-23.
126 Rosenzweig, The Star 0/Redemption, 250.
127 Ibid.
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beloved and world; it represents the recipient of the gift, the person who is
neither simply the subject of the action (the giver) nor the object acted upon
(the gift)' .!28 The dative contains the original Yes to the world, !29 the giving of
Creation, as well as the receiving in itself of this gift.
It is now for the first time in this chapter that we can situate ourselves
within the original 'causal' sense (aUia) of the 'accusative', before its Latin
mistranslation. The unifying and thanks-giving aspect of the dative, which
Rosenzweig highlights, brings this causal aspect to the fore: 'Every act of
thanks is concentrated in the dative; the act of thanks gives thanks for the gift;
when giving thanks to God, one confesses the origin of the gift in him, one
recognizes in him the one who answers the prayer' .130 To acknowledge that
Creation is a gift, and that one is a gift within this prior gift of Creation, is to
acknowledge the original giving of the gift by the Creator-the original 'real
order' of giving which we have been calling the 'dative'. Yet, if it is true that
creatures can only know their Creator by the effects of the Creator?' (although
this is not exhaustivej.!" then we can now see that the 'accusative' represents
that 'order of knowledge' as perceived by creatures; in other words, the
'accusative' represents that reasonable intuition that recognizes one's status as
an 'effect' from an original cause, that is: ontologically, to 'stand accused'
means to be caused, or rather, created. The 'two kinds of accusatives' of
which Rosenzweig speaks above are the 'real' order and the order that comes
'by way of creaturely knowledge'r'" God creates God's Creation, speaks
!28 Gibbs, Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas, 76.
!29 'The Yes is the beginning' (Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 34--5).
BD Ibid., 250, emphasis mine.
m Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. Joseph Kenny OP, trans. Anton C. Pegis et
a!. (New York: Hanover House, 1955), I, c. II, n. 4; II, c. 15 (hereafter ScG); Aquinas, ST, I,
q. I, a. 7 ad I; q. 2, a. I; q. 2, a. 2; q. 12, a. 8, etc.; cf. De Ver., q. 2, a. 14, where Thomas says
that God's effects are mediated by secondary causes.
132 ST, I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 2; I, q. 12, aa. 11-12; De Ver., I, 7.
133 These are similar to, but should not be confused with the 'real' versus 'conceptual' or
'intentional' orders of relation between creation and God, where here 'real' = 'by creaturely
knowledge' and 'intentional' = 'real'. I have chosen the former designations for clarity. This
comes from the fact that while creatures are really related to God, God is intentionally related
to God's creatures. This somewhat confusing designation (to the modem mind) is meant to
foreclose against two possibilities of thinking: I) any necessity in God being related to
Creation, that is, it upholds a Creation as e free gift, and 2) any 'real' change on God's part
who, as the plenitude of all perfection, is the efficient cause of creation. On this see ST, I, q.
45, a. 3 ad I; I, q. 6, a. 2 ad I; III, q. 2, a. 7. For a discussion regarding the misunderstanding
of Process Theology on this matter, see BurreIl, Aquinas: God and Action, 97-100. A further
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(vocative) and thus gives (dative) it into being as a gift, which exists as seen in
the 'real order' of things; but the 'by knowledge' order consists of this
experience that describes the following reality as seen from the side of
creatures. As Thomas Aquinas articulates it: because 'God is not known to us
in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we
name Him from these ... ; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far
as [it] relates to the source of its meaning' .134 While creation itself cannot be
reduced purely to causality and also has an entire-and no less co-extensive--
participatory aspect.!" for now the above argument suffices to show that the
accusative bears within it an older, more properly causal determination which
sheds light on our discussion of grammar at a deeper ontological level.
distinction Thomas makes is that the Triune Persons are not logically related to one another,
but are really related to one another (ST, I, q. 28, a. 1 ad 3). It is for this reason that W. Norris
Clarke makes the following suggestion: 'For it is precisely in the intentional order of
knowledge and love that interpersonal relations are located. This whole domain of being
simply escapes or transcends the entire set of Aristotelian categories of change, immutability,
and real relation. Hence I believe we can truly say that without doing violence to his own
basic metaphysical positions St. Thomas could and should say that God does have authentic
mutual personal relations with all created persons, even though he himself would not call
these by the strong technical term of "real relation'" (W. Norris Clarke, 'What Is Most and
Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Today', in Explorations in Metaphysics:
Being-God-Person [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994], 26). Clarke
does not pursue this defense of Thomas on Thomas' own technical terms, but makes a brief
attempt (Ibid, 26-7) to sort out this dilemma by redefining immutability, which he then
expands upon in idem, 'A New Look at the Immutability of God', in Explorations in
Metaphysics, 183-210. Immutability here is 'controlled' against static Greek (not to mention
Cartesian and Lockean variants of substance) by an analogical notion of personhood gained by
the Judeo-Christian concept of a personal God of love (Ibid, 207 -8).
134 ST, I, q. 13, a. 8. The logic at work here mirrors the inverse directionality explicated in the
difference between res significata and modus significandi. On this see Ibid., I, q. 13, aa. 1, 3,
6; ScG, I, c. 34, n. 6. Compendium Theologiae, trans. Cyril Vollert, SJ (St. Louis, MO &
London: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), I, 27 (hereafter Comp. Theo!.): "as regards the assigning
of the names, such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the inteIlect that
assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the thing signified by the
name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other
beings." For a detailed discussion, see Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible
God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, D.
C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 334-52. Aaron Riches, "Being Good:
Thomas Aquinas and Dionysian Causal Predication," Nova Et Vetera 7, no. 2 (2009): 443:
"for Denys and Aquinas, knowledge of God and naming God are tightly tied to the reality of
the causal ontology of creation as such. If creation and signification are linked, then being is
already a kind of predication. The act of existence mediates the cause of creation, and this
mediation of God in creation makes predication of God possible."
135 ST, I, q. 13, a. 6; Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, trans. English Dominican Fathers
(Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1952), q. 7, a. 7 (hereafter De Pot.). Hampus
Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and
Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino, Uppsala Universitets Arsskrift 1953:5
(Uppsala: Lundequistska bokhandeln, 1953), 290-2: "If our names were merely expressing
the pure causality of God, our denominations would be of the kind which, generaIly speaking,
approach extrinsic designations." This will be explored more fuIly in the next chapter.
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To conclude this chapter, 1 turn to Michel Henry, whose thought provides
further resources for considering the existence of persons in the accusative,
doing so within an transcendence-within-immanence of Life's auto-affection.
For Henry, 'auto-affection' refers to the '[a]ffection by [the] self that is an
'immediate experience of the self .136 The way that Henry translates auto-
affectivity's mere philosophical ambit into a simultaneously theological
register is within a phenomenology of truth within a study of the person of
truth in the Gospel according to John. Therefore, truth reveals itself to itself, as
in: the person of Christ who is the truth (John 14:6), comes to testify to the
truth (John 18:37). Thus, Henry states, 'Only Truth can attest to itself-reveal
itself in and through itself. 137 Due to the interchangeability of Life, Truth, and
Way, Henry applies this logic to Life: 'what Life reveals is itself .138 Within
this immanent auto-affectivity and auto-revelation of Life, the self is given
over to itself. 'Life engenders itself as me'.139This causes the Self to be passive
with regard to not only itself and its modalities of life, but primarily, 'the Self
is passive with respect to the eternal process of Life's self-affecting that
engenders it and never ceases to do so. This passivity of the singular Self
within Life is what puts it into the accusative case and makes of it a "me" and
not an "1", this Self that is passive about itself only because it is passive to
begin with about Life and its absolute self-affection' .140 Attendant to our
discussion of the causal nature of the accusative case above, Henry's emphasis
on passivity reflects the self's createdness; the self-affection of the 'me' attests
to the primary '1' of Life who gives it unto itself. Additionally, the reason that
the Self is constantly in the accusative case for Henry 'is because it holds fast
to its own experience, which is not that of being affected but of being
constantly self-affected, within itself, in a self-affection that is independent of
136 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 189, 462, respectively. Furthermore, auto-affection is
also the co-extensivity of being with time such that 'time [is] itself under the form of the pure
horizon of Being'. Michael O'Sullivan comments that Henry's purpose for bringing this co-
extensivity to the forefront is because the self's auto-affection must include 'both the
individual's self-awareness and her being in time, [which] distances Henry from Husserl's use
of this term which Derrida critiques for its forgetting of time' (Michael O'Sullivan, Michel
Henry; Incarnation, Barbarism and Belief An Introduction to the Work of Michel Henry
[Bern: Peter Lang, 2006], 34n.6).
1J7 Henry, I Am the Truth, 10.
BM Ibid., 29.
IW Ibid., 104.
140 Ibid., 107, emphasis mine.
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external affecting or any relation with the world' .141 The Self affects itself
within a 'pathetik' auto-affection, which entails a kind of suffering of the
flesh-but this suffering is not tragic, for it is the very fragility of Life itself
which is the condition of being blessed: the joy142 experienced in the
description, 'blessed are those that suffer' .143
How does this differ in kind to Levinas' ethics of accusation, which in a real
sense ultimately amounts to a self-accusation? First of all, there is no joy in
Levinas, only obsession and insomnia.l" Perhaps the greatest difference,
again, is that while Levinas eschews an analogy of apperception with a
transcendental ego (as found in Husserl and the early Levinas), Henry fully
embraces the transcendentality of the ego, but locates this within what he calls
the Ipseity of the 'Arch-Son':
'Before Abraham was ... Me, I am'. These words signify that no
transcendental living 'me' is possible except within an Ipseity that it
presupposes ... -an Ipseity co-generated in the self-affection of
absolute Life and whose phenomenological effectivity is precisely the
Arch-Son. The First Born within Life and the First Living, the Arch-
Son holds the essential Ipseity in which life's self-affection comes to
be effective. But it is only within this Ipseity, and on its basis, that any
other Self, and thus any transcendental ego such as ours, will be
possible. Thus, the Arch-Son holds in his Ipseity the condition of all
others sons.!"
The Arch-Son here acts not only as the transcendental condition for all other
egos, much like Husserl's analogy of apperception, but here Henry
141Ibid., 108.
142'[I]n any effective living, for it to be so, to suffer and have joy are joint and
contemporaneous modes of pathetik self-affection' (Ibid., 202).
143Ibid., 200-1: 'Suffering and Joy are linked by an essential affinity, which refers back to a
primitive unity: the absolutely primitive original unity of Suffering and Rejoicing. Suffering
appears to be the path that leads to enjoying, and thus its condition. It is only in experiencing
oneself in the "suffer myself' that the life of the living Self comes into itself, such that
suffering is veritably a path and a way. It is the test that life must pass so that, in and through
that test, it attains itself and comes into itself in that coming that is the essence of any life, the
process of its self-revelation .... "to suffer" dwells inside "to rejoice" as that which leads to joy
in as much as it dwells within it, as its internal and permanent condition'.
144 On the topic of insomnia as 'wakefulness' in Levinas, see Emmanuel Levinas, Existence
and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 65-66; Levinas,
Totality and Infinity, 258; Emmanuel Levinas, "God and Philosophy," in The Levinas Reader,
ed. Sean Hand, trans. Richard A. Cohen and Alphonso Lingis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1989),169-71; Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearny, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas,"
in Face to Face with Levinas, ed. Richard A. Cohen, SUNY Series in Philosophy (Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986),30.
145Henry, I Am the Truth, 110.
69
personalizes this aspect: the transcendental condition is not an impersonal
concept, but is the 'First Born within Life', the one who said, 'Before
Abraham was, 1 am'. (Also of import is that Henry inserts the accusative 'me'
in front of this 'I am' statement, indicating the regard the Father has for the
Son.) 'The Self can only enter into Life in the [Arch-Son's] Ipseity and in the
originary Self that belongs to him, ... by making of [each self] a "me"-never
come to him except by making of him a "me "-this transcendental "me" that 1
myself am. "Before Abraham was [but this means 'before any transcendental
"me" whatever, whether it be Abraham's or David's'], 1 am." ,146 Henry goes
on to say later that the Self must pronounce its own 'me' in the accusative and
not the nominative case because of 'the fact that it is engendered, not bringing
itself into the condition that is its own, not experiencing itself as a Self, and
not having this experience of self, except in the eternal self-affection of Life
and of its original Ipseity' .147 The self-experience of the self puts the self into
the accusative 'me', which signifies that 'for each me, its ipseity does not
come from it, but inversely, it comes from its ipseity' .148 This mirrors the order
set out by Thomas that 'Creation is like God, but God is never (positively) like
creation' .149 That is, every self comes from an Jpseity which is not its own. To
reach itself, and to reach all others, the transcendental Self must pass 'under
the triumphal Arch, through this Door that is Christ in the parable of the sheep
reported by John. It is in the very movement ... in which I reach myself and
am given to myself through my transcendental birth, that I also reach,
eventually, the other-since I identify myself with such movement and
coincide with it' .150 Heeding the astute warnings of theologians wary of
146 Ibid., III, the text in brackets here are Henry's.
147 Ibid., 135.
148 Ibid., italics are Henry's.
149 I Sent. d. 35, q. 1. a. 4 ad 6; De Pot. 7. 7. 3 ad contra; De Ver. 2. II ad 1. Citing Lyttkens,
The Analogy Between God and the World, 284.
150 Henry, I Am the Truth, 255. Comparing Barth to Levinas Graham Ward says, 'Levinas's
self recognises in the hungry and the destitute its own sonship, its own ipseity, its own state of
being a hostage to God and responsible for others. And Levinas describes this condition in
terms of recognising the Suffering Servant. Barth describes this condition in terms of
recognising the death of Christ. But whereas for Levinas each is called to be the Suffering
Servant pouring out her life for others, for Barth the believer only enters "the form of the
death of Christ". No human being approximates to the uniqueness of Christ, they only
approximate to the "form" of such uniqueness. Another way of putting this would be to say
that sonship is a mode of being, an existential condition for Levinas. The sonship of believers
for Barth is living in the form of a mode of being, living as a figure of a person whose own
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turning God into a merely transcendental concept, lSI Henry, in his later Words
of Christ ably transforms these insights into a God who speaks his word in
Christ: 'Life only becomes itself in the Self of the First Living Being whom it
generates in itself as its Word [Verbe]. Each living being in tum only
experiences itself in the Self of this Word [Verbe]. This is how the prologue
puts it: "All things came into being through him, and without him not one
thing came into being" (John 1:3)'.152
In order to become a self, a person that can offer itself to others, one must
first 'pass through Christ', who is the 'original' person. Moreover, Christ also
stands as the 'I am' prior to Abraham, arriving amidst Creation paradoxically
therefore as the lamb slain before the foundation of the world (Rev 13:8), yet
also as the one who enters this world through a virginal birth. Henry shows us
that all personhood has its beginning in the Arch-Person of Christ; to be a self,
to have one's personhood'" is always to have it more primarily in the first
Self-what Henry calls Jpseity-who testifies to himself as the Truth.
Levinas' ethics fail not merely for its terrorizing violence, but primarily and
precisely because (obsessive, slanderous) accusation is not primary: a self-gift
that finds itself created within the gift of Creation is more original. Levinas
says that responsibility to the other comes too late and thus we are always
guilty.!" but here he speaks all too soon because he misses that any (causal)
living is original and proper. There is, therefore, a secondariness, a level of mediation in Barth
that is absent from Levinas'. Graham Ward, "The Revelation of the Holy Other as Wholly
Other: Between Barth's Theology of the Word and Levinas's Philosophy of Saying," in
Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, ed. Claire Katz and Lara
Trout, vol. 3: Levinas and the Question of Religion (London and New York: Routledge,
2005), 328. At the same time, Levinas's construction of the 'third' that he names 'illeity' is
not a mediating, common 'third' but a rupturing, non-thematizing 'thirdness' which makes the
other itself different. On iIIeity in Levinas, see Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 147-50; for
Ward's commentary, see Barth. Derrida and the Language of Theology, 144--<i.
151 'If God is thought within the human context as a lingual being, but initially apart from the
word in which he is, the danger of a transcendental concept of God looms anew, that concept
which led into the aporia of the unthinkability of God'. Eberhard Jungel, God as the Mystery
of the World: On the Foundatin of Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute Between
Atheism and Theism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1983),
230n.3. I do, however, reject Jungel's own rejection of the Dionysian and Thomist
apophaticism aluded to here. Cf. Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 248n.l03, for Hart's
remarks against transcendentalism.
152 Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012),110.
153 For creatures, their status as person will only ever be 'had' by participation, and not by
essence.
154 'In an approach I am first a servant of a neighbor, already late and guilty for being late. I
am as it were ordered from the outside, traumatically commanded, without interiorizing by
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accusative is always first and foremost given within the dative of the vocative,
of calling creation into existence, and of breathing life into the dust to make
humanity. If obsessive accusation is always primary, then there would be no
way to know otherwise, which is why the kind of 'accusative' -accusation
Levinas commands can only be intelligible if there is a primary gift, and also
if the accusative is reconfigured along more coherent 'causal' trajectories
involving creation. True, such a reconfiguration would not bear much
resemblance to Levinas any longer, but his traumatic and torturous ethics
exact a high price. And, because Levinas wants to escape being, it is difficult
to see how one can take seriously his pronouncements concerning the
goodness of creation, let alone the fact that it is difficult to know who is
accusing me because of the feature-less, character-less anonymity of the Other
within his thought.
Names and naming are so important within the Jewish and Christian
traditions for this reason: they signify a primary mystery whose ineffability is
still one we may encounter. The prior testimony to the truth, to the name of
God, is also what makes possible the beginning of the response of the human
person, and also to God. To quote Rosenzweig one more time, commenting
upon God's call to Adam in the Garden: 'To God's question: "Where are
you?" the man still remained a You, as a defiant, obstinate Self; when called
by name twice, with the strongest fixity of purpose to which one cannot
remain deaf, the man totally open, totally unfounded, totally read, totally-
soul, now answers: "I am here."'!" The true 'I am' as revealed in the Person
of Jesus Christ-who, as the Adam now becomes first-stood before Pilate in
accusation. The slander directed at him by the crowd, and the confrontation
with Pilate himself looks different when we realize that in their (diabolical)
accusation, this very person was (and is) their judge and their creator. In the
person of Christ, slander ends and redemption begins, because when Christ
himself stands accused it means that Christ is the maker and cause of the same
representation and concepts the authority that commands me' (Levinas, Otherwise Than
Being, 87). See also Levinas, "Substitution," 93.
155 Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 190.
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forces that crucified him-and yet he forgives them. Perhaps this is why after
the jeremiad of the Grand Inquisitor, Christ simply kisses him on the cheek.!"
In the following chapter, I explore the personal distance that has unfolded
through the analysis of this chapter. If the preceding standpoint of Levinas
(and along with him Modem and Post-Modem thought which tends to
prioritize becoming over being, the flux over any kind of stability) assumes a
radical heterogeneity that arises from an ontological equivocity, then what
follows will not be its reactionary opposite-that of univocity-but of the
created distance manifest in the person under the rubric of analogy.
156 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Karamazov Brothers, trans. Ignat Avsey, Oxford World's Classics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 329.
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PART II: Persons, Analogically
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CHAPTER4
ARRIVING AT THE PERSON'S ARRIVAL:
RESOLUTIO AND RECAPITULATION
From Creation, we had sought thepath to Revelation.
-Franz
Rosenzweig!
The starting point of metaphysics is so charged with life that it can
never be left behind, but, like a fruitful seed, it contains, and has the
power to unfold out of itself, the whole of metaphysics. Any extension
of the initial problem is always at the same time an intensification of
the original question that, rather than developing away from the
origin, develops into it and thus becomes ever more original.
-Hans Urs von Balthasar
In the preceding chapter, we saw the consequences of the ethics of radical
heterogeneity from the standpoint of an originary accusation as embodied in
the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This standpoint worked from a set of
assumptions which, to our mind, is untenable. The set of assumptions seems to
be as follows: 1) all phenomenological intentionality must be rejected because
it 'totalizes' the other into itself in an Hegelian fashion; 2) typical notions of
Being as such also lie within this totalizing gaze and therefore any ethics of
the self must be constituted from the 'hither side' of being (i.e., otherwise
than, beyond, etc.) in the form of a un-declinable accusation which puts the
violent 'I' into not a nominative form, but its accusative form of 'me'; 3)
therefore, all selves are constituted asymmetrically in such an Ur-aIterity that
rejects all forms of analogy, especially that of the analogy of apperception of
Husserl's transcendental ego, which also falls within the same narrative that
everything within 'Being' is totalizing. The only option that Levinas is left
with is one of extreme dialectics and rupture. In this sense, the violent rhetoric
found in Levinas' writings follows naturally.
!Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, 202-3. 'Von der Schopfung hatten wir den Weg zur
Offenbarung gesucht' (Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern Der Erlosung [Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1990],209). According to Michael Mack's slightly modified translation in
German Idealism and the Jew, 121.
2 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:25.
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But the structure of being does not have to be this way, all protestations of
the Heideggerian narrative of metaphysics to the contrary.' For example,
knowing other things and other persons within the act of being need not be
violent at all, but can exhibit a self-giving aspect. This is indeed how the
classical definition of truth and knowing understands it, as exemplified by
Thomas Aquinas. Lorenz Puntel remarks in response to Levinas, 'Because
knowledge has to do with truth, its essential point is precisely not the
assimilation of things, of "the other," to the subject; rather, it is the
diametrically opposite: the assimilation of the knower to what is known'. 4 It
seems like most of the violence that Levinas sees in classical accounts of
ontology is reduced to this simple misunderstanding.
We see this misconstrual most clearly in how Levinas understands
'Western philosophy' where the entirety of the tradition is re-read through the
idealism of Berkely and most notably the HusserlianlHeideggerian
understanding of Being. His two main texts, Totality and Infinity as well as
Otherwise than Being, state his historiography clearly. The the latter text,
Levinas describes logos within what he calls an 'amphibology', which means
that 'identification at any level implies the temporalization of the lived,
essence' .5 'Essence', as Levinas defines it, 'is the very fact that there is a
theme, exhibition, doxa or logos, and thus truth'. 6 What this means is that,
within this space of identification, 'to be' is the nominalizing force which not
only temporalizes everything, but it also 'designates' all entities within the
'Said' of Being, thus preventing them from 'resounding'. 'The birthplace of
ontology', Levinas says, 'is in the said. Ontology is stated in the amphibology
of being and entities,.7 Accordingly, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas singles
out 'mediation' ('characteristic of Western philosophy') and
phenomenological mediation, 'where the "ontological imperialism" is yet
3 For an insightful counter-narrative to Heidegger's, see Stanley Rosen, The Question of
Being: A Reversal of Heidegger (New Haven, CI': Yale University Press, 1993).
4 Puntel, Being and God, 287, emphasis in original. Thomas states in De Ver., q. I, a. I: "True
expresses the correspondence between being and the knowing power, for all knowing comes
about through the assimilation of the knower to the thing known." This is restated in ST, I, q.
16, a. 2.




more visible,.8 This is the prioritization of Being over existents found in
Husserl and Heidegger: 'To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to
already decide the essence of philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with
someone, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to a relation with the Being
of existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of
existents (a relationship of knowing), subordinates justice to freedom'.
Levinas thus concludes that this primacy of freedom over ethics 'marks the
direction of and defines the whole of Western philosophy'i '
On the contrary, according to Thomas' vision of metaphysical adequation,
the assimilation of the knower to the things known is in a sense a 'passive'
assimilation, and not at all as the actively 'intentional' act which 'totalizes' all
things unto itself. 10 This is because Thomas has such a strong tendency to
always emphasize reality, not statically, but as esse, the verb of being in its
act." In this sense, as creatures we only have our knowledge as it 'is received
from things, and, by its nature, comes after them' .12 Oliva Blanchette remarks
that there is some wisdom in maintaining the 'traditional description of truth
as an adequation of intelligence to [a] thing rather than as a static conformity
between subject and object. Object suggests an opposition that cannot be
overcome, a gap that cannot be bridged, which clearly is not the case where
there is truth. Thing, which still can be opposed to intelligence, as that which
takes its stand in being rather than just in intelligence, is not defined by this
opposition. It is defined rather by what it is as it stands in being and as it
presents itself to be represented, as that with which representation has to
compose in the exercise of judgment' .13 Knowledge and truth for Levinas
8 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 44.
9 Ibid., 45.
HI 'Knowledge received from things known consists in a passive assimilation by which the
knower is assimilated to objects of knowledge previously existing' (De Ver., q. 2, a. 8 ad 2).
The issue in this question in De Ver. concerns itself with whether or not God knows non-
beings. God is infinitely unique in this case because, likened to that of an artist, God is also
the cause of all knowledge as the artist is to his or her artwork; whereas we only know things
after they already exist. This echoes the same logic of the 'passive nominative' that
Rosenzweig discusses when he comments upon "'the" heavens and "the" earth' (Rosenzweig,
The Star of Redemption, 164).
11 Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 159-64 at 164.
12 De Ver., q. 2, a. 8.
13 Oliva Blanchette, Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics
(Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 202, emphasis mine.
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exhibits this oppositional subject-object dichotomy" such that the 'gap' about
which Blanchette speaks is always a distance of violence instead of the
distance crossed in giving one's own intellect over to the thing as it presents
itself in an act of judgment. As Blanchette concludes, 'There is no gap to
bridge between intelligence and being. There is simply knowing of being to
begin with. Intelligence is already one with being from the very beginning of
reflection and, as finite or limited in its understanding, it has only to make
itself adequate to the being with which it is somehow one'. 15 If the latter half
of the previous chapter explored how, in a sense, Being has no intrinsic
Goodness for Levinas, we now also can see that neither does Levinas have the
philosophical resources to be able to judge it to be True, either. It is not so
much that Truth is a correspondence to us as it 'is that which we must
correspond to in speaking'. 16 Truth, therefore, has a relational, and even
analogical character."
In order to understand the Goodness and Truth of Being, however, one
must have an understanding that these differences are already contained within
Being. 'Being actually contains its differences', Blanchette says, 'and cannot
be known fully apart from these differences'." This does not mean one will
ever know Being fully, but only through a clarification by way of the
differences within Being." Yet, Levinas' so-called alterity is one that assumes
14 Zaborowski, Robert Spaemann's Philosophy of the Human Person. 216-17: "Spaemann
criticizes the supposition that the epiphany of the 'other' comes from 'beyond Being'; for
'Levinas understands "being" in a modem sense as objectification'. In contrast to Levinas,
Spaemann retrieves what he considers a more fundamental notion of Being, one which goes
beyond the distinction between the subjective and the objective and so overcomes the modem
dialectic of spirit and nature."
15 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being. 76.
16 Ibid., 54, emphasis mine.
17 On Thomas' conception of truth as relational in contrast to that of Augustine's ("that which
is") and Philip the Chancellor's (negative) conceptions of truth, see Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval
Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Studien Und Texte Zur
Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters 52 (Leidcn: E.J. Brill, 1996), 253-6. For an account of
truth as analogical, see Balthasar, Theo-Logic, I.Truth of the World; Hans Boersma, 'Analogy
of Truth: The Sacramental Epistemology of Nouvelle Theologie', in Ressourcement: A
Moment for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012),157-71.
IS Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 110. Cf. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in
ThomasAquinas, 206.
19 Such an understanding paves the way for the possibility of all scientific endeavours (cf.
ibid., 141); however, it is another question as to just how such an investigation is pursued,
viz., under the aegis of controlling nature on the one hand, or of discovering being's
differences via a respectful scientific stewardship on the other.
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that Being possesses no intrinsic difference within itself, much like the same
way that Francisco Suarez defines being as that abstracted from all difference,
omitting all reference to actuality (and thus serves as one of the originators of
modem essentialism)." Thus, Levinas has to regard all possibility of
difference as 'otherwise' than Being, 'beyond essence', but in so doing, and in
so removing any potential for analogy, the other ends up becoming the most
self-same, univocal concept of all, always doing the same thing: accusing,
obsessing, causing trauma, in an endless repetition of the same, much like the
boring and monotonous cottage industry of film horror sequels. Despite all of
the best intentions to maintain alterity, it is here that supposedly equivocal
basis is truly seen for what it is: a metaphysical univocity. Without Being's
fecundity displayed in all its difference, it only makes sense that Levinas'
'Other' remains featureless and anonymous.
How then can one speak of the manifold difference of Being? As the
previous chapter showed through the various proposals of Franz Rosenzweig's
emphasis on the giftedness of creation (who, along with the early Derrida,
identified this gift with the 'dative' case) and Michel Henry's focus upon the
Arch-Son whose Ipseity holds 'the condition of all other sons' ,21 the notion of
the 'accusative' was expanded and redefined-albeit inchoately-to include
both a new understanding of a causal relationship to the other as well as an
affirmation of the difference of the other as contained within a higher 'Arch-
Person'. It is this Arch-Person who acted as the primary analogate for the
possibility of all other persons. Thus, to speak of Being's difference with the
utmost of respect to its own dignity-that is, in order to adequate one's own
intellect to the Goodness, Truth, and Beauty of Being-necessarily involves
the use of analogy, not only in reference to Being qua Being, but also in
speaking about Persons.
In this chapter I will expand upon these insights by exploring the ways in
which analogous speech is the only appropriate way to refer to persons, which
20 Francisco Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965), II, 4. See
Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 108-9. For an opposing view which defends Suarez against
charges of being an 'essentialist', see Jose Pereira, Suarez: Between Scholasticism and
Modernity (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), 97-139, esp. 103-5, 119-20.
21 Henry, I Am the Troth, 110.
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will be unfolded in three sections. The first attempts to answer the question,
'Why the person, and how is it "picked out" '? This is accomplished through
an act of metaphysical resolutio, which is the following of the path which
culminates in the affirmation the the human person is the primary analogate of
being. The second part examines the problem of the person itself as a
perfection term. At issue is whether or not the person is itself sufficient
alongside the divine unity of other well-known perfection terms such as
'goodness', 'one', 'wise', 'truth', etc. The third and final section of this
chapter completes the metaphysical path by moving beyond the transcendental
affirmation to the transcendent itself in the arrival of the first person who
comes last: Jesus Christ, the one who recapitulates the world and person in
himself in his life, death, and resurrection.
a. Resolutio, or Beginning at the End
The previous chapters have worked under the presumption of the person as
the causal and analogical 'key' to untangling the issues that surrounded
accusation, the accusative, and the person's status as 'accused' within the
created order. But, how does one arrive at this presumption? Asked in another
way: how does the person arrive?" As will become clear, this one question
asked in two distinctly different ways is an integral part of the way one
articulates the order of human and divine things. For now, it suffices to
express the questions of arrival in a way that mirrors, although is not identical
to, the impulse behind Thomas Aquinas' description of knowledge of God. He
22 This question shares a common ancestor with a similar question asked regarding ontological
origins under the heading of "arrival of the fittest" vs. the "survival of the fittest" in
Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea, 108-17. Also relevant here is the concept of 'emergent
personhood' as developed along the lines of the critical realistic account of personhood in
Smith, What Is a Person?, 25-89. 'Human persons are proactively-not responsively-
emergent realities. Perons are not subsequent products of purely physical processes, the final
outcomes of a temporal series of events governed by other agents at the end of which persons
emerge. To the contrary, ontologically, personhood adheres in the human from the start-s-even
if in only the most nascent, densely compacted form possible-acting as the causal agent of its
own development' (Ibid., 87-8, emphasis in original). That is, persons are proactively
emergent in that not only do they 'emerge' from the physical, chemical, and biologically
lower levels and capacities (42-49), but as emergent, they are 'centers' of self-transcendence
(Ibid., 61-3) and thus enact their own downward causality on these capacities in their freedom
as persons.
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says that we know at least in a confused and distorted way that God exists, but
we do not absolutely know, 'just as to know that someone is approaching is
not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who
is approaching'. 23 One can know that God exists, but outside of revelation, one
will not be able to discern just what kind of God this is, that is, just who this
God is. We can never know the essence of God perfectly, but we can only
know God from God's effects, whether this knowledge is by means of nature
or by way of grace." Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the
relationship between theology and philosophy, while distinct, will be treated in
a mutual way; that is, the philosophical discussion will assume a theological
end, while the theological will, in tum, rely on philosophical assumptions not
as one over against the other, but in the relationship of water turned into wine,
of grace assuming and perfecting nature."
What effects, then, are 'available' (so to speak) for picking out as fitting
analogates? Thomas selects certain transcendentals such as being, one, truth,
goodness, beauty, and otherness (aliquidi," which cannot be understood
outside of the long tradition of divine naming that he inherits from
Dionysius." In this vein, W. Norris Clarke speaks about choosing 'stretch
23 ST, I, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1.
24 This is first stated in ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 obj 1 in reference to John Damascene, De Fide Orth. i,
iv: 'It is impossible to define the essence of God'. Thomas clarifies this in regard to knowing
God from God's effects in ST, I, q. 1, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. 1 corpus; q. 2, a. 2 ad 3, etc; ScG, III,
cc.51-6.
25 See ST, I, q. I, a. 8 ad 2; q. 2, a. 2 ad 1.
26 See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals. The exception to Aertsen's
case is beauty (ibid., 335-59). On this see Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 192-7 and the
important footnote with sources on this debate on p. 214n.137. Importanly, see Mark D.
Jordan, "The Evidence of the Transcendentals and the Place of Beauty in Thomas Aquinas,"
International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 4 (1989): 393-407 at 403 where Jordan points
out that Thomas maintains participatory language to speak about beauty in the same way that
he does other transcendentals. For two other accounts of beauty as possessing an analogous,
participatory structure, see Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite; John R. Betz, "Beyond the
Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part One)," Modern Theology 21, no. 3
(2005): 367-411; John R. Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of
Being (Part Two)," Modern Theology 22, no. 1 (2006): 1-50. On "aliquid" in Aquinas, see
Philipp W. Rosemann, Omne ens est aliquid: Introduction a la lecture du "systeme''
philosophique de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Leuven: Peeters, 1996).
27 Likewise, Rudi A. Te Velde, Aquinas on God: The "Divine Science" of the Summa
Theologiae, Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2006), 102: "Analogy should not be treated in isolation from the whole of the analysis of
divine names." Specifically, Te Velde is referring to aa. 5-6 of ST I, q. 13, which itself is a
consideration of the divine names (divino rum nominum). For an account of Thomas'
indebtedness to Dionysius, see O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas.
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terms' and putting them through a 'stretch' procedure in order to discern
whether or not they may be fittingly used, that is, 'open' enough." It is
important to use wisdom in judgment in determining the term's 'proper' from
its 'abusive' extension (in the sense of the Cajetan's use of abusio, not to be
confused with typical English connotations of abuse)," Such prudent judgment
includes the recognition that a term's original meaning and etymology are not
always key to its ratio of understanding." Instead, sometimes the excellence
of a term, despite its origin, must be considered." Clarke has two ways of
speaking about the malleability of these terms. One way is to indicate the
upper and lower limits of these expansive terms, those terms 'having a floor
but no ceiling: intellectual knowing, love, life, joy, etc'. and those terms
'having neither ceiling nor floor: the all-pervasive "transcendental properties"
applicable across all levels of being, such as being, activity, unity, power,
intelligibility, goodness (in the widest sense)' .32 Elsewhere, Clarke delineates
these two types as 'relatively transcendental properties' and 'absolutely
transcendental properties', respectively. The relatively transcendental
properties are those which Clarke describes as 'so purely positive in meaning
28 W. Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God: A Contemporary Neo-Thomist
Perspective (Winston-Salem: Wake Forest University Press, 1979),52-6; idem, The One and
the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2001), 44. For a helpful commentary on Clarke's work on analogy, see Philip A.
Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities: How Words Refer to God, American Academy of Religion
Academy Series 81 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993), 13-94, here on "stretch terms", 75-
82. Lyttkens says that the 'concept must be regarded as an "open" concept' (Lyttkens, The
Analogy Between God and the World, 348, 379).
29 Joshua P. Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum
Analogia (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010),123.
30 Hochschild speaks in a similar way to Clarke: 'Terms become analogical by a process of
extension; they are extended from one, original signification to cover another, new
signification. Some of these extensions are more fitting than others. What determines the
fittingness or "propriety" of such an extension is not only the original meaning of the term, or
its etymology, but the similarity of what is signified in what is originally denominated by the
term to what is signified in that which the term is stretched to denominate' (ibid., 124,
emphasis mine).
31 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2.
32 W. Norris Clarke, "Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language About God," in
Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-Gad-Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1994), 132. While the two kinds of terms mentioned here have more ontological
and 'active' connections, Clarke precedes these with two other terms possessing a more
'ontic' flavour, but just as important in their own right: '(I) those having a ceiling but no
floor (no lower limit) in their application: terms like physico-chemical activity, whose upper
limit is biological activity, or perhaps consciousness, but that extend downward to unknown
depths of matter still hidden from us and perhaps very strange indeed compared with what we
know; (2) those having both a floor and a ceiling, say, biological activity, or sense knowledge,
limited by the non-living or unconscious below and intellectual knowledge above' (ibid.).
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and so demanding of our unqualified value-approval that, even though they are
not co-extensive with all being, any being higher than the level at which they
first appear must be judged to possess them-hence a fortiori the highest
being-under pain of being less perfect than the being we already know,
particularly ourselves'." To the above-mentioned earlier list of knowledge,
love, life, and joy, Clarke here adds freedom and 'personality, at least as
understood in Western cultures' .34 The absolutely transcendental properties are
'those attributes whose meaning is so closely linked with the meaning and
intelligibility of being itself that no real being is conceivable which could lack
them and still remain intelligible' .35 For our purposes, it seems that the notion
of 'person' fits within Clarke's category of 'relatively transcendental
properties'. It would seem, however, that considering the above-considered
priority of the person in our investigation, that this may pose a problem for my
thesis. How can a 'relative' property have 'absolute' significance?
This question becomes all the more pressing with the recognition that
Thomas has a priority of Being (ens) in his list of the transcendentals. Jan
Aertsen emphasizes this priority: 'Being, "that which is," is the Archimedean
point of Thomas's thought' .36 Being retains a certain priority because of the
fact that that all other conceptions resolve toward Being (ens).37 Thus, to even
ask the question, 'What is Truth?' for Aquinas, first requires the
acknowledgment that what we first conceive of is Being, yet Being is not
33 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 57.
34 Ibid. Clarke has in mind here the lack of a 'substantial' self as implied in the person-less
philosophy of Buddhism, which tends to reduce everything to its relations. On this see Clarke,
Person and Being, 17, 58-60, which also applies to existentialist-phenomenologist accounts
inspired by Nietzsche such as Heidegger, et al. Instead, for Clarke, to be is to be a 'dyadic'
substance-in-relation (ibid., 15). See a full account of this in W. Norris Clarke, "To Be Is To
Be Substance-in-Relation," in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-Gad-Person (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 102-22. For an account which emphasizes
relationalityas more constitutive (but not at the expense of substantiality, but rather because of
the nature of substance), see Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012). Christian Smith argues for a
more mutually reciprocal account, stating that 'Relations need substances and substances need
relations'. Smith, What Is a Person?, 232, more generally 230-3. For a brief and helpful
account that locates 'personality' not at the level of the person, but at the level of the 'soul' as
'something attributable to the "person," see Rowan Williams, "'Person' and 'Personality' in
Christology," The Downside Review 94, no. 317 (October 1976): 253-60, here at 257,
emphasis in original.
35 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 57.
36 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 84.
37 De Ver., q. 1, a. 1.
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contained within a genus, that is, Being is not itself a category of thought.
Rather, 'As what falls first in the understanding, being is that in the light of
which everything is understood'." Establishing the priority of Being (ens),
Thomas says that 'what the true adds to being [is], namely, the conformity or
equation of thing and intellect'. 39 We have these other predicates such as True,
Good, One, Beauty, otherness (aliquid) that we first recognize when we call
something 'true', 'good', etc., but they all are referred to, and thus 'resolve' in
the process of resolution (resolutio) to Being (ens). According to Thomas, this
is exactly what 'metaphysics' is, in that movement 'after' (f-.lETa) physics," or
as he puts it in the prologue to his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,
'inasmuch as it considers being and what follows upon it-for these
transphysical things are discovered in the process of resolution (in via
resolution is) as the more common after the less common'. 41
The method of resolutio, '[t]he "way of resolution" is always directed to a
terminus which in a certain respect is first'. 42 Being is what falls first in the
intellect, but arriving at Being is that which comes last in this process. The
process begins in the apprehension of physical things in their composition as
possessed within a unitary whole which is most common to them, reduced to
the most simple principles." In his commentary on Boethius' De Trinita te,
Thomas describes the via resolutionis in two ways. The first likens the
relationship of physics to divine science as to that of 'reason' to the 'intellect',
the latter of which is that 'non-discursive mode of knowing proper to the
immaterial substances'. 44 Reason participates in the intellectual process in that
the intellect both begins and serves as the end of the rational process,
according to the way of composition or discovery (secundum viam
composition is vel invention is), 'insofar as reason gathers one simple truth from
38 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 72.
39 De Ver., q. I,a. I.
40 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 7-8.
41 Aertsen's translation in Jan A. Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics: The 'via Resolutionis' in
Thomas Aquinas," The New Scholasticism 63, no. 4 (1989): 405-18 at 406.
42 Ibid., 408.
43 Te Vel de, Aquinas on God, 55.
44 Here I am following the helpful work of Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 410-11. See
also the summary in Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 133-35, 157.
Aertsen is commenting on In Boethii De trinitate 6, 1,211, 11. 15-19. Cr. De Ver., q. 15, a. I.
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many things'," Thomas says that 'according to the process of resolution, all
consideration of reason in all the sciences terminates in the knowledge of
divine science'. 46 The progression of reason in the sciences to its terminus in
the intellectual knowledge of the divine science can take place on two levels,
secundum rationem and secundum rem. The first," secundum rationem is the
process described above from De Veritate I, 1 where one proceeds according
to the intrinsic causes of a thing, leading back to the most universal, that of
Being (the opposite being by composition where one attains to the particular
via the universal). The second, secundem rem, proceeds according to a
demonstration 'made through extrinsic causes or effects by composition when
we go from causes to effects, by resolution when we proceed from effects to
causes. The ultimate term of this resolution is attained when man arrives at the
highest causes, which are the immaterial substances'. 48 Both of these
resolutions have an 'intellectual' end in divine science which treats of both
kinds of intrinsic and external causes. On the one hand, we have the intrinsic
resolution to Being (secundum rationem), and on the other the cause of Being
itself (secundum rem). As Aertsen notes, there is an intrinsic connection
between these two resolutions: 'The reduction terminating in being, in that
which is transcendental, goes together with the reduction terminating in the
transcendent cause'. 49 Thomas elaborates on this connection in a brief history
on the question of being given in ST I, q. 44, a. 2: 'Finally some thinkers
advanced further and raised themselves to the consideration of being as being.
And they assigned a cause to things, not only according as they
are these or such, but according as they are beings' .50
Keeping the relationship of these two ways of resolution both distinct and
rightly ordered is not only crucial to properly understanding the logic of
arrival, but also important in order to avoid error. One error to avoid is the
conflation of the two orders, an error which Thomas attributes to the
45 Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 410.
46 In Boethii De trinitate 6, I, 212, II. 1-2. As quoted in Aertsen, 'Method and Metaphysics',
410.
47 Although, Thomas treats them in the reverse order as Ido here.
48 Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 411, emphasis mine.
49 Ibid., 416.
50 For a helpful commentary on this article of Thomas', see re Velde, Aquinas on God, 132-8.
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'Platonists'. The Platonists confuse the predication of the universal with many
things-an appropriate activity-with the predication of a cause from an
effect," which is impossible, for the very reason that a cause is not directly
available to reason, but only is apprehended later through the way of
resolution. Thomas makes a distinction between the 'first in commonness' and
the 'first in causality'. The 'first in commonness' is first apprehended as
transcendental by the intellect, whereas the 'first in causality' is the
transcendent God, and therefore not directly accessible. 'The first in the order
of our intellectual know ledge is not transcendent, but transcendental'. 52 It is
important to remember that there is no identity between these two 'ways', but
a relation of causality: God is the cause of Being." For Thomas, 'the first
cause of things is not the first known, but the final end of the human desire to
know'."
That which is arrived at 'last' in the resolution is connected to the first in a
circular movement. 'This resolution has a "reflexive" structure in the sense
that "that which was the first becomes the last." ,55 Likewise, this is only
possible because 'the last has become the first', or as Thomas describes it, it is
only natural to proceed 'from the sensible to the intelligible, from the effects
to the causes, and from that which is later to the first' .56 The path of the
resolutio leads to a real change in 'relationship of thought to the object,
constitutive of a science, thus a change in the perspective from which reality is
considered in a certain science. 57 Again, we see the pattern of truth as that of
the adequation of the intellect towards the object; the way of resolution in
metaphysics is one of the key ways in which one's intellect apprehends not
only the truth of Being, but the truth of its created reality by its cause, the God
who creates out of nothing.
5! Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago, IL: Henry
Regnery Co., 1961), X, 3.1964 (hereafter In Meta.). Thomas also notes that Plato errors in a
similar way in conflating the order of knowledge with the separable forms (ST, I, q. 84, a. I).
52 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 168.
53 Ibid., 393-94.
54 Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 416. Aertsen contrasts Thomas with Bonaventure for
whom "the most pure being, the divine being, is the first known" (ibid).
55 Ibid., 417.
56 In I Sent. 17, I, 4. As quoted in Ibid.
S? Te Vel de, Aquinas on God, 55.
86
Thus far, however, the via resolutionis has only given us those 'absolutely
transcendental properties' about which Clarke spoke. The names such as true,
good, one, being, etc., have a 'transgeneric' sense, common to all reality. 58
Personality, or rather, that contained in the analogical, 'trascendental' reality
of the person does not exist in the same way that these 'absolute
transcendental properties' exist. While it may have no 'ceiling', it does,
however, have a 'floor', as Clarke puts it. More precisely, all created reality
does not exist and have goodness, truth, beauty in the same way that a person
does; all being does not shine forth its aspect of truth such that all of Being
also has an 'aspect' of personhood. That is, all of Being is not, following
Aquinas and Boethius, an 'individual substance of a rational nature' (natura:
rationalis individua substantiay'" 'For', as Boethius says, 'if every nature has
person, the difference between nature and person is a hard knot to unravel' .60 It
is clear that the Person enjoys a privileged place in Being, but Persons do not
share the same status as 'absolute' due to the fact that the very definition of a
Person (whether Boethian/Aquinan or even more recent personalist accounts)
implies distinction," which thus assumes being and is something that not only
exists within being but is that existent substance who has its own being." Nor
58 Ibid., 110.
59 Contra Eutychen, eh. 3 in Boethius, The Theological Tractates, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K.
Rand, and S. 1. Tester, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard
University Press, 1973), 84-5. For Aquinas, see ST, I, q. 29, a. 1; De Pot., q. 9, a. 4. Aquinas
slightly modifies the formula to say 'that which susbsists in an intellectual nature' (subsistens
in natura intellectuali) in Ibid., q. 9, a. 3 ad 1. However, the sense remains the same, as
subsistence refers to what exists in itself and not another, and thus for Aquinas 'person'
indicates the same reality (ST, I, q. 29, a. 2 ad 2) considered under the genus of rational
substances (ST, I, q. 29, a. 2; De Pot., q. 9, a. 2). Lastly, Aquinas also accepts 'hypostasis of
rational nature' as equivalent (Ibid., q. 9, a. 2 ad 7). For an account of Thomas' taking up of
Boethius' definition, see Horst Seidl, "The Concept of Person in S1. Thomas Aquinas: A
Contribution to Recent Discussion," The Thomist 51 (1987): 435-60 at 435-40.
60 Boethius, The Theological Tractates, 82-3.
61 '[T]he meaning (ratio) of person implies distinction in general and hence is abstracted
(abstrahere) from every mode of distinction', Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros
Sententiarum I, d. 25, q. I, a. 2 ad 5 as cited in Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God,
147.
62 On the logic of 'having' as most particular to human persons who have their own being, see
Mary L. O'Hara, The Logic of Human Personality: An Onto-Logical Account (Amherst, NY:
Humanity Books, 1998), 127-34; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe
According to Maximus the Confessor, trans. Brian E. Daley, SJ (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius
Press, 2003), 223. Commenting on Robert Spaemann's work, Holger Zaborowski remarks,
'the path of the reconstruction of a realistic understanding of Being by means of a recollection
of what Spaemann considers self-evident-that is, the experience that reality is ultimately not
an endless stream of becoming, but a mixtum compositum of substantial Being and becoming.
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is the person merely a collective bundle or 'succession of experiences but that
which (successively) has them. And this is no other than what is meant by
substance'." How then, can that which has a 'floor' and not exist 'everywhere'
be of equal importance?
Presently, there does not seem to be a way to make personhood more
'general' to fit the measure of 'absolute' in the same way that being and the
other transcendentals are absolute. Nor would one want this, either, for the
very nature of persons are their distinct incommunicability as persons. To
reduce persons to a more 'general' understanding would in fact do away with
persons altogether. Moreover, Rude Te Velde has posed a special challenge to
any account of analogical naming that attempts to 'read off some particular
thing in nature and apply this to God, as if God could
be addressed as some particular reality, the highest and first in the
order of essences. God is not a being among others who is merely
higher and more perfect than everything we know of. God cannot be
approached in the line of "more of the same"-that is, the same as the
perfections we encounter in the world of creatures, such as life,
intelligence, goodness, and so on-but then enlarged to its maximum
and purified from its imperfections. Analogy is often taken to be a sort
of procedure of abstraction and sublimation by which finite perfections
are purged of their material flaws and defects and then extended to
their ultimate limit in God. In this way, however, the focus of thought
remains somehow restricted to the order of essences and is still, what
Thomas would call, "physical" in its way of conceiving reality. In my
interpretation, analogy is not a matter of picking out some properties
(perfections) belonging to one domain in order to apply them in a more
perfect and purified form to another domain-the "domain" of God-
since this view presupposes a conception of a hierarchy of essences
which tends to regard God as the highest essence instead of being
itself."
Metaphysically, the reason this approach is impossible is because the process
of analogical naming involves the transfer of a name from one genus to
another such that the limits of one domain are transcended by referring to
another domain. 'But in the case of the analogy of divine predication it is the
whole of all categorically distinct things as such (as being) which is
It is a reality of substances and subjects and, in its highest form, the reality of persons who
freely 'have' their nature' (Robert Spaemann 's Philosophy a/the Human Person, 42).
63 Peter Simpson, "The Definition of Person: Boethius Revisited," New Scholasticism 62, no.
2 (1988): 210-20 at 214.
64 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 117.
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transcended towards something existing extra omne genus' .65 That is why
certain names do not count as appropriate for analogous divine predication,
but still remain apposite for metaphorical use, such as 'lion' or 'stone',
predicated of God.66 The primary problem with this approach, even if it were
to make the predication into the most sublime realm of particular beings, is
that in the end, it makes God just another being among beings (thus falling
into the ontotheological trap), and so, on Aquinas' terms, falling into the error
of predicating things of God univocally." The via resolutionis cannot be
followed in order to speak analogically of divine persons in the same way we
speak of Being. Why? Because persons, as distinct, cannot be reduced to the
analogical unity of being as persons. The procedure of secundum rationem and
secundem rem does not seem to work here, for it involves that resolution of all
intrinsic causes from its effects into the commonness of being, and then refers
this being to its extrinsic creator as cause. Analogy, thus far, seems to only
apply metaphysically to Being. Thomas seems to reaffirm this emphasis on
Being when he says in De Potentia that 'Being ... signifies the highest
perfection of all (omnia perfectissimumf and is thus also 'the actuality of all
acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections (perJectio omnium
perJectionum)' .68 Because analogy, for Te Vel de, is not that picking out of a
higher 'this' amongst a univocal series of essences, he concludes therefore that
'[ a]nalogy is meant to articulate the commonness of effect and cause: the
effect is differently the same as its cause, precisely insofar as it is being'. 69
The preceding may adequately suffice for an analogy oj being as far as it
goes," but arguably for Aquinas, being is not the only 'thing' picked out
analogously; nor is being qua being the only criteria for what counts as the
'highest' term. There is a temptation to assume that that which is 'absolute' is
that which is the 'highest', 'best', or the entity spoken about most analogously.
65 Ibid.
66 De Pot., q. 7, a. 5 ad 8; ST, q. 13, a. 3 ad l.
67 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5, se. & co.
68 De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9. Similarly: 'ipsum esse is the most perfect of all things
(perfectissimum omnium), for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made
actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists' (ST, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3; and ScG, III, c.
66, n. 5).
69 Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 117-18, emphasis in original.
70 The specific practices named the 'analogy of being' stemming from the debate surrounding
Przywara will be considered below in section c) of the next chapter.
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In one sense, this is of course true; but in another, it is incomplete. Te Velde
would not disagree with what follows, as he himself makes similar points in a
separate, later article; 71 nonetheless, his challenge above does serve as a useful
proofing ground for any such analogical enterprise engaged in naming God.
In order to complete this understanding we will consider absolute versus
relative terms, the idea of perfections, and finally, how this enables one to
understand the person as the 'prime analogate' of being.
b. The Person Perfected
Before continuing to answer this question, something must first be kept in
mind regarding the terms 'absolute' and 'relative'. In Aquinas, what is
'absolute' and what is 'relative' do not necessarily denote one thing that is
'higher' and another that is 'lower', especially if one is referring to God, due
to divine simplicity (although this of course is true when referring to creatures
in relation to God). Instead, denoting what is 'absolute' is to refer to that
which is essential in God, and this is why persons cannot share the same
absolute status: 'nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as
distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the Persons, since what is
predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential'."
That which is 'relative' does not indicate imperfection, but only what is
distinct. 73
With this clarification out of the way, in De Potentia Thomas devotes an
entire article (q. 9, a. 3) to the question 'In God Does the Term 'Person'
Signify Something Relative Or Something Absolute?' In varying degrees,
there are eighteen objections listed attempting to argue that the person actually
signifies the essence" and not the relation." In the three sed contra statements,
71 Rudi A. Te Velde, "The Divine Person(s): Trinity, Person, and Analogous Naming," in The
Oxford Handbook of the Trinity, ed. Gilles Emery OP and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 359-70.
72 De Pot., q. 8, a. 3.
73 '[I]n the Godhead nothing that is predicated absolutely, but only what is relative, can be
distinct' (Camp. Thea!., I, 61).
74De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 args 1-3,5-6, 10, 13-14.
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Thomas first adheres to Boethius in noting that' "every term that refers to the
Persons signifies relation." Now no term refers to the persons more than
person itself. Therefore the word person signifies relation' .76Next, the terms
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are shown to signify relation, and as they are the
three divine persons, it follows that person therefore signifies relation."
Lastly, because nothing essential or absolute is divided in God,78 and persons
are divided, therefore, the persons are relative." Thomas' given answer is as
follows: 'I answer that the term person in common with the absolute names of
God is predicated of each Person, and does not in itself refer to anything else,
and in common with the names signifying relation it is divided and predicated
of several: wherefore it would seem that person admits of both significations
absolute and relative. How the name person can admit of both significations
has been explained in various ways' .80 'Person' opens up to contain both
relative and absolute significations, the latter of which admits of essential
predicates like truth, goodness, and wisdom which apply to all three divine
persons, as they share the same nature." Additionally, 'person' also
legitimately refers to the relation in a 'semi' -absolute way (i.e., directly so)
such that, as Thomas said in a previous question, in God relation can be
something besides being merely relation, 'for it is God's very substance in
reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely
relative'." The status of 'person' as an absolute term comes from 'its mode of
signification: and yet it signifies a relation'. 83 The absolute modus of
signification refers to the 'substantive' nature that the term signifies in its
formal aspect, which makes plural designation possible." Thomas illustrates
75 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 args 4,6-18.
76 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, s.c. I.
77 De Pot., q. 9, q. 4, s.c. 2.
78 De Pot., q. 7, a. 3 co.; q. 9, a. 7 ad 2; esp. q. 9, a. 8; ST, I, q. 3, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 42, n. 16; I, c.
58.
79 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, s.c. 3.
80De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
8! For truth, see De Ver., q. I, a. 7; ST, I, q. 16, a. 5. For goodness, wisdom, etc., see De Pot.,
q. 7, a. 5; ST, I, q. 6, a. 3; q. 13, a. 2.
82 De Pot., q. 8, a. 3 ad 8.
83 De Pot., q. 9, a. 6 ad 2.
84 De Pot., q. 9, a. 6. 'Accordingly seeing that person is a substantive the possibility of its
being predicated in the plural depends on the form signified thereby. Now the form signified
by the word person is not the nature absolutely, for in that case man and human person would
mean the same thing which is clearly false: but person formally signifies incommunicability or
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the substantive designation in the following illustration: 'What? queries not
only the essence but also sometimes the supposite, for instance: What swims in
the sea? Fish. And so the answer to what? is the person'."
The remainder of Thomas' detailed response to the various ways in which
person can admit of both relative and absolute significations is as follows:
first, Thomas considers two (insufficient) opinions for how this is so, and then
he offers a more satisfying response. The movement of the article first
considers the equivocal option, then what appears to be the univocal, and
finally what I argue is the analogical solution. The first option considers those
who 'say that person signifies both [essence and relation], but equivocally'."
'Person' signifies the essence absolutely in both the singular and the plural,
'like the name "God," or "good" or "great": but that owing to the insufficiency
of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of
Nicaea accommodated the term "person" so that it could be employed
sometimes in a relative sense, especially in the plural, as when we say that
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three Persons, or with the addition of a
disjunctive term as when we say: "One is the Person of the Father, another of
the Son," or: "The Son is distinct from the Father in person."?" Furthermore,
when 'person' is predicated absolutely of the singular, it may also signify
either the essence or the relation, e.g., 'The Father is a person', or, 'The Son is
a person'. The essence is signified absolutely, therefore, usually when
referring to the singular, and then only relatively when referring to the divine
persons in the plural-except in this latter, equivocal case where the Son is
named as a person. But this proves unsatisfactory for Thomas because the
wisdom of the Church Fathers chose the name 'person' (hypostasis), in
response to heretical opinions, precisely because it did not signify the essence
absolutely, but signified what was distinct, that is, the subsistent relations
individuality of one subsisting in a nature, as we have clearly explained. Since then there are
several properties which cause a distinct and incommunicable being in God, it follows that
person is predicated of God in the plural, even as it is predicated of man on account of the
manifold individualizing principles' (ibid.).
85 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4 ad 1. Also ST I, q. 29, a. 4 ad 2.
86 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
87 Ibid.
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revealed in Scripture as Father, Son, Holy Spirit." In either case, to allow the
essence to be signified directly as a person-even if 'equivocally' so-is
inadmissible for it ultimately admits tritheistic conceptions to enter into the
understanding of God.
The second, insufficient option under consideration admits of different
aspectual versions of what appears to be univocal emphases on different
aspects of the person. They both amount to signifying one thing directly (in
recto) and the other indirectly (in obliquo), but neither of them equally. The
first option in this group is the opinion that 'person' expresses the essence
directly and the relation indirectly. Thomas elaborates on this in the parallel
question in the Summa Theologica where he says: 'forasmuch as "person"
means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence.
And what is "by itself " implies relation indirectly; for the Father is
understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct from the Son'. 89 But
this cannot be allowed for the same reason stated above, that is, that one
cannot predicate the essence absolutely of the divine persons in a plural
manner without lapsing into the notion of three 'Gods'. The other view is the
converse of the same idea where 'person' signifies the relation directly but the
essence or nature indirectly. While Thomas still rejects this view in De
Potentia, in the Summa Theologica he grants that, in contrast to the first, those
who holds this view 'come nearer to the truth'. 90 The reason why this option
still fails (at least in De Pot.) is because although the relation is signified
directly, 'it should not be predicated absolutely, or of each Person'." Again,
this is impossible because a relation by virtue of its definition is not 'absolute'
because that is how the nature is signified. Moreover, some even attempt to
say that 'person' signifies both directly, and some of those even say that it
signifies them directly and equally. Thomas, too, rejects this approach as
'unintelligible', following Aristotle's dictum that every term signifies (at least)
88 Ibid. The parallel text in ST I, q. 29, a. 4 has the same reference to the Church Fathers
response to heretical opinions.
89 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.
90 Ibid.
91 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
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one thing in one sense, thus, that which does not signify something signifies
nothing."
Thomas does not describe these two mirrored approaches as 'univocal',
however, these unintelligible approaches are devoid of sense precisely because
of the conceptual confusions which betray univocal presumptions. In the first
example above, the divine persons are individuated by their subsistent,
absolute essences In the plural, in the same way as human persons are
individuated. Hence, each of the divine persons are thought of as more
'absolute' versions of each of us," and could easily give rise within modernity
of admitting, e.g., three psychological centres. But we know this is impossible
because there is only one, shared, 'consubstantial' essence amongst the divine
persons. In the second example (which is somewhat closer to the truth for
Thomas), the relation is put on the same plane as that of the essence in order to
be signified directly, which he fears will be signified absolutely, and each
person cannot be 'absolute' for that is not how these terms work for the
Church Fathers who fashioned these words over the years of the Church
councils.
Before coming to his final answer," Thomas first provides an account of
how signification works in order to better grasp just how 'person' refers to the
relation. He follows Aristotle such that 'the proper definition of a term is its
signification'." Thomas' aim is to understand how something may be
'included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the
92 Ibid. Thomas is referring to Aristotle's Metaphysics 4.4.1006b7, where this concept is tied
to the principle of non-contradiction. For Thomas' commentary on this in In Meta., IV, 7.613-
615. E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A
Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 50n.48, points
out that "a word had to have at least one significate, but that others were not ruled out." See
also Michael L. Ross, "Aristotle on 'Signifying One' at Metaphysics r 4," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 25, no. 3 (September 1995): 375-393.
93 See re Velde's concerns on this matter expressed above, from his Aquinas on God, 117-18.
94 Thomas also remarks: 'Hence others said that it signifies relation as affecting the essence:
but it is difficult to see how this is possible inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence
in God. And so others said that the relation does not express the absolute, i.e. the substance
which is essence, but the substance which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation.
This is indeed true, but does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or
subsistence is less clear than that of person' (De Pot., q. 9, a. 4), but these remarks do not
much add to Thomas' case (nor our own).
95 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4. Thomas' reference is to Metaphysics 4.
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more common term'." The example referred to is that of 'animal' and 'man':
to refer to an animal doesn't necessarily entail signifying man, as it may be
any sensible animate substance whether cat or man; but when referring to
man, it is always assumed that a man is a rational animal per its definition,
and thus 'animal' is included in the designation as an indeterminate term
falling under a common designation of a more determinate term. Thomas says,
'it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word "person" in general; and
another to ask the meaning of "person" as applied to God' .97 Thomas
distinguishes here between formal and material significations.
Formally, 'person' will apply, analogously, to humans, angels, and divine
persons, as individual substances of a rational nature." As Robert Spaemann
articulates it, 'To be a person is the form in which "rational natures" exist' .99
Likewise, 'man' applies to that which is composed of a rational soul and the
body. Furthermore, the person is a term relating to a genus, that of substance
as it is applied to human persons being rational animals, so one formal
differentiation is to be made here, that is: God is not contained in a genus.'?"
But Thomas quickly dispatches with this by saying that God 'belongs to the
genus of substance as the principle of the genus' .101 Materially, human persons
are individuated such that it is a particular human nature which has this flesh,
these bones, and this soul.!" The material designation of 'person', outside of
the incarnation'?' and the sense which implies incommunicability in the
subsistent nature,'?' is not fitting for designating a divine person. lOS What
96 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.
97 Ibid.
98 In ST, I, q. 29, a. 4 ad 4, Thomas flatly denies that person is spoken of in either an equivocal
or univocal way of human persons, angels, and divine persons. For an account of the
analogical extension involved in Boethius' definition of the person which makes Thomas'
own application possible, see Simpson, "The Definition of Person: Boethius Revisited," 218-
19; Seidl, "The Concept of Person in St. Thomas Aquinas," 435-60 at 450-8.
99 Spaemann, Persons, 31.
lOO ScG, I, c. 25; ST, I, q. 3, a. 5; Compo Theol., 1,12-13.
101De Pot., q. 9, a. 3 ad 3.
102 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4; cf. q. 29, a. 2 ad 3.
103 ST, III, q. 5, a. 2, where Aquinas affirms the material flesh and bones of the human body,
although it is not through these parts that the assumption occurred (STIlI, q. 6, a. 5).
104 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4.
lOS 'It is accidental to person as such that it is composite, because the complement or
perfection required for personality is not to be found at once in one simple thing, but requires
a combination of several, as is to be observed in men. But in God together with supreme
simplicity there is supreme perfection: wherefore in him there is person without composition.
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individuates in humanity is the individual matter, but what individuates in the
divine nature is relation of origin,'?" which is due to the fact that for Thomas,
matter is not the first cause of individuation.!" Concomitantly, what
distinguishes human from divine persons is that divine persons are self-
subsistent, whereas human persons, because they are materially composed, are
not self-subsistent.!" When referring to the divine person, because of the self-
subsistence of each hypostasis, referring to a divine person signifies the nature
fully existing as identical in the divine personal existence. Whereas for the
human person, the lack of self-subsistence means that to refer to human
nature, it does not directly involve the act of existence as identical with this
nature; thereby, for the human, '[t]he person adds to the nature the very act of
existing' .109 In each case of differentiating the human person from the divine
person, when speaking about the divine we have to transcend the modus
significandi because no created reality is identical with ipsum esse.11O
Thomas' answer is thus simply, 'the term "person" signifies nothing else
but an individual substance of rational nature'."! Just as the determinate 'man'
assumes the indeterminate 'animal' nature, so also the substance, whether of
human or divine nature, is assumed under the name 'person' as it is an
As to the parts which combine to make the definition of person they do not argue composition
in person except in material substances: and individual, being a negation, does not imply
composition through being added to substance. Hence the only composition that remains is
that of individual substance, i.e. hypostasis with the nature: which two in immaterial
substances are absolutely one and the same thing' (De Pot., q. 9, a. 3 ad 4).
106 Likewise, while the material aspect cannot individuate what is proper in God, neither can a
purely formal aspect individuate what is proper for the created human: 'For a thing may be
understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the
principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is
constituted by humanity, and Socrates by "socrateity": or it may be taken for the way as it
were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his
generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then
that a thing's origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in
reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not
produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation' (De Pot., q. 8, a. 3).
107 ScG, II, c. 40.
108 De Pot., q. 9, a. 3. ad 5. Cf. STI, q. 39, a. I ad l.
109 Gilles Emery OP, The Trinity: An Introduction to Catholic Doctrine on the Triune God,
trans. Matthew Levering (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2011), 105-6, emphasis in original.
110 Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 59. For
Thomas see De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 7; q. 7, a. 5 ad 2; ScG, I, c. 30; Scriptum super Sent., I, d. 22,
q.l,a.2adl.
111 De Pot., q. 9, a. 4.
96
individual and incommunicably distinct from others. Thomas concludes,
saying,
seeing that this [designation of a person as an individual substance of a
rational nature] can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it
follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a
relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way
of substance not qua essence but qua hypostasis, even as it signifies a
relation not qua relation but qua relative: e.g. as signifying Father not
as signifying paternity. For in this way the signified relation is
included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is
nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine
essence.!"
That is, a divine person is a subsistent relation in the divine nature. Despite
eschewing the mode of direct/indirect (in recto/in obliquo) in De Potentia, in
the Summa Thomas allows for this language, saying that 'it is true to say that
the name "person" signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not,
however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis' .113 The
direct/indirect language is maintained throughout Thomas' discussion of the
divine persons.'" What he disallows is signifying the relation absolutely, for
as a term signifying the essence, this makes no sense. The hypostasis is that
'individual substance', that supposit that refers to the relation (in God) or
individual matter (in humans). With, therefore, the understanding of the term
person 'by force of its own proper signification', 115 one can now also say that
'person' signifies the essence directly, and the relation indirectly, 'inasmuch as
the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is
expressed as distanced by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into
the notion of the person indirectly' .116 This latter point is explained more fully
later in the Summa with regard to divine simplicity: in God the essence and
hypostasis are really the same, but are distinguished according to our way of
thinking'" and thus the creaturely limitations of our mode of signification. lIS
112 Ibid.
113 ST, I, q. 29, a. 4.
114 Cf., e.g., ST, I, q. 34, a. 3 ad I; q. 41, a. 5.
lIS Ibid., I, q. 29, a. 4.
116 Ibid.
117 ST, I, q. 39, a. I.Cf. 'In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this
belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that
which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the
97
Despite this clarification, the fact remains that 'person' signifies, analogously,
an individual substance of a rational nature which is the relation qua
hypostasis. Since the divine relation is its own subsistent reality, 'relative
predication' becomes now possible in speaking about divine persons.!"
After considering the various opinions, Thomas rests on this simple
solution, and it proves to not only be the most fitting, but it also proves to be
the most analogous solution. This is due in part to the fact that the nature is
analogously spoken of, whether of human, angelic, or divine persons, but it is
also due to the very perfection of a person. It is true that Being is the
'perfection of all perfections' in God, but it should be noted that this is not
because of its most 'general', or 'common' aspect; rather, in the places where
Thomas speaks of being (esse) or being itself (ipsum esse) as the most perfect
(perfectissimumv'" the reference is to esse as the most perfect because it is the
most actual. That is, being as act is perfect because it does not admit of any
potency, for 'act is always more perfect than potentiality' .121 Coextensive with
this is God's perfection not as the material cause (as this would admit of
potentiality), but the most perfect efficient cause (causae ejJicientis) of all
created reality.':"
There is an order at work here of act determining potentiality, and not the
other way around, 'since in defining a form we include its proper matter
instead of the [potential] difference: thus we defme a soul as the act of an
hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before
we understand its relation' (De Pot., q. 8, a. 3 ad 5).
118 Emery says, 'in our language about God, we signify the essence as if we were referring to a
form: we signify "that through which" God is God, even though, in the divine reality itself, the
divine essence is nothing other than the person (there is in God none of that composition of
form and supposit which characterizes corporeal creatures). And we signify the person as the
concretely existing subject or subsistent, even though the person has no other reality than the
divine essence itself. Our words cannot do any better than this. The different ways of
signifying the essence and the person follow from this. For this reason, because of the mode in
which it is signified in our speech, the essence cannot take the place of the person: that which
properly belongs to the person is thus not attributed to the essence'. Gilles Emery OP, The
Trinitarian Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010),146-7, emphasis in original.
119 For a parallel account which provides commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, see Pabst,
"The Primacy of Relation over Substance and the Recovery of a Theological Metaphysics,"
553-78 at 574-5.
120 De Pot., q, 7, a. 2 ad 2; ScG, I, c. 28, n. 10; ScG, III, c. 66, n. 5; ST, I, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.
121 De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9; ST, I, q. 4, a. 1.
122 ST, I, q. 4, a. I.
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organic physical body' .123 Whereas univocal terms have no ordering and are
abstract ('human' is as true of Seren Kierkegaard as it is of Michael Pedersen
Kierkegaard, despite the latter being the father of the former), analogy entails
a concrete unity of order. An analogous term, according to Blanchette, 'always
implies an order among the analogates, at least with reference to the primary
analogate, and it cannot be understood apart from this order' .124 Therefore, the
ordering within the via reso/utionis, while it is true to its logic to 'resolve' to
the most common and perfect of all-being-it is just as appropriate to
recognize the concrete ordering of things, and recognize with Thomas that
'''Person'' signifies what is most perfect in all nature (persona significat id
quod est perfectissimum in tota natura}-that is, a subsistent individual of a
rational nature.!" Te Velde puts it well: 'Where "being" is found in the
highest degree, entailing subsistence and intelligence, there must be "person"
as well' .126 And, Jean-Louis Chretien renders the signification of 'what is most
perfect' beautifully: 'the place where the world transforms its light into
song' .127 This resounds the same truth reflected in the following statement
from Gaudium et Spes, which says that 'all things on earth should be ordained
to man as to their center as summit' .128 Thomas also calls the person that
which 'is of all natures the most exalted' or 'most worthy' (est omnium
naturarum dignissimau'" The person's own dignity comes from its
specifically metaphysical designation as existing through him- or herself'!"
Perfectissimum, a superlative describing that which is 'most perfect', relies
on the logic of completion, that is, of that which reaches its complete end in
123De Pot., q. 7, a. 2 ad 9.
124 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 124. Cf. Yves R. Simon, "On Order in Analogical Sets,"
New Scholasticism 34, no. 1 (1960): 1-42; Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language,
202-9.
125 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3.
126 Te Velde, "The Divine Person(s): Trinity, Person, and Analogous Naming," 365.
127 Jean-Louis Chretien, The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, trans. Jeffrey Bloechl,
Perspectives in Continental Philosophy 26 (Fordham University Press, 2002), 128.
128 Gaudium et Spes §12 in Flannery OP, Vatican Council 11,913.
129 De Pot., q. 9, a. 3.
130 Gilles Emery OP, "The Dignity of Being a Substance: Person, Subsistence, and Nature,"
Nova Et Vetera 9, no. 4 (2011): 991-1001 at 992. The reference to Thomas' definition of
dignity comes from In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, qla 1, corp. For excellent accounts of the issue
of human dignity, see John F. Crosby, "A Neglected Source of the Dignity of Persons," in
Personalist Papers, 3-32; Thomas D. Williams, Who Is My Neighbor?: Thomistic
Personalism and the Foundations of Human Rights (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University
of America Press, 2005), 146-64.
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act. 131 Because of its 'ends' - or 'completion' -orientated signification, Thomas
says 'that perfection cannot be attributed to God appropriately if we consider
the signification of the name according to its origin; for it does not seem that
what is not made (jactum) can be called perfect iperfectumv P' All that comes
to be is brought out of non-being to being, from potency to act when it is
made. 'That is why it is rightly said to be perfect, as being completely made, at
that moment when the potency is wholly reduced to act, so that it retains no
non-being but has a completed being. By a certain extension of the name,
consequently, perfect is said not only of that which by way of becoming
reaches a completed act, but also of that which, without any making whatever,
is in complete act'.133When Thomas refers to Matthew 5:48 which says, 'Be
perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect' ,134 the Greek for 'perfect' here as
't'rAno.; also shows its signification to be one of the completion of an endl35_
which we see most starkly in the crucified person of Jesus Christ on the cross
when he utters in John's Gospel, 'It is finished' (TE't'EAEu't'aL).136
When Thomas explains the reasoning behind the use of 'nature' (natura)
and not 'essence' (essentia), one witnesses a similar logic of perfective
completion at work. It is objected that 'essence' should be used in the
definition of the person such that a person is an individual substance of a
rational essence, because of the fact that, according to Aristotle, nature is the
principle of motion and rest, and this cannot apply to God (or angels) in whom
motion does not exist.'" To this, Thomas replies that the principle is an
intrinsic one that can be applied both formally or materially to apply to any
kind of movement. That is,
the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of
anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And
here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.)
131 For a recent account of the history of this concept, see Anthony D. Baker, Diagonal
Advance: Perfection in Christian Theology, Veritas (London: SCM Press, 2011).
132 SeC, I, c. 28 n. 10.
133 Ibid., I, 28.10; cf. ST, I, q. 75, a. 5 ad 4; q. 54, a. 1; q. 4, a. 1 ad 3.
134ST, I, q. 4, a. I, s.c.; SeC, I, c. 28, n. 10.
135 Amongst numerous examples, see John 4:34, which reads, 'Jesus said to them, "My food is
to do the will of him who sent me and to complete [n:Anwaw] his work."
136 John 19:30.
137 ST, I, q. 29, a. I obj 4.
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that, "nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing,"
for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from
the special form of a thing. So in the definition of "person," which
means the singular in a determined "genus," it is more correct to use
the term "nature" than "essence," because the latter is taken from
being, which is most common.!"
Not only does the specific difference of nature complete each thing in the
received form of an act, but here Thomas shows that a perfection does not
always follow from what is the most common. Instead, the perfection of a
person is within a nature because of its distinction as a completed form, the
most perfect in all of nature. In addition, this particular form of the person is
part of an intrinsic teleological order such that all other natures-even the
most cosmic-are ordered to it. Spaemann and Low remark, 'If the human is
understood therefore generally as the purpose of nature, then he or she must be
understood as the telos of all other natures, including the stars, which are the
conditions of generation'i'" That is, the whole generation of the cosmos is
ordered toward the human person as its end.""
Arriving at the choice of the person as the prime analogate (or ana/ogand)
happens in multiform fashion. Oliva Blanchette's writing on analogy in his
book Philosophy of Being is instructive here. Blanchette observes that, given a
differentiation between lower and higher forms of being, it is befitting to begin
with a 'higher form of being as the primary analogate in order to arrive at a
more comprehensive science of being as a whole, for the higher forms
encompass the lower in a way that the lower cannot encompass the higher, just
as the human form of being encompasses the lower forms, such as the sentient,
the living, and even the nonliving, in a way that the nonliving cannot
encompass living or sentient forms, let alone rational forms",'" Persons are in
this sense 'more' than their own nature, and because of this dignity, persons
1.18 ST, I, q. 29, a. 1 ad 4.
139 Robert Spaemann and Reinhard Low, Natiirliche Ziele. Geschichte Und Wiederentdeckung
Des Teleologischen Denkens (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), 77 (translation mine).
140 ScG, III, c. 22, nn. 8-9.
141 Blanchette, Philosophy 0/ Being, 134. And see Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality
in Thomas Aquinas, 248, 251-3, where Te Velde speaks about how a "more perfect form
allows a thing to participate more perfectly in being" (here p. 251). This logic can be found as
early as Dionysius, who, concerning the angelic orders in his On the Celestial Hierarchy, eh.
5, states, 'in every sacred rank the higher orders have all the illuminations and powers of those
below them and the subordinate have none of those possessed by their superiors' (Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works, 159 [PG 3:196b-<:]).
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can therefore encompass and recollect their own nature in ways that other
substances cannot. 142 Encountering being at its most replete does not occur in
the encounter with 'being' as such, but always, through particular beings.
Similarly, one does not encounter other forms first as mathematical equations
nor as chemical compounds, but first as whole beings and other selves,
including our own person in the presence of and among other persons.!"
Blanchette's own resolutio does not only involve resolving reality into its most
common term 'being' as if it was 'some abstract entity or some lowest
common denominator that would be found in all this plurality and diversity of
beings as a ground apart from the plurality and diversity' .144 This is because
plurality and diversity are themselves real and the diversity and plurality of
being, which includes these differences. At the height and perfection of these
differences within being the person is found, encountered in oneself and in
others in and amongst interpersonal relations.!" as that particularly 'unifying
entity' which is 'adequate to the analogy of being as it presents itself in
experience without reduction and without monopolization, for the higher
identity of the human being leaves ample room for the lesser identity of lower
beings, thus allowing for the differences of being not only within one and the
same being but also between different kinds of being.!" It is only with the
person as the primary analogate of being that, as its summit and perfection, we
can account for being in all its difference.!" Jan Aertsen sums up this nicely
when he says, 'The movement of egress and regress is characteristic of the
entire created reality. But only man is able "by the way of resolution" to
tend explicitly to God as end' .148
In answering the question, 'how does one arrive at the person?' above, I
have sought to explain how Te Velde's concerns regarding analogous terms
referring to God, while of utmost importance and most definitely not incorrect,
142 Spaemann, Persons, 98.
143 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 135; cf. Clarke, "The 'We Are' of Interpersonal
Dialogue."
144 Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 140.
145 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 91.
t4(, Blanchette, Philosophy of Being, 138-9.
147 Ibid., 139.
148 Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics," 417, emphasis in original; cf. De Ver., q. 22, a. 2.
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they were, however, incomplete. In every way, Thomas shows how the term
'person' is 'malleable' enough to include both human and divine persons, the
latter of which are able to shed the 'physical' and univocal way that Te Velde
warns against, turning on issues of formal signification and perfection. In
exploring how one arrives at choosing the person as the prime analogate of
Being, it is important to recognize that, in arriving at this juncture, one cannot
conflate this with the person's arrival, however much these two questions are
related.l'" Blanchette reminds us that even in choosing the person as the
primary analogate of being, one is still speaking secundum esse, that is,
making designations within being and not yet necessarily to God.ISO That is,
just like the metaphysicians' arrival at being qua being, one must note that
Thomas did not stop there, but connected this to the metaphysicians'
realization that there is a further step to make: the transcendent cause of (the
transcendental) being. lSI Te Vel de calls this a 'reflexive reversal' where, in
tracing the movement from effect to cause, 'the cause is understood formally
as cause, thus as positing through itself the effect' .152 In like manner, the
resolutio of the person must also go under its own shift in recognizing the
eminent personal cause of creation.i" including the cause of the person, that
is, where creation's perfection is found in humans and preeminently in the
divine persons. In order to examine this person as such, we must now look at
the arrival of the person itself, but this shift cannot be done merely through
looking at the biological emergence of the person as this would still be too
ontic, too physical; in other words, the arrival of the true person would still be
just a bigger projection of our own self. Therefore, this investigation must
attend to the perfect form of the God-man which also takes up and redeems
149 Thomas ascribes this error of conflation to the Platonists. In Meta., X, 3.1964; Aertsen,
Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 168.
ISO Oliva Blanchette, "Analogy and the Transcendental Properties of Being as the Key to
Metaphysical Science," The Saint Anselm Journal 2, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 1-23 at 10. And see
Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Human Being as Primary Analogate of Being: Reflections on
Blanchette's 'Key to Metaphysical Science'," The Saint Anselm Journal 2, no. 2 (Spring
2005): 24-34, who attempts to supplement Blanchette'S work with further, theological
resources.
151 That is not to say that the power to create belongs to anyone of the divine persons, as
creating for God belongs to the entire Godhead, as explained in ST, q. 44, a. 2. Certain
appropriations, however, are allowed to specific persons (see co. and ad 2).
m Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 130, emphasis in original, and see p. 107; idem, Participation
and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 138.
153 ST, I, q. 45, a. 6.
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materiality (and not the other way aroundj.I" This shift is helpfully explained
by the logic of recapitulation as expounded by St Irenaeus of Lyons.
c. Recapitulation: All Things Gathered up in the Person of Christ
'Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming
down from the Father of lights '. But there is something more. Inspired
by the Father, each procession of the Light spreads itself generously
toward us, and, in its power to unify, it stirs us by lifting us up. It
returns us back to the oneness and deifying simplicity of the Father
who gathers us in.
-Dionysius the Areopagite'"
All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing
came into being.
-John 1:3
Proceeding to talk about the arrival of the person entails a slight
reconfiguration of perspective. In understanding the cause as cause, that is, in
understanding the arrival of the person as the arch-person requires the
reflexive reversal that can only be enacted in the event of recapitulation. The
method of resolutio described above is, according to Thomas, more akin to
that of the philosopher as opposed to that of the approach of the believer; that
is, as Matthew Kostelecky puts it, 'In philosophy the first consideration is of
creatures and the last is of God; in the teaching of the faith the consideration
of God comes first, that of creatures comes afterwards' .156 However, as we
have seen in exploration above, this was an approach from the creaturely
realm that was informed by faith. The shift from seeing the cause as cause of
all, of the arrival of the person who is truth, will always therefore be a
154 Cf. ST, Ill, q. 2, a. I.
155 "The Celestial Hierarchy," in Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works,
145 [PG 3:1208]. He is quoting Jas 1:17.
156 Matthew Kostelecky, "Human Nature Reflected in the Investigation of God: The Case of
the Summa Contra Gentiles," in Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of
Thomas Aquinas, ed. Harm Goris, Herwi Rikhof, and Henk Schoot, New Series XIII (Leuven:
Peeters, 2009), 104-5. The reference to Thomas is to ScG, II, c. 4, n. 5. Cf. Lyttkens, The
Analogy Between God and the World, 346.
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recognition that is informed first by revelation. For the theological logic of
recapitulation, we tum to the work of St Irenaeus of Lyons.
Recapitulation (avuKE<j:>aAcllWUU:;) is itself not a single, univocal concept.
Eric Osborn states that its complexity is a formidable one, combining at least
eleven ideas: 'unification, repetition, redemption, perfection, inauguration and
consummation, totality, the triumph of Christus Victor, ontology,
epistemology and ethics (or being, truth and goodness)'. 157 I will not be
treating all of these concepts, nor do I hope to unfairly limit myself to only one
of these at the expense of the others; that is to say, for my purposes,
epistemology and ethics are not crucial aspects here, although they are not
unimportant. 158
The word 'recapitulation' itself, as John Behr points out, originally stems
from literary and rhetorical usage. The Roman rhetorician Quintillian remarks:
'The repetition and grouping of the facts, which the Greeks call
avuKE<j:>aAulwul~ [recapitulation] and some of our own writers call
enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the
whole case before his eyes, and, even although the facts may have made little
impression on him in detail, their cumulative effect is considerable' .159 Behr
comments on this, saying, 'recapitulation summarizes the whole case,
presenting a restatement of the case or story in epitome, bringing together the
whole argument in one conspectus, so that, while the particular details made
little impact, the picture as a whole might be more forceful. Recapitulation
provides a resume which, because shorter, is clearer and therefore more
effcctive.'" Thus, Paul comments that the commandments are 'summed up in
this word (EV 're;, A6ycp 'rou'rcp aVUK€<j:>aAulOlJ'rUl), "You shall love your
neighbour as yourself?"!" The summing up is also a gathering, as Paul writes
in Ephesians: 'With all wisdom and insight he has made known to us the
mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure that he set forth in Christ,
157 Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97-8.
ISS E.g., ibid., 232-48.
159 Quintillian, Institutio Oratoria, 6.1.1. As cited in John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, I: The




as a plan for the fullness of time, to gather up (avaKEcpaAal~JaaaeaL) all
things in him, things in heaven and things on earth'. 162
Inspired by Paul's theology, for Irenaeus, recapitulation means primarily to
join up again, gather up, and unite.!" This happens primarily and uniquely in
the person of Christ, but it involves the whole event of the life of Christ in the
passion and resurrection as well.l" Humanity is recapitulated in Adam, who
we are told by Paul is a type (rurroc) of the one to corne.l" For Irenaeus,
'Adam is God's image because he has been fashioned after the physical form
of the Son's future incarnation, and because the life visible in his person is the
life of God' .166 It is important to note that Irenaeus takes the Epistle to the
Colossians quite seriously here which states that Christ 'is the image (EiKWV)
of the invisible God, the firstborn (rrQw'[o-roKO~)of all creation'. Irenaeus is
not merely glossing Genesis 1:26-7 but, in response to the various mythologies
of Ptolemy and Valentinus, is displaying Christ's cosmic significance.!"
Humanity is created after (secundum) the likeness of God and Christ after (ad)
the image.!" which was not revealed in its fullness until the person of Christ
became flesh.!" The human person is created after the prototype of the Son
(God's image), 170 and the Son thereby serves as 'man's antetype, the model or
pattern after whom man was formed, at the time when he was created from the
162 Ephesians 1:8-10.
163 Gustav Molwitz, De ANAKEifJAAAIQIEQI in Irenaei Theologia Potestate (Dresden: B. G.
Teubner, 1874),3; cited in Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 103-4.
164 Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Jrenaeus,
trans. Ross Mackenzie (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959),81-2; J. N. D Kelly,
Early Christian Doctrines, 5th, rev. ed (London: Continuum, 2000), 170-4; Jaroslav Pelikan,
The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, I: The Emergence of the
Catholic Tradition (100-600) (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 144-
5.
165 Romans 5:14. Irenaeus points out that the Gnostics try and go above God and look for
types of types in an infinite regress. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, IV.19.l ,2 (hereafter AH).
On this see Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 105.
166 Matthew C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of
Redemption (Boston, MA: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008), 135.
167 For an excellent discussion of the background to this, see Matthew C. Steenberg, Of God
and Man: Theology as Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (London: Continuum,
2009), 29-41.
168 AH, IV.33.4 (PG 7:271C). For commentary on this passage, see J. T. Nielsen, Adam and
Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons: An Examination of the Function of the Adam-
Christ Typology in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus, Against the Background of the
Gnosticism of His Time (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comps., 1968),58.
169 AH, V.16.2.
170 Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 138.
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dust of the earth'. 171 Later, and in the same vein, Thomas Aquinas will say that
humanity is made 'to the image of God' (ad imaginem Dei).172
The logic of recapitulation is such that the first (Adam) becomes last, and
the last (Christ) becomes first.!" Perfection is imparted to humanity by joining
the end to the beginning, linking humanity to God.174 This linking is done
through God's economy (oikonomia), who, in the person of Jesus Christ,
recapitulates the long development of mankind in himself'!" 'As one who
perfects the human race, Christ must be a member of that race, and as first of
all creatures and first-born from the dead he can bring humanity to
perfection' .176 This linking the end to the beginning also means that the end of
the law of Christ is joined to the beginning."? Indeed, Irenaeus' proto logy is so
deeply rooted first in Christology that John 1:3 serves as the lens through
which Genesis I: I and the creation of humanity is to be read: 'All things came
into being through him, and without him not one thing came into being"-
otherwise, the Genesis account alone remains partial. 178
This work of perfection effected in the Incarnation is of a 'higher' kind of
perfection than the perfection of nature that we have learned to call the person,
after Thomas' designation stated above.!" Wingren states, 'There is in the
Incarnation something that is essentially different from what we find in
Creation, even when Creation is at its most perfect. That which became a
reality in the Incarnation is not present even as a potentiality in man. He is
171 Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 95.
172 ST, I, q. 93, a. 1; cf. ScG, I, c. 29, nn. 3~.
173 See Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea, 392-400, esp 393-7. Likewise, Erich Przywara
says that Christ is 'the second Adam, and yet more first than the first one'. Erich Przywara,
Logos, Abendland, Reich, Commercium (DUsseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1964), 147; cited by and
trans. by Kenneth Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," in The
Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph
White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011),158.
174 AH, IV.20.4. Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 106.
175 AH, III.18.1. Nielsen, Adam and Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons, 58. Going
back seventy-two generations to Adam (AH, III.22.3).
176 Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 110-11. AH, V.l.3; III.18. 7. And see John Behr, Asceticism
and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement, The Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 62-5.
177 AH, IV.12.4.
178 Steenberg, Of God and Man, 27.
179 ST, I, q. 29, a. 3.
107
destined to be like God, but he has never been destined to be God' .180 This
Creator-creature distinction is important to remember, for as Osborn reminds
us, for Irenaeus, recapitulation does not merely describe Christ's work as the
head, chief, or 'summit' of things (although he is these things as well), but as
the one who perfectly 'unites a vast plurality' and is thus the 'unity of all
things' .181 Human nature is united in this or that particular person; but for the
one through whom all things came into being, he unites all of being, all
natures, not just in the here and now, but for all time until the eschaton. Lest
we reduce recapitulation to a nominal saving of particular persons only up
until the present time, it cannot be forgotten that recapitulation in the person of
Christ 'covers the whole of the period from the birth of Jesus to the
eschatological perfection' .182 The full likeness of man to God will also only be
fulfilled 'in the participation in Trinitarian glory which is the promise of the
eschaton' .183 The difference between these two kind of 'perfections', that is, of
the difference between the work of creation enacted in and through the second
person of the Trinity in contrast to the perfection in created nature in the form
of the human person, is also the difference between the primary analogate and
its analogue in creation. The chasm here is, on the one hand infinite, but on the
other hand the image and likeness still must be held together; in other words,
the distance is enacted by the gift of participation in the body of Christ in the
Eucharist. Otherwise, to hold that only the image alone, or only the likeness
alone can be saved is to fall into the error of the Gnostics according to
Irenaeus, for this sunders spirit from the body. On the contrary, 'by sharing in
the body of Christ, which is the church, man can grow in the image and
likeness of God'. 184
With the arrival of the true person who recapitulates all of reality, one can
affirm now the co-primacy and coextensive reality of both God's oneness and
God's triunity in three persons. What is common (God's esse) is distinct-but
1110 Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 99.
lRl Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 115.
1112 Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 192 and 193-4.
IH" Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 138. In speaking about the distinction between 'image'
and 'likeness', Thomas designates two kinds of ways in which they are related, the first being
a kind of 'preamble' and that which is more common in things; and the second being of the
type described here which is the likeness being the perfection of the image (ST, I, q. 93, a. 9).
1M AH, II1.l7.3. Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 213.
108
not divided-from what is proper, just as it is true to say that the Father is the
same thing as God, but 'he is not common as God is, but proper (sed
proprium)' .185 It is for this reason that one must always hold these two together
in a kind of reduplication (redoublement), as Gilles Emery often puts it,
against a one-sided 'personalism' on the one hand or an 'essentialism' on the
other.!" It is in this sense that a truly theological analogy of being will only be
adequate insofar as it is also simultaneously an analogy of persons. In a similar
fashion, Aaron Riches remarks, 'the analogia entis-though conceived in
terms of what is one in God-arrives, nevertheless, in terms of the
relationality of personhood: as a gift from someone. And what is personal and
relational in God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' .187
Above I have shown how the path of resolutio blossoms in a 'reflexive
reversal' towards an affirmation of a cause of creation, not only in its
beginnings, but in its end as linked to the beginning in the recapitulation
through the person of Christ. The image of the human person is taken up
through its participation in the Eucharist towards the eschatological
completion of its likeness in Christ. Yet, this only offers a philosophical and
theological justification for determining the person as a valid primary
analogous term (which 'stretches' unto the eschaton). What about how
analogy itself is said to operate? In the next chapter I will continue to extend
my discussion of analogy. However, I will not be turning to the debate about
analogy itself with regard to the classical issue of the analogy of being alone;
on the contrary, what I will now show that when the analogy of being IS
investigated in detail, it finds its fulfillment and completion within a
coextensive analogia personae.
IRS De Pot., q. 8, a. 3.
1116 Gilles Emery OP, "Personalism or Essentialism in the Treatise on God in Saint Thomas
Aquinas?," The Thomist 64, no. 4 (2000): 521~3, esp. 527-36; idem, The Trinitarian
Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, 44-8; idem, The Trinity, 86; idem, "The Doctrine of the
Trinity in St Thomas Aquinas," in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas
G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum (London and New York: T
& T Clark, 2004), 67-89 at 50-1. Emery's goal is to show, contra myriad unnuanced readings
of Thomas, that the designations of what is 'common' and 'proper' to God follow in that
order, not because Thomas is an 'essentialist' and persons are for him only an afterthought,
but that this is due to the historical shape taken in responding to the heretical positions of
Arianism and Sabellianism.




THE PERSONAL LOGIC OF ANALOGY
For from the greatness and beauty of created things
we may, by analogy [avaA6ywc;j, contemplate their Creator.
-Wisdom of Solomon
13:51
Manuduction is the form oftheosis.
-Peter M Candler, Jr'
To reach God, man must go through all of nature and find him
under the veil where He hides Himself only to be accessible.
Thus the whole natural order comes between God and man as a
bond and as an obstacle, as a necessary means of union and as
a necessary means of distinction.
-Maurice Blondel'
In this chapter I aim to show how the philosophical and theological use of
analogical speech can refer to God not only in an 'essential' way, but also a
proper or personal mode as well. This stems from the recognition that the
human person is the most fitting as the primary analogate of Being as
indicated in the previous chapter; moreover, it is rooted in the way in which
analogy also functions as a distinctly personal enterprise. This chapter can be
thought of as one answer to Lewis Ayres' critique of 'relational ontologies',
whose proponents fail 'to offer an adequate account of analogy'." I share in
Ayres' critique of said theologians (e.g., Metropolitan John Zizioulas),
primarily because their accounts of the person strongly tend toward speaking
1 'CK yaQ f.lEyi8ou~ KaMov~~ Kat KTla~.!(hwv avaA6yw~ 6 YEVWLOUQYO~al),(WV
9EwQELmL'. ava.A6yw~ is also often translated as 'corresponding' here, or classically as
'proportionably' .
2 Peter M. Candler, Jr., Theology. Rhetoric. Manuduction. or Reading Scripture Together on
the Path to God, Radical Traditions (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2006), 44.
3 Blondel, Action (1893), 410.
4 Lewis Ayres, "(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontology," in The Trinity and an Entangled
World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghome (Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010),130-45 at 133.
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of human and divine persons in a univocal manner, and hence do violence to
the notions of nature and freedom in an unnecessarily dialectical way.' It
should be noted, though, that adding a personal dimension to the analogical
discourse does not ensure any kind of certainty (as this would strive after
univocity), just as in the same way persons themselves can never fully be
grasped or defined, and then even only as analogical gestures such as we find
in Boethius and Aquinas. Yet at the same time, the reality of the person is
more concrete than any generic notion of 'relationality' can provide on its
own. As I hope to show, the reason why persons and analogical talk about God
(whether 'common' or 'proper') never succeed in comprehensive certainty
resides in the fact that both God and human persons are themselves ultimately
mysteries. Put in another way, the practice of analogical speech participates in
the same reality which escapes definitional structure." While human persons
share in this ultimate likeness of the mystery of the Triune God, this difference
is analogical, that is, the mystery of God remains in an 'ever greater'
dissimilarity from God's creatures.
The plan of this chapter is as follows: I will first layout the fundamentals
of the debate concerning analogy and how it operates following Thomas
Aquinas and the relevant literature with respect to its connection to causality
and participation; next, I will consider what is at issue in the discussion
surrounding the 'analogy of the concept' versus 'analogy of judgment' as a
response to the writings of Christos Yannaras; finally, I will tum to the issues
surrounding the analogia entis, Erich Przywara, and how they shed light on
the analogical perfection of the person. Additionally, with the help of Hans
Urs von Balthasar, I show how the shape of analogy is orientated to that of
service. The previous chapter assumed a great deal of the logic and practice of
5 This is the astute argument of Douglas Farrow, "Person and Nature: The Necessity-Freedom
Dialectic in John Zizioulas," in The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church,
ed. Douglas H Knight (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 109-24. For two accounts of the violence
of dialectics as they oppose the peaceableness of paradox, see John Milbank and Slavoj Zifek,
The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic?, ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2009); and the forthcoming work: Rustin Brian, Covering Up Luther: How Barth's
Christology Challenged the Deus Absconditas That Haunts Modernity, Veritas (Eugene, OR:
Wipf & Stock, 2013).
6 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 23, 31-2.
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what I will explore below, but in doing so, I hope to shed light on some of the
issues that animate what is at stake in gesturing toward persons as analogical.
a. The Work of Analogy between Univocity and Equivocity: Causality and
Participation
The recent literature on the debate concerning analogy used in theological
speech about God has been vast.' In the twentieth century, the controversy
overlapped with and surrounded the two figures of Karl Barth and Erich
Przywara, SJ under the heading of the analogia entis (this debate will be
partially attended to in Part C below). Discussions of analogy have their
beginnings in the Ancient Greeks including Plato and Aristotle," and its
influence has been so pervasive that western European metaphysics cannot be
7 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World; George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas
Aquinas on Analogy: A Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis, Jesuit Studies (Chicago:
Loyola University Press, 1960); Bernard Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being
According 10 Thomas Aquinas, ed. Andrew Tallon, trans. E. M. Macierowski, Marquette
Studies in Philosophy 25 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2004); Ralph
McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St Thomas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961);
idem, Studies in Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); idem, Aquinas and Analogy
(Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996); Burrell, Analogy and
Philosophical Language; idem, Aquinas: God and Action, 63-88, 131-85; James F.
Anderson, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence (St Louis, MO: Herder
Book Co., 1949); idem, Reflections on the Analogy of Being (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1967); Henry Chavannes, The Analogy Between God and the World in Saint Thomas Aquinas
and Karl Barth, trans. William Lumley (New York: Vantage Press, ]992); Clarke, "Analogy
and the Meaningfulness of Language About God"; E. L Mascall, Existence and Analogy: A
Sequel to "He Who Is" (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966),92-]2]; Lorenz B. Puntel,
Analogie Und Geschichtlichkeit. Philosophiegeschichtlich-Kritischer Versuch Uber Das
Grundproblem Der Metaphysik (Freiburg - Basel - Wien: Herder, 1969); Battista Mondin, The
Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 2d ed., rev. and enriched (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); James F. Ross, Portraying Analogy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981); Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities; Roger M. White, Talking About
God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious Language (Farnham: Ashgate,
20 10); Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God; D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God:
Theology, Language. and Truth (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2009),42-3,55-81, ]41-80,212-]5; Patrick Lee, "Language About God and the Theory of
Analogy," The New Scholasticism 58, no. I (1984): 40--66.
S Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 18-58; Mondin, The Principle of
Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, 1-4; Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical
Language, 75-83; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 30-47; Rocca, Speaking the
Incomprehensible God, 77-92; White, Talking About God, 27-72.
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thought without it." In this regard, analogy's origins are concerned with
mathematical proportionality," but also, for Plato it involved the proportion
between the four elements as well as the four forms of knowledge (knowledge
: opinion :: thinking: imagining)." Aristotle restricted his use of analogy to
more logical, semantic concerns. Theologically, the practice of analogy takes
most of its cues from the different writings of Thomas Aquinas as its point of
departure on the one hand," and as a 'doctrine' as such, from the work of
Cardinal Cajetan in his De Nominum Analogia," To a large extent, most of the
writing around analogy in the middle of the twentieth century was attempting
to sort through the Cajetanian legacy. Most accounts (Ralph McInerny and
David Burrell) tend to argue that Cajetan attempted to 'systemetize' Aquinas
along the lines of a 'procrustean' analogy of proportionality (analogia
proportionalitatis) and thus in effect unwittingly tum analogy into a
formalized univocity;" additionally, a recent account by Joshua Hochschild
attempts to defend Cajetan as responding to a different set of concerns than
Aquinas' own. IS
Much of the literature concerns the metaphysical issues involved in such
analogical designation, but Thomas cannot also be understood outside of his
9 Puntel, Analogie Und Geschichtlichkeit, 4.
]()White, Talking About God, 11-25,59,121-2.
11 Respectively, see Timaeus, 32c and Republic, 534a.
12 ST, I, q. 13, aa. 5--6; De Pot., q. 7, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 34; Lyttkens calls these three passages
"decisive" in The Analogy Between God and the World, 286. For a more comprehensive list of
sources in Thomas, see the two indices in Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 157-
302.
13 Cardinal Cajctan, The Analogy of Names and The Concept of Being, trans. Edward A.
Bushinkski, 2nd ed., Duquesne Studies: Philosophical Series 4 (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 1959),9-78.
14 Mcinerny, The Logic of Analogy, 1-23; Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 11-
20, 119-22; Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, 63~; McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, 3-29.
IS Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). See the diverging reviews of Hochschild's
book, first appreciative but skeptical, by Rolnick: Philip A. Rolnick, "The Semantics of
Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia- By Joshua Hochschild," Modern
Theology 28, no. I (January 2012): 141-5. And then surprisingly positive by Burrell: David
B. Burrell, "The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia by
Joshua P. Hochschild," Nova El Vetera 9, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 252--6. But this may be,
because, as Rolnick says in his review, 'Hochschild is consistently balanced and fair in his
expositions, but he may not realize how close he comes to where Burrell has long been'
(Rolnick, "The Semantics of Analogy, by Joshua Hochschild," 144).
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context of thirteenth century logic and semantics." It is, of course, following
Aquinas, best to keep these two concepts together, but ordered such that
metaphysics comes first followed by its logical, semantic use as a science, for
the latter depends on the former, and not vice versa. The reason that this is
important to keep in mind is that both McInerny and Burrell claim that
analogy is only a logical or semantic concern." Burrell will go so far as to say
that what is primarily operative for Thomas is an epistemology such that
'Aquinas' metaphysics presupposes an epistemology' .18 In one sense this
appears to be true insofar as Aquinas' method is one that admits that we
cannot know what God is, but rather what God is not. 19 But this is to assume
that theology'S 'object' (i.e. God) only concerns knowledge and that there is
no aspect that the endeavor also includes a real (i.e. ontological) participation
in its end. In response to these epistemological sensibilities, Conor
Cunningham rightly notes analogy'S manuductive aspect: 'In terms of
theology, analogy is part of a metaphysical doctrine, and so it is cosmological,
rather than epistemological, and only as such can we appreciate its position
16 See, e.g., the helpful historical work of E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of
Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic"; idem, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-
Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," Mediaeval Studies 54, no. 1 (1992): 94-135; idem,
"Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," Vivarium 33, no. 1 (1995):
50-75.
17 On this see Ralph Mcinerny, "The Analogy of Names Is a Logical Doctrine," in Being and
Predication: Thomistic Interpretations, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy
16 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 279-86. See also
Herbert McCabe, OP, God and Evil: In the Theology ofSt Thomas Aquinas (London and New
York: Continuum, 2010), 56-8. To this, Burrell's work can be added to a large extent as
approving of Mcinerny's work. See the sources listed above (fn. 3) as well as David B.
Burrell, "From Analogy of 'Being' to the Analogy of Being," in Recovering Nature: Essays in
Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph Mclnerny, ed. Thomas S.
Hibbs and John O'Callaghan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999),253-
66. Although, over the years he has been moving somewhat to embrace more metaphysical
and Platonic 'participatory' language such as that of 'emanation', e.g., David B. Burrell, "Act
of Creation with Its Theological Consequences," in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical
Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum
(London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004), 27-44, esp. 33-8; idem, "Metaphysics of
Creation," in Belief and Metaphysics, ed. Peter M. Candler, Jr. and Conor Cunningham,
Veritas (London: SCM Press, 2007), 66-72. For an account of this movement, including a
hesitation toward participation language in his earlier works, see Rolnick, Analogical
Possibilities, 123-6, 161, 184-6. For a recent work defending analogy as belonging 'entirely
to the science of Logic', see John R. Mortensen, Understanding St. Thomas on Analogy
(Rome, Italy: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2006), stated here on p.
1.
18 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 127.
19 ST, I, q. 3, prologue.
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and function; a function which IS also more pedagogical than
epistemological' .20
Lawrence Dewan has shown just how limiting and misleading this
approach is in response to Ralph McInerny's mature work on the matter."
McInerny, as a logician, claims that analogy in Thomas is only 'logical', yet
Thomas himself clearly speaks about analogy both from the position of the
logician and the metaphysician. Thomas speaks of a situation (which
McInerny ignores)" where the logician will see only univocity in naming and
the metaphysician will recognize analogy. This is because the real diversified
content of being demands such careful, metaphysical discernment. 23 It is the
metaphysician, not the logician, who actually goes about defining genus,
species, and the analogue involved in analogous speech, and, in tum, it is the
logician who benefits from the metaphysician's discernment, not the other
way around." Moreover, as Klubertanz points out, the logician is not
concerned with 'the way in which perfections are in being but only the way in
20 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 181.
21 Lawrence Dewan, "St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," in
Form and Being: Studies in Thomstic Metaphysics (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 2006), 81-95; Lawrence Dewan, "Does Being Have a Nature?
(Or: Metaphysics as a Science of the Real)," in Approaches to Metaphysics, ed. William
Sweet (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 23-59; Reinhard Hutter, "Attending
to the Wisdom of God - from Effect to Cause, from Creation to God: A Relecture of the
Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas," in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the
Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed, Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 209-45 at 224-8. Dewan is responding to McInerny,
Aquinas and Analogy. Gabriela Besler compares two different approaches to analogy, one
logical, and the other metaphysical, as coming from two different but legitimate standpoints in
"Two Thomistic Interpretations: Thomas Aquinas' Theory of Analogy - Bochenski Versus
Krapiec," in Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Harm
Goris, Herwi Rikhof, and Henk Schoot, New Series XIII (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 149-62.
Lastly, see Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 12In.49.
22 Dewan, "St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," 90.
23 The text at issue is from Thomas at In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1. cr. De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, s.
c. I. See Dewan, "St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," 87ff. 'The
metaphysician incorporates into the meaning of the name of the thing differences in the mode
of being of the things given the common name' (Ibid., 92).
24 Dewan, "St. Thomas and Analogy: The Logician and the Metaphysician," 83-4, 94. Cr.
Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas On Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation, ed.
Joseph Bobik (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), 100 (c. 39). Here
Thomas speaks about how the oneness of a genus is signifying its form and not its content, to
which it is indifferent. Te Velde remarks: 'The unity ofa genus is a unity of signifying, not a
unity of what is signified. For instance, the genus of animal signifies the essence of animal as
one and the same in all its different species, hence in an indeterminate manner. The genus
does not deny the existence of the differences, it does not consider them; its way of signifying
is indifferent to what is not indifferent in the thing signified' (Participation and Substantiality
in Thomas Aquinas, 195-6).
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which they are concei ved' .25 There IS, therefore, an unnecessaril y
parsimonious view that the logician tends to take here: the logician tends to
deny that there is a metaphysical aspect involved in the judgment of naming;
whereas, the metaphysician will allow for both the metaphysical and the
logical aspects to operate not just in tandem, but in their own proper order, for,
as Klubertanz remarks, 'both the mind and the things are concerned' when
analogy arises."
It will not suffice to settle for the following remarks of David Burrell: 'the
"analogical use of language" refers both to the linguistic structures which
make such usage possible, as well as to the quality of consciousness which
guides the way we actually proceed' .27 Using language analogously is only
part of the procedure. The reason we employ language analogously in the first
place is because the reality involved is so expansive that the ratio of our
concepts cannot contain them in adequate ways; on the contrary, by their very
definition these realities are impossible to contain in any genus, such as being,
or God. There is, of course, nothing wrong with focusing on the analogous use
of language, and so there is also nothing wrong per se with taking inspiration
from Wittgenstein's emphasis on use and following examplesf'-c-indeed, it can
be very helpful. However, if we are to allow Thomas to lead us by the hand,
we cannot stop short at the Aristotelian-inspired emphasis on the grammar of
language itself," for being led in a faithful manuductio will also reveal the
Neoplatonic logic at work in Thomas' own words, even when those words
themselves use Aristotelian categories." The Neoplatonic aspect comes out
25 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 114.
26 Ibid.
27 David B. Burrell, "Beyond a Theory of Analogy," ed. George F. McLean, Proceedings of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 46, The Existence of God (1972): 114-22 at
116.
28 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim
Schulte, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th Edition (West
Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 76-81 (§§ 172-82); cf. Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical
Language, 123.
29 Cr. John Milbank, "A Critique of the Theology of the Right," in The Word Made Strange,
7-35 at 13-14 and esp. 33n.15.
30 This is one of the incisive points made in Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the
World, 172-3, 297-8, 346, 352-3. Crucially, see W. Norris Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by
Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?," in Explorations in Metaphysics:
Being-Gad-Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 65-88; W.
Norris Clarke, "The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas," in Explorations in Metaphysics:
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especially with regard to the vertical dimension of the relationship of cause to
effect." If one is to be led by Aquinas' hand in the practice of analogy, one
needs to pay attention to both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of this
leading, for it is only in this way will one also heed the order of arrival
explored in the previous chapter-otherwise we are only left with the
philosophical resolutio and never make the theological step of recognizing
God as the (uncaused) cause of Being itself." This particular path of
philosophical-theological discovery must always be maintained for the
following reason given by Thomas: because we cannot know directly God's
essence, we only know God from God's effects as mediated by secondary
causes." Therefore, while in the strictest sense we do not have any conception
of God, Thomas sheds light on a faithful approach that allows us to begin to
come to an understanding of who God is. Thus, Thomas' aim is to avoid
idolatry and not mistake created things for God. Accordingly, Te Velde says,
'The formula ipsum esse subsistens signifies God as he is knowable to us on
the basis of his "reflection" in the world'. 34 Analogical language appears to
hold a privileged place in Thomas' account of language of God, for it points
toward this similarity-in-difference that the creature shares with its creator in
such a way that the relationship between the two retains its faithful dignity,
and he does so without collapsing the one into the other, or putting them
asunder.
For Thomas, above all, analogical language is a part of, and not to be
separated from, language about God-namely, under the rubric of 'The Names
Being-God-Person (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 89-10 I; John
F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas and Participation," in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John
F. Wippel (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 117-58; Te
Vel de, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas; and the chapter entitled
"Platonism and Aristotelianism in Aquinas" in John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in
Thomas Aquinas II, Rev. Ed, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 47
(Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 272-89.
31 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 71, where it is shown that this begins in
Proclus. More directly, as I will show below, this ProcJean dimension is inherited from
Dionysius.
32 Cr. Ibid., 346. In this sense, we would only end up at a transcendentalism and never arrive at
the transcendent.
33 ScG, I, c. II, n. 4; II, c. IS; ST, I, q. I, a. 7 ad I; q. 2, a. I; q. 2, a. 2; q. 12, a. 8, etc.; De
Ver., q. 2, a. 14.
34 Te Vel de, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 120.
117
of God', which is the title of question 13 of the Summa Theologica:" The
name of this question hearkens back to the tradition of divine naming
stemming back to Dionysius." In keeping with this Dionysian tradition,
Thomas begins Article 1 of Question 13 with a reference to the triplex via
method of naming also employed by Dionysius." That is, because we cannot
know God's essence, 'we know God from creatures as their principle
(secundum habitudinem principii), and also by way of excellence and
remotion'." Although the order here is not exactly the same (the second two
being reversed), this corresponds to the three steps of per causalitatem, per
remotionem, and per eminentiam, whereby God is 1) first recognized as the
cause of the perfection name in question, 2) then through negation in the sense
that God is 'not' at all like the way in which we understand the perfection
because 3) God is the transcendent source of the perfection in a most excellent
way (although the ordering of the triplex via varies with the context for
Thomas)." The way of eminence is emphasized in Article 2 where Thomas
discusses substantial predication of God. Words such as 'good' can be
attributed to God, not merely because God is the cause of Goodness, but
because whatever goodness we attribute to God pre-exists in God and 'in a
more excellent and higher way'." Article 2 responds to the issue of speaking
literally of God, offering the classic distinction of the res significata and
35 Te Vel de, Aquinas on God, 102.
3(, Herbert McCabe's translation of this question as 'Theological Language' tends to obscure
Thomas' connection to the divine names tradition ofDionysius. See Herbert McCabe, OP, ed.,
SI. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, vol. 3 (New York: McGraw-Hili, 1963),46-97.
37 For a helpful discussion see O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas,
31-41; Te Vel de, Aquinas on God, 76-7,96, 103-4; idem, Participation and Substantiality in
Thomas Aquinas, 120-1; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 49-74; Long, Speaking
of God, 153, 176-80. And see the excellent article: Aaron Riches, 'Being Good: Thomas
Aquinas and Dionysian Causal Predication', Nova et Vetara 7, no. 2 (2009): 439-76.
38 ST, I, q. 13, a. 1. Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 'we cannot know God in his
nature, since this is unknowable and is beyond the reach of mind or of reason. But we know
him from the arrangement of everything, because everything is, in a sense, projected out from
him, and this order possesses certain images and semblances of his divine paradigms. We
therefore approach that which is beyond all as far as our capacities allow us and we pass by
way of the denial and the transcendence of all things and by way of the cause of all things [tv
T~ mxvTwv acpaLQEUn Kai il7TEQOXtjKai EV Ttj mxvTwv alT4]. God is therefore known
in all things and as distinct from all things. He is known through knowledge and through
unknowing'. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 108-9 [PG
3:869D-872A]).
39 See Michael B. Ewbank, "Diverse Orderings of Dionysius's Triplex Via By St. Thomas
Aquinas," Medieval Studies 52 (1990): 82-109; cited by Riches, "Being Good: Thomas
Aquinas and Dionysian Causal Predication," 463-4 and 463n.115.
40 ST, I, q. 13, a. 2.
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modus significandi" That is, perfection terms can literally (which is not to be
confused with 'univocally') apply to God so long as the following procedure is
followed: 'As regards what is signified (quod significat) by these names, they
belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and
are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification
(modum significandi), they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their
mode of signification applies to creatures'." Such designations include
perfection terms as 'being', 'good', 'Jiving"," and, I would add, 'person'.
Before turning to the issue of analogy, Aquinas also refutes (in Article 4) that
these names of God are not synonymous and therefore redundant because of
the fact that their manifold diversity represent the divine simplicity from the
side of creation in an imperfect way. The one simple reality of God that these
names signify are considered under different aspects."
Thomas turns to analogical predication in the fifth article, but does so first
as a response to univocal predication. All three of the objections assume a
univocal predication between creatures and God, but Thomas replies that this
is impossible because of the nature of causality when a divinely simple God
creates. Elsewhere, Thomas quotes Isaiah 40: 18, 'To whom then have you
41 ST, I, q. 13, a. 3. For other place in Aquinas see ScG, I, c. 34, n. 6; Compo Theol., I, c. 27.
For discussions of the distinction see Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in
Thirteenth-Century Logic" (for historical background); Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God
and the World, 294, 350, 376-81,468-71; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 334-
52; Long, Speaking of God, 174-7. Critically: John S. Morreall, Analogy and Talking About
God: A Critique of the Thomistic Approach (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America,
1978), 114, calls the distinction "bogus." Ashworth remarks, 'while the distinction between
res significata and modi significandi is central to Aquinas's theory of religious language, it is
in no way central to his theory of analogy (insofar as he has a general theory). It places no role
in his explanation of the use of such words as sanum and ens' ("Signification and Modes of
Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 60; idem, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-
Century Logic," 122). This assumes falsely that analogy lies outside of Thomas' 'religious
language', as if Thomas was not using the analogy of health (sanus) to talk analogously about
how we refer to God. Oddly, Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 116-17, 178-80,
says that the res/modus distinction is more "at home" in John Duns Scotus than in Aquinas,
for it assumes a univocal core. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 349n.46, points
out that John Wippel has absolved Thomas of this. See John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes
in Thomas Aquinas, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 10 (Washington, D.
C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984),238.
42 ST, I, q. 13, a. 3.
43 ST, I, q. 13, a. 3 ad l.
44 ST, J, q. 13, a. 4 ad 3 puts it succinctly: 'The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about
that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a
manifold manner, as things represent Him'. Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 6.
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likened God?,45 Echoing the arguments outlined above in Article 4, God as the
efficient cause possesses all perfections within himself," but because the
effect of creation is not an 'adequate result of the power of the efficient cause,
[it] receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure
that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in
the agent simply, and in the same manner' .47 Applying the term 'wise' to the
human person and to God can in no way be univocal, for wise is an accidental
attribute of the human and distinct from his or her essence, whereas in God it
is identified with the essence." Nor can we name creatures and God in a
purely equivocal way either, for 'it follows that from creatures nothing could
be known or demonstrated about God at all'. 49 As an answer to navigating this
dilemma, Thomas proposes that these names are said 'in an analogous sense,
Le. according to proportion (secundum analogiam, idest proportionem)'. 50
Interpretive difficulties have plagued the remainder of the article ever since
Cajetan. While I will not sort through all the subsequent history including
figures such as Sylvester of Ferrara and Francisco Suarez," below I will
provide exegesis with reference to the recent relevant accounts that bring out
what I hope to show is Aquinas' own emphasis in the matter.
Thomas proceeds by saying that analogous names are used in two ways, the
first of which tarries primarily on the predicative level, while the second, to
which Thomas gives more emphasis, operates at the transcendental level. The
first example Thomas gives is when many things are 'proportionate to one
45 De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, s. c. 3.
4<, ST, I, q. 4, a. 2.
47 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
4H Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, s. c. 5. 'Now God's relation to being is different from that of any
creature's: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can
it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the
other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the
first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of
substance and accident' (De Pot., q. 7, a. 7, co.).
49 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5. While he does not mention it in this article, in De. Pot., q. 7, a. 7 Thomas
names Moses Maimonides as an example of one expressing 'pure equivocation'. For a further
account that contrasts the two, see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina,
Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), esp. 47;
Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities, 153-69 comments on this saying that Burrell becomes less
"apophatic" when confronted with analyzing Maimonides' extreme equivocal predication.
50 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
51 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 215-41; Klubertanz, St. Thomas
Aquinas on Analogy, 7-17; Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to
Thomas Aquinas, 120-55; McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 3-31.
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(proportionem ad unum)' as when 'healthy' is 'predicated of medicine and
urine in relation and in proportion to the health of a body, of which the former
is the sign and the latter the cause' .52 (To avoid confusion with this translation
which seems to indicate that the former [as medicine] is the sign and the latter
[as urine] is the cause, the end of the corpus of this article, as well as other
places in Thomas, explicitly states that the urine is the sign, while the
medicine is the cause.53) This we find hearkens back to Aristotelian pros hen
(71QOC; EV) analogy," where what is analogous is common to several and,
despite there being no single truth toward which these analogates point
toward, there is stilI some nature (cpUULC;) towards which it refers. 55 Thus,
following Aristotle, analogical unity for Thomas is defined by the ad unum
relation," which he explicitly emphasizes further in the sixth article with
reference to the per prius and per posterius designation. That is, names are
predicated of many with an analogical reference to some one thing, which
'must be placed in the definition of them all' .57 In so doing, names are
'applied primarily (per prius) to that which is put in the definition of such
other things, and secondarily (per posterius) to these others according as they
approach more or less to that first'. 58 Thomas refers back to the sanus example
to explain that the 'one' thing to which urine and medicine relate is the 'health
of the animal'. Despite Cajetan's analysis, Thomas does not care to analyse
whether or not these terms are more 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic' here, for what is
52 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5. The type of analogy here is a kind of equivocation, but a deliberate
equivocation (as opposed to equivocation by chance, a casu), or aequivoca a consilio. Thomas
includes analogy within equivocation broadly conceived in Ibid., I, q. 13, a. lOad 4;
Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 108n.74. The
conception dates back to Boethius and Simplicius is broken down into similitude, proportion,
from one (ab uno), and to one (ad unum), as explained in Ibid., 101-2; McInerny, Aquinas
and Analogy, 92-3. Aquinas only focuses on the last of these two, however his division of
analogy into many-to-one and one to another as cause and effect do not fit isomorphically
within this distinction (Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic,"
122-23).
5.' ST, I, q. 13, a. 6; a. 10. Cf. ScG, I, c. 34, n. 2; ST, I-II, q. 20, a. 3 ad 3; De principiis naturae
ad fratrem Silvestrum as contained in Thomas Aquinas, An Intrduction to the Philosphy of
Nature, trans. and ed. R. A. Kocourek (St. Paul: North Central, 1948), c. 6.
54 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7.4.1 030b 1. In translation: Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh
Lawson- Tancred, Reprinted (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 181.
55 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 52, 58. See also White, Talking About
God, 59-60; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 79, 84-5.
56 In Meta., VII, 4.1337; Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to
Thomas Aquinas, 44; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 139-41.
57 ST, I,q. 13, a. 6.
58 Ibid.
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at issue is the degrees ('more or less') of the relation of the things to the one,
primary instance.
It is important to recognize what Thomas is not saying here. Despite these
examples having three things (health of body, medicine, and urine), one
should not be confused with his statements elsewhere which speak about a
relation of two things to a third, as in De Potentia and the Summa Contra
Gentiles." In these examples, Thomas is explicitly rejecting this model of
analogy, and in the Contra Gentiles, he actually rejects the model outlined
above when stated in the following way: 'with reference to one health we say
that an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as its
cause, food as its preserver, urine as its sign'. 60 Thomas rejects this particular
formulation because it assumes that one is-univocally-positing something
prior to God under which the two subjects have a relation." Rather than
rejecting this option tout court in the Summa Theologica, Thomas instead
reconfigures it along the lines of participation (Le. 'more and less') and
especially causality, as will soon be clear.
This second example states that things are said analogically 'as one thing is
proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since
medicine is the cause of health in the animal body'. 62 In the same way,
because we only name God from creatures, analogy provides logic of the
'reflexive reversal' such that 'whatever is said of God and creatures, is said
according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause,
wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently'. 63 Analogy, Thomas
adds, is a 'mean' between pure univocation and pure equivocation.
Accordingly, analogous speech is the way in which creatures can speak about
59 De Pot., q. 7, a. 7; ScG, I, c. 34, nn. 3-4.
60 ScG, I,c. 34, n. 2.
61 ScG, I, c. 34, n. 4; similarly in De Pot., q. 7, a. 7. Cr. De Ver., q. 23, a. 7 ad 10.
62 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5, my emphasis.
63 Ibid. Cf. 'To avoid complete equivocation, then, it becomes necessary to rely upon the
relation binding each effect to cause, the only link enabling us to make an accurate ascent
from creature to creator. This relationship St. Thomas caIls analogy, that is to say, proportion'
(Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook [Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994], 106).
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God as cause of all, as the agens analogicum, the analogical agent. 64 Indeed,
earlier when speaking about perfections in God, Thomas states that the
likeness of a creature to God is not based on agreement of the form of genus or
species, but according to a certain analogy." The analogy is not one of
proportionality in the sense of A:B::C:D, but of being proportioned as effects
to their cause." Commenting on ST I, q. 13, a. 5, Lyttkens remarks, 'the
fundamental ontological condition underlying the analogy between God and
creation is the likeness of the effect to its cause'. 67 This is because, as Lyttkens
concludes, 'All St. Thomas' analogies between God and the world are
ultimately based on the relation of cause to effect. The likeness of an effect to
its cause is the prerequisite of our knowledge and designations of God, and
likewise of our conceiving creation as in relation to God. Ontologically, the
analogy between God and the world is accordingly the likeness of effect to
cause' .68
Both the predicative and transcendental analogies are founded not upon the
univocal, but by the creatures' analogical relation to God just as an effect is
proportionally like its cause. The basis for all analogy in Thomas is this causal
relation, which is what the oft-quoted dictum 'analogy is analogous' is
attempting to articulate. This locution does not have the same intention as
speech being metaphorical 'all the way down' as one may find in Derrida's
infinite deferral of the 'becoming-space' of differance." but it is an example of
analogy itself being ordered toward one (ad unum), as when McInerny rightly
states, '''analogy'' has several meanings one of which is privileged and
64 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5 ad 1. This is because creation is only real for us but logical for God, what
Thomas calls a mixed relation where one term is logical while the other is real (Ibid., I, q. 13,
a. 8). For more on this see Conor Cunningham, "Being Recalled: Life as Anamnesis," in
Divine Transcendence and Immanence in the Work of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Harm Goris,
Herwi Rikhof, and Henk Schoot, New Series XIII (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 59-80, esp. 61-7.
65 ST, I, q. 4, a. 3 co. and ad 3.
66 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 48.
67 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 287.
68 Ibid., 244. 'In other words, as soon as it is realized that the world is created by, and has
received its esse from, God, the causal relation follows as a matter of course' (Ibid., 267).
69 See Jacques Derrida, "Differance," in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago,
IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1982), 1-27; and the interviews contained in Jacques
Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1981), esp. 24-29, 39-47, 79-
81.
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explanatory of the others'." (In contrast to Derrida's differance we may name
analogy rather the 'ordering-space' which gives intelligibility not within a
static designation but is closer instead to Levinas' 'resounding' of the existents
without the violence of rupture that both of these thinkers advocate.)"
Similarly, Lyttkens remarks that, despite Cajetan's (and his followers)
protestations to the contrary, the analogy between God and creation is in fact
'always intrinsic, not only in analogies of attribution, but also when analogia
unius ad alterum is characterized as an analogy of relations. The same real
relation-the likeness of effect to cause-is described all the time, although
from different logical aspects'. 72 This is what analogous speech attempts to do
in all cases when referring to God: somehow to talk about that which is
beyond all genera, to gesture therefore 'transgenerically' to the God who
creates out of nothing, to the point where one realizes that even 'to create' in
this sense can only be understood--analogously.
The type of causality here is not just formal, but also efficient and final:
since every agent brings about something similar to itself (omne agens agit
sibi simile),73 causality cannot be merely the thought of as the creation of an
imperfect copy imitating its prototype." Because Cajetan and his followers
placed too much emphasis on the Thomas of the Sentences" and De
Veritate-that is, the early Thomas-we get a picture of Thomas who seems
to advocate the analogy of proportionality, especially so in De Veritate, q. 2, a.
70 See the chapter '''Analogy' is Analogous" in McInerny, Studies in Analogy, 95-104 at 95.
McInerny's conclusion is as follows: "'Analogy" means (1) a determinate relation between
quantities; e.g. double, triple, equal; (2) any relation between things, a determinate mode of
which is the relation of effect to cause; (3) the relation between several meanings of a
common term where all the meanings are ways of signifying the same res significata and one
way of signifying the res is privileged because it enters into the explication of the others, e.g.
"healthy," "being," analogy'" (Ibid., 103). My argument, following Lyttkens, Klubertanz, and
Montagnes et al., is that of the three, McInerny's (2) is the normative, prime analogous
instance of this which orders the other ones. For McInerny, the phrase goes as far back as
McInerny, The Logic of Analogy,4.
71 Cf. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 42-3.
72 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 335.
73 In IV Sent., d. 1, q. I, a. 4 ad 4; ST, I, q. 3, a. 3, obj 2; q. 4, a. 3; q. 6, a. 1; q. 19, aa. 2, 4; De
Pot., q. 7, a. 1 ad 8. See the following insightful study: Philipp Rosemann, Omne Agens Agit
Sibi Simile: A "Repetition" of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven University Press,
1996), esp. 221-352 on Aquinas.
74 Cf. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 95-6.
75 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 35-6.
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11 where the formulation is exactly of this kind." However, as Montagnes
(and Lyttkens and Klubertanz)" have pointed out, not only was this an early
formulation of Thomas, but he never again returns to it in his mature writings.
In these early formulations, Montagnes observes that 'Thomas accepts the
same formalist conception according to which the principal relation of beings
to God is that of imitation, but he grasps the danger that it presents: more or
less to confuse the creature with the creator and to succumb to the univocity to
which our conceptual processes incline US,.78 Obviously, Thomas would not
flee towards equivocity to solve this dilemma and thus sunder the predicative
and transcendental ability to speak about God. Instead, the solution rests in the
fact that he
had to conceive being no longer as form but as act, and causality no
longer as the likeness of the copy to the model but as the dependence
of one being upon another being which produces it. Now this is exactly
what efficient causality implies: exercised by a being in act, it makes a
new being exist in act, which being is not confounded with the first,
since the effect and the cause each exist on its own account, but which
communicates with it in the act, since the act of the agent becomes that
of the patient. At the same time the act is that which the effect has in
common with the cause and that by which it is not identified with it.
Thus, it is by a veritable communication of being that God produces
creatures and creative causality establishes between beings and God
76 'Consequently, it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor
yet purely equivocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or,
in other words, according to a proportion. Since an agreement according to proportion can
happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. There is a certain
agreement between things having a proportion to each other from the fact that they have a
determinate distance between each other or some other relation to each other, like the
proportion which the number two has to unity in as far as it is the double of unity. Again, the
agreement is occasionally noted not between two things which have a proportion between
them, but rather between two related proportions-for example, six has something in common
with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first type of
agreement is one of proportion; the second, of proportionality' (De Ver., q. 2, a. 11). In this
regard, Puntel sees Thomas as following Aristotle's definition and maintains that
proportionality has the final word in Thomas, and so he sees the work of Montagnes and
Fabro as contradictory to what he himself sees in Thomas. See Analogie Und
Geschichtlichkeit, 16, esp. 287-91. This is due to Puntel's emphasis on the 'logic' in
'analogic', for, as he says, metaphysics without logic is unthinkable (Ibid., 5). I maintain,
however, that Lyttkens, Klubertanz, Montagnes et a!. have rightly shown that while this
formulation does show up in Thomas (see references in the next footnote), that it should in no
way be held as normative.
77 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 323-9,433-41,457, and esp. 474-5;
Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 94.
78 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 78. For a
fuller account by Montagnes, see pp. 63-77.
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the indispensable bond of participation so that there might be an
analogy of relation between them."
Te Velde describes this kind of causality such that 'the effect itself has the
dignity of a cause'." In the De Potentia text, Thomas describes this causality
in terms of the art to the artist, or, according to his example, as the material
house akin to the house in the mind of the builder. Cunningham helpfully
comments on this example, saying that 'we are, in effect, left thinking
causality more in terms of artistic intention. This does afford us a greater
knowledge of causality, but we are left comprehending it less-since efficient
causation cannot now be simply imagined in terms of power, for it is
conjoined with finality, the more ultimate reason for causation' .81 Provided
with the analogy of an 'artistic intention of an end', Cunningham remarks that
only a deliberate effect of the artist created in love is able to sustain creation in
an intimate way to give creatures the dignity of secondary causality.
Naturalistic modes of causation-that is, univocal causality-do not bestow
the dignity of freedom, for they cannot also think the final cause as loving
such that the creature is unified (yet distinctly so, unconfusedly) to the Creator
in the artistic end known as the beatific vision." In this way, Thomas says that
'the nature of being patient, moved, or caused must always have an order to
the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and
dependent thereon: so that it is ordered to it as the cause of its perfection'. 83
Causality where the 'act of the agent becomes that of the patient' is articulated
in terms of the participation that the patient has in the agent, that is, the
effect's dignity as it participates in the cause.
Participation is inherently linked to causality In Thomas. 'Even where
participation is not explicitly defined in terms of causality, a relation to a cause
is normally implied'. 84 Participation, taking a 'part' of something.f names not
79 Ibid.
80 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 161.
81 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 187.
82 Ibid., 187-8.
83 De Pot., q. 7, a. 10.
84 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 92n.l and 95fT.
85 In German this is readily apparent etymologically as die Teilnahme. For Aquinas's
discussion of participation, see Expositio libri Boetii De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2, n. 24. In
translation: Thomas Aquinas, An Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius, trans.
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a quality as much as a qualification of being, that is, of having one's being in a
different way than God 'has' being. For God's esse is God's very nature (per
essentiav" whereas creature's have their being per participationem" For God
to be ipsum esse subsistens means that, as subsistent being itself, all
perfections are included in God as actus purus while creatures are subjects-in-
potency who participate in that which is pure act. Hence, according to
Montagnes, 'the primacy of act and the priority of efficient causality go hand
in hand. Exemplarity does not disappear; it is subordinated to efficiency. In
sum, participation is presented as the communication of act to a subject in
potency' .88 Creatures in potency have a share in being, which means not onl y
do they have their being by participation, but they are also good by
participation in the first cause which is the Good.89 Thomas highlights this
notion of participation in the first cause when speaking about God as the
analogous cause (agens analogicum). God cannot be the univocal cause of
everything, for then a univocal cause would only be the cause of itself (since it
is contained in the species), but must therefore be a non-univocal agent such
that, as it causes all things analogically, creatures are placed underneath this
cause in the same way that individuals participate in the species." This is not
to be understood as the less universal participating in the more universal, but
as the participation of the concrete in the abstract."
A crucial point must be made here regarding the level of participation:
creation does not participate directly in the essence of God, for nothing can
know or participate directly in God's essence, as is clear in Thomas." What
Janice L. Schultz and Edward A. Synan (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 200 I), 19-21. For a helpful commentary, see Te Velde, Participation and
Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 8-34, esp. 11-12,29, 33-t.
8() David Burrell articulates this as, 'to be God is to be to-be'. Burrell, Aquinas: God and
Action, 25-6.
87 ST, I, q. 4, a. 3 ad 3; q. 3, a. 4; q. 3, a. 8, q. 44, a. I; De Pot., q. 3, a. 5; ScC, I, c. 33; c. 22;
Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World,256.
88 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 40.
89 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 6, aa. 1-2; q. 6, a. 3 s. c. and co.; q. 5, a. 2; q. 6, a. I ad 2; Te Vel de,
Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 33-t, 64-5.
90 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5 ad I.
91 In De Hebd., lect. 2, n. 24 (p. 21); Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas
Aquinas, 79-80.
92 ST, I, q. I, a. 7 ad 1; q. 2, a. I; q. 2, a. 2 ad 3, etc.; ScC, I, c. II, n. 5; c. 12, n. 7; III, cc. 51-
6, etc.
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participates is being itself," not directly in God, but in the divine similitude,
'which precisely as similitude is distinguished from the divine essence itself,
and consequently in itself distinguished into a multitude of distinct
"similitudes" according to the differences of being (differentia entis)' .94
However, this does not mean that there is a double participation or double
creation in God. Rather, as Te Velde puts it:
the divine cause expresses itself in its effect as distinguished from
itself and in each distinct creature the divine cause is distinguished
from itself in a distinct way in accordance with the appropriate idea of
this creature. So the negation in the effect of the identity of essence
and esse in God is included in the likeness each creature has of
God. This is exactly the reason of calling the likeness between God
and creatures "analogous": since it is not in spite of their difference
that they are similar in a certain respect. They are different from one
another in what they have in common, the one has being in identity
with its essence, the other has being as distinct from its essence."
Thus, the language of participation communicates the degrees of ontological
diversity that creation has a share in with its relationship to its Creator. One
way to express this is that participation reveals the 'difference in unity' or
'identity in difference' of this relationship." Another facet of this is expressed
most clearly when speaking of the divine perfections, for just as all the
perfections are contained simply and perfectly in God, 'the nature proper to
each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection', 97
Human persons themselves stand in a privileged place within creation due to
the possession of an intellect which has the capability of reflecting the divine
intellect. So those who have more charity 'will have a fuller participation in
the light of glory' for the reason that the increase of charity signals the
increase of desire, 'and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt
and prepared to receive the object desired' ,98 That is, there is a 'longing of the
effect back to its cause' which stems from the desire and need for salvation,"
93 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 29.
94 Ibid., 115-16.
95 Ibid., 116, emphasis in original.
96 Ibid., 206, 280, respectively. Or: 'differently the same' (Te Velde, Aquinas on God, 102,
118).
97 ST, I, q. 14, a. 6.
98 ST, I, q. 12, a. 6. We also see degrees of wisdom spoken of in ST, I, q. 9, a. 1 ad 2.
1)<) Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 481.
128
motivated by the desire for the Good as beginning and final end. lOO Causality
now exhibits not only its efficient character, but its final mode as well.
The end of creation is found in its beginning, expressed analogically in
terms of a real participation in the divine similitude of Being in God. This is
afforded by the unity found in the concept of being, but also, states
Montagnes, in 'the real unity of the Principle of being. Hence, the structure of
analogy and that of participation are rigorously parallel: they correspond to
each other as the conceptual aspect and the real aspect of the unity of being' .101
With reference to the real diversity of beings, the analogy of being is not
meant to act as a 'stand-in' the proportional unity of a concept, for this would
subsume God 'under' a concept (in Thomas' language, 'genera' or 'species');
rather, '[the analogy of being] is supposed to reproduce the unity of order
which ties beings up with their Principle. Thus and thus only does the realistic
and critical character of the theory of the analogy of being show up within
Thomas's philosophy'v'" 'Critical', because analogous speech paves its way
between untenably univocal speech on the one hand and impossible, hyper-
fallibly equivocal speech on the other; equally 'realistic', because such speech
gestures toward the real aspect of created reality itself as having a participated
'share' in the Triune God. It is this latter aspect that will always be
egregiously missing from the cry of the logician aiming to assert that analogy
is 'purely' or 'only' semantic.'?' Again, both disciplines need each other
insofar as they recognize the order of things themselves in the reflexive
reversal of knowledge which we have called analogy.
So far in this chapter I have spoken about the analogy of being with regard
to Thomas and the analogously ordered ways in which it functions in his
primary texts. We know, however, that the way in which Thomas uses the
IfMJ re Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 30-1.
101 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 91.
102 Ibid.
Jill Similarly, Rocca says that regarding the conclusions that Aquinas comes to as to why
predication cannot be univocal between creatures and God, 'The conclusion is epistemological
and semantic, but the reasons themselves are various ontological truths about God that
Aquinas has previously established to his own satisfaction' (Rocca, Speaking the
Incomprehensible God, 176). Moreover, the reason why predication cannot also be purely
equivocal follows the same logic: it would destroy both epistemological and ontological
reason (ibid, 176-80).
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Boethian 'definition' of the person is also analogous, speaking of angelic,
human, and divine persons all as 'individual substances of a rational nature'.
But does Thomas actually speak this way explicitly about the person itself as
predicated analogously? In a much-overlooked passage in his commentary on
the Sentences, we see that in fact Thomas' logic is consistent: 'Person is said
of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but analogously; and
so far as to the thing signified it is said primarily (per prius) of God than of
creatures, but as far as the mode of signification it is said the other way around
(e converso [i.e. per posteriusti, as it is also of all the other names which are
said to be of God and creatures by analogy'.'?' We see here the common
themes spoken of above regarding the per prius et per posterius designation
tied up with discussion of the res significata with respect to creaturely modi
significandi, and in this respect we see that E. J. Ashworth is quite incorrect to
argue that these designations are not part and parcel of Thomas' teaching on
analogy, considering the fact that Thomas makes an explicit connection in this
passage. lOS Moreover, because 'person' is said neither univocally nor
equivocally of God and creatures, this is because the analogical order of
things indicates that the three divine persons are 'most real' such that they are
spoken of primarily (per prius), even though in the order of knowledge we
come to know our biological parents (per posterius) as the first persons whom
we encounter. God is the primary analogate regarding esse, viz., God is ipsum
esse subsistens while creatures have their esse by participation; but we also see
co-extensively that the divine persons are primarily analogous for human and
angelic persons as well. The Thomistic analogia entis is thus always already
an analogia personae.
104 In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, co., translation mine. The text reads: 'Respondeo dicendum,
quod persona dicitur de Deo et creaturis, non univoce nee aequivoce, sed secundum
analogiam; et quantum ad rem significatam per prius est in Deo quam in creaturis, sed
quantum ad modum significandi est e converso, sicut est etiam de omnibus aliis nominibus
quae de Deo et creaturis analogice dicuntur'.lit,Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 60; idem,
"Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 122. Aquinas also would contradict
Ashworth's reading in Camp. Theol., I, c. 27. Here is another place where Aquinas speaks of
analogy where the thing signified (rem significatam) points primarily (per prius) to God, but
the order is ditTerent to that of creatures. 'Modi significandi' is not explicitly stated here, but it
appears to be assumed with the God-creature distinction made.
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We have come a long way from the previous discussion of the accusative
and accusation. In that discussion we saw that Levinas' rejection of what he
saw as Being's 'totalizing' aspect, coupled with his rejection of persons as
analogous (with regard to Husserl's transcendental analogy of apperception),
piled upon misunderstandings of the tradition of metaphysics-all led to a
violent reality where, in order to respect the alterity of the person, the person
seemed to disappear altogether in unavailable anonymity. Accordingly,
'standing accused' was thus transposed into a different key: the accusative
case is more properly thought of as the causative case where that which is 'in
the accusative' is the patient of a (causal) agent. To stand accused is to be, in
word, caused. But the causality spoken of in Thomas is not univocal or
material, but analogous, which is not simply a word used to invoke 'not
univocal' as much as it clarifies and contains many analogous meanings
within itself, just as St Irenaeus' use of 'recapitulation' served to encapsulate
at least eleven meanings (indicating its own kind of analogous usagej.!"
As a summary of this section, to be caused analogously refers to the
following: 1) the order of knowledge versus the real ontological order, which,
when led by the hand in the way Thomas teaches, upholds the dignity of the
otherness of God in that we cannot know God's essence in itself; 2) a radical
expansive broadening of causality to include its intimate efficient and final
modes, indicating God as the first and final Good who motivates and calls us
toward God's own delight; t07 3) the participatory reality that analogous speech
refers to such that God is primary while creatures secondarily participate in
this subsistent ipsum esse, the 'I am who 1 am'r'" 4) lastly, the fact that as
to(, Osbom,lrenaeus of Lyons, 97-8.
to7 Cf. ST, I, q. 13, a. II ad 2: "This name 'good' is the principal name of God in so far as He
is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of
cause." But from the standpoint of creatures (which of course is inescapable, thankfully), the
following must always be kept in mind: 'The attribute "being" does not name God prior to the
distinction between infinite and finite being. It signifies God as the cause of the being [of] all
things, as finite beings are not intelligible unless their being is understood as derived from one
who is its being. God is known as being on the basis of the intelligible relation between cause
and effect, a relation in which the common factor cannot be abstracted from the distinction
between cause and effect' (Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas,
194).
toH While Jamie Smith initially provides a critique of "participation" language in response to
Catherine Pickstock here: James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic
of Incarnation (London: Routledge, 2002), 170--6; the following essay tends to place the stress
in the wrong place regarding Plato: idem, "Will the Real Plato Please Stand Up?: Participation
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cause, we actually know nothing about analogous causation in the way that
creatures know causation because God is eminent as the uncaused cause of all
out of nothing. 109 Following here upon Thomas' and Dionysius' reliance on the
triplex via, we cannot rest with speaking of causality as we think of it, which
is typically material; rather, to stand accused as a person means to radically
participate in God's Being which is simultaneously a Triunity of persons, each
subsistent in the one nature. There is no way to derive the three from the one
or the one from the three (except through faith in the revelation of the
personsj.!" but both must be thought in a reduplication (redoublement), and it
is in this sense that we have a co-extensive analogy of being and analogy of
the person. Our own personhood only is insofar as it participates in this
Versus Incarnation," in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant,
and Participation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 61-72. This is understandable,
however, in light of the fact that Pickstock and Milbank themselves tend to overstress Plato at
times, even though they fully acknowledge it is more of the neo-Platonism that Thomas
Aquinas inherited that is what is more at stake. That being said, Smith has admitted (in
personal correspondence) that he has changed his mind on the issue of participation, primarily
influenced by the following two works of Hans Boersma: Nouvelle Theologie and
Sacramental Ontology: A Re/urn to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009);
Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011). The first place in print this change has been noted can
be found in James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a
Creational Hermeneutic, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 19n.14. So in
that sense, the forthcoming article may already be out of date: Brendan Peter Triffett,
"Processio and the Place of Ontic Being: John Milbank and James K. A. Smith on
Participation," Heythrop Journal (forthcoming 2013), accessed online:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.comldoi/10.lI11 Ij.1468-2265.20 12.00770.xlpdf.
Notwithstanding. I am sympathetic to the accounts of the 'New Plato' that Smith is
reacting against (see esp. the recent account self described as a 'third Plato' in D.C. Schindler,
Plato's Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic, [Washington, D.
C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008]). Regarding Radical Orthodoxy, it would
have been more fair for Smith (in his 'Will the Reali Plato Stand Up?' essay) to have also
referenced Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, 181-8, or any of the other works on
Thomistic analogy which develop the usage along Neoplatonic contours, to which those
sympathetic to recent reconstruals of of a more Neoplatonic-Aristotelian Thomas are indebted.
E.g., Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica Di Partecipazione Secondo S. Tommaso
d'Aquino (Torino: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1950); Cornelio Fabro, "The Intensive
Ilermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," trans. B. M. Bonansea,
The Review of Metaphysics 27, no. 3 (1974): 449-91; L.-B. Geiger, La Participation Dans La
Philosophie De Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1953); Clarke, "The Meaning of
Participation in St. Thomas." Recently, the following article has proved crucially helpful: D.
C. Schindler, "What's the Difference? On the Metaphysics of Participation in a Christian
Context," The Saint Anselm Journal 3, no. 1 (Fall 2005): 1-27. The main idea here is that
many, many centuries after Plato, these ideas were transformed via Proclus, Dionysius, and
then Thomas so that it was never a matter of contrasting 'incarnation' to 'participation', but
the creatures' non-competitive participation in the Incarnate one has been achieved in an
entirely orthodox Christian manner.
109 To clarity, this is not a 'proper' name of God, but a description of God through God's
effects similar to Thomas' second way (ST, I, q. 2, a. 3). The most proper name of God is, of
course, 'I am who I am' (ST, I,q. 13, a. 11).
110 ST, I,q. 32, a. l.
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fullness of this ever-greater reality, but our participation in this analogous
cause is not like that of billiard balls and falling dominoes, but like that of art
in the mind of the artist. God alone contains the fullness of being and the
fullness of persons as Father, Son, Holy Spirit.
b. Analogy of the Concept?: An Analogy of Judgment in Reply to Christos
Yannaras
Despite what I have written above, a recently-translated work entitled
Person and Eros by Eastern Orthodox philosopher Christos Yannaras would
claim that the exact opposite is the case for Thomas Aquinas.'!' Based upon a
much-expanded 4th-edition of Yannaras' doctoral thesis with the title of 'The
Ontological Content of the Theological Notion of Personhood', 112 this work
develops a very intriguing blend of Eastern Orthodox tradition (Dionysius,
Maximus, Palamas) with such recent European existentialists as Jean-Paul
Sartre and especial1y Martin Heidegger. While this is not the space to provide
a detailed exegesis of this highly interesting and provocative work,'!' what
interests us are Yannaras' comments in a chapter called 'On Analogy and
Hierarchy'.'!' The main thrust of the work is to combat the 'conceptualization'
of 'the West', and in every case, what comes from 'the East' by way of
Orthodoxy has the right tools to supplant Western ideas which Yannaras
argues lead to Atheism. Despite the all-too-tidy division of what is 'East'
versus what is 'West', and despite his reliance on such obviously Western
figures as lIeidegger into whose form Yannaras injects the content of
111 Christos Yannaras, Person and Eros, trans. Norman Russell (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross
Orthodox Press, 2007). See the following article that captures in nuce what I am doing here in
this section, but in response to Zizioulas: Ralph Del Colle, "'Person' and 'Being' in John
Zizioiulas' Trinitarian Theology: Conversations with Thomas Torrance and Thomas
Aquinas," Scottish Journal of Theology 54, no. 1 (2001): 70-86.
112 Christos Yannaras, "The Ontological Content of the Theological Notion of Personhood"
(Thesis, University of Salonika, 1970).
11.l For a helpful distillation of Yannaras' argument from his doctoral thesis, see Rowan
Williams, "The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos Yannaras,"
Sobornost 6, no. 6 (1972): 415-30 at 417-21.
114 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 201-20 (§§70-4).
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Orthodox voices, lIS the primary constructive heart of the book is laudable and
helpfully articulates a 'theological personalism' that cannot be dismissed. In
this section I will provide a summary of Yannaras' argument on analogy and
hierarchy and then illustrate not only how he misreads Thomas Aquinas, but
also how much of the internal debate amongst Thomists would very much
agree with Yannaras' central insights which we will consider under the aspects
of 'analogy of the concept' versus 'analogy of judgment'.
Rowan Williams remarks that Yannaras' project, 'like any attempt to
explicate the relation of finite to infinite, is inevitably an essay in analogy' .116
That is, the issue is: how do we speak of divine persons when we only initially
know other human persons? For Yannaras, the issue comes down to personal
existence: for God it is total presence (7t:aQOUUla,parousia) while for human
persons our situation is one of absence (anouula, apousiay" until that
eschatological time when we become '''all prosopon"-"all person.?'!" The
person is primarily a rekuion:" to the extent that all talk of nature or essence
(ousia) must be denounced as 'essentialist' and therefore 'rationalistic';
instead, he proposes existential categories of presence (parousia) and follows
I Ieidcgger such that the person 'ek-sists', standing outside one's nature in
ecstasy toward the other.!" All the measures the 'West' might make, whether
with regard to space, time, or objects, are all properly understood rather as
115 Rowan Williams remarks: 'as to the use made of Heidegger's system and terminology
throughout, one may be forgiven for wondering whether it is perhaps a little uncritical: it is
reminiscent of the use made of Hegel by Russian theologians at the end of the 19th and the
beginning of the 20th century' (Williams, "The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the
Thought of Christos Yannaras," 426). As one example, Yannaras follows Heidegger
completely when he quotes him to the effect that Hegel's 'concept', Nietzsche's 'eternal
return of the same', and Thomas Aquinas's actus purus are all physicalistics such that
'metaphysics steadfastly remains physics'. While this is true for Hegel and Nietzsche, this is
of course fallacious with regard to Thomas. Yannaras, Person and Eros, 225 (§75); citing
Martin Ilcidcgger, Einfuhrung in Die Metaphysik (Tilbingen: Niemeyer, 1958), 14.
JII, Williams, "The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of Christos Yannaras,"
425.
117 Williams helpfully puts it this way, ibid.
11K Yannaras, Person and Eros, 293 (§95).
119 Ibid., 5-6 (§ I).
120 Ibid., 19-20 (§6), 27-8 (§8), 262-7 (§86), 273-4 (§88). For the Heideggerian account of
the 'ek-sistence of man', see "Letter on Humanism" in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: Ten
Key Essays Plus the Introduction to Being and Time, ed. David Farrell Krell, Rev. and
expanded ed (London: Routledge, 1993), 217--65, esp. 228fT.
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primarily personal: space is personal absence (apousia), time is personal
presence (parousia), and objects or things are personal deeds (pragmatay'"
According to Yannaras, the Orthodox understanding of analogy begins in
its preference for Plato over Aristotle. While Aristotle's conception of analogy
is a comparison of quantities, dimensions, proportionality of arithmetical
relations, and the measurable aspect of relations.!" for Plato analogy
'represents the logos of the fitness of the eyes to receive light or the fitness of
the mind to recognize the good. Plato's understanding of analogy ... is an
iconic relation, a relation between image and that which is depicted, and the
knowledge of this relation is a dynamic fact which presupposes the mind's
aptitude for cognition and the mind's participation in that which is depicted
through its image'. 123 Fast-forwarding to the Middle Ages, Yannaras follows
an article by Gottlieb Sohngen to the effect that all medieval scholastics
defined analogy in the a:b: :c:d formula, as in 2:3: :4:6.124 In this case, if 6 were
the unknown quantity, simple algebra could be used to determine its value.
'Thus the relation between beings and Being, and between Being and God,
may be expressed according to the Scholastics with the precision of
mathematical analogy: beings : Being = Being : x, where x, represents the
Cause of Being, namely, God. In this case, the analogical participation of
beings in Being is the key for understanding the analogical participation of the
Being of beings in its divine Cause, and God, the Cause of Being, is defined
analogously in relation to Being, the cause of beings'. 125 The Scholastics thus
exhaust being because they have not an experiential analogy, but a
transcendent analogy which operates and is purely confined to the predicative
'intellectual extension' of 'unity', 'goodness', 'truth', etc.!" Put bluntly,
'Scholastic analogy ignores the personal existence of God, the Triad of the
divine persons, the mode of existence of the divine essence, which is
121 These concepts are repeated all throughout, but the central loci, respectively, are found in
Yannaras, Person and Eros, 105-28 (§§36-45), 129-55 (§§46-55), 35-39 (§12).
122 Ibid., 204--6 (§70).
m Ibid., 202-3 (§70). Yannaras cites Plato, Republic 6:508c4-d9.
124 Gottlieb Sohngen, "Analogie," in lIandbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe, ed. Heinrich
Fries, vol. 1 (Munich: Kosel, 1962), 49'-{)1 at 57; Yannaras, Person and Eros, 361 n.19.
125 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 209 (§70), emphasis Yannaras'.
]2(, Ibid., 209-10 (§70).
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personal' .127 This is because the Scholastics turned God into a transcendent
'object', 'accessible only through the subject's ability to rationalize', leaving
the 'existential problem untouched', matter ontologically unexplained, and
'the origin or principle of what exists was transferred to the necessity of the
things that determined essence, not to the freedom of the person, not to triadic
love as the self-determination of the mode of existence' .128
Unsurprisingly, Yannaras applies this analysis of all of the 'Scholatics',
mutatis mutandis, to Thomas Aquinas as well. Before moving on with my
exposition, it should be noted that Yannaras is no doubt influenced here on the
one hand by Lossky's inability to see moments in Dionysius which pushes
beyond the kataphatic-apophatic dialectic into the via eminentia (in this sense
Lossky has waged that 'the West' is 'kataphatic'j.!" and on the other hand
Yannaras is completely remiss to see Thomas' very clear and pervasive
indebtedness to Dionysius who takes up these three ways, especially regarding
language about God and thus ontological, causal analogy, not to mention the
fact that Thomas cites Dionysius as a trusted guide over 600 times in the
Summa Theologica alone, let alone Thomas' own commentary on Dionysius'
The Divine Namesi" But Yannaras will not acknowledge any of this, seeing
127 Ibid., 211 (§70), emphasis Yannaras'.
12H Ibid., 210-11 (§70).
129 Although it should be said that as philosopher, Yannaras is much more amenable to the
Neoplatonic influence of Dionysius. See Ibid., 216, 366n.50. For Lossky's considerations of
Dionysius, see Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood,
NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 38-9, 215-16, 229-30; Vladimir Lossky, "La
Notion Des 'Analogies' Chez Denys Le Pseudo-Areopagite," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale
Et Litteraire Du Moyen-Age 5 (1931): 279-309. For commentary on Lossky's relationship to
Dionysius and apophaticism, see Aristotle Papanikolaou, Being with God: Trinity,
Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2006), 12-25; Paul L. Gavrilyuk, "The Reception of Dionysius in Twentieth-Century
Eastern Orthodoxy," Modern Theology 24, no. 4 (October 2008): 707-23 at 712-16; Charles
M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: "No Longer l" (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 153-96. For critiques of Lossky's understanding, see
"Lossky, the via negativa and the Foundations of Theology" in Rowan Williams, Wrestling
with Angels: Conversations in Modernity, ed. Mike Higton (London: SCM Press, 2007), 1-24.
For works on the Neoplatonic heritage of Dionysius, see Christian Schafer, The Philosophy of
Dionysius the Areopagite (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006); Eric Perl, Theophany: The Neoplatonic
Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
2007); Sarah Klitenic Wear and John Dillon, Dionysius the Areopagite and the Neoplatonist
Tradition: Despoiling the Hellenes (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
nil For Thomas' indebtedness to Denys, see O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics
of Aquinas; A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and PaJamas (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),30-1, 76-7; Kevin Corrigan and Carl N.
Still, "The Problem of Aquinas's Notion of Reditio Comp/eta in Relation to Its Neoplatonic
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Thomas along with the rest of the Scholastics as guilty of' contemplation of an
impersonal absolute, which precisely because it is impersonal permits no
solution other than pantheism or agnosticism'. 13! Furthermore, due to these
shared set of assumptions, the 'West' is guilty of a kataphaticism which he
sees as synonymous with extreme rationalism, and in this sense is a
theological nihilism 132 that is to blame for modern atheism.!" What, then, is
Yannaras' alternative?
Yannaras' proposes instead what he calls a Byzantine version of analogy
that 'refers, as a cognitive method, to the possibility that existence can be led
by the call to personal relation to the actual realization of the relation. That is
to say, it refers to the analogical grades of the power of existence to participate
wholly (not only intellectually) in truth.?" Following Dionysius' On the
Celestial Hierarchy, Yannaras takes up the idea of 'analogical similarities as
dissimilarities,'!" which enables him to hold that analogy in this schema
functions not 'quantitatively-measurably', but 'qualitatively-iconically' .136 The
upshot here is that this introduces a dynamism which transposes the cognitive
focus on objective attributes into the unique mode of the existence of personal
otherness which cannot be known definitively, 'since its "definition" is its
otherness, its unique, dissimilar and unrepeatable character'; in other words, it
can only be 'depicted' iconically.!" If the analogical similarities involved in
this approach do not indicate the possibility of personal relation, then they
remain as 'empty intellectual predicates'. 138 At this point, those familiar with
debates around the analogia entis will wonder: but doesn't the Fourth Lateran
Council of 1215 say that there cannot be a likeness posited between the
Creator and creature without there being an 'ever greater dissimilarity' (major
Sources," in Being and Thought in Aquinas, ed. Jeremiah M. Hackett, William E. Mumion,
and Carl N. Still (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2004), I-IS; David B.
Burrell and Isabelle Moulin, "Albert, Aquinas, and Dionysius," Modern Theology 24, no. 4
(October 2008): 633-49 at 637-44.
111 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 212 (§71).
IJ2 Ibid., 23 (§7).
113 Ibid., 248 (§82).
B4 Ibid., 212-13 (§72).
us See On the Celestial Hierarchy, 2.4, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 151 [PG
3:I4[c; 144a, c; I45a].
1.% Yannaras, Person and Eros, 213 (§72).
m Ibid.
11K Ibid., 2[4 (§72).
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dissimiltudo) between the two? In response to such an objection, Yannaras
rejects this doctrine because, according to him, 'even in this statement
dissimilarity does not refer to the otherness of the personal mode of existence.
Dissimilarity coexists with similarity in a quantifiable-measurable relation.
The analogy of similarities, which presupposes at the same time even greater
dissimilarities, does not cease to represent objective predicates, or to constitute
a quantitative comparison of objectified magnitudes' .139
Despite the fact that the precise context of this statement from the Fourth
Lateran Council is exactly the relationship of the persons of the Trinity in
relation to human persons in light of the analogical distance between the
human and divine persons (in condemnation of Joachim de Fiore), Yannaras
rejects this formulation nonetheless. Joachim de Fiore insisted that, rather than
understanding God as a Trinity of divine persons who simultaneously,
mysteriously is the one God in a shared, consubstantial essence between them
(and in this regard Joachim thought there was a 'fourth thing' in God), instead,
he considered the Trinity as a kind of collective of persons, just as three
human people form a group-all of which quickly lapses into a 'tritheism'.
Against this impetus, Erich Przywara is instructive, and deserves to be quoted
at length:
The point of departure for the council's verdict is thus the greatest,
most profound, and most intimate mystery of revelation: the mystery
of deification through "participation in the divine nature," as children
of the Father, con-formed [mit:formig] to the Son, in the Spirit of the
Iloly Spirit;-the mystery of the redemption of the "unity" of the
church as a unity with the Father who sends, in unity with the Son who
is sent, and thus in unity with the Holy Spirit understood as the unity of
the Father and the Son;-and hence the most proper mystery of God as
the mystery of the self-communication of the tri-personal life in the
personal life of the "children of God" as "members of the church."
And yet this is precisely the point of departure into the "ever great"
mystery of the "ever greater dissimilarity" between the "creator"
[emphasis addcd]-understood as the "Incomprehensible and Ineffable
One Ilighest Something" [Unbegreiflichen und Unsagbaren Einen
Hochsten Etwas] (whose intimacy to itself is that of "Father, Son, and
139 Ibid., 214-15 (§72).
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Holy Spirif'}-and the "creature," which in itself is "one people of
many persons, and one church of many believers. ,,140
That is, precisely where the Triune God is communicated as personal, from
the creaturely standpoint, this is where the 'ever greater dissimilarity' arises.
Przywara puts it even more starkly in a work written fifteen years later on the
Old and New Covenants [Alter und Neuer Bumf]:
The inner-divine rhythm [Rhythrnus] of the "opposition of relations"
wherein the Father is called "Father" "in regard" [irn Bezug] to the
Son, the Son is called "Son" "in regard" to the Father, and the Holy
Spirit "Spirit" "in regard" to the Father and Son,-this unfathomably
incomprehensible rhythm [Schwingen] of the entire "in regard [to]" in
the mystery of the Godhead is the depth behind the entire rhythm of
the "in regard" in the material "regard" between the Old and New
Covenants, and in this the formal "regard" between "no matter how
great a similarity" and the "ever greater dissimilarity" between Creator
and creation in this material relation [Bezug] (and in any possible
relation generally).":
The reality of God as coextensively-and mysteriously-one and personal
underlies, logically, the real relation between creatures to their creator, always
within a finite regard of 'ever greater dissimilarity'. Yannaras, however,
overlooks this full context and debate involved between the rejection of
Joachim and the affirmation of Peter Lombard's position by the Fourth
Lateran Council.
Instead, Yannaras confronts what he sees as necessarily 'impersonal' in the
'West' with, as just mentioned above, what he calls the 'Byzantine' version of
analogy. In this he draws support from Dionysius the Areopagite. Thus,
according to Yannaras, the Byzantine version of analogy takes 'the objective
similarities themselves as real dissimilarities. That is to say, it refers the
dissimilarity to the otherness of the personal mode of existence, to the priority
which existence has in relation to the understanding of objective essences'i'"
141) Erich Przywara, "Reichweite Der Analogie Als Katholischer Grundform," Scholastik 15
(1940): 339-62, 508-32; as reprinted in Erich Przywara, Analogia En tis. Metaphysik. Ur-
Struktur Und All-Rhyth mus, vol. 3 (Einsiedeln: Johannes- Verlag, 1962), 247-301 at 253-4. I
am following the forthcoming translation from John Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013).
141 Erich Przywara, Alter Und Neller Blind. Theologie Der Stunde (Wien: Herold Verlag,
1955), 539, translation mine.
142 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 215 (§72).
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Analogy in this vision is therefore a 'hierarchy of cognitive-existential
powers and perfections', which is always registered in an existential-not
'static', i.e. 'Westem'<-key.!" Indeed, Yannaras labels his understanding of
Byzantine analogy as the very difference which separates itself from the West,
'in the contrast between the objective-quantitative understanding of analogy
and the understanding of analogy as hierarchy-a difference between two
cultures, whose consequences for human life we are only just beginning to
evaluate' .144 Hierarchic analogy designates a real, universal way of
transmitting knowledge, whose comprehensive 'sacred order' involves raising
up in proportion (analogos) each personal existence in imitation of GOd.145
Additionally, this sacred, analogical order involves real participation. Citing
On the Celestial Hierarchy, Yannaras states, 'The "beauty befitting god" is
"simple," good" and moreover "teletarchic," which means "transmitting to
each, according to their merit, a share of his own Iight.:"!" This is because
Dionysius 'sees all beings as participating in the hierarchic unity of
communion with the Godhead, in proportion, or analogously, to the mode of
existence which each one embodies'."? For the Areopagite, living beings
participate in the divine life-giving power and energy bestowed dynamically to
them as an energetic manifestation of 'divine wisdom, dynamically
summarizing the whole hierarchic arrangement of the world in the immediacy
and unity of personal relation between created and uncreated '.148 What
Yannaras adds to Dionysius here, not found in the text itself, is the later
Palamite emphasis on the essence-energies distinction. Hiearchic participation
is a participation in the personal energies of God, which Yannaras highlights
as another failure of the West, including now, since the fourteenth century, a
failure to understand theosis.!"
14.1Ibid.,216 (§§72. 73).
144lbid., 220 (§74).
14~Ibid., 2 I 7 (§73).
14(, Ibid.; citation is to Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 153-4 [PG
3: I 64d].
147Yannaras, Person and Eros, 219 (§74); Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The
Complete Works, 156 [PG 3:177c].
1411Yannaras, Person and Eros, 219 (§74); the reference is to On the Celestial Hierarchy, 4. I,
in Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 156 [PG 3: 177d].
149Yannaras, Person and Eros, 52-70 (§§ 19-23). See especially: 'The problem of the
essence-energies distinction set the seal on the differentiation of the Latin West from the
140
To begin my response to Yannaras' articulation of hierarchic analogy as his
response to 'Western essentialist' renderings of analogy, it is crucial to be
allowed a brief but necessary excursus on the all-too-neat 'East' versus 'West'
divide. Not only does Yannaras espouse this line in his works ad nauseum, but
many other Western Twentieth-century theologians (both Protestant and
Catholic alike) have, to my mind, falsely adopted this misleading division as
well. In order to illuminate what follows, I will be using the research of
Michel Rene Barnes and Kristen Hennessy as helpful guides out of this
misleading and unnecessarily polemical morass. ISO
The often uncritically assumed position is as follows: the Eastern church,
or at the very least the Cappadocians and therefore the 'Greeks' have 'always
begun' with articulating the divine persons first, and then goes on to articulate
the divine nature/substance, while it is the 'West' or 'Latins' who have
'always begun' with the 'nature' or unity of the 'One God' first, and then
speaks of divine persons. This, it is thought, explains why those in the West
seem to rarely speak of the divine persons (Karl Rahner perpetuates this
narrative to some extentj.!" and thus also it becomes manifestly no surprise
Greek East. The West denied the distinction, wishing to safeguard the simplicity of the divine
essence, since rational thought cannot tolerate the conflict between existential identity and
otherness, a distinction not entailing division or separation. In the West's understanding, God
is defined only by his essence. What is not essence does not belong to God; it is a creation of
God. Consequently, the energies of God are either identified with the essence of "pure act," or
any external mani festation of them is necessarily of a different essence, that is, a created effect
of the divine cause. But this means that theosis, the participation of human beings in the
divine life, is ultimately impossible, since the grace that deifies the saints, even if
"supernatural," according to the arbitrary definition given to it by Western theologians from as
early as the ninth century, remains without any real explanation. And it was precisely the
defense of the fact of the theosis of human beings, the participation of the hesychasts in the
sensory experience of the mode of the divine life (in the uncreated light of God's glory), that
led the Orthodox Church in the synods of the fourteenth century (1341, 1347, 1351 and 1368)
to define the essence-energies distinction as the formal difference distinguishing the Orthodox
East from the Latin West and to see summarized under the heading of the knowledge of God
the heretical deviations of the Roman Church' (Ibid., 65 [§22J, emphasis in original). While it
is outside the scope of this chapter to go into a refutation of this obviously wrong-headed and
clear misreading of not only the 'West' but especially Thomas Aquinas, in the meantime I
refer the reader to, e.g., Clarke, "The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas"; and esp.
W. Norris Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," The
New Scholasticism 48, no. 1 (1974): 19-39.
I 'ill Michel Rene Dames, "De Regnon Reconsidered," Augustinian Studies 26, no. 2 (1995):
51-79; Kristin Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak
of'His' Paradigm," Harvard Theological Review 100, no. 2 (2007): 179-97.
1~1 Rahner famously says, 'We must be willing to admit that, should the doctrine of the Trinity
have to be dropped as false, the major part of religious literature could well remain virtually
unchanged' (Rahner, The Trinity, 10-11).
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why thinkers such as Lossky, Yannaras, and most recently, John Zizioulas
speak much about personhood, to the chagrin of the 'West'.152 The
consequences of deviating from this 'Cappadocian' emphasis have bequeathed
a long history of decline into 'essentialism', 'rationalism', and thus Modernity
and atheism, themes which we see repeated above in Yannaras' chapter on
analogy and hierarchy.
These readings of 'East' versus 'West' and its misleadingly rigid
characterizations stem from what Michel Rene Barnes has dubbed 'de
Regnon's Paradigrn.!" In fact, as Barnes and Hennessy in particular have
shown, this 'paradigm' is at best not de Regnon's; at worst, this paradigm's
mutation is incredibly false, for a variety of reasons. First, de Regnon's
designation of 'Greek' actually encompasses writers of the first four hundred
years of Christianity, and this term actually includes patristic theologians
writing in both Latin and Greek.!" 'Latins' for de Regnon signify scholastic
theologians, and as Hennessy points out, Saint Augustine is not among them
as its representative. ISS Instead, while still counted among the 'Greeks',
Augustine does serve as a 'bridge' to later scholastic thought. As Hennessy
152 To the previously-cited works of Lossky and Yannaras, the following work stands out:
Christos Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the West, trans. Peter Chamberas and Norman Russell
(Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2007). John Zizioulas, Being as Communion:
Studies in Personhood and the Church (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1985); John
Zizioulas, "On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood," in Persons. Divine and
Human, ed, Christoph Schwebel and Colin E. Gunton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991),33-46;
John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church
(London: T & T Clark, 2006). In the West, Michel Barnes has picked out the following texts:
Frederick Crowe, Doctine of the Holy Trinity (Willowdale: Regis College, 1965); James
Mackey, The Christian Experience of God as Trinity (London: SCM Press, 1983); John
O'Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in Light of Process
Theology and the Theologyof Hope (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); David Brown,
The Divine Trinity (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1985); Catherine Mowry
LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1991).
Kristin Ilennessy shows that Sarah Coakley has added the following theology textbooks to
Barnes' list: G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: S.P.C.K., 1952); Kelly, Early
Christian Doctrines; Edward Hardy and Cyril Richardson, eds., Christology of the Later
Fathers (London: SCM Press, 1954); Maurice Wiles, The Making of Christian Doctrine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). For Coakley's article, see "Introduction-
Gender, Trinitarian Analogies, and the Pedagogy of The Song," in Sarah Coakley, ed., Re-
Thinking Gregory of Nyssa (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 1-13 at p. 2fT. Remarking on
Brown and LaCugna, Barnes says that both 'embrace the paradigm and develop it fruitfulJ in
order to critique the Augustinian component, but both scholars seem unaware that the
paradigm is not embedded in the original texts' (Barnes, "De Regnon Reconsidered," 55).
m Barnes, "De Regnon Reconsidered," 51.
1'>4 Ibid., 53-4; Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 187.
m Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 189-90. For another account defending
Augustine along similar lines, see Pabst, Metaphysics, 74-9.
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puts it, 'By accentuating the scholastic debt to Augustine, de Regnon subtly
argues for the scholastic debt to the Greek Fathers who had such an impact on
Augustine's thought'!" - the point here being that Augustine himself is
counted among the 'Greeks'. The second and more important point that
Hennessy draws out of de Regnon's work is that while he does indeed
distinguish between 'Greek' /patristic and 'Latin' /scholastic theologians, 'he
most emphatically does not oppose them'.""
Jlennessey illustrates that de Regnon's motives are two-fold. The first
stems from the context of the neo- Thomist revival that he had been
experiencing in the aftermath of Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris encyclical. 158 For
these neo- Thomists, the entire tradition was summed up in St Thomas and
reificd so that instead of being a part of the tradition, Thomas was the
tradition. The neo-Thomist rigidity led de Regnon to engage in his own kind
of ressourcement of the more varied and richer tradition.!" In light of the
emerging 'monologism'!" of the neo-Thomist school, de Regnon's second
motive was, via a 'retour aux sources,' to show the diversity of the voices of
the tradition so that it can 'allow us to draw near to the divine mystery along
two inverse paths, to approach this mystery from two opposing sides'. 161
Ilennessy makes it clear that in no way does de Regnon want to elide the
1.<;(. Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 190. One could add to this the
enormous influence of the Greeks upon Thomas Aquinas such as Pseudo-Dionysius the
Areopogite, St John Chrysostom, St John Damascene, Origen, St Cyril of Alexandria, St Basil
of Caesarea, St Athanasius, St Gregory of Nyssa, et al. For more on this topic see Gilles
Emery or, "A Note on St. Thomas and the Eastern Fathers," in Trinity. Church. and the
Human Person, Faith & Reason: Studies in Catholic Theology & Philosophy (Naples, FL:
Sapicntia Press of Ave Maria University, 2007), 193-207; Ignaz Backes, Die Christologie Des
III. Thomas Von Aquin Und Die Griechischen Kirchenvdter (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1931).
m I lcnnessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 19 I.
ISH Ibid., 183-{;.
159 Hennessy herself makes the self-consciously anachronistic comparison to the
ressourcement of the later nouvelle theologie (Ibid., 185). The irony here is that by returning
to the wider tradition, de Regnon makes the more catholic move whereas the neo- Thomists, by
attempting to enforce a kind of sola Thomisticum, end up with a kind of one-sided
'protestantism' in their approach to the tradition.
1m See Bakhtin's discussion of this principle in Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's
Poetics, trans. and ed. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), 79-83; Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, ed. Caryl Emerson
and Michael Holquist, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986),
161-3; Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Michael Holquist,
New edition (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982), 342-{;.
11.1 Theodore de Regnon, Etudes De Theologie Positive Sur La Sainte Trinite (Paris: Victor
Retaux, 1892), I :430; Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 195.
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differences between the 'Greek'/'Latin' duality that he describes, but instead
he intends to act as a moderating voice, commending his readers to take both
approaches as necessarily related and complementary, both valid and mutually
corrective sides of the same triune mystery.!" In this light, simply returning to
the sources one finds that both 'sides' are as rich and varied as the other,
which is why it would come as no surprise to find that Dionysius talks about
the contemplation of the intellect toward conceptual things.!" or the cherubim
and seraphim engaged in 'triply luminous contemplation of the one who is the
cause and the source of all beauty,"?' or even therefore to find St Maximus the
Confessor saying the following completely devoid of any 'geographical'
polemic: 'We are to think of both of these distinctly, as was said, first one
way, then the other: one, single, undivided, unconfused, simple, undiminished,
and unchangeable divinity, completely one in essence and completely three in
persons, and sole ray shining in the single form of one triple-splendored
light'i'" All of these designations in both traditions are, in fact, quite porous.
Moreover, those in the Roman Catholic 'West' themselves saw these problems
with certain encrustations of their own tradition and attempted to ameliorate
the problems through various attempts at ressourcement.
Regrettably, in addition to following John Romanides' polemic against
'the West,'ll>6it is precisely this strawman that Yannaras adopts from Lossky's
11,2 Hennessy, "An Answer to De Regnon's Accusers," 196.
1(" On the Celestial Hierarchy, 2.4, in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 151 [PG
3: 144a]: "Now when we apply dissimilar similarities to intelligent beings, we say of them that
they experience desire, but this has to be interpreted as a divine yearning for that immaterial
reality which is beyond all reason and all intelligence. It is a strong and sure desire for he clear
and impassible contemplation of the transcendent. It is a hunger for an unending, conceptual,
and true communion with the spotless and sublime light, of clear and splendid beauty."
1104 On the Celestial Hierarchy 7.2, in Ibid., 163 [PG 3:208c]. Furthermore, these highest
angels 'are founded next to perfect and unfailing purity, and are led, as permitted, into
contemplation regarding the immaterial and intellectual splendor' (ibid., 164 [PG 3:208dJ).
](osMaximus Confessor, The Church's Mystagogy, in Selected Writings, trans. George C.
Berthold, The Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), chap. 23,
pp.205-6.
1M, George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou, "Augustine and the Orthodox: 'The
West' in the East," in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. Aristotle Papanikolaou and
George E. Demacopoulos (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008), 11-40 at
28-33. Yannaras follows Romanides' in locating the fault in Augustine'S supposed heretical
rejection of the essence-energies distinction. On this see Christos Yannaras, Elements of
Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology, trans. Keith Schram (Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1991), 154-5; Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the West, 16. Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou
remark, 'The question must be raised, however, whether Romanides and Yannaras were
judging Augustine anachronistically through a hesychastic framework. It might also appear
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own narrowly insufficient reading of de Regnon."" Yannaras' own
formulation of this misleading paradigm contrasts what he calls the
'apophaticism of essence' with the 'Eastern' 'apophaticism of the person'. 168
Paul Gavrilyuk notes, however, that this is a historically unsupportable
distinction, which 'is at odds with the Palamite insistence that it is the essence
(or unnamable "super-essence") of God, not the divine persons, that is
absolutely incomprehensible' .169 There are, therefore, alternative readings of
the two traditions, such as Erich Przywara, who sees precisely the opposite in
a Greek Orthodox 'East' whose over-emphasis on participation leads to an
essentialism on the one hand while an Augustinian, Lutheran 'West' on the
other hand leads toward a 'theology of opposition' and thus existentialism (the
latter of which would explain why the secularized versions of this theology in
the West were themselves atheistic existential isms in Nietzsche, Sartre, et
al.).170 Additionally, regarding analogy in the 'West', Gavrilyuk remarks,
'Yannaras mistakenly, but confidently, reduces all forms of Western
apophaticism to the method of correcting the limits of analogical predication
in natural theology'. 171 That is, Yannaras sees a misreading of analogy as the
root of the 'West's failure to account for a properly apophatic approach to
that they were injecting neo-scholastic-manual understandings of theological epistemology
and salvation, albeit in their filtered, imitative Greek form, into Augustine' (Demacopoulos
and Papanikolaou, "Augustine and the Orthodox," 35).
11,7 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 298-9n.26, he cites Lossky's citation of de Regnon: "Latin
philosophy first considers the nature in itself and then proceeds to the person; Greek
philosophy first considers the person and afterwards passes through it to find the nature. The
Latins think of personhood as a mode of nature; the Greeks think of nature as the content of
the person"; citing de Regnon, Etudes De Theologie Positive Sur La Sainte Trinite, 1:433. In
light of the research of Barnes and Hennessy exposited above, this can only be read now as a
highly selective and context-less choice, and thus incredibly misleading.
I(,H Yannaras, Person and Eros, 20-3 (§7).
1109 Gavrilyuk, "The Reception of Dionysius in Twentieth-Century Eastern Orthodoxy," 714;
he is citing Christos Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the
Areopagite, ed. Andrew Louth, trans. Haralambos Ventis (New York and London: T & T
Clark, 2005),71,87.
PI! See Eric Przywara, "Die Reichweite der Analogie als katholischer Grundform" in Ana/ogia
Entis, 3:289-90. Moreover, Barnes notes that in contrast to English language patristic
scholarship that unconsciously accepted de Regnon's paradigm, 'French language scholarship
makes it clear that his is de Regnon's own paradigm, and that he may be wrong' (Barnes, "De
Regnon Reconsidered," 56). Part and parcel of this French debate is that 'the criticism that
Greek trinitarian theology is not only nature-based but improperly nature-based because of the
Greek attachment to the term homoousios. According to these same scholars, Latin trinitarian
theology, by which they mean Augustine's trinitarian theology, is person-oriented, and not
nature-oriented, as de Regnon would have it, because Augustine'S theology is based on
psychology and not physics' (ibid, 55 and the sources listed on p. 72).
171 Gavrilyuk, "The Reception of Dionysius in Twentieth-Century Eastern Orthodoxy," 713;
citing Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God, 28.
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God-a misreading stemming from tarrying too close to natural philosophical
assumptions about God, i.e., a hardened Aristotelianism as pagan rationalism.
(What's more, while Yannaras affirms analogy but critiques the form it takes
in 'the West', Zizioulas rejects analogy altogether under the assumption that it
is merely linguistic, offering instead an 'ontological' connection, clearly
passmg over so many transparently ontologically-replete accounts of
analogy.!")
Nevertheless, when Yannaras makes the following assertion: 'That is why
there is no reference in the Summa Theologiae to the personal God of
existential relation: there God is the object of rational inquiry, an abstract
intellectual certainty, an ontic essence absolutely in actuality, an impersonal
and existentially inaccessible motive cause,t73-this may easily be dismissed
as an unnecessary fabrication not only of Thomas himself, but also of much
(but not all, understandably) of the Thomist tradition. But how can this be, if
Thomas is so 'essentialist'T" The answer to this'" is found by looking at the
172 John Zizioulas, "Relational Ontology: Insights from Patristic Thought," in The Trinity and
an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghorne
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010),146-56.
173 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 56 (§20).
174 'Essentialist' here is not to be taken in the usual contrast of God's essence being the same
as God's existence as Thomas articulates it, although Yannaras is clearly aware of this dictum;
rather, 'essentialist' for Yannaras is usually a cipher for a (false) historical legacy of
'beginning with the one God', etc., in other words, another way of reifying de Regnon's so-
called paradigm. David Bentley Hart, remarking upon the analogia entis against certain
dialectical rejections of it as 'essential ist', says: 'the analogia en tis is quite incompatible with
any naive "natural theology": if being is univocal, then a direct analogy from essences to
"God" (as the supreme substance) is conceivable, but if the primary analogy of is one of
being, then an infinite analogical interval has been introduced between God and creatures,
even as it is affirmed that God is truly declared in creation (for God is, again, infinitely
determinate and is himself the distance-the act of distance-of the analogical interval). Thus
the analogia en/is renders any simple "essentialist" analogy impossible' (Hart, The Beauty Of
The Infinite, 242).
175 Amongst other approaches that deflate such overwrought claims, which Rahner also
perpetuates to some extent in response to Thomas' Summa Theologica, see Herwi W. M.
Rikhof, "Authority in the Contemporary Theology of the Trinity," in Aquinas as Authority. A
Collection of Studies Presented at the Second Conference of the Thomas Instituut Te Utrecht,
December /4-16 20()O, ed. P. van Geest, H. Goris, and C. Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 213-
34. Rikhof argues that Rahner's take on Aquinas as introducing a rift between the "on the one
God" and "on the Triune God" is in fact a misdiagnosis of the problem due to the fact that
such language never actually appears in the original version of Aquinas' Summa. Instead,
over the course of time in translation (which is always a form of interpretation), section
headers and new terminology were introduced. 'So a new terminology is used, and with it,
associations and assumptions are introduced, apparently without a conscious decision and
awareness of the connotations involved and without a clear argument in favour of such a
decision. Since it seems that the type of terminology belongs to a later period, it means that
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recent tradition of 'existential' Thomists in the line of Etienne Gilson'" (with
whom Yannaras is clearly familiar but whose points appear to have fallen
flat)."" That is, for Thomas, God is not 'essence' (although God is the simple
divine unity of essentia and esse), but is most properly considered to be
subsistent existence (esse, 'to-be') itself, echoing the most proper name for
God, 'I am who I am'. In this regard, W. Norris Clarke is instructive:
St. Thomas' point is not that existence belongs necessarily to the
divine essence, conceived as already the plenitude of perfection in its
own right as essence. It is rather that the entire essence itself of God is
nothing else than the pure unlimited Act of Existence (Jpsum Esse
Subsistens), which of itself by "nature" contains, at least equivalently,
all possible perfections. This is not a reduction of existence to essence,
as in the other traditions, but just the opposite: a reduction of essence
to existence. This is the truly daring aspect of the doctrine, and the one
that has made it difficult for those in other traditions even to grasp, let
alone accept. 178
Conjoined with, and crucial to this understanding of the primacy of esse is the
aspect of form, which Gilson states is 'the act by which the matter is made to
be the matter of such or such a determined substance. The proper role of form
is, therefore, to constitute substance as substance'F? The act-of-being (ipsum
esse), therefore, is akin to the act itself with respect to the form itself, as
Thomas says.!" In this way, form 'achieves substance' as the principle of
existence iprincipium essendirl" and as such Gilson lays the groundwork for
Clarke's quotation above, saying that '[ t]o assert that the act-of-being has the
bearing of an act with regard to form itself ... is to affirm the radical primacy of
existence over essence' .IM2 Hence, 'the act of existing lies at the very heart, or
if one prefers, at the very root of the real. It is therefore the principle of the
principles of reality'. 183 Language is at its creaturely limit here, for Thomas is
attempting to point toward the ultimate unity of subject and verb, essence and
Aquinas is read and interpreted in terms of a later development, and without noticing this
filter. On this basis he is then judged and defended' (Ibid., 216-18).
176 E.g., Gilson, The Christian Philosophy a/St. Thomas Aquinas, 3~4, 81-3, 91-5, 370--5;
Joseph de Finance, Etre Et Agir (Paris: P. U. F., 1945).
m Yannaras, Person and Eras, 299n.28, 310n.36, 362n.31, etc.
178 Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," 24.
179 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy a/St. Thomas Aquinas, 32.
1110 ScG, II, c. 54, n. 5.




existence, or as Clarke puts it, 'that which is and the act of ising' .184And if it
could be possible for one term in Thomas to 'win out', it would indeed be the
verb, for Thomas chooses esse to express the subject in God, and not
essential'"
Persons-angelic, human, and divine-are articulated within this act-of-
being. Again, Yannaras says here that persons come 'after' the essence as an
afterthought and therefore have no real existential reality for articulations from
'the West'. But for Thomas, this to once more misunderstand the radical
nature of the fullness resplendent within the ipsum esse. That is, for Thomas,
to be a person (or anything else) means that one is a particular subject in that,
within the perfection of the act-of-being, essence becomes the limiting
principle, the inner limit to this subject!" Te Vel de emphasizes here that in
Thomas, it is not usually a limiting 'by' (per) the essence, but nearly always a
limiting 'to' (ad) a subject by determinate essence. Significantly, this
emphasizes that 'a nature is not so much a pre-existing subject which is
already determined in itself, but that the specific nature is the determinateness
being acquires in that in which it is received'. 187But, aside from a very
qualified sense regarding the divine persons who are subsistent and who all
share the same perfect act-of-being consubstantially with each other only
being differentiated by their relations of origin-none of this applies to God,
for God is simple ipsum esse subsistens. We know creatures as 'this' subject
as a particular limited essence received in 'that' form in the act-of-being; in
God, however, there is no limitation, and no way to 'map out' conceptually the
essence-esse distinction, because it is only 'real' from the side of creation and
'logically' the same in divine simplicity in God. Gilson remarks that the very
way the real distinction itself is articulated is so often done in a way that it
makes it seem as if 'existence were itself an essence-the essence of the act-
of-being'. But, continues Gilson, '[t]his is to treat an act as though it were a
thing'.188It is understandable that Yannaras has misunderstood this distinction
1M Clarke, "What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," 25.
ISS Ibid., 26.
186 Ibid., 35-7; and especially idem, "The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas"; idem,
"The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas."
lK7 Te Vel de, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 152.
188Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 35.
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in the aftermath of a rigid Neo-Scholasticism, but a clearer way to understand
the problem of the distinction as a formulation is to understand that it only
becomes a problem for those whose essence is not to exist, i.e., creatures.
When Yannaras argues, therefore, that 'the West' is guilty of turning
analogy into a measured concept, this attack does find purchase only insofar as
various Thomists have misread Thomas in assuming that all versions of
analogous predication reduce to the analogy of proportionality-the very
articulation which gives rise to the most schematized, conceptual mapping.!"
In the literature, this is the version of analogy that introduces the following
schematic:
Human's essentia God's essentia
Human's esse God's esse
However, with even a modicum of reflection, one will quickly see that such an
arrangement of proportionality is, in the words of David Burrell, a 'bag of
tricks,' 190 despite the legacy it has had and continues to hold to some degree
since Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia. The reason that proportionality fails is
due to three key factors. First, the right side of the above diagram is not two
'things' or 'proportions' in God because of God's divine simplicity which
expresses that God's essence is God's act-of-being (esse). Accordingly, Te
Velde avers, 'Being is not said analogously of God and creature because there
exists a similarity between the way God relates to his esse and the creature to
its created esse. On the contrary, there is a radical diversity in [the] way they
both relate to being' .191 Secondly, taken as a schema itself, this kind of relation
can only express the utmost of the radical diversity between creature and God,
for we only know in some sense how the two proportions on either side relate
to themselves (either simply by itself in God or by participation in the
creature), but not, however, between the two sides of the proportionality. For
this reason, Eberhard Jungel misreads Thomas through a Kantian lens and
1M9 For two defenses of the analogy of proportionality, see Anderson. Reflections on the
Analogy of Being; and most recently, Steven A. Long, Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of
Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith (Notre Dame. IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
2011).
190 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 13.
191 Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 97n.
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concludes that in Thomas there can only be a pure apophatic silence regarding
this relation.l'" That is, Jungel reads Thomas not as espousing analogy, but as
proffering equivocation, but this reading is far afield from displaying a
measured degree of fairness to Thomas' texts.'?' And thirdly, as indicated in
192 Jungel also locates Thomas' apophaticism within a Socratic, Dionysian, and Damascene-
inspired legacy which he seems to argue comes merely from a pagan spirit of the ineffable
distance of God to creation (JUngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 232~5). At every turn,
however, JUngel misses that the references to these other thinkers, or the thinkers themselves
(if they are Christian), are directly inspired by Scripture, e.g., Exodus 33:20; John I: 18; I John
4:12; I Timothy 6:15-16.
193 Rolnick, Analogical Possibilities, 191-240, 285-{i; HUtter, "Attending to the Wisdom of
God - from Effect to Cause, from Creation to God," 209-12, 240-5. HUtter shows that
oddly, Pannenberg comes out on the opposite pole and accuses Thomas of univocation. For
two accounts that defend Jungel, see Archie J. Spencer, "Causality and the Analogia Entis:
Karl Barth's Rejection of Analogy of Being Reconsidered," Nova Et Vetera 6, no. 2 (2008):
329-376; Ry O. Siggelkow, "The Importance of Eberhard JUngel for the Analogia Entis
Debate," The Princeton Theological Review 15, no. I (2009): 63-76. Spencer too attempts to
shoe-horn Aquinas anachronistically (but also spuriously on the level of metaphysics) into the
Kantian framework. For a response to Spencer, see Thomas Joseph White, OP, "How Barth
Got Aquinas Wrong: A Reply to Archie J. Spencer on Causality and Christocentrism," Nova
Et Vetera 7, no. I (2009): 241-70 and 241 and 242n.3 where he briefly, but decisively casts
aside the Kantian shackles that Spencer and JUngel have placed upon Aquinas. Siggelkow,
however, is guilty of what he charges John Betz with: he claims Betz has overlooked Jungel
and mischaracterized Barth by overlooking twenty-five years of Barthian scholarship, but
Siggelkow himself has not shown he understands the analogia en tis debate from the Catholic
perspective, let alone paid any careful attention whatsoever to the multitude of scholarship on
Thomas, analogy, and participation from the last sixty years (indeed, Siggelkow does not cite
Thomas once). The most egregiously false assertion of Siggelkow's is: 'For Aquinas, God the
Creator is always understood as the highest essence and first cause of all that exists in the
created order' (p. 71). Siggelkow displays his confusion in that, this account of Thomas, while
false, is actually asserting that Thomas' ontology is a univocal series of essences, yet
Siggelkow is wont to agree with JUngel that Thomas actually possesses an equivocal project
(i.e., as too 'apophatic'). Joseph White detects the same misunderstanding at work in
Spencer's claims, betraying a confused ahistoricism (White, 'How Barth Got Aquinas
Wrong', 247). Showing no citational support to any of Thomas' texts, let alone any
scholarship on the matter, Siggelkow simply follows Jungel's account unquestioningly. The
present chapter and section of this thesis should, I hope, dispel all such caricatures of Thomas
as being an 'essentialist'.
Moreover, Siggelkow also does not realize that Przywara himself continued to clarify his
own project on the analogia entis over the years, to the point that, as Kenneth Oakes shows,
'Przywara's later work itself reflects that the subject and object of theology is not primarily
being but the analogia fidei and the commercium, and thus the center of theology is always
and irreducibly the work wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ upon the cross for the sake of
creation. It is still Przywara's contention, however, that to speak of the Creator and creation
well, we will need to be mindful of analogy, and of the analogia entis. Once again the
analogia entis, according to Przywara, ever and only reflects and radiates the glory of Jesus
Christ, the incarnate God' (Kenneth Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich
Przywara," in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed.
Thomas Joseph White [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011],
147-71 here at 170). Oakes' essay is commendable not only for its breadth, but also for its
ability to extend the discussion to the whole Przywara, and not to only focus upon the
analogia entis of 1932 as Siggelkow narrowly does, despite his laudable efforts to promote
Jungel's work. Lastly, Betz himself has shown his willingness to learn from Oakes' work, and
has accommodated and adjusted accordingly. John R. Betz, "After Barth: A New Introduction
to Erich Przywara's Analogia Entis," in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or
the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
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the previous section regarding an analogy of two things to a third, this schema
does the same thing in that it subordinates humans and God to a higher
concept, that is, the concept of the proportionality itself.!" God is not merely
some 'x' to solve in an algebraic equation, and in this sense, Yannaras is right
to reject the Neo-Scholastic forms of conceptualism that attempt to determine
God within such a schema. As Hans Urs von Balthasar rightly remarks, 'The
analogia entis forbids the erection of any overarching third that includes both
God and the creature; God cannot fall under any concept' .195
If anything, the recent literature on the analogy debate shows how one
cannot simply rely on the etymology of words to make an all-determining
case, as Cajetan did regarding the Greek analogon, usually translated as
'proportion' .196 When one actually follows what Thomas says regarding
language about God, proper proportionality is actually not one of the methods
he follows, especially when one understands that this can in no way apply to
God as ipsum esse. Indeed, as Ashworth remarks, 'Where Cajetan went wrong
was not in focusing on ontology but in his gratuitous introduction of the
analogy of proportionality'. 197 In this regard, the Creator-creature relation is
here not a four-element analogy, but a two-'element' participatory analogy.!"
Publishing Company, 2011), 35-87 at 57n.74. The article of Oakes' to which both Siggelkow
and Betz refer is Kenneth Oakes, "The Question of Nature and Grace in Karl Barth: Humanity
as Creature and as Covenant-Partner," Modern Theology 23, no. 4 (October 2007): 595-616.
This article is actually much more amenable to Betz and the Catholic tradition than Siggelkow
lets on, attempting a kind of rapproachment between Barth and Henri de Lubac. See also
Oakes' recent work which expounds Barth in more detail: Kenneth Oakes, Karl Barth on
Theology and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Lastly, for Balthasar's brief judgment on Jungel's understanding of analogy, see Hans Urs
von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Theological Logical Theory: Truth of God, trans. Adrian J.
Walker, vol. II (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2004), 273n.109.
194 Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, 462, 471.
195 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, I: 17.
196 Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy of Being According to Thomas Aquinas, 126.
197 Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 128.
198 And thus the work of this chapter has shown, I would argue, that the conclusion of
Stamm berger is incorrect, as he states that the analogy of attribution corresponds to the level
of logic, and the analogy of proportionality to the level of ontology. See Ralf M. W.
Stammberger, On Analogy: An Essay Historical and Systematic, Europaische
Hochschulschriften (Series XXIII) 540 (Frankfurt am Main; Berlin; Bern; New York; Paris;
Wien: Peter Lang, 1995), 25.
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God is subsistent act-of-being itself, whereas creatures have their esse by
participation, that is, only 'in part', and therefore borrowed.!"
Addressing the famous three-fold division of analogy found in the
Sentences commentary (upon which Cajetan uses to over-determine the rest of
Thomas' use of analogy), even here one must be forced to address the role of
the metaphysician as one that guides the discourse, as shown by Lawrence
Dewan in the previous section. The first division is according to intention
alone and not according to esse, and here Thomas refers to the famous health
in body, urine, and medicine example; the second division is according to esse
alone and not intention, and so the logician will univocally predicate 'body' on
multiple subjects where the metaphysician and natural philosopher will see a
real difference; and the third division, as it refers to those perfections in God
such as truth and goodness, is according to both intention and esse/" 'When
we focus on words,' states Ashworth, 'we focus on the one intentio
corresponding to each word. When we focus on natures, we focus on their esse
or being'. 201 The third division, therefore, while it requires both the skills of
the logician and the metaphysician, must place a priority upon the
metaphysician because, as stated above, the priority of God as ipsum esse-
the reality of the act-of-being-must guide our discussion here, and not, pace
Cajetan and his followers (and even some of his critics like McInerny),
according to intrinsic and extrinsic modes of predication within a scheme of
proportionality.
As previously stated, Yannaras' polemic is not without a basis when
applied to the Neo-Scholastic attempts to tum analogy into a conceptual
enterprise, as in Cajetan and his followers. It is for this reason that Gilson
articulated analogy as transferred not to the plane of concepts as Duns Scotus
attempted to do with the doctrine of the univocity of being, but the real
divergence between Thomas and Scotus stems from the fact that the former
199 This is not to be confused with the impossible logic of taking a piece or 'part of God. On
'borrowed existence' see Cunningham, "Being Recalled," 59-80 at 59~!'
zoo In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 adl ,
201 Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic," 129.
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transferred analogy instead to the plane of judgment?" The reason for this is
two-fold. On the one hand, it has to do with how being (esse) is articulated,
that is, it is not a concept or contained within a genus, and' [i]f being is not a
concept, then the unity of being cannot be a concept. If, therefore, there is to
be any unity of being in knowledge at all, there remains only the judgment'. 203
On the other hand, it is because all of the 'attributes' of God turn out to be not
attributes at all,204because, as Gilson says, one must continually repeat that
God is esse, the 'I am who 1 am,' who is all of these attributes, not in a
composed manner, but simpliciter/" Even Joshua Hochschild (who we have
already mentioned as one who has written a recent defense of Cajetan's
'semantics of analogy'), takes Gilson, et at'.s point about analogy requiring
judgment, arguing that one finds this working in Cajetan as well, as he too
pays attention to judgment, ordering his concepts underneath this usage.i"
To explore this idea further, it will be fruitful to recall the discussion at the
beginning of the previous chapter concerning Levinas' misunderstanding of
the truth of knowledge. There we saw that for him, Being is always static and
202 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 107; Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns
Scot (Paris: Vrin, 1952), 101.And see Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 153-4;
Clarke, "Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language About God," 126-32; Rocca,
Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 154-95. Rocca points to a small handful of other early
sources making parallel remarks such as SchiIIebeeckx and BouiIIard, the former of whom
emphasizes the person's 'tendential' reference to God in analogous statements, and the latter
of whom highlights the same anti-conceptual leanings as Gilson. Edward SchiIIebeeckx,
Revelation and Theology, trans. N. D. Smith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968), 2:167;
Henri Bouillard, The Knowledge of God, trans. s. D. Femiano (New York: Herder & Herder,
1968), 105-7; Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, cited on 155-7.
203 Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 116. For a more nuanced account, however,
Rocca says, 'Thomas can be read both ways on the question of whether the concept of being is
the root of all judgments or the fruit of some of them, that is, whether the concept of being is
an independent, essentialist, and primal concept of the mind's first operation, or a quasi-
essential concept that is the product and, as it were, the residue of even more primary
existential judgments: he opts for the former in those texts where he is quoting Avicenna and
allowing some of the Avicennian vocabulary's essentialistic themes to shape his own thought,
but he implies the latter if we combine the texts that derive ens from esse with his
understanding of judgment as the way to knowing esse' (Rocca, Speaking the
Incomprehensible God, 165-73, here at 172-3). Analogy, however, always follows the latter
course.
204 One finds a similar argument in Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, 13-47, esp 15-20.
205 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 107.
206 Hochschild, The Semantics of Analogy, 58-64, 124, 174-5. Hochschild contends that the
critique is appropriate against Scotus, not Cajetan. This is not the place to offer a critique of
Hochschild, but see Philip Rolnick's review of his book: "The Semantics of Analogy:
Rereading Cajetan's De Nominum Analogia- By Joshua Hochschild." Modern Theology 28,
no. 1 (January 2012): 141-5. If Hochschild is correct regarding his treatment of Cajetan, then
perhaps the simplest critique of Cajetan was that his judgment did not go far enough.
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totalizing, and operates within a strict subject-object dichotomy which elicits
an account where the object is always violently subsumed under the subject's
gaze. Like Yannaras, this criticism only holds water when one is only
operating at the level of concepts. However, for Thomas and the tradition that
followed, truth is not the correspondence of objects to the 'subject' as such;
rather, truth 'happens' when one corresponds one's intellect towards reality, to
the matter at hand, and this is what Thomas calls the act of judgment. In this
respect, Thomas says, 'when the intellect begins to judge about the reality
apprehended, then its very judgment is something proper to it which is not
found in the reality outside the soul; and this judgment is said to be true when
it corresponds to the external reality'. 207 The only reason that the intellect has
pride of place in this order at all is not because it is an ego that sublimates
everything to itself, but because the intellect is the only faculty capable of
making such judgments with regard to nonintellectual reality.?"
As such, the distance between the intellect and the reality outside the soul
is not merely parallel nor a unity in a Hegelian sense, but is itself a distance of
proportioned analogy; it is an opening where the things are revealed to
themselves in teleological fruition not only for the things themselves, but also
uniquely for the intellectual soul of the person." The relation between the two
is real, which includes both an interest in the integrity of the thing for its own
sake in its own beauty, but also involves a dialogical, reciprocal mutuality.
Catherine Pickstock helpfully clarifies: 'Intellection, then, is not an indifferent
speculation; it is rather a beautiful ratio which is instantiated between things
and the mind which leaves neither things nor mind unchanged. This means
that one must think of knowing-a-thing as an act of generosity, or salvific
compensation for the exclusivity and discreteness of things' .210 Analogy as
judgment, which Rocca calls 'analogy-in-the-act rather than analogy-after-the-
fact,' is therefore an act which takes concepts and necessarily transcends them
because the dignity of the realities themselves command such respect. 211 That
207 De Ver., q. I,a. 3; as cited in Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 161.
208 Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 164.
209 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, Radical Orthodoxy (London:
Routledge, 2001), 7.
210 Ibid.
211 Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 193~.
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is why we can have a 'concept' of a person as an individual substance of a
rational nature, but one never actually meets this concept; rather, they
encounter persons, for persons themselves are in no way concepts! What's
more, the activity of dialogue can be now considered as a personalized act of
analogical encounter, not only with other persons.i" but also with non-human
entities, as when one attends to the grain of the wood in the craft of
woodworking, or in the slow, deliberative enjoyment of an aged whisky,
which itself took years to become what it is.
To Yannaras' critique that analogy must be a hierarchical understanding
and not conceptual, Thomas Aquinas would only nod in approval. In fact,
when one reads Thomas and does not ignore the manifold passages on
participation and its degrees, as well as his long treatise on angels in the
Summa Theologica which itself is heavily indebted to Dionysius' On the
Celestial HierarchlI3-indeed, it could not have been written without it-
then one realizes that analogy in Thomas has been attempting to articulate a
real, 'sacred order' all along. While the examples of Thomas' use of
Dionysius' On the Celestial Hierarchy abound, two will suffice as illustrations
for our purposes. First, Thomas relies on this analogical order found in
Dionysius to defend not only the impossibility of seeing the essence of God,
for, 'According to Dionysius a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the
sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to
some similitude representing in part the divinity' .214
Secondly and more relevant to the topic at hand, in the first question on
angels in the Summa, Thomas' very first authority quoted is Dionysius to
illustrate the hierarchic order of the angels as they enlighten one another.?"
But Thomas does not stop there, for in the corpus of this article he illustrates
how truth itself is an analogical reality, participating and intensifying in
different orders of one level of the hierarchy enlightening the next. 'All that is
212 For an extended account on dialogue as dia-Iogos, see the next chapter.
213 ST, I, qq. 5~3, 106-13.
214 ST, I, q. 12, a. 11 ad 1. Thomas cites On the Celestial Hierarchy, 4.3, Pseudo-Dionysius:
The Complete Works, 157 [PG 3:180c]. To this, Thomas adds that the levels of participation
include the degrees of prophecy (ST, II-II, q. 174).
215 ST, I, q. 106, a. 1 s.c. Citation is to On the Celestial Hierarchy, 8.1, Pseudo-Dionysius,
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 167 [PG 3:240b].
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made manifest is light,' as it says in Ephesians 5: 13. This reality IS
communicated through the manifestation of intellectual light as each IS
illumined with the known truth."? The illumination occurs in degrees of
intensity: one degree of illumination occurs according to the strengthening of
intellectual power caused by being 'in the neighborhood' of a superior angel,
just as fire makes those things nearest it hot; a second degree of illumination
occurs through communication of likeness according to the degrees possessed
by the higher angels as they are able to propose to the lower angels. Thomas
concludes the corpus of this article by citing On the Celestial Hierarchy
accordingly: 'Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and
multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as
to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy'. 217 Even in the angelic realm,
illuminative knowledge is achieved by way of manuduction, by a leading of
the hand upwards toward God. Moreover, this activity of leading is also
eminently personal, as angels themselves are part of this hierarchy not merely
as immaterial beings, but precisely as persons.
The main difference for angels is found in their nature: they are purely
immaterial, of an intellectual nature.!" not subsisting in a material, human
nature, but still existing as creatures as distinct in their intellective knowledge
from their esse/" For human persons, the manuductive act must respect the
physical order of things, which means therefore that they must be involved an
act of resolutio on the path to God. This reflexive reversal into the
metaphysical ordering of things names God as the analogical cause of
participated Being, and thus intuits the real logical order of things-that is,
respecting the order of a true metaphysics. Angels, Thomas says, because they
'are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own
intelligible nature [must] consequently ... attain their intelligible perfection
216 Thomas cites Ephesians 3:8: 'To me the least of all the saints is given this grace ... to
enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been
hidden from eternity in God'.
217 ST, I, q. 106, a. 1. The citation is to On the Celestial Hierarchy, eh. 15, in Pseudo-
Dionysius: The Complete Works, 185 [PG 3:332b], which, however, loses the sense of
analogical lifting or analogous "anagogy." The Greek reads, 'fKllU'IT) Y£lQ ouaia VOEQ£l, n']v
&'lQOUflEVTlV aunj 7tQO~ 'tij~ eElO'tEQa~ tVOElbTi VOTlULV 7tQOVOTl'tlKlJ bUVUflEl bUXlQEi Kat
7tA1l0EUEl, 7tQO<; n']v 'tTi<; KambEEU'{EQa~ avaywYllCJlV avaAoyiav'.
218 ST, I, q. 41, a. 3 ad 2.
219 ST, I, q. 54, aa. 1-3.
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through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the
species of things known, together with their intellectual nature' ,220In this
sense, knowledge is not attained through deduction as it is for human
persons.i" for the proper objects of the angelic intellect are intelligible
substances, '[ w]hereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is
united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter',222 In
sum, both human and angelic persons in Thomas participate in an analogical
sacred order, each according to their own mode of personal existence which
determines the way in which their intellects come to bring each other to
teleological fruition,
One wonders, after such an investigation, whether Yannaras could really be
talking about Aquinas at all, but of course Yannaras' polemic (as well as
Levinas') will indeed continue to be of some relatively minor use, or at least
as a sound warning for those intent on making Thomas' teaching on analogy
into a rigid theory, As mentioned, it is often remarked that Thomas has no
'general treatise on analogy', or that, as far as logic is concerned, 'Aquinas
offers no theory of analogy' ,223 Yet there are those like Montagnes who claim
that in Thomas there is 'a coherent and unified theory of the analogy of
being' ,224How can this be the case? Burrell is absolutely right to emphasize
that Thomas' comments on analogy cannot be 'systematized', if that means
that it is turned into an absolutely formulaic enterprise.f" and especially if one
is attempting to locate a 'univocal core' in his analogous usage.!" Analogy
cannot be univocity, otherwise it would not be analogy, as by definition it is
the middle path practiced between univocation and equivocation.i" True, there
is no single question devoted to analogy, nor does he set out to even explain
analogy in the same way when he does give different accounts of its usage,
But, the fact that there are many articles spanning Thomas' many works, as
220 ST, I, q. 55, a. 2.
221 ST, I, q. 60, a. 2.
222 ST, I, q. 84, a. 7.
223 Respectively, K1ubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy, 105; Burrell, Analogy and
Philosophical Language, 170 and see also 124, 198,242,263,267.
224 Montagnes, TheDoctrine of the Analogy of Being According to ThomasAquinas, 72.
225 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 123-4.
226 Ibid., 13.
227 ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
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well as the fact that Thomas himself employs analogy all the time, even when
he does not say, 'and now I am speaking of esse analogously', shows that it is
a mediating logic and economy that guides most of his work. Indeed,
whenever he speaks of persons, whether divine, angelic, or human, he always
applies or assumes Boethius' definition, analogously ordered to the divine
persons as the prime analogates, the most perfect subsistent personal realities
by which all other persons are measured. There is thus no 'plain doctrine' of
analogy, no single core, nor a univocal 'logic', but that does not mean that
Thomas does not still actually have a teaching on analogy. This teaching
contains similar, ordered logics of affirming a middle path between
univocation and equivocation with terms signifying different levels of
proportioned participation in a higher, subsistent reality which is the cause of
and simplicity itself of whatever perfection terms are under examination-and
one can still affirm this without making the same mistake as assuming that it
always happens in the same way in every case. For example, truth is
participated in analogously, but this is distinct from participating in Beauty or
Goodness, despite the fact that these transcendentals are convertible with one
another. Likewise, to be a human person will always be spoken of in an
analogous way differently from any of the transcendentals, and because
human nature itself is different than the angelic nature, they will, in turn,
participate in God differently according to their own diverse modes of
creaturehood.
It is for this reason that Burrell highlights Thomas' locution of
'analogously speaking' (analogice loquendo) in contrast to discussions of
'analogous concepts'r'" There can be no such thing as an 'analogous concept'
in and of itself, as 'a concept cannot but be univocal', which runs contrary to
the attempts of William of Ockham and Duns ScotuS.229 For Thomas, this lack
of formulation is therefore not a failing, but more about 'showing' or pointing
toward where the truth lies as opposed to a formalized 'saying' .230 Therefore,
228 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 121.
229 Ibid., 191.
230 Ibid., 197-9. This strong division seems analogous to Levinas' divide between 'Saying'
and the 'Said', or Barth's discussion of the dialectic between the Word and words. For more
on the similarities between these two thinkers on precisely this point, see Ward, Barth,
Derrida and the Language of Theology, 147-70.
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Burrell states that this analogous usage points not to the disembodied logic of
semantics as it points 'from language to the language user. Or rather they
speak of language as emanating from a person with aims and purposes'. 231 He
continues:
And of course this is the context of language-human life and life's
concerns. It is the language arising therefrom which forms the matrix
for logic. To call attention, then, to those aspects of our linguistic
comportment which are neither susceptible of a rigorous account nor in
need of logical justification is not to spurn logic. It is to preserve its
integrity. Indeed it is not logic so much as an excessive demand for
clarity which stands in the way of the proposed account. To require
that 'similar to' be explicated by way of 'identical with,' for example,
reflects an attitude, not a theory.f"
Not only does Burrell highlight the personal use of analogy, but Janet Soskice
makes a similar remark regarding metaphorical usage: 'For it is not words
which refer but speakers using words'r'" Here she follows Hilary Putnam who
says, 'The realist explanation, in a nutshell, is not that language mirrors the
world but that speakers mirror the world [... ]' .234 Burrell, Soskice, and
Putnam's insights rightly point to the dimension of personal usage as it is an
exhibition of why analogy itselfis a personal enterprise. Analogy is analogous
precisely because it is individual persons themselves engaging in analogical
naming over space and time. As the primary analogates of Being, persons all
illuminate the distance between themselves and the world as they both relate
to their source in the Triune God. Usage itself requires that language and the
things themselves be properly used, and so in this regard, analogous usage
does at least have some loose parameters or 'guard rails' to guide the person
on this path. Furthermore, the reason that analogy has a privileged
understanding as personal stems from the very fact that all of the
231 Burrell, Analogy and Philosophical Language, 243.
232 Ibid., emphasis in original.
233 Janet M. Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1985), 136.
234 Hilary Putnam, "Realism and Reason," in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 123, emphasis in original. The sentence continues: 'i.e,
their environment-in the sense of constructing a symbolic representation of that
environment'. This part of his formulation is somewhat imprecise for representationalism
poses problems of its own, but it is outside of the scope of this thesis to address Putnam's
work.
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transcendental terms and perfections are understood primarily as coinciding in
a supremely personal God.
The distance between the Father and Son in the person of the Spirit is one
of pure, overflowing love. The Son as sent by the Father in the Spirit is the
very Word of the Father, the image of the invisible God; for us then, Christ
becomes the 'prime analogate' of the Godhead. But one has to be careful here
because there is not an element of participation here between the divine
persons in the same way that we participate in God: for, because of divine
simplicity, not only is the entire Godhead a Trinity of three persons, each
consubstantial with the other existing distinctly by relation, but each person
contains the entire Godhead at once as well, for there are no 'degrees' of
analogous distance here either. Therefore, for Christ to be revealed to us is to
also have the full revelation of the Father and the Spirit, supremely personal,
yet paradoxically one. The logic of analogy is thus personal not because
human persons are the primary analogate of Being, but it is personal precisely
because of the advent of the revelation of the divine Logos in whom human
persons have their being. The 'logic' of the ana-logic is Christ. Faith then
becomes as much an ana-logical witnessing to the personal God in the sense of
the upward motion implied in ava and avw235 as it is always already a being
anagogically lifted up into higher participation of the eminently personal God.
c. Personal Service: Przywara & Balthasar on the Analogia Entis & the
Analogia Personae
In the final section of this chapter, I tum to the work of Erich Przywara and
the debate surrounding the analogia entis, or the 'analogy of being'.
Przywara's work in particular updates and sharpens the question of analogy in
three ways. First, writing in the early twentieth century affords him the
position of being able to reflect on much of the analogical tradition that has
235 On the logic of !Xviiinvolved in analogy, see Przywara, Ana/ogia Entis, 3: I03-4.
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transpired since the initial debates surrounding Thomas Aquinas. Second,
related to the first point: as Przywara read widely in the theological as well as
philosophical traditions-both ancient and contemporary-he is able to
provide his own flavour of 'updating' to the literature on analogy as he
incorporates aspects of not only Aristotle, Plato, and Augustine to Thomas'
teaching on analogy, but also Goethe, Nietzsche, Simmel, Troeltsch, Scheler,
Newman, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Husserl, and Heidegger.?" Finally,
Przywara confirms the central point of this thesis: the analogia entis is
fulfilled and completed in an analogia personae, itself upheld and united in
the person of Jesus Christ. While Przywara's primary Analogia Entis text itself
was always Christ-focused (especially in its final pages), in this chapter I
employ the recent work of Kenneth Oakes who shows us that in the later
writings of Przywara, the analogia en/is is primarily about Christ crucified.
Like the history of analogous usage in Thomas, this particular debate
surrounding Przywara's Analogia En/is has generated its own set of issues
within the correspondingly extensive array of literature.237 Below I will
provide a brief summary of Przywara's analogia en/is in what it adds to
Thomas' notion of analogy, but also distinctly how it refers to the person as its
prime analogate. Additionally, I will refer to the work of Hans Urs von
Balthasar who also takes up Przywara's task and expands it in certain ways. I
will not be exploring the debate revolving around Karl Barth, Gottlieb
Sohngen, Eberhard Jungel, or Hans Urs von Balthasar, except as needed to
clarify Przywara's position.i"
236 These are the figures that Przywara mentions in the Preface to the First Edition of Analogia
Entis.
237 Erich Przywara, SJ, Analogia En tis. Metaphysik. Ur-Struktur Und AII-Rhythmus, vol. 3
(Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962). In what follows I will be following the forthcoming
translation by John Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2013). For secondary literature on Przywara, see Thomas F. O'Meara,
Erich Przywara, S. J.: His Theology and His World (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2002); Puntel, Analogie Und Geschichtlichkeit, 149~8, 533-52; Betz, "Beyond
the Sublime (pt. 1)"; Betz, "Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2)"; Betz, "After Barth"; Niels C.
Nielsen, Jr, "Przywara's Philosophy of the 'Analogia Entis'," The Review of Metaphysics 5,
no. 4 (June 1952): 599~20; James V. Zeitz, "Przywara and Von Balthasar on Analogy,"
Thomist 52, no. 3 (1998): 473-98.
23R Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Ill, trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (London: T &
T Clark, 2004), xiii, where Barth makes his famous "invention of the antichrist"
pronouncement; Gottlieb Sohngen, "Analogia Fidei I. Gottahnlichkeit Alleinaus Glauben?,"
Catholica 3, no. 3 (1934): 113-36; Gottlieb Sohngen, "Analogia Fidei II. Die Einheit in Der
161
The text of Pryzwara's Analogia Entis is broken up into two main sections,
the first entitled 'Metaphysics As Such' [Metaphysik Uberhaupti, and the
second labeled 'Analogia Entis'. The first section begins by examining the
rhythm that abounds in philosophy itself. This is exhibited by tracing the
movement of different types of philosophical approaches that, on the one
hand, begin by way of an a priori method, concerned with essences, which he
labels the 'meta-noetic'. Examples of this type are Plato, Descartes, Kant, (the
late) Husserl, and especially Hegel. On the other hand are the kinds of
philosophies as 'existence philosophies', concerned with an a posteriori
method, focused on concrete existence and practice. Emblematic here are such
thinkers as Aristotle, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and
Sartre.?" Both approaches, however, live within a polar tension such that each
implies the other. For example, a meta-noetics will, as a noetics, always refer
Glaubenswissenschaft," Catholica 3, no. 4 (1934): 176-208; Gottlieb Sohngen, "Analogia
Entis Oder Analogia Fidei?," in Die Einheit in Der Theologie (Munich: K. link, 1952), 235-
47; Gottlieb Sohngen, "Analogia Entis in Analogia Fidei," in Antwort. Karl Barth Zum
Siebzigsten Geburtstag Am 10. Mai 1956, ed. E. Wolf (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1956),
266-71; Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation,
trans. Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992); Eberhard Mechels,
Analogie Bei Erich Przywara Und Karl Barth. Das Verhiiltnis Von OfJenbarungstheologie
Und Metaphysik (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1974); Bernhard Gertz, Glaubenswelt Als
Analogie. Die Theologische Analogie-Lehre Erich Przywaras Und Ihr art in Der
Auseinandersetzung Um Die Analogie Fidei (Dusseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 1969); Jungel, God
as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundatin of Theology of the Crucified One in the
Dispute Between Atheism and Theism, 226-98; Siggelkow, "The Importance of Eberhard
Jungel for the Analogia Entis Debate"; Joseph Palakeel, The Use of Analogy in Theological
Discourse: An Investigation in Ecumenical Perspective (Rome, Italy: Gregorian University
Press, 1995); Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God, 93-103; Spencer, "Causality and
the Analogia Entis"; White, OP, "How Barth Got Aquinas Wrong"; Timothy J. Furry,
"Analogous Analogies? Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth," Scottish Journal of Theology 63,
no. 3 (2010): 318-30; Keith L. Johnson, "Erich Przywara's Early Version of the Analogia
Entis," The Princeton Theological Review 15, no. 1 (2009): 9-22; Keith L. Johnson, Karl
Barth and the Analogia Entis, T & T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology (London: T & T
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239 For a more detailed account of these approaches, see Erich Przywara, "Essenz- Und
Existenzphilosophie: Tragische Identitat Oder Distanz Der Geduld," Scholastik 14 (1939):
515-44; reprinted in Analogia Entis, 3:213-46. Here Przywara also connects these approaches
to a desire to relocate the religious dimension of the tragic into a collapsed immanent domain
in an effort to be unified with the Absolute, whereas the Christian account of the tragic is itself
overcome in the crucified Christ, expressed within the distance of patience from the believer.
See the recent and commendable Tomas Halik, Patience with God: The Story of Zacchaeus
Continuing In Us, trans. Gerald Turner (New York: Doubleday Religion, 2009). Przywara's
essay could very well be read as a reversal of Nietzsche in a reconfigured 'The Crucified
against Dionysios'. For a similar account from another angle, see Girard, I See Satan Fall Like
Lightning, 173--6.
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towards and assume categories of existence.?" Niels Nielsen remarks, 'The
analogia entis confirms that the knowing consciousness is directed beyond
itself to being in the very act of knowledge ..... As the fundamental principle
of all speculation and reflection, the analogia en tis signifies that philosophical
inquiry is directed to a real object of knowledge in being'.": We see here the
logic spoken of above in the previous sections where the intellect 'adequates'
itself toward Being, as Thomas Aquinas remarks at the beginning of De
Veritate. Contrariwise, the a posteriori also tends toward the a priori; in other
words, the existential standpoint will find itself directed toward the essence of
things, as in Aristotle. But Przywara warns, 'We pose our either-or not
between a meta-noetics and a meta-ontics, but between a meta-noetics that
provides the point of departure for a meta-ontics and a meta-ontics that finds
its reflection, at the last, in a meta-noetics'. 242 Posed in this way, the question
of a pure opposition fades away. As such, the movement of the 'meta-ontic
moves backward in self-critique, reflexively, towards the meta-noetic'. 243
Moreover, such a construction of meta-ontics itself presupposes an
epistemology. 'The epistemology that this method in practice employs is one
that presumes a complete adequation between knowledge and being: so
complete, in fact, that knowledge is nothing other than being brought to
expression-indeed, being manifesting itself to itself. 244 Both movements thus
imply and interpenetrate one another.
From the standpoint of finitude, however, 'an account of the act of
knowledge . .. manifestly precedes any account of the objects of
knowledge'r'" Even in a case of an extreme meta-ontics (i.e., existentialism,
dialectical materialism), 'the meta-noetic point of departure is unavoidable.
According to its own formal structure, therefore, metaphysics must begin from
240 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:23-8. 'Even Kant's pure categories of judgment bear the form
of ontological categories: quality, quantity, modality, etc. Even Hegel's retreat to the inner and
most formal species of judgment runs up against an expression proper to ontology: identity
and opposition. Even the most formal comportment of consciousness as such-relation (that
between act and objectj-e-has an ontological shape' (ibid, 26).
241 Nielsen, Jr, "Przywara's Philosophy of the 'Analogi a Entis'," 609.
242 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:24-5.
243 Ibid., 3:25.
244 Ibid., 3:26.
245 Ibid., 3:25 emphasis in original.
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the problem of the act'. 246 The reason for this is that Przywara is following the
Thomistic order of discursive reasoning which we explored above when
delineating the 'arrival' of the person: we first know God from God's effects,
from the effects of grace and from other creatures, and we then engage in the
act of a reflexive reversal in realizing the proper, logical order of things-this
itself is what we called the analogical act of judgment. Thus, in Przywara's
terms, the meta-antic is 'objectively prior' while the meta-noetic is granted
'methodological priority' .247 He calls the difference between the two
approaches a 'suspended tension' (Spannungs-Schwebe), an existential tension
which indicates that the formal principle of the analogia entis is itself part and
parcel of a 'creaturely metaphysics' .248 Like the Thomistic insight that regards
creatures as creatures in distinction from God in that they do not have their
own existence (esse) in the same, identical way that God has in God's
simplicity, Przywara formulates the creaturely 'composition' where it is not
their nature to be esse as: 'essence in-and-beyond existence' (Sosein in-tiber
Daseiny?" John Betz notes that the difference between Aquinas and Przywara
on this point consists in the latter's emphasis not only on the 'tension' of the
essence 'in and beyond' existence, but upon the fact that the 'creaturely being
is "in becoming" (in fieri), or that it only "is" as becoming, specifically as a
"coming to be" of essence'. 250 This is indebted to the Augustinian emphasis on
the nature of the creature as that which both "is" and "is not" (est non est),
with a stress on what the creature is 'not yet', as in 1 John 3:2 which says,
'what we will be has not yet been revealed'r'"
Tracing the movements in both a priori and a posteriori approaches to
metaphysics, Przywara highlights that when considered as an a priori and a
posteriori metaphysics in act, both tend toward one another, just as in the
mutually interpenetrating moments of the meta-noetic and the meta-ontic.i"





250 Betz, "Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2)," 26.
251 Ibid., 15.
252 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:36-60.
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iiibergeschichtlich) system, which as supercreaturely, attempts to reconcile
impasses (aporai) and tends toward an absolute dialectic of historical
progress.i" Here we see the transition from a Kantian to an Hegelian
approach. On the other hand, an a posteriori metaphysics of the act bears the
form of intrahistoricality (lnner-geschichtlichkeit). In this method, truth is
derived from history: 'truth is known to the degree that the eye that surveys
the universality of the intrahistorical turns its gaze upward to contemplate
superhistorical truth.'" A dilemma immediately arises here because either one
takes this as an idealism, or, one attempts to collect the various traditions
within history to form a common denominator, itself leading toward an
historical aporetics. The reason for this, according to Przywara, is that when
taken strictly, this approach always leaves historical remainders.i" The
reciprocal relationship between these two approaches must be where the truth
lies, for, taken absolutely, the vantage point from either end is only truly
permissible from a truly divine perspective. As Przywara puts it:
For the creature, only something similar (although precisely for this
reason essentially dissimilar) is possible: firstly, moving "with" the
current, which is to say, maximally, giving oneself up to it;-secondly,
moving "in" the current, which is to say moving in the conscious
awareness that even the most vigorous attempt to move "with" the
current never grasps the whole of it (because both its past as well as its
coming possibilities always loom out of the reach of any attempt,
concomitantly, to grasp it), but is instead ever more deeply grasped by
it. Seen thus, all "comprehension" must know itself, consciously and
from the first, as a "being comprehended." In the course of this work
itself, we shall see how the theme of the Analogia entis takes such a
method as its own proper mode of operation-how, that is, it
formalizes itself in such a method: in every "comprehending of
something" (and therein union with it) there is the greater "above-and-
beyond" of "being comprehended by it" (and therein the increasing
distance that transcends all unity).256
The analogical tension between 'comprehension' and 'being comprehended'






we only know when we love God such that we are in tum known by God."'
We thus do not exist in ourselves, but have the locus of our existence
primarily in another.i"
It is within this trajectory that Przywara formulates the theological within
an immanently philosophical metaphysics. Within this 'in between'
(Zwischen) within being, the question of the 'in itself as the 'ground-end-
definition itself (Grund-Ziel-Sinn) comes to light.i" That is, from the focus
upon the 'between' comes the 'ground-end' of this between such that one
finds that at the heart of this 'end' within the pure a priori, from the above to
the below, 'is a certain relation between God and creature: namely, a oneness
with a God of the "Ideas" and of "Truth," to the point of reenacting the
groundedness, directedness, and determinateness of all reality from this
God' .260 Likewise, in a pure a posteriori from the metaphysics of the object or
the act, the reverse moment is seen from the below to the above. This problem
as distinctly a creaturely problem exhibits the 'formal fundamental form of
"God beyond the creature."?" Either side of this dilemma strives toward the
absolute, whether it is an absolute 'ideal' or absolute 'universal', and thus at
its core, these 'are questions concerning the innermost rhythmic beat between
God (as the absolute) and the created (as what is grounded, directed, and
determined by the absolute), in that they are concerned with the innermost
beat of becoming (between essence and existence) in the creature'. 262 Between
the idea of being and the actuality of being: this is the remit of the 'intra-
creaturely', which is the common plane of the problem-not that between God
and creature, where there can be no univocity.i" The relation between God to
the creature, however, does not fall between the aforementioned rhythms of a
priori and a posteriori aporetics (except analogically as an intensification of
the dissimilar in the similar), but the relation can only be characterized as one
257 1 Corinthians 8:2-3. Regarding Balthasar's adoption of this rhythm, see Schindler, Hans
Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 249, 368; Aquinas, De Ver., q. I, a. 2
and q. 2, a. 14.
20R Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 96.






of gift, or 'complete "gratuity" ivollige «Ungeschuldetheit»), .2M This complete
gratuity is expressed in the knowledge of God as an unknowing, an approach
which explodes any ability to comprehend God in concepts. To quote
Przywara:
"above-and-beyond" here really means what I Corinthians says about
the relationship between revelation and thought: "scandal" and "folly"
in the sign of the "cross." "Pure thought" is "routed," forced to flee
undecidably either to "necessity without actuality" or to "actuality
without necessity." And precisely thus is it philosophy: participation in
the truth, which is God. For the one metaphysics, theology is the
EvuAExnll ... -that is, its ultimate life-giving form-in that it
appears ... to be the aTEQllaL~ of philosophical thought-that is, its
blasting open to the point of a hollowing-out: "life in death." In that, as
Thomas says, the relationship of the theological to the philosophical is
one of excedere (the "blasting open" in the "above and beyond" to the
point of a "hollowed-out abandonment"), it is one of per-ficere (of a
"thorough crafting-to-the-end" to the point of "perfection"). 265
This perfecting rhythm is that which is 'suspended "between" absolute identity
and absolute difference, and finally, "between" nothing and the Creator who
creates out of nothing. Such is the complexity of the matter, and it is precisely
in the intersection of these two "analogies"-the "immanent" and the
"theological"-that Przywara locates the analogy of being' .266
Locating the analogia entis is not the same as securing its foundation as a
positive given, however; rather, locating the analogy of being is to articulate
the contours, rhythm, and perfection of the human person's experience of the
depths of God, who remains 'ever greater' distinct. This is why even Barth, as
Balthasar notes, affirms that the analogia entis is itself a distinctly 'formal
principle'r'" however much the former continued to reject it throughout his
work. Philosophy's movement into theology-and hence its perfection-is a
passage which, in its completion, still affirms the difference between the two
and hence their dignity, yet without creating a tertium quid, that is, no 'third
thing'r'" This motion itself as the non-univocal movement of philosophy into
theology mirrors the theological logic of the analogy of being. To reuse a
264 Ibid., 3:81-2.
265 Ibid., 3:83, emphasis in original.
266 Betz, "Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2)," 22.
267 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 47-8.
268 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:84-5.
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quotation from Balthasar: 'The analogia entis forbids the erection of any
overarching third that includes both God and the creature; God cannot fall
under any concept'r'" In addition to Barth, Przywara even chides his 'dear
friends' Gottlieb Sohngen, Theodor Haecker, and Balthasar for not
understanding that 'analogia' in Aristotle is a 'proportion between two X'.270
He further clarifies: 'Should an "analogi a entis" (which Barth reckoned as
Mariology) be the "fundamental Catholic principle", then it is not a mere
"principle" but a "constant structure of that which is purely and clearly
factual." Then, as I have always stressed, it stands as a "suspended middle"
between the absolutely transcendent God of Calvin, Kierkegaard, and Barth,
and the absolute immanence of the God of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and
Harnack. - "Analogy" as a genuine relation between two X, eradicates from
the root every "derivation", whether deductive or inductive'r'" Such a
derivation would itselfbe the logic of the 'third', which is eschewed from the
beginning in the rhythm that Przywara articulates (which, as 'two relating to a
third', Aquinas also rejected as we saw above).'?"
How, then, does Przywara articulate the approach to God if not via some
other logic that guides the Creator-creature distinction? This striving after a
'third' is only attained in the following: 'the "third" is a possibility that is
fulfilled solely in the measure that "God is all in all," and is thus ever more
greatly beyond every grasping and comprehending by way of concepts. Not in
the measure that the mystery becomes a concept, but in the measure that the
concept is overcome in the mystery'r'" Przywara locates this 'so-called
"third" (sogenanntes «Drittes») as within an ever greater realization within
the theological itself, that is, in the inter-personal, Trinitarian life of God;274in
269 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, I: 17.
270Erich Przywara, In Und Gegen. Stellungnahmen Zur Zeit (Numberg: Glock und Lutz,
1955), 278. For commentary on this aspect in Przywara, see Mechels, Analogie Bei Erich
Przywara Und Karl Barth. Das Verhdltnis Von Offenbarungstheologie Und Metaphysik, 31-4.
It is a kind of 'balanced measure' (Ausgleichs im MafJ) (ibid, 34) of the Aristotelian law of
contradiction which finds itself within the creaturely space between transcendence and
immanence. Here the logic of in-and-beyond (in-fiber) is shown as an 'immanentizing
transcendent' (immanierende Transzendenz) and a 'transcending immanence'
(transzendierender Immanenz), (ibid, 34-7).
271Przywara, In Und Gegen, 279, translation mine.
272 ScC, I, c. 34, n. 2.
273Przywara, Ana/ogia Entis, 3:86-7.
274Ibid., 3:88.
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other words, Przywara's 'third' is akin to the via eminentia of the path of
theology as espoused by Dionysius and Thomas. The relationship therefore
between 'concept' and 'mystery' is one that is experienced as a reductio in
mysterium: 'the "concept" arises here anew out of the "mystery": as a "being
comprehended" (einbegrifJen sein) by the "mystery": just as the night unveils
its countenance only so far as the light has faded'v'" The mystery seizes us 'in
order to com-pre-hend us (um uns ein-zu-be-greiJen). It leads us in order to
lead us back into itself .276 Przywara refers to 1 Corinthias 8:2-3 and remarks
that its full significance is 'not simply a sinking away of philosophical
"knowing" (vvcovm) before a theological and conceptual determination
provided by definite revelation (fyvwa-raL), but a sinking in the depths into
the infinity of union (el bE n~ ayan~ rov Ocov, ouroc fyvCLJa-raLun'
av-rov). In other words, even the concept of "defined truth" leads into the
mystery'r'" Likewise, Balthasar, who owes an intellectual debt to Przywara.?"
says, 'in its act of self-possesion, the worldly subject understands that it is
already possessed and comprehended, that the eternal prius of being known is
the intrinsic form of knowledget.?" The truth is apprehended in nearly
identical terms to that of Przywara's own: 'In the first experience, the subject
wraps itself around the object, in the sense that when something is grasped, it
finds itself inside the person who grasps it (comprehensively). In the second
experience, however, the subject is introduced, initiated even, into the
mysteries of the object; it explicitly lays hold only of a fraction of the object's
depth and richness, albeit with the promise of further initiation to come'. 280 In
275 Ibid., 3:89.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid. While Przywara goes on to say that his real target here is Hegel (ibid), the shape of the
argument against which Przywara is critiquing is one not too dissimilar to certain
Heideggarian- and Levinasian-inspiried readings of theology in which metaphysics must be
completely 'evacuated' to make room for faith (the assumption being: metaphysics per se are
seen as wholly pagan and outside of God's capacity to save them and rightly direct them).
Both Marion and Westphal follow this path. See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-
texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Merold
Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith, Perspectives in
Continental Philosophy 21 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001).
278 On Balthasar's indebtedness to Przywara, see Rodney A. Howsare, Balthasar: A Guide for
the Perplexed (London: T & T Clark, 2009), 5-8; Stephen Wigley, Balthasar's Trilogy
(London: T & T Clark, 2010),15-18.
279 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000,1:259.
2RO Ibid., 1:40.
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both Przywara and Balthasar, the contour of veracity traced out is that of a
first encounter, deepened by a second movement of a more original truth
which is the mysterious depth, a depth which itself has us in possession, and
not the other way around as our post-Kantian assumptions might lead us to
believe. We do not fundamentally possess the truth as much as the truth is that
which possesses US.281 Indeed, as David Bentley Hart states, 'Analogy is a
discourse of truth that has disabused itself of the notion that truth is a thing
only to be grasped' .182
Przywara brings the first part of Analogia Entis to a close by highlighting
the impulses of the Catholic church against Hegelian movements within it that
seek to conflate and thus confuse philosophy with theology. Citing the Vatican
I document De fide et ratione, Przywara emphasizes the council's decision to
maintain the distinction between faith and reason.i" However, the borders of
faith and reason are not set at odds, but are in service to the one truth in God,
stemming from the 'submission to the church [as] a being-formed-in-Christ,
who as the Eternal Son of the Father is the Logos, the Intellectus Sui within
the intra-divine life. Thus, what might look like "disciplinary cowardice" is
actually a noetic mysticism of participation in the intra-divine procession of
Eternal Truth' .284 The achievement worked out is not a half- or semi-
philosophical and semi-theological compromise but instead, it finds its
completion in a union where the two totally interpenetrate as 'one in the one
God of the one truth' .185 Instead of violating the independence of philosophy
and theology, this interpenetration in the rootedness of divine truth in fact
establishes their very integrity. Philosophy, like a nature upon which grace
builds, becomes the 'groundwork' for theology; theology, though, 'comes to
be, formally, the inner liberation of the act of philosophy'. 286 Against both a
rationalistic positivism on the one hand and a rationalistic fideism on the other
is a single reductio in mysterium: 'The reductio in mysterium (which is also
281 Benedict XVI likewise says, "we never have the truth; at best it has us'. In Benedict XVI,
Light of the World: The Pope, the Church, and the Signs of the Times: A Conversation with
Peter Seewald, 50.
282 Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 317.





and precisely the church's final word) is thus a way into the mystery "in" the
concept and "beyond" the concept-which is, at the same time, the answer to
Hegel's attempt to grasp the mystery "as" concept (in "absolute knowledge"),
in that it is primarily the concept which appears "as" mystery (namely, as the
"self-concept" of a Trinitarian dialectical God)' .287Przywara's summary,
therefore, is as follows: 'The "in-and-beyond" has shown itself to be the
fundamental formal relation within our principle of metaphysics as such'28R_
that is, understood precisely as a 'creaturely metaphysics'.
Thus ends our exposition of Part I of Przywara's Analogia Entis which he
calls 'metaphysics as such' (Metaphysik iiberhaupty. Before moving on to the
conclusion of the section in looking at Part II entitled 'Analogia Entis' of the
same work, it will be noteworthy to pause and examine the nature of truth
contained within such a 'creaturely metaphysics'. In this regard, Hans Urs von
Balthasar's Theo-Logic (vol. 1): The Truth of the World acts as a kind of
refashioning of Part Iof Przywara's Analogia Entis. The first thing to note is
that the structure of worldly truth itself, because it bears this 'in-and-beyond'
quality, is inexhaustible in the same way that a deepening into mystery leads
not to more certainty, but further into the mystery itself. The reason why 'truth
is always an opening, not just to itself and in itself, but to further truth?" is
contained in the following: '[T]ruth begins to unfurl its inexhaustible
plenitude-which only goes on becoming more and more inexhaustible-in
the course of long familiarity with it. ... [I]t is obvious from the outset that
truth, as a property of being, is at bottom no more susceptible of, or accessible
to, an exhaustive definition than is being itself. [... ] Definition is the
determination of a generic concept by the addition of a specific difference.
However, being itself is not a genus, because all the differences of being are
themselves being'. 290 Creaturely reality, therefore, 'must always remain richer
than any cognition of it and ... the truth even of the lowest level of being
contains a richness that so utterly eludes exhaustive investigation that it can
continue to engage inquirers until the end of time yet never ends up as a heap
287Ibid., 3:94.
288 Ibid., 3:97.
289 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:39.
290 Ibid., 1:26.
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of unmysterious, completely surveyable facts'.": While non-human things are
clearly not 'persons', they still possess an analogous 'personal' quality of an
incommunicability, that is, an intrinsic value that is a 'being-for-themselves'
as a unique gift given to them alone.?"
The relationship described here, however, is not one of pure subjectivity
found everywhere (i.e. panpsychism), as there is still a subject-object relation,
albeit not that of an oppositional dichotomy as Levinas assumed the nature of
metaphysics to inhabit. Here again, just as Puntel remarked in regard to
Aquinas, Balthasar also speaks of an 'adequation' of the subject to the thing as
it really is, but in the sense that the person 'lets [him- or herself] be determined
and measured by the thing [object]'. That is, ' [a] proportion has to be achieved
between subject and object, and the decisive measure of the proportion lies
with the object' .293 Objects exist for subjects, not violently in a mere utilitarian
sense, but in the way that the subject exists for the object as one who judges
the truth of the object, an act of measuring which is a free, spontaneous,
achievement in creativity.i" Human persons engage in a 'balancing act' of
receiving the measure in 'consenting self-abandonment [Hingabe]' while
simultaneously judging and measuringr'" put another way, creaturely truth is
experienced in a polarity of both observant theoria [8EWQla] and creative
poesis [7tOLT]UlI;V96 Truth, realized as a personal adequation to the object in
giving oneself over in self-abandonment,"? as well as with the simultaneous
self-abandonment of the object to the subject.i" reveals truth precisely as
291 Ibid., 1:85.
292 Ibid., 1:81.
293 Ibid., 1:41, emphasis mine. Similarly, Balthasar later says, 'the foundation of the good does
not lie primarily in the seeker but in being itself, which is the object of seeking (bonum est
principaliter in re)' [The Latin translated by Adrian Walker reads: 'the good is principally in
(extramental) reality'] (Ibid., 1:222).




298 Ibid., I: 112-13. Jorg Disse, without much elaboration, takes issue with this aspect of
Balthasar's thought insofar as he sees this conversation to be a 'strange anthropomorphism'
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subject-object relation. See his "Person und Wahrheit in der Theologie Hans Urs von
Balthasars," in Gott Fur Die Welt. Henri De Lubac, Gustav Siewerth Vnd Hans Vrs Von
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creaturely truth. And, as Balthasar says, 'To recognize creatureliness as
creatureliness means to recognize God immediately within it. To perceive the
limit of worldly truth means to apprehend concomitantly and tacitly what lies
beyond it'. 299 In this recognition, true knowledge begins to flourish for the first
time.
True knowledge is established within this suspended middle between
receptivity and the creative activity of personal adequation-a knowledge
whose character is distinctly realized as service. Balthasar states, 'Knowledge
is, in the very act of its origination, service, because it begins when the
subject, without being consulted, is conscripted into the world's labor force
and attains judgment only at the end'. 300 Service, therefore, comes after the
careful discernment of the world's objects'?' to the degree that it serves the
truth precisely insofar as it is a service to love itself." That is, worldly truth is
further grounded in the service of God, who is in-and-beyond creation.?" It is
here in the conext of personal service that all of the themes come together in
Przywara's definition of the analogy of being.'?' For Przywara, 'Service is
never simply a discrete act of charity,' Brian Dunkle says, as 'it is rather the
activity that characterizes the creature qua creature, related analogically to the
Creator' .305 Furthermore, as David L. Schindler has shown, the person cannot
be merely reduced to its empirical objectivity either, as, in light of the
reduction placed upon the person in light of the Enlightenment, it overlooks
apparently fails to see that what is at work in Balthasar is not unnecessary
anthropomorophism, but rather a consistent 'meta-anthropology'. On this see Martin Bieler,
"Meta-anthropology and Christology: On the Philosophy of Hans Urs Von Balthasar,"
Communio 20, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 129-46.
299 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000,1:252.
31XI Ibid., 1:68.
301 'At the beginning of its cognitive activity, the subject, far from being isolated in itself, find
itself in the midst of a veritable babel of objects expressing themselves and offering it their
truth. By the same token, the effort of knowledge consists in understanding these voices and
interpreting their diverse languages' (ibid, 69).
302 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:203.
303 Ibid., 1:256. For a helpful account of the history of Przywara's account of the God who is
'in us and beyond us' as he draws this out from Augustine, see Kenneth Oakes, "Three
Themes in Przywara's Early Theology," The Thomist 74, no. 2 (2010): 283-310 at 284-94.
304 On this topic, see the following helpful article: Brian P. Dunkle, "Service in the Analogia
Entis and Spiritual Works of Erich Przywara," Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (2012): 339--62.
3()S Ibid., 343-4.
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the gift-based character of the creature whose nature is seen most truly in
service and adoration.l'"
Before reconnecting with Przywara's emphasis on service, I will quickly
trace the movement in Part II of his Analogia Entis that provides the basis for
his analogical rhythm-indeed, it is precisely movement that characterizes this
second part of Przywara's work as we shall see. Within the creaturely
metaphysic outlined in Part I, Przywara draws out that being's rhythm itself
has an 'order', or as he puts it, an 'ordering order.?" Analogy balances the
confusion between the divine idealist 'logic' and the wordly defiant 'dialectic'
and sets up a properly creaturely logic. Przywara refers to the grammar of
'analogy' as ordering both 'according to an orderly sequence' in the sense of
the Greek ava and as 'up above' as from avw.308 When seen under this
aspect, the analogical movement between creature and Creator takes a
decidedly anagogical shape: 'In its ava, then ... , the livaAOy(t:EU8aL of
analogy says that thought, as a distanced obedience to the Logos (ava in the
sense of "according to" an "above"), is the pervasive working of the Logos in
all things (ava in the sense of an "above that orders")' ':~09
The upward movement is grounded not in pure logic, nor in a dialectical
ascent as in Hegel, but in analogy which is itself grounded in the principle of
non-contradiction. It is here, based upon Aristotle's principle, that the noetic
and ontic forms, and thus the meta-noetic and the meta-ontic, interpenetrate.?"
In nuce, this principle states that something cannot simultaneously both 'be'
and 'not be' at the same time."! Both the logic of identity, and the Hegelian
dialectical logic, attempt to radicalize contradiction to the extent that 'the
world is the rhythm of its dialectical unfolding. This is to say that the noetic-
ontic principle of identity remains determinative in the background (however
much Hegel, against Fichte and Schelling, seeks to decommission it), but
306 David L. Schindler, "The Embodied Person as Gift and the Cultural Task in America:
Status Quaestionis," Communio 35, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 397-431 at 415.
307 Przywara, Ana/ogia Entis, 3:99.
30M Ibid., 3: 103-4.
309 Ibid., 3:104.
310 Ibid., 3: 104-5.
311 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 5, 1061b-I 062a (in English translation: Metaphysics, 328).
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works itself out in the absoluteness of contradiction'. 312 Pure logic and
dialectical logic ultimately amount to the same thing, that is, the final form is
that of identity.!" Analogy, in contrast to these logics, works itself out in the
principle of non-contradiction in a dynamic synthesis, serving as the
'minimum' but also within the movement itself. 'That is to say', Przywara
clarifies, 'it is not something "from" which one can make deductions; rather, it
itself is simply the basis for a back-and-forth debate, whose dynamic is every
again renewed. It is the ever renewed debate that takes place between
Heraclitus and Parmenides'?" Analogy takes place in the principle of non-
contradiction in that it is a measured equilibrium in the midpoint between
Heraclitean 'all is movement' and the Parmenidean 'all is rest' .315
Furthermore, this equilibrium is dynamically orientated in that 'the foundation
of analogy [is] understood as an immanent dynamic middle directed to an end.
For the "middle" (understood as the back and forth of EVEQyna between
bvva,"H~ and Evn:Atxna) grounds the rhythm of analogy. The "end-
312 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:108. Hegel says as early as his 'Difference' essay, 'Life
eternally forms itself by setting up oppositions, and totality at the highest pitch of living
energy is only possible through its own re-establishment out of the deepest fission' (G. W. F.
Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. H. S.
Harris and Walter Cerf[Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977],91). Most
eminent of all Hegel's explicit reliance on contradiction is his clear statement: 'everything is
inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this law in contrast to the others expresses
rather the truth and the essential nature of things. . .. [C]ontradiction is the root of all
movement and vitality; it is only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it
moves, has an urge and activity' (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.
V. Miller [Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1969], 439, emphasis in original). Or in the first
volume in the Encyclopaedia of Logic: 'There is in fact nothing, either in heaven or on earth,
either in the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract "either-or" as it is
maintained by the understanding. Everything that is at all is concrete, and hence it is inwardly
distinguished and self-opposed' (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic:
Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusdtze, trans. T. F. Gaeraets,
W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991],
187/§ 119 A2). Accordingly, Charles Taylor calls contradiction the 'motor' for Hegel's
dialectic. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 119-20,
227, 276-7,280--2,304. Lastly, see the important work: Songsuk Susan Hahn, Contradiction
in Motion: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2007).
313 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3: 109. Przywara adds, 'The Hegelian "contradiction" has been
radicalized in the Heideggerian "Nothing." But this Nothing, as Nothing, is the fundamental
principle determining and producing all things. This "productive Nothing" utters the ontic-
netic "I am who I am" of the principle of identity' (Ibid.). Cf. the comments on the One in
Plotinus as it produces nothing, as well as the plenitude of nihilism in Cunningham,
Genealogy of Nihilism, 5-9, 178-9.
314 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:109-10, emphasis in original.
315 Ibid., 3:112.
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directededness," on the other hand, shows the "measure from above" (which
lies in the avw of ava)' .316
To this movement realized within the analogical middle, Przywara adds:
'But it is precisely this "end-directedness" that ultimately leads this foundation
beyond itself'."? The reason that the foundation is led beyond itself stems
from the 'boundlessness' (Grenzenlos) of the purely formal character of the
'all is movement' and 'all is change' formulations when seen as the defining,
ideal antic forms. On the contrary, that which is bounded
is characterized by the qualitative-material aspect of the (energetic)
unity of antic and defining form .... Thus, here, for the first time, a
certain transcendence is mixed into what till now has been immanence.
It is not simply that-as it has been to this point-the principle of non-
contradiction signifies (both noetically and ontically) a rhythmic
middle. It is rather that there is a stress upon "end-directededness,"
which becomes more clearly an "end towards which .... " The changing
movement of the creature is (both noetically and ontically) not only
like the surging back and forth of the sea's same ultimate elements (the
TIOlOV understood as ouaLa-~oQ<Prl)' but also, and precisely, like the
turbulent infinity of the sea governed by the everlasting stars (the
TIOlOV understood as dbo~). The principle of non-contradiction thus
has a stress toward the principle of identity, but in such a way as to be
"directed" towards it, not equated with it. It is not identity that holds
sway between them, but analogy itself: an analogy from the moving
earth of the creature to a "heavenly identity.'?"
Analogy, therefore, becomes a relation between the antic and noetic such that
antic being itself is related to truth and beauty noetically such that the latter is
in-and-beyond the former. As Przywara puts it: 'analogy is established as a
participatory being-related-above-and-beyond' res begriindet sich Analogie
als teilnehmendes Uber-hin-aus-bezogen-seini."" That which is 'beyond'
bears a relational priority to that which is 'below' as the archetype is to the
image.f"
As this relation is opened up and described by Przywara, he relies upon
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to show that their accounts of causality
316 Ibid., 3: 116, emphasis in original.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid., emphasis mine.
319 Ibid., 3: 118.
320 Ibid., 3: 120.
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represent a 'decisive reversal of Aristotelianism'.'" Metaphysics within such a
strict Aristotelian framework cannot think change outside of potentiality nor
act as total act which excludes potentiality. But within the suspended middle
of analogy, there exists now an 'active potentiality of an unlimited "service to
God."'322 The creaturely potentiality is taken to its utmost extreme in the
potential oboedientialis which expresses the coinherence of 'beyond nature'
and 'in nature'; in extremis it is the most negative as the most positive of
potentialities: 'a positive potentiality so bold as to journey into the nature of
God himself. 323 This pathway bespeaks a "'fruitful possibility" (potential
activa)' that is not pure passivity but is a "'free gift from above," by virtue of
the nothing of "powerlessness" being summoned to "service." In this way it
realizes the Augustinian notion of being liberated by God (gratia liberatrix)
for free service (libera servitus)' .324At the highest peak of potentiality, our
passivity is a beckoning toward action. However, 'far from constituting an
emancipari a Deo-as Augustine calls Pelagianism-the deed of free action is
an indication of the most incisive potentiality: the distance of the servant from
the Lord'.325Przywara notes that the 'crown' of this Augustinian achievement
is the Thomistic notion of secondary causality: 'the doctrine that the creaturely
"is (valid)" is so very much something produced from the divine Is (Truth,
etc.) as to have its own power of operation'v'" Secondary causality, therefore,
as a non-competitive understanding of creaturely activity in relation to God's
own divine act, is itself an analogous relation of the creature to God as a
relation of service.
The core of Przywara's Analogia Entis gathers these themes together in the
doctrine set forth by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) statement which says,
'between Creator and creature no similarity can be noted, however great,
321 Ibid., 3:133.
322Ibid.
323 Ibid., 3: 132-3.
324 Ibid., 3: 134. Przywara cites Augustine, Serrn. CLXXIV, ii, 2 and In Ps. XCIX, 7.
325 Ibid. The citation to Augustine is to Opus Imperf. In Jul.
326Ibid. 'Out of the eminence of its goodness, the first cause gives to other things not only
their existence but the power also to be causes themselves (prima causa ex eminentia bonitatis
suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint, sed etiam quod causae sin!), (De Ver., q. II, a.
I).
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without having to note a greater dissimilarity between them'. 327 This statement
captures the rhythmic movement of analogy in the following way: first, in the
analogy of attribution (analogia attributionis), which is the 'positive
relationship' between God and creatures 'however great'; but secondly,
negatively in the 'ever greater dissimilarity' as it overcomes the positive
attribution, that is, 'by virtue of the ever new above-and-beyond of God,
beyond even the greatest possible proximity to Him-in an illimitable
"suspended" analogy (analogia proportionis secundum convenientiam
proportionalitatisvi" To be sure, in at least two places beyond the Analogia
Entis text, Przywara explicitly states that analogy is precisely this same
formulation: In the text In und Gegen he states, 'Analogia entis is an
abbreviated way of stating what the IV Lateran Council-and thus a
Christianity that was still one-defined in 1215';329 and the essay entitled 'The
Scope of Analogy as a Fundamental Catholic Form' ('Reichweite der
Analogie als katholische Grundform') is entirely devoted to expositing the
council's response to Abbot Joachim of Fiore's doctrine of the Trinity.?"
Joachim's doctrine of the Trinity resulted in a tritheism'" based upon the
fact that the triune persons were not truly united in 'a true and proper (veram
et propriam) unity' but instead in a kind of 'collective and by similitude (quasi
collectivam et similitudinariam), just as many persons are called one people,
and many believers one church'r'" Moreover, the Joachimite formulation, in
that it posits the 'Spirit as goal and end', amounts to an extension and
development of Origenism: 'since, for Origen, the way of salvation is one of
increasing spiritualization--even to the point of an ideal dissolution of the
327 First stated in full in Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:l38. The Latin reads, 'inter Creatorem et
creaturam non potest tanta similitude notary, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitude notanda'
(Denziger, 432).
328 Ibid., 3: 139.
329 Przywara, In Und Gegen, 278.
3]0 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie als Katholischer Grundform"; as reprinted in
Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:247-301. Also in this essay, Przywara comments upon the Fourth
Lateran Council (directed as it is against Joachim), stating that "'analogy" appears not so
much as a principle or as the form of a new theological possibility, but rather as the self-
expressions of the position of the church as regards all possible theologies' (ibid, 274,
emphasis in original). Przywara footnotes another article by himself here: "Neue Theologie"
in Ringen Der Gegenwart, vo!' 2 (Augsburg: Filser, 1929), 669ff.
331 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in Ana/ogia Entis, 3:254-5.
332 Denzinger, 431; as cited in Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in Ibid., 3:251.
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visible forms of the New Covenant into "pure spirit."?" Hegel, as we saw
earlier, continues in this same vein, developing a dialectical process of
spiritualization that ends in pure identity.?' Przywara is to the point: 'Analogy
is thus posed against identity, which "theopanizes" God and "pantheizes" the
creaturc'r'" The council, therefore, sided with Peter Lombard's formulation
and thus ultimately Thomas Aquinas represents this position in that they
emphasize the ultimate distance between God and creation.!" That is, 'the
mystery of unity with and in the tri-personal God (as the greatest and most
profound mystery of the supernatural and of redemption) becomes the site of
the most formal manifestation of the distance between God, the creator, and
the creature'r'"
Yet Balthasar also warns against this distance when it is expressed as
having its locus defined by the creature and not by God. There is a temptation
to locate the dissimiliarity in the wrong place: that is, 'by saying that "nature"
simply denotes the moment of dissimilarity (that aspect of creation that makes
it "not God"), while grace bespeaks the moment of similarity (of
participation). But that would be a dangerous oversimplification, and indeed it
would lead us right back to Baius. The creature is not dissimilar to God
because of its nature as a creature. Rather it is similar to the God who is
always ever dissimilar'r'" Similarly, Balthasar shows that the reason why
service must be the primary act of knowing the truth is because it locates the
truth outside the subject-recall the priority of the object-in contradistinction
to making the subject's own appetite or striving the site of definition; whereas,
focusing upon the striving or appetite for truth defines truth not only by what
is lacking in the subject, but it thereby places undue emphasis on the subject in
333 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:255-8, here at 257. Przywara adds,
'though as of yet without the explicit distinction of the three stages proposed by Joachim'
(ibid).
334 Similarly, David Bentley Hart remarks that the tragic 'dualism' haunting Platonism gives
rise 'so naturally to the tragic "monism" of Plot inus-for dialectic and identism are finally the
same' (Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 246). And, William Desmond also shows how
dialectic tends towards univocity in his Being and the Between (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1995),131-75.
335 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in Analogia Entis, 3:293.
336 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:251, 258-{j).
337 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:253.
338 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 286, emphasis in original.
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a way that does not respect truth's true path of discovery in the subject's self-
abandonment in freedom to the object, but also the object's freedom to the
subject?" To exercise a Thomstic diagnosis, in one sense these approaches
ultimately confuse the 'logical' and 'real' relations between creatures and God
by defining everything from creation's real relation to the creator. Put another
way, it is the failure to think analogously, to perform the 'reflexive reversal' in
thought toward the God-directed logical order of things. Analogy articulates
the formal trajectory of this task in that it is the human person who is capable
of serving this true order of analogical participation in the Triune God. It is for
this reason that service is the primary path toward knowledge of the truth:
worldly truth is revealed within the act of service, shown to us in that God,
revealed in Christ, says to us: 'I live among you as one who serves'r'"
For Przywara, then, the Fourth Lateran Council's formulation puts the
ground of the service of truth within the 'ever greater' divine foundation of the
tri-personal God, who is 'ever more exalted, beyond everything creaturely,
ontic or noetic'.": As we saw above, Przywara moves through the positive
'attributive' analogy, to the negative of the 'ever greater', but this also
involves a third rhythm analogous to the via eminentia of Dionysius that is a
greater positivity of the Deus semper major. In the following quotation, note
that Przywara also shows how this analogical logic makes the reflective
reversal in the two orders (creaturely/reallbelow-to-divine/logicallabove). As
he puts it:
The illimitable "suspended" analogy (analogia proportionis secundum
convenientiam proportionalitatisy establishes a new "attributive"
analogy (analogia attribution is), but one that proceeds not, as in the
first moment, from below to above, but rather from above to below:
from the Deus semper maior, the creature's "realm of service" is
"attributed" to it. The "ever greater dissimilarity" (maior dissimilitudo)
here has a positive sense: that of the delimitation of a positive realm
339 See Balthasar, Thea-Logic, 2000, 1:257. D. C. Schindler remarks, 'the object knows that it
receives the strength to realize its being only from the subject's confidence; if the object has
come to be what it is, it owes everything to the subject. The "place" of this realization is the
being of the subject as freedom, but it is only freedom because it has put itself wholly at the
service of the object, that is, because it is objective. Thus, this act of knowledge is creative
because it is objective, and it is objective because it is creative' (Schindler, Hans Urs Von
Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 214).
340 Luke 22:26-7. Cr. Henry, Words of Christ, 53.
341 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:139.
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into which the creature IS "sent forth" for the "performing of a
service. ,,342
The performative aspect of the service highlights the secondary causality (viz.,
active, positive potentiality) of the creature as it analogically participates in the
same activity of the God who is above-and-beyond: 'the mysticism of rapture
is humbled by the distance between Lord and servant' .343 It is for this reason
that, as an exemplar of scholastic ecclesial theology, Thomas Aquinas is held
to be 'the most adequate theologian of this theology of analogy' .344 In his
writings, 'the order of the positive difference between God and creature is
preserved-the difference, namely, between God's complete sovereignty and
the creature's active "exercises'" .345 Formulated in Thomas' thought from the
development of the Fourth Lateran Council's insights is the vision 'that God's
surpassing greatness is manifest precisely in that he establishes the creature's
independence from himself-endowing the creature with its own proper being,
its own proper agency, and its own proper providence' .346 The human person
adequates him- or herself in being towards the God who is in-and-beyond
creation in an adequation proper to their agency as service: a posture of
ontological genuflection which also bears the patience of overcoming the
impatiently tragic by participating in the patience of God, that is, the one
whose incarnate form arrives in the 'form ofa slave'."?
If it has not already become apparent, Przywara's Analogia Entis IS as
much an 'analogy of being' as it is an 'analogy of the person', the latter
specifically located in the person of Christ incarnate, crucified, risen, and
ascended at the right hand of the Father. Despite the debates that arose around
this text, Przywara himself always made this fairly explicit, in the original text
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid., 3: 139-40.
344 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:296.
345 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in ibid., 3:297.
346 Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie" in ibid.; Przywara cites in this regard De Ver., q. 9, a.
2;q. II, a. 1.
347 Philippians 2:7-10. This is the conclusion of Przywara's essay "Philosophies of Essence
and Existence," which shows how the philosophies of essence and existence (both ancient and
Modern) are based in an impatience which demand either immediate identity or tragic
disintegration. See "Essenz- und Existenzphilosophie" in Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:245--6.
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itself, but even more so in his later writings.?" David Bentley Hart, himself
indebted to Przywara, rightly says, 'It is Christ, the Logos and measure of all
things, who calls analogy forth, who shows ... the bounty of creation in [its]
truest light' .349 In Przywara's Analogia Entis text, he sets up this measure first
by looking at the order of creation in its real relation to God and finds that it is
the human person who is the 'immanent middle' between the purely material
and the purely spiritual; however, as a 'border as transition' seen from above
and below it ultimately finds its form in pure spirit which, although it is a
'connecting middle', is still within the universe as such.?" This is because it is
still confined to the opposite pole of pure corporeality and thus pure spirit is
still mutable, whereas with God there remains an infinite distance: Deus in
infinitum distat ab Angelo, 'God is infinitely distant from the angel' .351
Przywara states, 'Thus it is God who is the "middle": as the one in whom
alone all multiplicity and all correlated antitheses are one'.352
For Przywara, on the one hand, all forms of the 'middle' within the
creaturely are replete with God as the middle in God's own descending
revelation. And this applies even and especially in the case of the human
person. 'On the other hand, however, all of these revelations of God as middle
fall short of the personal revelation of God as middle in "the mediator." Christ
appears as the reality of the way in which God-the-middle takes up the All: as
the "infinity that assumes" (infinita virtus assumentis [the infinite virtue of the
one assuming]) he is the unifying head of everything from the invisible to the
visible, not only of all persons of every age, but also of pure spirits'r'" In this
sense, however much the human person may share in this likeness, God is
'formally beyond all creaturely forms of a middle' in that 'the form of its
348 In what follows I am indebted to the fine scholarship in Kenneth Oakes, "The Cross and the
Ana/ogia Entis in Erich Przywara," in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the
Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2011),147-71.
349 Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 317. On the very next page Hart connects the analogy of
beauty in Christ to the arrival in the form of a servant.
350 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3: 194-5.
351 Ibid., 3: 196; citing ST, I, q. 56, a. 3 ad 2.
352 Przywara, Ana/ogia Entis, 3: 196.
353 Ibid., 3: 198, emphasis Przywara's. He cites here the following four texts from Thomas
Aquinas: A Disputed Question: Concerning the Union of the Word Incarnate, trans. Jason
Lewis Andrew West, n.d., a. 2 ad 15,
http://www4.desales.edul~philtheo/loughlinJATP/index.html;ST.III. q. 8, a. 6; a. 3; a. 4.
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uniqueness is the uniqueness of God himself: the "All in one" of the mediator
figuring as the immediate visibility of the oneness of God,.3s4 The mystery of
the unique incarnation reaches its apogee in the question about Christ's being:
'for, on the one hand, the one divine Person, as one substance, also stipulates
the one divine esse of Christ (unum esse simpliciter propter unum esse
aeternum suppositiy/" but, on the other hand, the reality of Christ's humanity
at the same time includes the being of his humanity as an esse secundarium,
though not accidentalei'" in the mode of a nova habitudo esse personalis
praeexistentis ad naturam humanam'r" Przywara states that analogy in
Thomas culminates in the analogia entis such that 'the entis signifies so great
a separation between God and creature that there is no common genus
whatsoever between them ... -but even so, it is precisely here that, at the root,
a radically positive unity is declared' .358 This is because for Thomas the
matter of the 'perfecting border' (confinium as perfectio) intends in every case
a 'going beyond': 'from man as middle to spirit as middle to God as middle.
But it is precisely this that makes it the phenomenon of "perfection," since the
"middle of creation" is constituted by God in the God-man, and this not
merely as a human middle, but rather (in the "scandal of the cross") a human
middle within the all-too-human, and as such-in this way-a middle that
brings all things to perfection'. 359
It is here in the focus upon the perfection found in the scandal on the cross
that Kenneth Oakes has shown that Przywara's 'theology is wholly a theologia
crucis'?" Earlier, in response to Yannaras, it was shown the Fourth Lateran
Council's statement in response to Joachim de Fiore was wholly and explicitly
354 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3: 198.
355 De Unione, a. 4. Trans by Betz and Hart: 'one simple being on account of the one eternal
being of the suppositum'.
356 Ibid. For an account of the esse or 'is'/'to be' of Christ, see the following two excellent
works: Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, "Aquinas: God IS Man: The Marvel of the
Incarnation," in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction, ed. Thomas G. Weinandy,
OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John Yocum (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2004),
67-90; and the forthcoming Riches, Christ, the End of Humanism, chap. 3.
357 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:201, emphasis Przywara's. The final Latin citatation is from
ST, III, q. 17, a. 12. Betz and Hart translate it: 'a new relation of the pre-existent personal
being to human nature'.
358 Przywara, Analogia Entis, 3:201, emphasis Przywara's. Przywara cites ST, I, q. 4, a. 3.
359 Przywara, Ana/ogia Entis, 3:201-2.
360 Oakes, "The Cross and the Ana/ogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 148.
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both a point about the being of God with respect to creatures precisely as it
was about the ever greater distance between creatures and the three persons of
God who is one. Likewise, Oakes points out that Przywara's indebtedness to
the Council's formulation consists of upholding 'decisions that have their
primary location in the doctrine of the one God, who is Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit, who is "unity" and "perfection" "by nature." Przywara's analogia entis
is thus mindful of the particularity of this God who is Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit from all eternity'. 361 While the Christological center was the final,
perfecting end of Przywara's Analogia Entis, Oakes shows that especially in
his much neglected later works, Przywara's theology is even more focused
upon the crucified Christ.
Following the afterword to Przywara's late work Alter und Neuer Bund,
Oakes points to comments made about the difference between the analogia
entis and the analogia fidei which highlight the specificity of Christ crucified.
In order to proceed, it will first be helpful to quickly differentiate Przywara's
analogia fidei from that of Barth's. For 'Przywara intends by the term
analogia fidei the far more traditional sense of the practice or art of reading
Scripture in light of Scripture, a practice first given its postapostolic
expression in the works of Origen and encouraged by the First Vatican
Council.'" This is in contrast to what Przywara dubs 'the now fashionable
pseudo-analogia fidei' which 'Barth and, following him, Haecker, Sohngen,




36.~ Przywara, A/ter und Neuer Bund, l l ; cited and trans. in Oakes, "The Cross and the
Ana/ogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 160. In what follows, all translations from A/ter und Neuer
Bund are Oakes'. At the end of his 'The Scope of Analogy as a Fundamental Catholic Form'
essay, Przywara makes an additional clarification against Barth and Sohngen's attempt to
make theology autonomous: 'Thus the attempts of Barth and Sohngen to pose an "ana/ogia
fidei" over against an "ana/agio entis"--or, as the case may be, to supplement the latter with
the former-contain their own riposte. By the phrase "ana/agio fidei," which is taken from
Rom. 12:6, what is meant-in the context of this verse and in connection with 1 Cor. )2 - is
the most authoritative regulation of the personal charisma of "prophecy" by the "analogy of
faith," as it is worked out in the unity of the one body through the "measure of faith" that
"God has given" (12:3): "if a man's gift is prophecy, then let him use it according to the
measure (analogy) of faith." This "analogy" is thus something objectively authoritative that is
given by God, standing above the subjective religious experience of "prophecy": and thus it
clearly points towards the "ecclesial theology of analogy," as we developed it above. It is thus
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The reading of Scripture for Przywara comes through the interpretation of
the analogia fidei between the Old and New Testaments. Specifically,
Przywara focuses upon Galatians 3:13-14 which says, 'Christ redeemed us
from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us-for it is written,
"Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree"-in order that in Christ Jesus the
blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles, so that we might receive the
promise of the Spirit through faith'. Przywara describes the interplay between
the two curses between the two testaments as an 'energetic correspondence': a
dynamic that, as it 'affects both Jew and Gentile, has only one name and one
place: "the cross is the exclusive and sole place and execution of the
'energetic' from the old to the new covenant. Within it alone are the deadly
oppositions between promise and law overcome, the curse of the law carried
and borne away in and by and through Jesus Christ."?" The two covenants, as
Przywara remarks, are 'nailed together' by 'the nails of the cross' ,365 forming a
unity which is the glory of the Lord God. Oakes pinpoints the crucial center of
Przywara's theology: 'Inasmuch as Przywara understands the analogia fidei to
be the practice of reading the Old and New Testament together, we can state
that it is Jesus Christ crucified who is at the very center of the analogy of
faith.'" As Przywara himself puts it in these concluding remarks on the
not an "actual analogia fidei" found within the event of actual "proclamation," as Barth
conceives the "analogia fidei": for such "actuality" is precisely the actuality of "prophecy,"
which is to be measured according to an objectively enduring "analogy of faith." Nor does it
suffice to articulate an "objective analogia fidei," understood as the whole harmonious
complex of the particular truths of the faith, as Sohngen would have it: for what is ultimate in
the living "body" is the living "authority" of the head, the "mystery," that is, "of the
(authoritative, positiving) will," which according to the letter to the Ephesians is the final form
of the church. Thus only one "authoritative analogia fidei' remains, i.e., the form of
"ecclesiological Christological theological authority," as we unfolded it above. -Viewed from
the perspective of the Fourth Lateran Council, however, the "analogia en tis" is regarded
solely and exclusively as the "final form" of the unity of supemature and nature itself. -Which
goes to say that there is no duality between an "analogia entis" and an "analogia fidei," but
rather that one and the same "analogia entis," directed in its double form both "above" and
"below," is in the response of the fourth Lateran Council the "metaphysical structure" of one
and the same "authoritatitive analogia fidei" (Przywara, "Reichweite der Analogie," in
Analogia Entis, 3:298n.l).
364 Przywara, Alter und Neuer Bund, 527-8; cited in Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis
in Erich Przywara," J 61.
365 Przywara, Alter Und Neuer Bund, 528; cited in Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis
in Erich Przywara," J 61 (he cites p. 531 but it is on p. 528).
366 Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," J 62.
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analogia fidei: 'The scandal of the cross and of God is the essence of the
analogiafidei between the old and the new covenant' ,367
The scandal of the cross as the locus of the analogia fidei opens up the
rhythm of the analogia entis, for as Oakes states with regard to the analogia
entis, it 'is not the final word concerning God and creation, for it too is
contained within a yet greater rhythm: that of the triune life in itself'. 36B The
formal rhythm of the ana/ogia entis reaches its culmination in the Fourth
Lateran Council formula: 'that in the yet-so-great of the similarity of the
"Trinity in us" (of the "that they may be one like us and in us" from John 17)
there arises the supra-transcendence of the ever greater of the dissimilarity of
the "Trinity in itself' (to the every yet-so-great of every unity in the
Trinity)' ,369 What is described here is the rhythm of an 'unalogia fidei in-over
the analogia entis', in that 'the analogia fidei resides "in" the rhythm of the
analogia entis, for even here Creator remains Creator and creature remains
creature, and yet the ana/ogia fidei remains "over" and in no way reducible to
whatever we may wish to say regarding Creator and creature through the
analogia entis' ,370 Furthermore, Przywara expands upon this rhythm in the
exchanges of the 'cornmercium' between law and promise, slavery and
freedom.?' The center for these exchanges is Christ on the cross, the place
where the sins and curse of the world are taken up and 'might participate and
share in the divine holiness, blessedness, freedom, goodness, righteousness,
wisdom, love-in the fullness of majesty' ,372 All the relationships between
God and the world come together and are recapitulated in Christ. As Oakes
367 Przywara, Alter Und Neuer Bund, 531, emphases Pryzwara's; cited and trans. in Oakes,
"The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 163.
3(.8 Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 163.
369 Przywara, Alter Und Neuer Bund, 540; cited and trans. in Oakes, "The Cross and the
Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 164.
370 Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 164-5; Oakes is following
the work of Francisco Luciani Rivero, "Analogia Como Agape. Logos, Comrnercium,
Theologia Crucis (Przywara}," in El Misterio De La Diferencia. Un Estudio Tipologico De La
Analogia Como Estructura Originaria De La Realidad En Tomas De Aquino. Erich Przywara
y Hans Urs Von Balthasar y Su Uso En Teologia Trinitaria (Rome: Editrice Pontificia
Universita Gregoriana, 2002), 415-55 at 448.
371 The crucial work here is Przywara, Logos. Abendland, Reich. Commercium. Again, J am
following the helpful work of Ken Oakes. See Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in
Erich Przywara," 165-9.
372 Przywara, Logos. Abendland, Reich. Commercium, 136-7; as cited and trans. in Oakes,
"The Cross and the Analogia En/is in Erich Przywara," 166.
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says, 'The commercium is, then, the name for the relationship between and the
history of Creator and creation, and as such it only has one true and proper
name: Jesus Christ'r'" To this end, Oakes remarks that it is unfair for
Balthasar to say that 'it is no accident that Przywsara never produced a
Christology' .374 Oakes concludes his remarks on Przywara, noting that Jesus
Christ crucified stands at the center of the analogia entis, the analogia fidei,
and the commercium.t'"
The analogia en tis, the ever greater dissimilarity between Creator and
creation, is uniquely revealed in the person of Christ crucified on the
cross, for this is the ever greater dissimilarity of God to creation: that
God was made man, the Creator made creation, without thereby
ceasing to be God and without creation ceasing to be creation, that the
infinite source and fountain of life and perfection was made a life, and
was cursed and crucified by the very creation he made, taking upon
himself and bearing away the sins of those that sinned against him. 0
admirabile commerciuml'"
Hans Urs von Balthasar, despite his remarks quoted above, does affirm
Przywara's work as Christological, and affirms the philosophical and
theological rhythms summed up in the analogia entis in light of revelation. He
says, 'In his major work, Deus semper major, Przywara relentlessly reduces
all aspects to a single focal point: God in the crucified Christ in the crucified
Church. He draws every direct statement about the relationship between God
and man into his dialectic of intersecting cross-beams, where the "crossing" of
a positive statement by a negative one imitates the true Cross (and as such is
the only form of negative theology),. 377 Rearticulating the logic of the Fourth
Lateran Council by focusing upon the person of Christ in the proportion
opened up by the Trinity in-and-beyond us, he offers the following summation
of this analogy:
373 Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia En/is in Erich Przywara," 167.
374 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: The Dramatis
Personae: The Person in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison, vol. III (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius
Press, 1992), 221; as cited in Oakes, "The Cross and the Ana/ogia Entis in Erich Przywara,"
167.
375 Oakes, "The Cross and the Analogia Entis in Erich Przywara," 169.
376 Ibid., 168.
377 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 328-9. On this topic see also Betz, "After Barth,"
85-6; Palakeel, The Use of Analogy in Theological Discourse, 147-9.
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we must begin with a primary attributio [attribution] of all things to the
Logos, who, being the ground and end of the creation, himself
exemplifies prototypically the right proportio [proportion] between
God and the creature and, through the Spirit, communicates it to
creation. Yet this proportion transcends every human concept.
Consequently, despite all appropriation (attributio) to Christ and all
graced "participation in the divine nature", it remains
a proportionalitas, a "proportional relation between proportional
relations", that is, between the relation of difference between God and
creature and the relation of difference between Father, Son, and
Spirit.?"
We see here not the 'analogy of proportionality' spoken about above where
the schematic shows that creatures relate to their own esse as God relates to
God's own esse-a formulation which, as we have been arguing, subsumes
God under a third concept and ultimately ends in agnosticism; on the contrary,
because Christ himself is this distance, he does not exposit God's 'being' or
esse in relation to that of God's essence, nor does Christ exposit his own
humanity (however much we affirm in faith that Christ is both fully divine and
fully human), but instead, Christ the Son exposits the Father in the Holy
Spirit?" We can know-primarily through first being known-this
proportionality in the very person of Christ who spans the infinite distance,
revealed in history as the concrete universal.?" The truth of the world is held
together in the second person of the Trinity (ColI: 17), 'which in turn
presupposes that the analogia en/is is personified in him, that he is the
adequate sign, surrender, and expression of God within finite being' .381
To conclude, in this chapter I have outlined the logic of analogy in Thomas
Aquinas as one that is both one of an analogia en/is just as much as it is
coextensively an analogia personae. Then, taking the example of Christos
Yannaras' critique of what he sees as 'Western' analogy, by way of a response
to his polemics I have offered an account not too unlike his own, one of an
'existential' analogy which finds its footing in the pure act of the God who is
ipsum esse subsistens, not an 'essentialist' understanding, but when analogy is
understood as an act of personal judgment, we affirm a tri-personal God in
378 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2004, II:316.
379 Ibid., II:312.
380 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:13.
3Rt Hans Urs von Balthasar, Epilogue, trans. Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius
Press, 2004), 89.
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whom we ontologically participate. Lastly, turning to the work of Przywara, I
have sketched the movement of his Ana/ogia Entis, a text that is a welcome
updating of the rhythms of the formulae of Thomas Aquinas and the Fourth
Lateran Council's statements against Abbot Joachim regarding the 'ever
greater' distance between creation and Creator. What I have hoped to
accomplish in this chapter is that, at every tum, the 'analogy of being', as it is
always already an 'analogy of persons' of the tri-personal-yet-one God, is seen
most clearly as it comes together primarly and truly in the person of Jesus
Christ. Christ is not only the prime analogate of all creation, but it is in him
where all creation is held, maintained, and redeemed. The revelation of God in
Christ by the Spirit is not the 'end of analogy' according to some.l" but is
analogy's 'end' only insofar as it finds its telos in the person of Christ who is
the analogy of being personified. Without Christ there can be no analogy, for
as John Betz says, the ana/ogia entis is ultimately grounded 'in the hypostatic
union of Christ, in whom the creature discoveres the entire breadth of the
analogical interval'. 383
Along the way in these chapters, a concomitant thread that has been spun is
the encounter of being as supremely personal, contra the work of Emmanuel
Levinas. As I have shown, his own philosophy misunderstands the adequation
of the truth of being as one that is always violently in favour of the subject. On
the contrary, in elaborating upon the depth and breadth of the Christological
focus of the analogical interval, the very form of Christ is one where
adequation, both philosophically and theologically, is not that of egoism, but
that of service. The contours of analogy have not a shape of 'accusation in the
accusative' but of a gift of the person of Christ as he reveals the gift of
creation in its most personal depths in himself by the Spirit as they reveal the
Father. What we previously saw as the accusative dimension is here shown to
be the trajectories of creation itself, the philosophical resolutio of being until it
is enacted, by personal judgment, into the theological affirmation of arriving at
the arrival of the person as revealed in the person of the Logos. There is no
382 See the interesting, but misguided essay: Bruce D. Marshall, "Christ the End of Analogy,"
in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas
Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 280-
313. There is not the space or the scope to go into the issues with this article here.
383 Betz, "Beyond the Sublime (pt. 2)," 20, emphasis in original.
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accusative without the prior dative of giving; that is, there is no creation
without the Creator who gifts it. The slander we experience as accusation is no
longer a reality that we need obsess over, even if it would want us to think that
it obsesses over us. On the contrary, the person of Christ is the one in whom
that slander, that curse, is exchanged in the scandal of the cross for our very
redemption. Analogy is the opening of the personal communication of the tri-
personal God in whom we live, move, and have our being. Without Christ,
there is only tragic equivocity and equally tragic univocity where impatience
reigns-yet with Christ's patient servitude to the Father in the Spirit, this
tragedy has no power over us. Analogy is that ever-greater rhythm to that
ever-greater loving, personal reality.
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CHAPTER6
THE DIALOGICAL PERSON: THE ANALOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF
COMMUNION
Am I really all the things that are outside of me?
Would I complete myself without the things I like around?
Does the music that Imake play on my awkward face?
Do you appreciate the subtleties of taste, bud?
- 'Taste', by Animal Collective'
The cosmos is a kind of dialogue.
- Anonymous commentator on Plato?
As you, Father, are in me and I am in you, may they also be in
us, so that the world may believe that you have sent me. The
glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they
may be one, as we are one, I in them and you in me, that they
may become completely one, so that the world may know that
you have sent me and have loved them even as you have loved
me.
- John 17:21-3
a. Introduction: Dialogical Beginnings, and What Dialogue is Not
In the previous two chapters, it was established that the person is primarily
understood as an analogical reality. That is, the human person exists and is
therefore to be understood as that existent reality which participates
proportionately (i.e. analogically) first and foremost in the person of Christ
who, for however great there may be a similarity to Christ (the directionality is
important here), there is always an ever greater dissimilarity between the two.
Moreover, human persons reflect this analogical similarity in and through
IAnimal Collective, 'Taste', Merriweather Post Pavilion, Domino Records, 2009.
2 Anonymous, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, trans. L. G. Westerink
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1962), 28.
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personal service which itself is 'derived' analogically from Christ who comes
in the form of a servant. Analogy helps us to understand that there is a proper
ordering here, both an ordering towards and upward anagogically to the person
of Christ who reveals the truth of their very person to him- or herself. Because
persons are analogically-understood and spoken of, 'person' can also apply
just as fittingly to angelic persons as to human persons, but most appropriately
spoken of with regard to the three divine persons in one God from whom all
reality owes its creation.
In this final chapter, I attempt to offer a further exercise in extending the
analogical discourse by focusing on the person as dialogical. The word itself
has a variety of meanings, and I will show that reducing it to the mere
encounter of two people speaking (which would in fact be more properly
described as a 'duologue') is not sufficient for beholding the resplendent
dialogical reality that persons themselves are. A 'duological' reduction is
ultimately an unmediated and univocal-that is monological-encounter that
either ends in a deadlock or dialectical sublation (in either case the end is
univocal). Hegel's own logic of contradiction works in a similar fashion:
because contradiction and division are the heart of Geist empowering all
forward movement, everything is split with itself and hence 'reconciliation' is
offered not as polarity and paradox (as in Goethe and Kierkegaard,
respectively), but as the sublating (i.e. suspending and cancelling) 'third'
which prioritizes identity (e.g., the identity of identity and difference).
The order of the chapter will be as follows. First, I will look to the
originator of the dialogical form: Plato, as the writer of Socrates, that
philosopher who engaged dialogically with his interlocutors in the pursuit of
truth. Secondly, as an expansion of the dialogical practice I will look at the
perplexing place of 'aporia' in the Socratic dialogues. That is, what is the
reason that so many of the Socratic dialogues end in a perplexing impasse?
Connected to this, I will look briefly at Heidegger's and Derrida's account of
aporia wherein being's aporia is revealed within one's own death (the
impossibility of the possible). In response to their accounts, I look back to
Kierkegaard's account of death in his Upbuilding Discourse entitled 'At a
Graveside', Thirdly, after this dialogical prolegomena, I will analogically re-
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enact the metaphysical 'reflexive reversal' through the dialogical motif of 'the
call and the response', articulated well in a book by the same name by Jean-
Louis Chretien.' This will set up the discussion in the same way that the
metaphysical via resolutionis tilled the soil for the analogical judgment
affirming the arrival of the person. The fourth section is itself an attempt at a
'reflexive reversal'-that moment between the call and the response where
one's understanding deepens, in faith, toward what is more ultimate. Here
Christos Yannaras' understanding of dialogue as dia-logos becomes explicit
both as an encounter with Creation, but also its Creator. The fifth and final
part of the chapter deals with the 'response' of the person-but once again,
this is not merely the response of words as if two people are having a
conversation (although it includes that as well, but secondarily); rather, human
persons are themselves the response within creation as 'what is most perfect
within all nature'. 4 Weaved throughout this final section is the work of
Mikhail Bakhtin, who I argue compliments the discussion towards a richer
understanding of dialogue. Exploring the dialogical response of the person
entails, firstly, the recognition that our own response has arrived late, but,
thankfully, it has been preceded by the response of Christ which makes our
own answerability possible. Next, I attend to the limits of dialogical
understanding, for there remains a monological temptation to make human
dialogue univocally constitutive of divine dialogue. Hans Urs von Balthasar
proves helpful in this regard, pointing us to the analogy of 'fruitfulness' and
the emergence, through the I-thou relationship, of a dialogical we
relationship. Finally, I look to the work of Karol Wojtyla / Pope John Paul II
in an effort to articulate the shape of this we in the communio personarum, a
place where persons engage in participatory dialogue with one another toward
the greater good.
What these various resources provide is an understanding of human
persons as dialogical. Before getting into the rest of the chapter, however, a
brief note about what this claim does not mean, in a series of repudiations of
what being dialogical does not 'merely' mean. First, as a descriptive measure,
3 Jean-Louis Chretien, The Call and the Response, trans. Anne A. Davenport, Perspectives in
Continental Philosophy 33 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004).
4 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 29, a. 3.
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to be a dialogical person does not merely mean that humans exist in
conversation with one another as the constitutive act of their being-although
it does also mean that this act is crucial and inescapable to a large extent (viz.,
necessary but not sufficient). Too much an emphasis upon being 'dialogically
constituted', when taken in the sense of being constituted 'relationally' may
tip the scales too far toward a conception that overlooks the substance of the
person him- or herself, that is, their human dignity.i Once again it does well to
heed Lewis Ayres' challenge to provide an account of analogy-which
emphasizes the person as a substance-in-relation who participates in the reality
of the Logos-before leaping head-first into talk of 'relationality'. 6 Second, as
a prescriptive warning, to be dialogical does not entail that one need merely to
engage in dialogical, many-voiced encounters. Such situations alone will not
solve the human person's dialogical yearnings; in other words, sitting around
with friends within a plurivocal discussion does not reveal the true nature of
dialogue, nor exhaust its richness, even though this is very much also a form
of necessary dialogue that remains, however, insufficient in and of itself. And,
as word of caution: I am not saying that dialogue must end-how could it?-
nor am I arguing for a view which would dictate the course of human life
(which would be a kind of patriarchal monologism). My aim is to simply bear
witness toward the way.
Lastly, in these introductory remarks I also want to distance myself from
accounts of speech which aim to remove the dialogical principle altogether.
Specifically, I have in mind thinkers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, who
reduces conversation and speech acts to 'the domain of the agon (the joust)
rather than that of communication'. 7 Against the Habermasian notion of
S As Hans Reinders shows, such an over-emphasis on relations also misses that one's human
dignity must come first, for the kinds of relations we intend usually assumes a certain kind of
capability of response, and would thus exclude people with profound intellectual disabilities.
Instead, Reinders offers an account of the inherent relationality of the person of Christ
'toward' human persons in a single act of love and friendship, regardless of their physical or
rational capabilities. See Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound
Disability, Theological Anthropology and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2008),286-7.
6 Ayres, "(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontology," 130-45 at 133.
7 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature 10 (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 88.n34. John Milbank remarks that, along with Gilles
Deleuze, Lyotard has also 'advocated an embracing of the "nco-capitalist" agon in all its
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'consensus'," Lyotard asserts that every language game (following
Wittgenstein)" really amounts to a situation where 'every utterance should be
thought of as a "move" in a game' ,10 As he summarizes it: 'to speak is to fight,
in the sense of playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general
agonistics' ,II However, as John Milbank points out, Lyotard's approach
suffers from a fatal flaw: '[Lyotard] cannot pass off [the claim that an infinite
diversity of language-games must be primary] as liberal pluralism, because
nothing, in his philosophy, in principle renders illegitimate the infinite
expansion of one language-game at the expense of others, nor the capture and
manipulation of many language-games by a single power', 12 Even more
damningly, Lyotard 'fails to come up with any convincing reasons as to why
the ontology of difference is detachable from fascism, or a politics of the
mythical celebration of power' ,13 In the last analysis, the 'differend', as an
inherently violent principle, has no other foundation than its own
heteronomous logic itself, and in this sense it is less than coincidental that it
shares in a similar kind of agon to Levinas' own violent neurotic obsession
made by the other, If every speech act is a violent 'joust', what is stopping a
speech act from being accusatory and filled with slander? Wouldn't such an
act be just another 'move' within somebody's (or the Nation State's) language
game? With regard to the discussion of Alfred Dreyfus in Chapter 2 above, I
ask: on Lyotard's terms, was his fault that he was merely 'playing' the wrong
'game'? One can quickly see that there is no way to adjudicate what would be
posiuvity and counter-positivity' (John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond
Secular Reason [Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993],315).
8 See, e.g., Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston, MA:
Beacon Press, 1975),
9 In a parenthetical comment, Lyotard states 'language games, of course, are what this is all
about' (Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 15). For Wittgenstein's comments on 'language
games' (Sprachspiele), see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 14-15 (§23),
10 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 10.
tt Ibid.
t2 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 317.
13 Ibid., 318-19, Milbank adds that this failure of the philosophers of difference prompted the
rise of Parisian 'reaction of the so-called nouveaux philosophes' (Ibid., 319). He cites the
following works: Bernard Henri-Levy, Barbarism with a Human Face, trans. George Holoch
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979); Guy Lardreau and Christian Jambet, L 'Ange: Pour Un
Cynegetique Due Semblant (Paris: Grasset, 1976); idem, Le Monde (Paris: Grasset, 1978);
Andre Glucksmann, The Master Thinkers, trans. Brian Pearce (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).
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'wrong' here in the first place, if ontologically the 'differends' between these
discourses really cannot make a decision except to be merely different"
In line with Lyotard's approach, we also see Jacques Ranciere taking up
this agonistic mantle in his collection of essays entitled Dissensus, which
similarly argues against the idea of consensus." For Ranciere, 'The aim of
consensual practice is to produce an identity between law and fact, such that
the former becomes identical with the natural life of society. In other words,
consensus consists in the reduction of democracy to the way of life or ethos of
a society-the dwelling and lifestyle of a specific group. Consensus is the
process underlying today's continual shrinkage of political space. The latter
only ever emerges in the very gap between the abstract literalness of the rights
and the polemic over their verification' .16 More to the point, contrary to the
fact that the word 'consensus' is supposed to extol the 'virtues of discussion
and consultation', in reality it means precisely its opposite for Ranciere:
'consensus means that the givens and solutions of problems simply require
people to find that they leave no room for discussion, and that governments
can foresee this finding which, being obvious, no longer even needs doing'. 17
Dissensus, on the other hand,
is the demonstration (manifestation) of a gap in the sensible itself.
Political demonstration makes visible that which had no reason to be
seen; it places one world in another-for instance, the world where the
factory is a public space in that where it is considered private, the
world where workers speak, and speak about the community, in that
where their voices are mere cries expressing pain .... Political
argumentation is at one and the same time the demonstration of a
possible world in which the argument could count as an argument, one
that is addressed by a subject qualified to argue, over an identified
object, to an addressee who is required to see the object and to hear the
argument that he 'normally' has no reason either to see or to hear. It is
14 To this end, there continues to be a lineage of radical heterogeneous accounts to the words
of Saussure: 'Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language
there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms
between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without
positive terms'. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin
(London: Fontana, 1974), 120, emphasis in original.
15 Jacques Ranciere, Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, trans. and ed. Steven Corcoran
(London: Continuum, 20 I0).
16 From the essay 'Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?' in Ibid., 72, emphasis in
original.
17 'The Head and the Stomach, January /996' in Jacques Ranciere, Chronicles of Consensual
Times, trans. Steven Corcoran (London: Continuum, 2010), I.
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the construction of a paradoxical world that puts together two separate
worlds. IS
Both accounts presume that the space of discourse is one of agon, so even in
the case of Ranciere's account of dissensus, persuasion toward a good end
does not seem to be a part of the picture, which is why he must resort merely
to 'demonstration'. In a real sense, Ranciere's approach has its merits (and is
clearly preferable to the pure agonistics of Lyotard's account). His task is to
provide a constant study of the 'dividing line' that separates communities and
allegiances'f=-it is this space in-between where dissensus happens. Davide
Panagia sums up Ranciere's emphasis on the 'partition' or 'distribution of the
sensible' (partage du sensible) as 'the site of political contestation directed at
the subjugating criteria that impart propriety, property and perception and that
structure a society's common order' .20 At the very least, the voices of the
marginalized, the worker, and especially the poor are brought to the
foreground of discussion--especially because those of privilege would prefer
that the poor would remain invisible as they are seen to hurt Twenty-first
Century tourist economies."
Yet even for Ranciere, as for Lyotard's 'jousting' speech act, the ultimate
concern of politics is based purely upon the notion of a heterology, which is
the purely formal opening to the Other." To be sure, Ranciere clarifies his
position and says, 'There is not one infinite openness to otherness, but instead
many ways of inscribing the part of the other' .23 But doesn't this amount to
simply moving back the goalposts one notch so that the Other is still inscribed
within the agon of each language game's heteronomous constitution? Are we
not back to a mere heteronomy? Despite the attempt to place himself between
18 From the essay 'Ten Theses on Politics' in Ranciere, Dissensus, 38-9.
19 Jacques Ranciere, The Philosopher and His Poor, trans. A. Parker, C. Oster, and J. Drury
(Pennsylvania, PA: Temple University Press, 1991), 225.
20 Davide Panagia, '''Partage Du Sensible': The Distribution of the Sensible," in Jacques
Ranciere: Key Concepts, ed. Jean-Philippe Deranty (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 95-103 at 97,
and see esp 95-100.
21 For one example, see the illuminating article: John W. Wright, "Being Visible While Poor,"
San Diego Union Tribune, December 24, 2004,
http://www.utsandiego.com!uniontrib/20041224/news_lzle24wright.html.
22 See "Does Democracy Mean Something?" in Ranciere, Dissensus, 59.
23 Ibid., 60, emphasis in original.
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Levinas and Derrida," Ranciere's logic of heteronomy lacks any account of
just who these 'others' are, not in the sense of naming them as 'poor' or
'workers', but with regard to providing an ontological gesture of just who
these people are as persons in themselves. He appears to mirror Levinas' flight
from the nominative into the accusative, assuming that any such account
amounts to denying 'the law of heteronomy' that is synonymous with the
pernicious dreams of Enlightenment liberation which caused the Nazi
genocide." It is true that totalitarian logics will always tend towards such
horrors, but it remains absolutely unconvincing that every account of the
whole or of its persons need be so grim, especially considering the fact that
there is often a tendency (e.g. in Levinas) to react against autonomy with a
'dominating heteronomy'." Dialogue need not be Hegelian-inspired consensus
as in Habermas, nor need it be reduced to a kind of non-dialogue of
'demonstration' (as in Ranciere) or strategically violent language-game
posturing (as in Lyotard). To reduce speech and dialogue to what seems to be
the polar dualism of 'agreement' versus 'disagreement' says nothing
inherently about the dignity, freedom, and incommunicability of the human
person, although one side or the other will stress one or more of these
capacities at the expense of the others. To take an example: the heterological
approach clearly reduces humans to an incommunicable level, and one is
wondering in the end just how free or dignified such a person could be if one
is left so bereft of any kind of ability to analogically relate to another person.
In fact, what happens is that the person is ironically evacuated to make room
for the person, as we showed above in Chapter 3 in the discussion of Levinas
and the accusative." In addition, not only is there no recognizable person, but
these deconstructive accounts and practices of dissensus amount to a form of
'dialectic unaccompanied by the insight that there is a Whole-hence the great
emphasis placed by the critics of reason on fragmentation, partiality,
24 Ranciere does this by clarifying that his proposed form of democratic practice is
conceptualized 'as the inscription of the part ofthose who have no part-which does not mean
the "excluded" but anybody whoever' (Ibid.).
25 Ibid., 59-60.
26William Desmond, Ethics and the Between (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 200 I), 202n.21.
27Similarly, John Crosby makes the connection in Levinas to an emphasis on
incommunicability. See his essay' A Neglected Source of the Dignity of Human Persons' in
Personalist Papers, 14.
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dissolution, difference, otherness, nonbeing. It IS Socratism without the
Good'."
In sum, the accounts based on a primary 'heterology' rely upon an
underlying logic which cannot ultimately account for both the dignity of the
person and their incommunicability because it relies on the mere fact of the
difference of the other. It is not the job of 'personalism', according to
Emmanuel Mounier, to replace the reduction of accounting for persons
'according to type' by instead taking 'their shades of difference into
account' .29 For the merely different can easily be accommodated and re-
conditioned by armies of doctors and psychologies into a grand, well-oiled
machine as in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. In such a machine,
'everything in it is contrived, nothing is created and no one engages in the
adventure of responsible liberty' .30 Such an alienating world is the complete
antithesis of a personal cosmos.
It is the claim of this chapter, therefore, that human persons are such that
they exist through dialogue both in themselves, with others, but more
primarily in and through (dia) the Word (Logos) of Christ. This is what a true
dialogue idia-logost" amounts to: the affirmation of the goodness of creation
that is held together in the second person of the Trinity. But how does such an
account of 'dialogue' arise in regard to the person? Joseph Ratzinger remarks
that the concept of the person itself' grew out of the idea of dialogue, more
specifically, it grew as an explanation of the phenomenon of the God who
speaks dialogically'." The Triune God is the God who 'speaks in the plural or
speaks with himself (e.g., "Let us make man in our image and likeness," or
28 Charles L. Griswold, Jr., "Plato's Metaphilosophy: Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," in
Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 143~7 at ISS. See Desmond, Ethics and the
Between, 156-9, esp 159 for the importance of standing under the good within a dialogue.
29 Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism, trans. Philip Mairet (Notre Dame, IN: Routledge &
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), xvii.
30 Ibid.
31 This idea of dialogue as dia-Iogos comes from Christos Yannaras, which will be covered
below.
32 Joseph Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," trans. Michael
Waldstein, Communio 17, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 439-54, here at 443; reprinted in Joseph
Ratzinger, Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life, trans. Michael
J. Miller and Matthew J. O'Connell (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2011), 181-96, here
at 185~. I will be following the pagination as represented in the Communio translation.
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God's statement in Genesis 3, "Adam has become like one of us," or Psalm
110, "The Lord said to my Lord" which the Greek Fathers take to be a
conversation between God and his Son)' .33 Ratzinger summarizes: 'The idea
of person expresses in its origin the idea of dialogue and the idea of God as the
dialogical being. It refers to God as the being that lives in the word and
consists of the word as "I" and "you" and "we." In the light of this knowledge
of God, the true nature of humanity became clear in a new way'. 34 Existing in
and through the Word, therefore, provides the analogically real basis for the
human person as dialogue.
b. The Living Form of Dialogue
In this section 1will look to the Socratic form of dialogue as handed down
to us by Plato. In the form of dialogue as embodied in the person of
Socrates-as well as the written dialogue itself-we see the beginnings of a
vital form of existence which ecstatically points to a deeper rhythm within
creation. This section will thus proceed first, by offering an answer to the
question, 'Why did Plato write dialogues?' and secondly and more
substantively, by looking at the nature of the Socratic dialogue itself.
Plato's venture into the art of writing dialogues is not without its
ambiguities, for he himself tells us in his Letters a couple of things that make
answering the question 'Why did Plato write dialogues?' less straight-forward
than it seems. Namely, in the Seventh Letter, Plato says in response to whether
he has ever written down his philosophy, that 'I certainly have composed no
work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in [the] future, for there is no way of
putting it in words like other studies'. 35 Moreover, language itself bears within
it a kind of inadequacy, such that 'no intelligent man will ever be so bold as to
put into language those things which his reason has contemplated, especially
not into a form that is unalterable-which must be the case with what is
33 Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology," 441.
34 Ibid" 443.
35 Seventh Letter 341 c.
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expressed in written symbols' .36 And finally, Plato sums up these remarks with
the statement that the mark of a 'serious man' is one who does not put his (or
her) most serious concerns into writing but into activity." The example that
Plato follows is in the communication of a circle, and all four of the means of
communication are deemed inadequate: naming (onoma), explanation (logos),
example (eidolon), and knowledge or insight. None of these provide certainty
for attaining the object in question.
These comments of Plato seem perplexing, especially for one so well-
known for initiating the art of dialectic and dialogue. Does this entail that the
dialogue form itself is ironically undercut by Plato himself?38 On the contrary,
Plato explains these remarks cogently in the wider context of the letter. As
Kenneth Sayre points out, Plato (in both the Seventh Letter and in his famous
remarks against writing in the Phaedrus) is not disparaging writing as such,
but the inadequacy of language itself, both its written and oral forms." Hans-
Georg Gadamer concurs, saying that Plato repeatedly emphasizes 'that each of
the four means [naming, explanation, example, and insight] has a tendency to
bring a reality of a specific sort to the fore instead of the reality of the thing
itself .... [... ] The word circle is not the circle itself, [etc.] Plato's thesis is this:
all these means assert themselves as whatever they are, and in pushing them to
the fore, as it were, they suppress that which is displayed in them'. 4() Even oral
speech bears this inadequacy, as it cannot properly represent the contemplated
idea of the soul for the reason that even names, descriptions, physical
36 Seventh Letter 343a.
37 Seventh Letter 344c.
38 Following a host of post-structuralist thinkers, this appears to be the conclusion reached in
Max Statkiewicz, Rhapsody of Philosophy: Dialogues with Plato in Contemporary Thought
(Pennsylvania, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009). Statkiewicz argues that
rhapsody mediates the apparent 'duologue' into a more 'anarchic' dia-logos.
39 Kenneth M. Sayre, "Plato's Dialogues in Light of the Seventh Letter," in Platonic Writings,
Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002), 93-109 at 103.
4() Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Dialectic and Sophism in Plato's Seventh Letter," in Dialogue and
Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1980),93-123 at 105. Otherwise, 'The assumption that a perfected
instrument of designation exists by which everything that one means and thinks precisely
could be designated-and this would be the ideal logical language-is a nominalistic
prejudice, the untenability of which has in my view been convincingly demonstrated in
Wittgenstein's logical investigations' (Ibid., 108-9; Gadamer cites Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Schriften, vol. 2 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1960], 289m.
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instances/examples, and scientific knowledge still bear an 'involvement with
sense experience'."
What, then, is the fuller context that Plato provides for his account of
writing? The key point has already been mentioned: the serious person
becomes 'serious' not in their writing, but in his or her activity. Rosemary
Desjardins says, '[t]he dialogues ... communicate through words and deeds;
what is more (and more subtle) they communicate through the actual interplay
of these two aspects, which constitute, respectively, the discursive and
dramatic elements of a dialogue' .42 Such a dramatic, dialogical enterprise is
'one that repeatedly involves the reader in the dialogue that it portrays', as
Gadamer puts it." That is, immediately after Plato's famous comments about
having never composed a work of his own philosophy, he says: 'Acquaintance
with it [philosophy] must come rather after a long period of attendance on
instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly,
like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once
becomes self-sustaining'." The practice of philosophy-whether in oral or
written fonn-consists of who listically unifying one's words and deeds within
an 'ensouled' life. It is not an instant knowledge, but may be obtained
'instantaneously' only after an 'acquaintance' that comes 'after a long period
of attendance'. This adheres well with what Gadamer says in his commentary
on Plato's Lysis." That is, the reason for the ensuing aporetic perplexity,
which causes the interlocutors to walk away not knowing what 'friendship' is,
stems from the fact that Socrates' dialogue partner was too young; in other
words, they had not properly become acquainted with one another over a long
41 Sayre, "Plato's Dialogues in Light of the Seventh Letter," 96.
42 Rosemary Desjardins, "Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," in Platonic Writings,
Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002), 110-125 at 117, emphasis in original.
43 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Philosophy and Poetry" in The Relevance of the Beautiful and
Other Essays, ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), 131-9 at 133.
44 Seventh Letter 341 c-d. Charles H. Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The
Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 388-
92 helpfully highlights these contextual and crucial remarks.
45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Logos and Ergon in Plato's Lysis' in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight
Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, 1-20.
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period of time to have become true friends." In sum, philosophy entails a
'close companionship' with its subject because reason itself reflects a degree
of personhood: friendship can only be defined in the activity of becoming
friends; philosophy can only be known in its performative and dialogical act of
question-and-answer;" justice can only be defined by the just person in being
just; etc. All of this does not mean that writing and orality are useless images
of the active person, but that they must be seen to be only useful insofar as
they are images. Notably, Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan,
remarking on the Symposium and the Socratic dialogue in general, state that
'for the first time in the history of thought, a new genre emerges, which is
conscious of its function as an image, as of its special representative powers,
and of its difference from all other literary and rhetorical genres, which turns
thought into living speech and character in an open-ended, inclusive way
[ ... ]'.48 To the question 'Why did Plato write dialogues', the answer is found
in creating a necessary (but not sufficient) image for recreating the dialogical
activity or deed (ergon) of the inquiring person. For now this will suffice for
addressing the issue of writing dialogues," and I will tum to the nature of
dialogue itself.
In his dialogue with Theaetetus, Socrates states that the essential structure
of reason is dialogical in nature. Thinking itself takes place 'as a discourse that
the mind carries on with itself about any subject it is considering'. 50 Likewise,
46 For further helpful resources on friendship in Socrates and Plato, see Mary P. Nichols,
Socrates on Friendship and Community: Reflections on Plato's Symposium, Phaedrus, and
Lysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Catherine Pickstock, "The Problem of
Reported Speech: Friendship and Philosophy in Plato's Lysis and Symposium," Telos 123
(Spring 2002): 35--64.
47 For a literary and philosophical look at this form within the context of what is known as
'reception theory', see Hans Robert Jauss, Question and Answer: Forms of Dialogic
Understanding, trans. and ed. Michael Hays, Theory and History of Literature 73
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); and see the earlier work, idem,
Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bahti, Theory and History of Literature 2
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).
48 Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan, Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure,
and Myth in the Symposium (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2004), 196, emphasis in original.
49 For further resources on dialogue in Plato, see Drew A. Hyland, "Why Plato Wrote
Dialogues," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 38--50; G. R. F. Ferrari, Listening to the
Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kahn,
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 292--328; Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue:
Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
50 Theaetetus 18ge-190a. See Schindler, Plato's Critique of Impure Reason, 255n.89; cf. p. 34.
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the Stranger tells Theaetetus in the Sophist something similar: 'thinking and
discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is, precisely,
the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself without spoken
sound' .51 This stems from the fact that persons are interiorly 'plurivocal', as
William Desmond puts it, for there is a doubling of the self in the same person
even in a soliloquy or monologue: that of the speaker and the listener. 52 If
reason itself is inescapably dialogical-universally so-then the form of
dialogue is not just ubiquitous for humans, but seems to be the living shape of
thought itself, one that requires a vigilant attentiveness. On this note, D. C.
Schindler says that the 'dialogue form intends the reader's active participation
because it presents ideas that are themselves still alive-m 'ensouled' as Plato
puts it in the Phaedrus' .53 To clarify, this does not mean that dialogues present
encapsulated philosophical truths-i.e. a truth that is stable because it has been
killed-but as 'living speech', active dialogues such as these 'teach others
how to philosophize' .54 An excavation of 'method' reveals an understanding of
truth that tends toward 'definition' and 'division', as in the approach of Peter
Ramus, intent on reducing real dialogue to mere pedagogical method. 55 Yet,
there is also a fine line between the 'search for method' and that of a
manuduction-the latter of which is an ensouled leading by the hand of a
teacher with his or her student. Therefore, it must be admitted that Socrates
was not concerned about his own 'method' at the 'meta-level' by any stretch
of the ancient imagination. 56 Such heavy pre-occupations are those of the
51 Sophist 263e. For more on the nature of this dialogical aspect of reason, see Ronald
Hathaway, "Explaining the Unity of the Platonic Dialogue," Philosophy and Literature 8
(1984): I 95-208, esp. 204.
52 Desmond, Being and the Between, 392n.l3.
53 Schindler, Plato's Critique of Impure Reason, 36, emphasis mine. See Phaedrus 278a.
54 The idea of 'living speech' comes from the Phaedrus 276a. The quotation is from Joanne
Waugh, "Socrates and the Character of the Platonic Dialogue," in Who Speaks for Plato?
Studies in Platonic Anonymity, ed. Gerald A. Press (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2000), 39-52 here at 49.
55 Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the
Art of Reason, New edition (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 188 and 152-6.
5<, See Gregory Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus: Method Is Ail," ed. Myles Bumyeat
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-37, here at 1-2. For a critique ofVlastos
see Hugh H. Benson, "The Dissolution of the Problem of the Elenchus," Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 13 (1995): 45-112, esp. 49. And see the essays contained in Gary Alan
Scott, ed., Does Socrates Have a Method?: Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and
Beyond (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
204
sixthteenth century and beyond. 57 For the sake of scholarly convention, I will
refer to the Socratic approach in general as the 'elenchus'. However, I am
more concerned with the overall aim of this way of dialogue. 58 In other words,
I am not limiting myself to the (intermediate) goal of truth statements (i.e.,
'What is FT questioning).
Gregory Vlastos defines the Socratic elenchus as 'a search for moral truth
by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only
if asserted as the answerer's own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its
negation is deduced from his own beliefs'." With a slightly different focus,
Richard Robinson defines the elenchus as 'examining a person with regard to
a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further
statements, in hope that they will determine the meaning and the truth-value of
his first statement'. 60 While both Vlastos and Robinson agree on the definition
57 See Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue.
58 Because, for instance, not all Platonic dialogues employ it in the same way, and some, such
as the Laws and Timaeus act more in the form of a treatise. Also, Vlastos' own definition of
the elenchus assumes an 'adversary argument', so he his forced to create appendices to his
own scholarship to attempt to explain why, e.g., the Lysis, Euthydemus, and Hippias Major
have killed the elenchus off. See Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press', 1991), 114-19; Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 29-
37. For an account that assumes a strong 'agonality' of the dialogue form which also finds
itself indebted to Wittgensteinian language games (Sprachspiele) and forms of life
(Lebensformen), see Jurgen Mittelstrass, "On Socratic Dialogue," in Platonic Writings,
Platonic Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold, Jr. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002),126-142, esp. 131, 137, 142.Vlastos' 'euthanasia' of the elenchus is
tied to a strict (but traditional) reading of Platonic chronology, which forces him to make such
nonsensical statements as 'So in these dialogues Socrates is only half Socratic' (Vlastos,
Socrates, 116).What we end up with, then, are two Socrates ("Socrates 'contra' Socrates in
Plato" in ibid., 46). Related to this is the hornet's nest of problems related to the 'mouthpiece'
thesis that Vlastos constructs. On this see Debra Nails, "Mouthpiece Schmouthpiece," in Who
Speaks for Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity, ed. Gerald A. Press (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 15-26, esp. 23-5. Jonathan Lear offers a critique of
Vlastos' method by arguing that a careful look at Socratic irony can actually unite the so-
called two Socrates: "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis," in A Companion to Socrates,
ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 442-62
at 56-60. For further helpful accounts-which I would argue helps prevent such unnecessary
hermeneutical gymnastics-see the following: Jacob Howland, "Re-reading Plato: The
Problem of Platonic Chronology," Phoenix 45 (1991): 189-214; Holger Thesleff, Studies in
Platonic Chronology (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1982); Holger Thesleff,
"Platonic Chronology," Phronesis 34 (1989): 1-26. For a standard account of Platonic
chronology, see Leonard Brandwood, "Stylometry and Chronology," in The Cambridge
Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),51-
89.
59 Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 4.
60 Richard Robinson, "Elenchus," in The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical
Essays, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 78-93
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of the elenchus as searching and examination," where they differ sharply is on
their emphasis. Vlastos seems to stop at the idea that the elenchus is merely
the discovery of 'truth in the moral domain'" and then attempts to trace out
the formal, analytic contours into which the greatest number of dialogues can
fit." Moreover, Vlastos claims that there is a progression in Plato away from
elenchus due to his enrapture with arithmetic formal statements. This is
claimed by arguing that the Lysis, Euthydemus, and Hippias Major dialogues
'euthanise' the adversarial form of Vlasto's (own) definition of the elenchus,
and that they serve to 'disengage' Plato from this explicit form=-except, that
is, for its reappearance in the Meno which becomes the ground for an essay
into the theory of recollection. 64
Against what I would argue are very odd interpretive gymnastics on
Vlastos' part, I would argue instead that the elenchus constitutes a
philosophical 'way of life'. For example, Robinson offers two interpretive
analyses which I think clarify the Socratic elenchus toward a direction which
is more amenable to Socrates' mission. First, in the Meno for example,
Robinson suggests that the elenchus is 'a method of teaching, of instilling
intellectual knowledge in other persons. It does not, however, actually increase
knowledge, but only prepares the ground for it' .65 This paves the way for
Robinson's analysis of the Apology where he brings out the well-known
declaration that Socrates' mission is to make people concerned about the
welfare of their souls." The elenchus described thus far by Robinson is
therefore less a propositional tool and more of a paradoxical way of knowing
less. Because Robinson's narrative points more toward the thematic
pronouncements of Socrates during his defense instead of toward the
mathematics and recollection themes of the Meno (which I would not discount
in themselves by any means but would nonetheless not allow to be the
at 78; this is reprinted from Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1953), 7-22.
61 See Apology 29c, 28e, 4lb.
62 Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," 5.
63 Ibid., 11-29, and see the final formulations of this on pp. 25-9 in his "[A] and [8]"
formulations.
64 See footnote 58 above.
65 Robinson, "Elenchus," 84.
66 Ibid., 86. Apology 29d-30b.
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thematic telos of a 'progression' in Plato), Robinson is able to remind us of the
way of living in which Socrates comes to realize that the only true knowledge
is to know that one is devoid of it.67
Secondly in regard to Robinson's interpretation of the elenchus, he remarks
that its very nature 'is a very personal affair, in spite of Socrates' ironical
declarations that it is an impersonal search for the truth', because in the end,
the answerer must be convinced of the conclusions," even if the conclusion
leaves one in aporia. Robinson comments upon the Gorgias, stating, 'Whereas
in law-courts you have to convince a third party, namely the judges, in the
Socratic elenchus you have to convince your opponent himself. Hence the
witnesses who are so effective at trials are useless here. The only true witness
and authority is the answerer himself; and if he does not admit the fact it is
irrelevant how many others do. The result depends not on a majority of votes,
but on the single vote of the answerer (471e-472c, 474a, 475e)'.69 What is
more, Robinson adds that' [b]y addressing itself always to this person here and
now, elenchus takes on particularity and accidentalness' .70 In sum, it appears
that the third party of the law courts-the impersonal-is actually where
Vlastos' definition appears to reside, whereas Robinson's definition of the
way of the elenchus resides more within the remit of the personal. Robinson,
unfortunately, does appear to share the same narrative of the rigid chronology
as Vlastos in the end," but against Vlastos's championing of 'method is all',"
for Robinson the method of the elenchus is put in its rightful place as a helpful
tool and guide for a more primary, personal, and divine concern.
67 Apology 29b.
68 Robinson, "Elenchus," 88, emphasis mine.
69Ibid., 88-9. There is a parallel to be drawn here between this logic and the continual mission
of'Soren Kierkegaard to speak to 'that single individual'. See Seren Kierkegaard, The Point of
View, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1998),9-11, esp. 37, and passim.
70 Robinson, "Elenchus," 89, emphasis mine. The sentence continues: ' ... which are defects. In
this respect it is inferior to the impersonal and universal and rational march of a science
axiomatized according to Aristotle's prescription. Plato might urge, however, that elenchus is
the means by which the irrational and accidental individual is brought to the appreciation of
universal science, brought out of his individual arbitrariness into the common world of reason'
(Ibid.). Robinson is arguing, much like Schindler does in his Plata's Critique of Impure
Reason, for relativizing these 'defects' within the larger whole which in tum still gives them
integrity bestowed upon them by the whole, or the Good.
71 See Robinson, "Elenchus," 90-3.
72 This is the subtitle ofVlastos' essay.
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A number of commentators have remarked on the fact that Socrates
embodies philosophy in such a way that it is exemplified as a 'way of life'.
Perhaps most notably, Pierre Hadot observes about Socrates, 'The real
problem [of philosophy] is ... not the problem of knowing this or that, but of
being in this way or that way .... Socrates practiced this call to being not only
by means of his interrogations and irony, but above all by means of his being,
by his way of life, and by his very being'." Richard Kraut concurs with this
observation regarding the life of Socrates, adding in his own way another
voice to answer the question, 'Why Dialogue?' when he notes that Plato's
encounter with the 'remarkable man' of Socrates is an event to be
remembered: 'Since Socrates is above all someone who enters into dialogue
with others, and not a propounder of systematic doctrine, the dialogue form is
the perfect medium for the expression of his life and thought'. 74 The dialogue
has been seen as both an expression of the life of Socrates as well as an
embodiment of the very nature and structure of reason itself;" one that
demands attentiveness, companionship, and a long acquaintance in order to
finally see this philosophical life 'set ablaze'. In the next section I will address
the Socratic tool of aporia that is very closely connected to the elenchus, and
will attempt to show how the Truth that this way points to is one that is Life.
c. Aporia: Life in Death
In this section I start by examining the Socratic logic of aporia (a7wQla)
and then tum to recent accounts of the aporia of death in Heidegger and
Derrida. I show that, even at the end of the dialogical encounter where we
73 Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, MA and
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 29.
74 Richard Kraut, "Introduction to the Study of Plato," in The Cambridge Companion to Plato,
ed. Richard Kraut, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), I-50 at 26-7. Cr. T. H. Irwin, who says: 'Plato chose the dialogue because he
thought it stuck most closely to the essential feature of Socratic argument,' in "Plato: The
Intellectual Background," in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. Richard Kraut,
Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 51-
89 here at 76.
75 Theaetetus 18ge-190a.
208
often find ourselves in perplexity and at an impasse, that there is still a
personal economy at work beckoning us on toward further life-not the
problems of death as such. In this regard, Seren Kierkegaard proves helpful as
one who, not only understood the Socratic spirit, but also as one who uses the
'aporia' of death to spur us on toward earnestness of life. At the end of our
perplexities, therefore, we constantly find an inescapably loving, personal
presence.
Vasilis Politis begins his study on this topic with the following: 'It is
typical of Socrates in a number of dialogues ... to lead the interlocutor towards
a state of aporia, a mental state of perplexity and being at a loss, about some
ethical subject=courage, piety, temperance, virtue' .76 Politis discusses two
uses of aporia in Socratic dialogues. The first use is the more familiar function
of Socratic aporia as catharsis which causes a mental state of perplexity and
being at a loss." In providing a summary of the character of this use of aporia,
Politis notes that the meaning of the term signifies a 'lack of resourcefulness' ,
or even to focus on its etymology, 'lack of passage', 'lack of a means of
advance', or 'impasse'." Likewise, Gillian Rose has pointed out that a literal
etymology of the word a-poria (anoQLa) means 'without a ford' or 'without a
path'." The use of the cathartic aporia aligns with Socrates' goal in
administering it in the Apology (21b): 'it is to test whether people really know
what they think they know and lead them to the recognition that they do not,
thus cleansing them of the belief in their own knowledge' .80
The second use of aporia that Politis treats is one that signifies puzzles and
problems, and here he highlights its 'zetetic' function." Here the more familiar
translation of anoQla is evidenced as 'puzzle' or 'problem', but in the zetetic
76 Vasilis Politis, "Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato," in Remembering Socrates:
Philosophical Essays, ed. Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2008), 88-109 at 88.
77 Ibid., 92-6. Politis examines Laches 194a-c and 196a-b; Euthypro I) bod; and Meno 80a-b
and 72a.
7R Ibid., 96.
79 See Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell,
)992), 166, 20), 256. She connects this with death, which will be explored below.
so Politis, "Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato," 96.
R1 Ibid., 97-105. Politis studies: Apology 21b; Charmides 167b-c; Protagoros 324d-e and
348c; and Meno 80c-d, 84a-c.
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function 'the term cX710Qla can refer just as much to what one is puzzled about
as to the puzzlement itself. 82 The example given is not always about what
something is-say, virtue--but the question raised in relation to it, e.g., 'can
virtue be taught?'!' The way in which this latter zetetic form of aporia is
connected to the elenchus is in Politis' definition of its function: 'to generate
particular searches, defined and directed by the puzzle and problem at hand'."
Politis' conclusion about this second use is that these very problems help
direct the higher aim of coming up with definitions in a 'dialectical search'."
What is most striking about Politis' ensuing conclusion is that even though he
has been at pains to differentiate these two uses of aporia, in the end he notes
their porosity: 'No doubt the two kinds of aporia are not sharply separate
states of mind; rather, there may be a continuous path from the one to the
other. Thus a person may at first experience the encounter with Socratic
dialectic as confusing, bewildering, and simply a cause of perplexity and being
at a loss; but gradually he may come to think that the cause of his perplexity is
particular puzzles and problems that he may try to articulate and solve'. 86
Politis admits that there is 'nothing obvious' or 'inevitable' about this
transition, saying that it is in fact a 'real innovation'. 87 In a word, Politis is
revealing that such a transition must in fact be narrated (as he himself has
done in a performative way). Correspondingly, Charles Kahn remarks that the
literary device of the aporia is employed 'for reinterpreting the Socratic
elenchus as the preparation for constructive philosophy. The reader is to
accompany the interlocutor in the recognition of a problem. But the more
astute reader will also recognize some hints of a solution'." Glossing Politis'
analysis in light of my discussion in the present chapter, we find that the
nature of aporia is analogous to the logic of the way of truth: an encounter
with a bewildering question or answer can in fact provide the very direction
82 Ibid., 105.
S} Ibid.
114 Ibid., 107, emphasis mine.
85 Ibid., 108-9.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 109. As an alternative to his own account, Politis contrasts the work of Gareth B.
Matthews, Socratic Perplexity and the Nature of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,2004), Ill.
88 Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 100.
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and path (TI6Qo~) deeper into the question itself (and as we will see later, the
questioner). The sun, though blinding, illumines our daily activities.
For the remainder of this section on aporia, I will address another but
related aspect of the question of Socratic perplexity within a contrast between
Socrates and Kierkegaard on the one hand, versus the Heideggian legacy of
death on the other. While it is not within the scope of this chapter to enter into
a full discussion of the gift, for the purposes of this section, I will briefly
address Heidegger and Derrida-perhaps the two philosophers of aporia par
excellence of the twentieth century. From Heidegger's es gibt of Being (co-
terminous with time) that comes from nowhere and nobody yet still somehow
'gives' ,89 to Derrida' s unilateral thinking of the gift which begins in, through
and with aporia" (indeed, Derrida explicitly bases his account of the gift upon
the shoulders of Heidegger's es gibt in his own if y a91), these two thinkers are
the gift's most aneconomic expounders. And, I would argue that ultimately
there is no coincidence that these same aneconomic thinkers are also so
primarily focused and concerned with death as a real determining event within
their thought, despite the fact that there appears to be an initial paradoxical
logic at work within their discussions of death. 92
For Heidegger, death is the 'the possibility of the absolute impossibility of
Da-Sein [die Moglichkeit der schlechthinnige Daseinsunmoglichkeiti. Thus
death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-
relational. and which is not to be outstripped [unuberholbarev" Earlier,
Heidegger states that the constitution of Dasein (the human existential defined
89 See Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, IL: University
Of Chicago Press, 1972).
90 See Derrida's responses in 'On the Gift: A Discussion Between Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Luc Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney', in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, eds.,
God, the Gift. and Postmodernism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 54-78,
esp. 60 and 77.
91 See Derrida, Given Time, 10, 20-22.
92 One can think here of Heidegger's discussion of being-toward-death in Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1978), 279-311 (§§46-53). Levinas' reversal of the 'possibility of impossibility'
in Emmanuel Levinas, God. Death. and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2001). Likewise in Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. David Wills
(Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1995); idem, Aporias, trans. Thomas Dutoit,
Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, 294, emphasis in original.
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as Being-there, or Da-Sein) is the following: 'Dasein is the possibility of
Being-free for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being"," The directionality of
Dasein, it's own 'thrownness' distinguishes its own 'dying' as a kind of death
to be distinguished from mere perishing as well as the concept of one's own
demise." Therefore, when Heidegger says, 'With death, Dasein stands before
itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being'Pv.-what emerges is the idea of
death as the limit at a border.
Commenting upon Heidegger's understanding of limit, Derrida notes that
Heidegger's aporia of death is indebted to the Greek conception of the 'limits
of truth' whose boundaries 'must not be exceeded' .97 Death as aporia means to
abide 'in the very place where it would no longer be possible to constitute a
problem, a project, or a projection'." At this stage, those familiar with
Derrida's writing on the 'Gift' will recognize the transposition that he makes
of Heidegger's work." Derrida changes Heidegger's 'possibility of the
absolute impossibility of Da-Sein' into the 'paradoxical possibility of a
possibility of impossibility: it is possibility as impossible' .100 More
specifically, this transposition is perceived 'as an impossibility that can
nevertheless appear or announce itself as such, an impossibility whose
appearing as such would be possible .... an impossibility that one can await or
expect, an impossibility the limits of which one can expect or at whose limits
one can wait' .101 Derrida aims to de-Hellenize Heidegger here in the wiping




97 Derrida, Aporias, 1.
98 Ibid., 12, emphasis in original.
99 See, e.g,: 'For this is the impossible that seems to give itself to be thought here: These
conditions of possibility of the gift (that some "one" gives some "thing" to some "one other")
designates simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift' (Derrida, Given
Time, 12). It should be added that Derrida is not saying that gifts are impossible, but that, 'if
there is a gift', then the gift 'as such' (he particularly emphasizes the 'as such') exists through
an impossibility. On this see Derrida's responses in 'On the Gift' in God, the Gift, and
Postmodernism, 59-{)0. In Aporias, Derrida also emphasizes the 'as such' in that '[e]verything
thus lies in this enigma of the "as such" and of the appearing that at once marks and erases the
three types of limits that we have described: (1) the (anthropologico-cultural) borders; (2) the
delimitations of the problematic closure, and (3) the conceptual demarcations of this
existential analysis' (Derrida, Aporias, 73, emphasis in original, and see 75).
1()() Derrida, Aporias, 70, emphasis in original.
101 Ibid., 73.
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doing away with the notions of border, closure, and demarcation, Derrida
hopes to unravel this braid, leaving it frayed and 'without end'. 102 Derrida' s
concluding words on aporia itself read: 'The ultimate aporia is the
impossibility of the aporia as such. [... ] Death, as the possibility of the
impossible as such, is a figure of the aporia in which "death" and death can
replace-and this is a metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and
beyond the name of name-all that is only possible as impossible, if there is
such a thing: love, the gift, the other, testimony, and so forth'. 103 Entailed
within this 'possibility of the impossible as such' is the endless exercise of
waiting in expectation for ... ?
In light of our previous analysis of dialogue and its frequent end in aporia,
Heidegger's and Derrida's focus upon death can only be seen as radically
impersonal ways to narrate such a perplexity. While it is true to say that the
power of death is a non-relationality in and of itself, the truth of the experience
of death is not one that we experience only by ourselves, nor is death
encountered only as a pure 'possibility as impossibility'. Death itself is not the
factor that determines personal incommunicability; the person himself already
possesses this unique quality, something that defines us and that we all share.
Because our existence is that which is first shared by us all (in similarly
different ways, i.e., analogous), the diversity of being already bears within it a
kind of 'incommunicability' which finds its perfection in the human person.
The experience of death is, therefore, shared differently: both similarly in that
we all share in the same humanity, as well as uniquely in that each person
undergoes its own experience. The aporia of death is thus not so much a
puzzling, radically heterogeneous distinguishing force as it is the differently
shared point along the path of shared lives together.
In contrast to this Heideggerian-Derridean legacy of death, I propose a
Socratic-Kierkegaardian alternative which creates a real opening, a path not
into death as an impasse as much as it is a focus upon the way of personal
102 Ibid., 78, emphasis in original.
103 Ibid., 78-9, emphasis in original.
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life.lo4 In the Phaedo, Socrates exemplifies primarily a way of life in
preparation for death. lOS One can see that the Socratic way of leading
interlocutors into aporia does not per se mean that one is left literally without
a way; rather it can well mean that the paths thought to be so certain were in
fact dead ends 'all along' and therefore one's entire trajectory (or at least
aspects of it) need to be rethought. As Desjardin's puts it, 'This kind of
aporia-meaning literally "no passage," "no way out," "no exit"-is intended,
of course, not as an end but rather as a beginning [... ]'.106 Similarly, Drew
Hyland also states that the aporetic dialogues of Plato aim precisely to 'drive
the reader beyond the dialogue itself. 107
104 Kierkegaard's indebtedness to and love of Socrates is well-known, from wnnng his
dissertation on him (Seren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to
Socrates/Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings II [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992]) to a final
paean to Socrates in The Moment: 'You, antiquity's noble simple soul, you, the only human
being I admiringly acknowledge as a thinker: there is only a little preserved about you, of all
people the only true martyr of intellectuality, just as great qua character as qua thinker; but
how exceedingly much this little is! Even though over the centuries there have lived in
Christendom a few isolated significant thinkers,-how I long to be able to speak with you for
only a half hour, far away from these battalions of thinkers that 'Christendom' places in the
field under the name of Christian thinkers!' Soren Kierkegaard, The Moment and Late
Writings, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009), 341, emphasis in original. For more on the connection between
Kicrkegaard and Socrates, see the following works: Paul R. Harrison, The Disenchantment of
Reason: The Problem of Socrates in Modernity, SUNY Series in Social and Political Thought
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 67-120; Jacob Howland,
Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaard's Socratic Art (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 2000); Paul Muench, "Kierkegaard's Socratic Task" (Dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh, 2006); Paul Muench, "Kierkegaard's Socratic Point of View," in A
Companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar, Blackwell
Companions to Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 389-405; Karen L. Carr,
"After Paganism: Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Christian Tradition," in Kierkegaard After
Macintyre: Essays on Freedom. Narrative. and Virture, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony
Rudd (Open Court Publishing, 2001); Stephen Leach, "Socrates in Hamann and Kierkegaard,"
in Kierkegaard and Great Philosophers, ed. Roman Kralik et al., Acta Kierkegaardiana 2
(Mexico City - Barcelona - Sal'a: Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos /
University of Barcelona / Kierkegaard Society in Slovakia, 2007), 36--67; and the essays
contained in Jon Stewart and Katalin Nun, eds., Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Socrates
and Plato, Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception, and Resources 2 (Surrey: Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd., 2010).
105 Importantly, see the following corrective article which argues against the regnant
Nietzschean view that Socrates despised life: Laurel A. Madison, "Have We Been Careless
with Socrates' Last Words?: A Rereading of the Phaedo," Journal of the History of
Philosophy 40, no. 4 (2002): 421-36.
106 Desjardins, "Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," 116, emphasis mine.
107 Hyland, "Why Plato Wrote Dialogues," 40.
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With this in mind, while it is true that Heidegger often plagiarizes and then
secularizes Kierkegaard' s thought,'?" Kierkegaard' s own thought about death
as outlined in his eponymous discourse 'At a Graveside' turns out to be a
radically different approach altogether.!" Paradoxically, even though the
whole discourse seems to be about death, it turns out not to be about death at
all. Death is neither defined by equality nor inequality; 110 on the contrary,
death is simultaneously certain and uncertain which is an earnestness!" (or
'seriousness'):" that compels us to admit that death is wholly inexplicable.!"
In the end, 'we should not be overhasty in acquiring an opinion with regard to
death'.": Kierkegaard's discourse on death, in the final analysis, is really
concerned with the earnestness of life, preparing for the 'final examination', 115
the transforming of one's life, and the caring for one's soul. In a sense, even
though 'At a Graveside' is an upbuilding discourse and thus delivered in a
direct, apostolic mode of address with his 'right hand' ,116 Kierkegaard has kept
his poetic left 'hand' slightly raised-because his authorship is a single
IOH See, e.g., the appendix to Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on
Heidegger's Being and Time Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 283ff.
III? Soren Kierkegaard, 'At a Graveside' in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, ed.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, trans. Howard V. Hong and Hong, Kierkegaard's
Writings X (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 69-102. For an interesting
critical commentary, see Gordon D. Marino, "A Critical Perspective on Kierkegaard's 'At a
Graveside'," in Kierkegaard and Death, ed. Patrick Stokes and Adam Buben (Indianapolis,
IN: Indiana University Press, 2011),150-8.
110 Kierkegaard, 'At a Graveside' in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 86 and 91.
III Ibid., 95.
112 'Seriousness' is how George Pattison renders the Danish word alvor that the Hongs
translate as 'earnestness'. See, e.g., George Pattison, Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses:
Philosophy, Literature. and Theology (London: Routledge, 2002), 115. See also George
Connell, "The Importance of Being Earnest: Coming to Terms With Judge Williams'
Seriousness," in Stages on Life's Way, ed. Robert L. Perkins, International Kierkegaard
Commentary II (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000), 113-48. Connell points out:
'The Hongs translate the Danish Alvor sometimes as "seriousness," but more often as
"earnestness," paralleling the German translation of the word as Ernst. Where "serious" is
etymologically associated with heaviness and weight (Old English swaer = heavy; also related
to Greek herma = ballast), "earnest" carries connotations of battle (Old English eornest=
combat or duel). In contrast, the Danish Alvor signifies complete, unalloyed truth. (at = all;
vor = truth, related to the Latin verus and the German wahr), (Ibid., 115-16).
111 Kierkegaard, 'At a Graveside' in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 96.
114 Ibid., 100.
lIS Ibid., 102.
116 Kierkegaard, The Point of View, 36. Charles Guignon notes that despite the lack of an
overly religious character to the discourse, it becomes readily apparent when Kierkegaard
notes that one is to become equal with God in death. Kierkegaard, "At a Graveside" in Three
Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 89; Charles Guignon, "Heidegger and Kierkegaard on
Death: The Existentiell and the Existential," in Kierkegaard and Death, 184-202 at 191-2.
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'breath'117-mirroring the logic of the Socratic aporia such that we are left not
having any idea what death is in the end. For Kierkegaard, the person is
commended who has the rare talent of what he calls 'practicing in his life the
earnest thought of death"!" Notably, the 'earnestness of life' promoted by
Kierkegaard's reflections here on a subject that leaves him perplexed (death),
are similar to something that G. K. Chesterton was to say some years later:
'what we suffer from today is humility in the wrong place .... The old humility
was a spur that prevented a man from stopping; not a nail in his boot that
prevented him from going on' .119
Accordingly, as a spur to thought, 'the thought of death gives the earnest
person the right momentum in life and the right goal toward which he directs
his momentum' .120This forward-moving, goal-directed movement has its basis
in the Christian life which John Behr calls 'a continual practice of death, or
rather, of life in death'. 121Behr bases his approach on the following well-
known statement from Kierkegaard's journals: 'We only understand life
backwards, but we must live forwards' .122Theologically, therefore, the heart of
Behr's work is showing that Christ is only recognized after his Passion,
crucifixion, and exaltation, and the disciples 'did this by turning back to the
scriptures'. m The identity of Jesus as the Son of God, and the life history of
the Church itself only makes sense at all-in light of the occasion of a death.
Behr remarks that the divine economy of salvation, much like Kierkegaard's
retroactive power prompted by the earnest thought of death, is 'known only
retrospectively from the Cross' .124Behr sums up his project by aligning this
insight with his own work: 'So here we stand, "straining forward to what lies
ahead" and pressing onwards in response to "the upward call of God in Christ
Jesus" (Phil 3.14), being drawn out of ourselves by the coming Lord, all the
117Kierkegaard, The Point a/View, 6.
IIH Kierkegaard, 'At a Graveside' in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 77.
119G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: Image Books, 1991), 27.
120 Kierkegaard, 'At a Graveside' in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 82-3.
121 John Behr, The Mystery a/Christ: Life in Death (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary
Press, 2006),143. Cr. Philippians 3:13-14.
122 Pap. IV A 164; JP I 1030. Cited on an unpaginated title page.
12] Bchr, The Mystery a/Christ, 22. These 'Scriptures', which are spoken about in the Creed,
are in fact the Old Testament.
124 Ibid., 142.
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while looking backwards to the Cross as the last publicly visible image of him
in this world.!" Similarly, Hans Urs von Balthasar remarks upon the
'rnartyrial existence' of St Paul where he says, 'So death is at work in us, but
life [of the resurrection] in you' (2 Cor 4: 11-12). Balthasar comments: 'Paul is
a witness, a martys, because the death and resurrection of Jesus give form to
his entire life' .126 Paul refuses, therefore, to reduce his mission to that of mere
words, but proclaims Christ crucified in his own deeds as well. It is in
Revelation 1:5 where martys becomes a 'blood witness', however, which then
remains the dominant (but no less true) connotation of 'martyr'. 'Throughout
the history of the Church', says Balthasar, 'the concept of the "martyr" will
remain associated with this life-concluding testimony, even though Pauline
theology, which understands the life of the witness as molded by the dying and
rising of Jesus, contains a more comprehensive concept of martyrdom' .127
Thus on my account, the occasion of aporia is not one that stops one in
their tracks, nor is it simply a perplexing puzzle that enters dialogue; on the
contrary, within the ensouled activity of a non-identically-repeating dialogue,
life itself is constantly spurred on by the earnestness with which it takes the
foundation of its own reality: the life, death, and resurrection of the person of
Jesus Christ. It is a kind of 'aporia' because the resurrected life of a crucified
person confronts us all, a life that is sometimes experienced as a stumbling-
block and foolishness.':" On the Socratic account, dialogue aims towards the
sparking of knowledge-wisdom alone; when this is transposed into the
Christian key, however, Christ as the Logos of the dia-Iogue (dia-Iogos) is one
whom all of our own reasons (Iogoi) refer, that is, 'Christ the power of God
and the wisdom of God' .129
The conclusion Ipropose to this section in light of these deliberations on
aporia is that one only is 'on the way', when one is orientated toward life.
Being lead into aporia, or attempting to figure out an aporia (of a particular
puzzle or problem) is not in and of itself lacking, because as Politis has shown,
125 Ibid., 145, emphasis mine.
126 Balthasar, Thea-Logic, 2004, II: 19.
127 Ibid., emphasis in original.
128 1 Corinthians 1:23.
129 1 Corinthians 1:24.
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such problems often have within themselves a transitioning element or power
that, despite all appearances, do in fact continue to lead one on a path of
further discovery, as long as one maintains that these searches and
examinations are part of one's 'way of life'. On the other hand, aporia does
have the potential to run about aimlessly when it forbids a personal giver and
personal way of life (as in the explicitly non-relational es gibt, or an ever-
expectant impossibility as possibility of death). As such, this kind of aporia
will find that it is only shadow-boxing'<" within its own impasse of denying all
forms of economy. Derrida's aporia of death 'as such', in moving beyond the
apparent limits and borders of Heidegger's own being-toward-death, only
amounts to an endless 'giving' of a content-less 'possibilization' of
impossibility. Indeed, there is a deep inability to 'construct a grammar of
giving' in Derrida.131 One cannot see where such an endlessly frayed braid is
supposed to lead, nor to whom it might lead when the 'metonymy that carries
the name beyond the name and beyond the name of name'I" is a seemingly
name-less goal-less 'goal'-let alone whether this expectation can ever
describe a life lived vibrantly, even if tragically. The addendum of 'love' to
Derrida's line of reasoning cannot but seem like an afterthought to such an
impersonal reflection. As D. C. Schindler notes, because Derrida's differance
lacks love (in the form of eros) and thus any kind of goal, it is only ever 'on
the move' while the Christian-Socratic elenchus-the dialogue--is always 'on
the way'. 133 In the final analysis, the aneconomics of differance, the gift and
especially the aporia 'as such' are revealed to be inherently blind when they
are situated within a 'Socratism' without the light of the--and here I would
add personal--Good. 134
Only a personal-that is, a named-reality can truly make life possible for
others, and likewise, it is only a personal Other that can draw me unto its life
130 er. 1 Corinthians 9:24-7.
131 Ward, Barth. Derrida and the Language of Theology, 193.
m Derrida, Aporias, 78-9.
133 Schindler, Plato's Critique of Impure Reason, 213n.136.
t:l4 Griswold, Jr., "Plato's Metaphilosophy," 155. It is not within the scope ofthis thesis to also
argue for the Good as personal, but D. C. Schindler has done this in a most excellent fashion
already, for he argues that Socrates is a stand-in for the Good. See his Plato's Critique of
Impure Reason, 179-87. See also Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans.
John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972),28-30.
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in the hope of a real expectation, whether it be a personal God or the embrace
of a friend. It is also the risk and fragility of such a reality that can let us down
on a creaturely interpersonal level, and as such, what becomes the (non- )space
of the truly 'impossible' is to renege on a promise (promising being a capacity
that only persons have ).135 That is: to tell a lie. When one acts in such a way or
harnesses language in order to bear false witness, 136 disappointment, sadness,
betrayal, and slander reign. The real space of the 'impossible' is thus not even
an aporia, but impossible-full stop-precisely because it does not want to go
forward; it deceives and desires to cut away or distinguish life. A lie, as that
which is impossible, admits of no 'spur' to life, nor a beyond, but merely
atomistic solitude: the utter lack of any relation, which amounts to the
nothingness of death.!" To tell the truth, to promise, and thus to bear truthful
witness is the risk, based in hope, of an involvement in personal dialogue
founded upon a prior reality that calls us toward itself. What makes any of this
possible in a seemingly 'impossible' way-as the real aporia or scandal-is
Christ crucified who says: 'For those who want to save their life will lose it,
and those who lose their life for my sake will save it'. 138 Or as Dietrich
Bonhoeffer puts it, 'When Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die'. 139 It
is towards the beginnings of that call to which I now tum.
d. The Call: An Aesthetical Analogy
m On this see Spaemann, Persons, 221-31; Robert Spaemann and Holger Zaborowski, "An
Animal That Can Promise and Forgive," Communio 34, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 511-21. For an
expanded account of capacity, see Smith, What Is a Person?, 25--61; Harriet A. Harris,
"Should We Say That Personhood Is Relational"," Scottish Journal of Theology 51, no. 2
(1998): 214-34.
136 For an interesting, yet flawed, account of the connection between language and lying, see
China Mieville, Embassy town (London: Macmillan, 2011). This otherwise brilliant novel rests
upon the assumption that language's manifold ability to refer to a myriad of things with a
single word is not due to its richness, but instead a lack. Thus the fact that 'that' can refer to
'this' or 'that' particular thing is seen in this construction as a lie, as opposed to many
referential instances being multiply true.
137 See Yannaras, Person and Eros, 273~ (§88).
118 Luke 9:24. Cf. John 12:25.
1\9 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller and Irmgard Booth, New
edition (New York: Touchstone, 1995),89.
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This section begins by following the path of personal dialogue through the
same trajectory outlined in Chapter 4 above: a metaphysical resolutio. That is,
in order to 'arrive' at the personal response of dialogue, we must first
acknowledge the personal call that bids the human, the call which is first
resounded in and through creation.
If one follows the anonymous commenter on Plato and acknowledges that
'the cosmos is a kind of dialogue' ,140 one may expect to find that creation itself
contains voices in conversation. The very definition of dialogue implies at
least two voices.!" one of a speaker and a listener existing through (dia)
speech (logos). If one assumes that humanity is one voice amidst creation,
what is the other voice? Is it creation that speaks to itself? Unless creation is
'schizophrenic' at its base, then the soliloquy of creation is merely
synonymous with the form of monologue. The dialogue of the cosmos must
ultimately not be with itself primarily-although when this does happen such
dialogues exist between different existents on the creaturely level; rather, the
dialogue of the cosmos is primarily between creation and the call of something
other than creation. And yet if the call is merely wholly other, then it would
not be heard at all, for how can a completely 'other' sound be heard if not with
one's ears as it picks up the vibrations of air we call sound?
The call must be sensed, at the very least-'heard' in some fashion. But if
the call is to be heard-let alone responded to-where exactly will the call be
located? The entirety of the created cosmos is dialogue, but if everything is
calling and the call is located everywhere, the call may not be discerned and
will go unnoticed, as in the way that we only feel differences of temperature
around us when the surrounding air is distinct from the temperature of our
own skin. Accordingly, the call, if undifferentiated, cannot be heard. Below I
will use the works of Jean-Louis Chretien and Johann Georg Hamann to
address the location and differentiation of the call. I will begin by providing an
exegesis of the first chapter of Chretien's The Call and the Response.
Afterward, I will connect Hamann's Christological aesthetics to this
140 Anonymous, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, 28.
141 This paragraph suspends for a moment Desmond's idea of the interiorly plurivocal account
of the person as discussed above. See Desmond. Being and the Between. 392n.13.
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discussion in an effort to highlight the dialogical acoustics of the call that
shines forth within creation.
Chretien locates the call of the dialogical cosmos within the transcendental
of beauty. Following a tradition started well before him in Plato's Craty/us,
Chretien affirms the etymological connection between the Greek kalon, 'the
beautiful', and to ka/oun, 'that which calls' .142 What Socrates discovers in this
dialogue is not particular instantiations of beauty, but 'the very source of
beauty as such. The origin of the word "beautiful," kalon, does not constitute
an etymology among others, but is the very origin of language. The word
ka/on is the name of naming: it names that which, in speech, calls'. 143 The
connection is thus that it is the beautiful that calls, but more than this, both
descriptions given above of the beautiful and of the call exhibit a kind of
'arche' function where, just like beauty as a transcendental is not merely a
bundle of beautiful things, the naming itself in the call also exhibits an
'originating' call.
These 'originary' or 'founding' aspects of the call are evident in Chretien's
tracing of the aspects of the call of beauty. I will outline four of these aspects,
the first being the characterizing direction of the call. Following Proclus,
Chretien states, 'what characterizes the call of the beautiful is that it calls us
toward itself .144 In fact, this call is so originary that we find that it precedes
every decision to respond to it in a 'prevenient'!" manner. 'Whenever we start
to answer the call, we have already answered; when we embrace it as a call, it
has already embraced us and circumvented us' .146 Via Philo of Alexandria and
Dionysus the Areopagite, Chretien quickly connects the call of the beautiful to
God such that God is the beauty that calls all unto himself. Philo transposes
the listening response 'from one kind of listening to another', to a listening
142 Cratylus 416b. Chretien, The Call and the Response, 6-7.
143 Ibid., 7.
144 Ibid., 12. The citation is to Proclus, Sur Le Premier Alcibiade De Platon, ed. A. Segonds
and A. Segonds, vol. 2 (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1986), 361. In translation: Proclus, Alcibiades I,
trans. and ed. William O'Neill (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965),215.
145 Chretien, The Call and the Response, 13.
146 Ibid., 12.
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that exceeds hearing with all of the senses.!" Dionysus draws upon the same
etymology of kalon in his Divine names but transposes beauty beyond the
impersonal Platonic conception to making God 'superessential beauty,
huperousion kalon, beyond being' .148 To counteract the Levinasian
interpretation of 'beyond being' as being separated from being, in commenting
upon the Good (which is convertible with Beauty as a transcendental), Adrian
Pabst rightly states: 'The idea that the Good is "beyond being" (h[EKHVlX '[lie;
ouaLae;) expresses its superabundance and plenitude, not its separation from
being. As such, the Good governs all forms and actualizes all particulars'. 149
With this in mind, 'God makes each and every being participate in the beauty
that he originates' .150 Chretien points out that because Dionysus makes the
origin of the call the creator God, 'neutrality vanishes [because] the origin is
the Word himself. lSI
The second aspect of the call is its infinite excess. There is always an
infinite excess of the call over every response and every decision, analogous to
the excess described by Blondel between the 'willing will' over the 'willed
will'v'" One always falls short in one's actual response, in the action done in
response to the original call (or the willing will in Blondel's case). For
Chretien the excess of the call over the response is due to the fact that we are
being called as particular persons (not abstract beings) in a chorus of'voices.!"
We can never measure up to the call, but it would be foolish to think that we
were ever meant to initially measure up on our own. There is an inherent
incommensurability in our response, for we will never correspond perfectly,
147 Ibid., 14. Philo of Alexandria, Legum Allegoriae, trans. and ed. C. Mondesert (Paris, 1962),
195 (III, 44); English translation: Philo of Alexandria, Philo, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H.
Whitaker, Loeb Classical Library I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930), 331.
148 Chretien, The Call and the Response, IS. Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The
Complete Works, chap. IV, 7 (pp. 76-7 [PG 3: 70IC-D]).
149 Pabst, Metaphysics, 44; Pabst also makes this statement in idem, "The Primacy of Relation
over Substance and the Recovery ofa Theological Metaphysics," 553-78 at 563-4. Desmond,
Ethics and the Between,S, 9, 158 speaks about the good as an "overdeterminate source." In
the Repuhlic VI, 509b, it says that the Good is 'not only the author of visibility in all visible
things, but of generation and nourishment and growth'.
ISO Chretien, The Call and the Response, 15.
151 Ibid., 16.
152 See Blondel, Action (1893), 134.
153 Chretien, The Call and the Response, 19.
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and this very incommensurability is indeed part of the very call itself.!" one
which indicates its nature as 'the immemorial' .155
The third and fourth characteristics of the call are that every call is a recall
('each kalein is anakalein'Y" and that the response of the call is only a
response by non-identically repeating the call. Every created word is a
repetition of the divine Word, attempting to repeat itself towards the one to
whom it is recalled; the recall is a call toward the beauty of one doing the
calling, the Word. Repeating the call is never merely a re-stating or identical
repetition, for we do not have access to the pure beginnings of the call that is
not mediated and that is thus not itself a repetition via tradition.!"
Furthermore, the very excess of the call and of the call over our response is
what causes us to enact a repetition: 'the excess of the call relative to any
possible response or to any act of hearing is precisely what parts my lips again
and again in order that I may sing what shatters my voice, what makes me fail
to hear the unheard-of that calls us' .158
The voice is discerned not only by hearing, but by sight as well, which
Chretien goes on to formulate in his short chapter entitled 'The Visible
Voice' .159 The encounter with the beautiful is furthered in a face-to-face
encounter. Despite the move to the visual metaphor, Chretien emphasizes that
this encounter still resounds as a dialogue. 'Visible beauty becomes properly
visible precisely when it speaks to us and we question it. Itmust speak to us in
order for us to see it as beautiful'. 160 It is here, at the questioning of beauty,
154 Ibid., 23.
155 Chretien names the immemorial as that which mirrors the logic of the excess of the call:
, ... the immemorial has for me something excessive about it, an excess that founds me, that
senses me and destines me, and is known to me only obliquely, in the excess of being. It is not
directly thematized'. From Chretien, The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, 16 and see 11-
12.
156 Chretien, The Call and the Response, 24.
157 See Ibid., 25.
ISS Ibid., 31. The 'excess of the encounter with things, other, world, and God' lie at the heart of
Chretien's The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For, 121 (emphasis in original).
159 See Chretien, The Call and the Response, 33~3.
160 Ibid., 35.
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that I want to supplement this discussion by the introduction of Johann Georg
Hamann's own creative response and focus upon his Aesthetica in Nuce.11I1
Hamann writes: 'Speak, that I may see you! - - This wish was fulfilled by
creation, which is a speech to creatures through creatures; for day unto day
utters speech, and night unto night shows knowledge' .162 The response to this
ancient wish to speak'" reveals Hamann's own 'aesthetics in a nutshell', viz.,
God's own speech is communicated to creatures through creatures in which
'the whole of creation is united in a relationship of dialogue and revelation' .164
Creatures, as part of creation, make up one of the two 'books' given to us by
God.16s The other book is that of the covenant as witnessed to in Scripture:
The book of creation contains examples of general concepts which
GOD wished to reveal to creatures through creation. The books of the
covenant contain examples of secret articles which GOD wished to
reveal to man through man. The unity of the Author is mirrored even in
the dialect of his works - in all of them a tone of immeasurable height
and depth! A proof of the most splendid majesty and of total self-
emptying! A miracle of such infinite stillness that makes GOD as
nothing, so that in all conscience one would have to deny his existence,
or else be a beast. But at the same time a miracle of such infinite
power, which fills all in all, that we cannot escape his intense
solicitude! _ 166
161 Johann Georg Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language. For
recent accounts of Hamann in English, see Ronald Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann. 1730-1788:
A Study in Christian Experience. with Selections from His Writings (London: Collins, 1960);
Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metaschematism; John R. Betz, "Enlightenment
Revisited: Hamann as the First and Best Critic of Kant's Philosophy," Modern Theology 20,
no. 2 (ApriI2004): 291-301; John R. Betz, "Reading 'Sibylline Leaves': J. G. Hamann in the
History of Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas 70, no. 1 (January 2009): 93-118; Oswald
Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical Enlightener, trans.
Roy A. Harrisville and Mark C. Mattes (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2012); but see especially the magnificent and scholarly account in Betz, After
Enlightenment.
](,2 Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language, 65. Cf. Psalm 19:2-
4.
163On the history of the 'Speak, that I may see you!', see Betz, After Enlightenment, 126n.52.
164Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metaschematism, 91.
1115 See also the helpful discussion in Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent, 67-86, esp. 70-78.
Hamann speaks of the books of 'nature' and of 'history' as parallel texts: 'Nature and history
are ... the two great commentaries on the divine word, and this word is the only key to unock a
knowledge of both'. Smith, J. G. Hamann. 1730-1788: A Study in Christian Experience. with
Selections from His Writings, 166; cited in Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent, 70.
1M Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language, 75.
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Indeed, Hamann adds, 'Nature and Scripture, then, are the materials of the
beautiful, creative, and imitative spirit' .167 These 'materials' are not on equal
footing, however, as Hamann indicates in the quotation above: the book of
creation is more general whereas the book of the covenant, or Scripture, is
more specific. There is a movement toward more specificity, or rather, to the
concrete singular in the Word.168 The creative spirit that unites these two books
together is 'the spirit of prophecy [that] lives in the testimony of the ONE
NAME' of Jesus Christ who saves, who is above all other names, and who is
the one to whom we should all bow and confess as Lord, the creator God.169
As John Betz comments,
For Hamann, then, Christ is the key to nature and Scripture, such that
when one is "in Christ" these "books," which previously had little or
nothing to say ...suddenly begin to speak (cf. 2 Cor. 3:15). What is
more, their speech begins to reveal the same dialect-the same
"style"-by which creation was first spoken, Scripture was written,
and to which Christ's entire life is one dramatic testimony: one
"dialect," which is essentially a "coincidence of opposites," of majesty
and abasement, glory and kenosis .170
Likewise, Oswald Bayer states, 'In the mediation effected by Jesus Christ, the
"exegete" of God, nature and history speak as creation. Jesus Christ is the
mediator of creation' .171 There is, then, a continuum of sorts between these two
books, but not within a univocal series, but analogously mediated by the prime
analogate of existence, Jesus Christ.
Nevertheless, Hamann blurs the boundaries between nature and Scripture
when he remarks, 'Every impression of nature in man is not only a memorial
but also a warrant of fundamental truth: Who is the LORD. Every reaction of
man unto created things is an epistle and seal that we partake of the divine
nature, and that we are his offspring"!" Nature itself cannot point the way
toward its author, but as Hamann shows, there seems to be no nature by 'itself
1t.7 Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Ibid., 85.
1(.8 Cf. Blondcl, Action (J893), 410: "The true infinite is not in the abstract universal, it is in
the concrete singular."
1(,9 Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language, 86-7.
170 Betz, After Enlightenment, 134, emphasis in original.
171 Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent, 75.
172 Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language, 79. Or, as Dickson
translates it 'Who the Lord is' (Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational
Metaschematism, 421).
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but always a nature within the human creature that participates in the divine
nature (Hamann footnotes 1 Peter 2:4). Gwen Griffith Dickson concurs that
there is not a sharp distinction between the two books in Hamann's Aesthetica
in Nuce, but instead, 'creation and revelation are coextensivet.!" In light of the
previous chapter's account of analogy, such a statement needs to be clarified;
that is, for every 'coextensivity', there is an ever greater 'discontinuity'. The
point of analogy is to pave a middle way between univocity (continuity) and
equivocity (discontinuity), with an emphasis upon the latter due to the infinite
plenitude of the Triune God. Notwithstanding, at every juncture, at every
sensate experience, Hamann shows that the call is always there, beckoning the
creature through (coextensive) nature toward the (discontinuous) beauty of
itself, to recall the very identity of oneself by confronting the call of: 'Who is
the LORD'.
While Hamann does not appear to explicitly acknowledge the etymological
tradition of connecting beauty (ka/on) with that which calls (to ka/oun), his
own aesthetics reflect the very same logic. One can witness this grammar at
work in the following quotation: 'This analogy of man to the Creator endows
all creatures with their substance and their stamp, on which depends fidelity
and faith in all nature. The more vividly this idea of the image of the invisible
GOD dwells in our heart, the more able we are to see and taste his loving-
kindness in creatures, observe it and grasp it with our hands'. 174 The
substance, stamp, and image is the prevenient call in the very creatureliness of
our being, which Hamann seems to say we experience in a sensible way-to
use Chretien's language, to see the visible voice uttered to us. To take an
analogous example a propos of this discussion, Michel Henry remarks that the
abstract paintings of Kandinsky, which possess dynamic, impressionist, and
'pathetic' subjectivities, constitute the cosmos precisely' inasmuch as they are
173 Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metaschematism, 145-6. See also Betz: 'the
key to these two books is Christ, who shows them to be intimately related "texts." Indeed, not
only do both speak to the senses (in the way, for example, that the Bible similarly speaks
through figures and parables); more importantly, both point to Christ, witnessing formally to
the same "dialect" and hence to a common, ultimately triune authorship' (Betz, After
Enlightenment, 134).
174 Hamann, Aesthetica in Nuce in Writings on Philosophy and Language, 78-9.
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sensible'F" This sensate nature, 'whose essence is Life', is communicated
within the dialogical dynamism and emotion of things, such that 'every
concrete object is ultimately a cosmos'. 176 As Betz brilliantly remarks, 'In
Christ, ... who renews the analogy between God and human beings, we are
enabled once again to hear the Logos in the visible work of creation-as
though perception were meant to be, from the beginning, a synaesthetic
religious experience, and all art were meant to be an innovative poetic
response to it'.'" Hamann's 'aesthetics in a nutshell', therefore, when seen in
light of Chretien's own work on the call of beauty, also 'repeats' the very
dialogical drama of the cosmos, which is revealed-indeed, spoken-'to the
creature through the creature' .
e. Reflexive Reversal: Personal dia-Iogos
In the previous chapter, I outlined the ways in which Yannaras' work falls
short in appreciating the Thomistic of analogy. In fact, Thomas' expression of
analogy is not antithetical to Yannaras' own articulation. Additionally, I
provided a brief look at how Yannaras' polemic against 'the West' is far from
accurate (although it does hit its mark in certain neo-Scholatic encrustations of
the tradition). In this short section I aim to positively appropriate his efforts as
taken from the same work, Person and Eros.178 Building upon the above
dialogical insights about the cosmos in light of Chretien and Hamann, the
work of Christos Yannaras is instructive, for he brings together the notions of
beauty with the inherently personal dimension of the world enacted precisely
through the dialogical act. Moreover, it is through following this path that one
can arrive at a 'reflexive reversal': that analogical act of judgment which, after
having heard the call 'to creation through creation', one may now respond to
this call-for the first time-as the dialogical person.
175 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky, trans. Scott Davidson (London:
Continuum, 2009), 138, emphasis in original.
176 Ibid., 138 and 142, respectively.
177 Betz, After Enlightenment, 134, emphasis in original.
178 Yannaras, Person and Eros.
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Yannaras, in remarking upon the incommunicability of the person, names
beauty as the category which 'presupposes the experiential cognition and
valuation of the mode by which the reality of the world exists' .179 That is,
'beauty reveals the mode by which the world is, the how' of its reality.!"
Beauty is first experienced not as possession through abstract proofs, but in
the context of being related to that which is beautiful. For the same reason that
one cannot 'prove' beauty, one also cannot 'prove' the reality of a person, for
each and every person possesses an incommunicability which is their own, yet
communicated relationally in the personal distance between each and every
encounter. As Yannaras puts it:
This mode of the "personal" uniqueness of beings is beauty, [and] is
the reality of nature as "cosmos." [... ] "Cosmos," ... is the appearance
of the personal universality of Being, of the mode by which beings are
the disclosures of a personal uniqueness and decorum, as presences of
beauty. The truth of beings is witnessed to as beauty, as the principle
of a personal uniqueness and dissimilarity, which presupposes and
discloses a personal creative presence and energy.!"
Entailed within the 'cosmopoeic energy' is the beauty that manifests itself as
the principle of the world's decorum tkosmoiotest, which cannot be
cognitively exhausted, 'but is encountered by human reason (logos) within the
context of a personal dialogue (dia-logos), a fact of personal relation'i'"
Human persons do not encounter semantic definitions and formulas in the
world, let alone other persons. True, concepts can be useful, but as Yannaras
rightly says, this in no way exhausts the truth of beings, for inherent in such
truth is the experience of personal reality. This reality saturates the universe
such that, like Balthasar, there is even an 'incommunicability' inherent to
things in the beauty expressed within the distance of their own appearing.!"
179 Ibid., 75, emphasis in original.
180 Ibid., emphasis in original. Yannaras adds that beauty is 'not the what', but I would argue
that a fully participatory account as his own should recognize that the 'what' participates in
the 'how'. Alas, his persistent anti-'Western' polemic drives such assertions, for he cannot
help but see any affirmation of nature whatsoever as somehow 'purely' substance-driven and
thus, for him, 'essentialist'. For the sake of argument, I will be leaving out such further
clarifications as Ibelieve Ihave already addressed this issue in the previous chapter.
181 Ibid., 81.
1M2 Ibid.
1R3 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2000, 1:81.
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Approaching the truth of the world, therefore, anses not only from a
particular attitude to the world, but also 'a mode of life and use of the world:
the world is the second term and logos of a dialogue (dia-logos), a personal
relation directed towards the realization and disclosure of the onefold truth of
Being' .184 According to Yannaras, within the constellation of such a relation,
'which refers to the basic requirements of human life (the taking of food, the
use of matter, art, technology and economics), the human person is in dialogue
with the world, respecting, studying, and highlighting the logos of existing
things' .185 The personal encounter qua personal does not impose utilitarian
demands (which would therefore be impersonal), for such an imposition
would deny the logos of creation: it would deny the personal truth of the world
and the human person, mutilating nature and humanity, denying both their
own perfection and end.!" To deny the logos of the world would, in a word, be
a world without relation. Itwould be a world where relation to the other would
be horrific: Sartre's 'Hell is - other people! (L'enfer, c'est les autresy'"
bespeaks of the ontological condition where the 'original fall is the existence
of the Other'. 188 Instead of personal ecstasy-going outside of oneself in love
for another-such a relation-less existence knows only the shame inflicted by
the other in a 'tragic loneliness of my existential self-containedness, my
inability to relate to the "other," and consequentially the irrationality of my
existence, the impossibility of dialogue, my incapacity to express love' .189
Where love abounds, however, and where perfect love drives out such fear
and shame, recognition and reception of the world's logos indicates 'the
experience of a personal relation. It reveals the world's logos as the second
184 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 96.
18S Ibid.
186 Ibid., 96-7. To this effect, Yannaras cites Saint Maximus Confessor who says, 'For nature
does not produce perfection through art when it has been mutilated, and when what belongs to
it from God on account of the logos of creation is cynically regarded' (To Thalassius 55 [PG
90:756b), cited in Ibid., 97).
187 Jean Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. I. Abel (New York: Vintage Books,
1989),45, as spoken on the lips ofGarcin.
188 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans.
Hazel E. Barnes, 2nd ed., Routledge Classics (London: Routledge, 2003), 286.
189 Yannaras, Person and Eros, 267-8.
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term of this dialogue-like relation, which can be experienced only as personal
communion, a communion of ecstatic-loving reciprocity' .190
Dialogue is thus a two-fold dia-logos: first as an encounter with and
through (dia) the logos of the world as the second term in a relation; and
secondly-and this is where the analogical reflexive reversal is enacted in a
moment of judgment and faith--dialogue is a discerning of the divine Logos
in creation which itself is contained and held in and through the Logos who
was 'in the beginning'. 191 This logic runs analogous to the logic traced out by
Thomas Aquinas in Chapter 4 above where, after one follows the via
resolutionis to Being from the vantage point of the primary analogate of
being-the person-c-one then makes an analogical judgment of affirming that
transcendent Being itself grounded in a transcendent cause.!" As the stewards
of Creation, human persons respect the logos of created beings in a relational
encounter which both upholds the dignity of Creation precisely as created in
and through the Logos, without whom nothing was made.""
f. The Response: The 'We' of Dialogical Personalism
[TJ he matter of the dignity of the human person is always more of a
call and a demand than an already accomplished fact, or rather it is a
fact worked out by human beings, both in the collective and in the
individual sense.
-Karol Wojtyla/John Paul 11194
190 Ibid., 172.
1911 Colossians 1:14-17;John 1:1
192 Jan A. Aertsen, "Method and Metaphysics: The 'via resolutionis' in Thomas Aquinas," The
New Scholasticism 63, no. 4 (1989): 405-18 at 416; Aquinas, ST, I, q. 44, a. 2; Rudi A. Te
Velde, Aquinas on God: The "Divine Science" of the Summa Theologiae, Ashgate Studies in
the History of Philosophical Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 132-8.
193 John 1:3.
194 From the essay "On the Dignity of the Human Person" in Karol Wojtyla, Person and
Community: Selected Essays, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York; Berlin; Bern; FrankfurtlM.;
Paris; Wien: Peter Lang, 1993), 179.
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The final section of this thesis attends to the dialogical response of the
person. While I will not be tracing-out the already well-trodden path of
providing a history of the notion of the person, }95 I will be exploring different
avenues of what has been known as 'personalism', 1% the thinkers of dialogue,
and 'dialogism' (the latter of which is associated with Mikhail M. Bakhtin).""
This section will be actively re-translating some of the work of members from
the above group, notably that of Bakhtin. Before laying out the plan of this
chapter, a few words are in order to explain how the inclusion of Bakhtin
helps shed light on the relationship between monologue and dialogue-what
we have so far been naming 'univocity' and what emerges within the
'ordering-space' of analogy.
195 Kenneth L. Schmitz, "The Geography of the Human Person," Communio 13, no. I (Spring
1986): 27-48; Clarke, "Person, Being, and St. Thomas"; Balthasar, "On the Concept of
Person"; Ratzinger, "Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology"; Christopher Stead,
Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 160-86;
Stephen A Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition and in the Conception of SainI A/bert the
Great: A Systematic Study of Its Concept as Illuminated by the Mysteries of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, Beitrage Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Und Theologie Des Mittelalters 57
(MUnster: Aschendorff, 2001), 9-176; Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 216--35; Spaemann,
Persons; Philip A. Rolnick, Person, Grace, and God (Grand Rapids, M[: William B.
Eerdmans,2007), 1-57.
196 See Mounier, Personalism; Romano Guardini, The World and the Person, trans. Stella
Lange (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Company, 1965); John Macmurray, Persons in Re/ation
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1961); Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a
Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Michael Polanyi,
The Tacit Dimension (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966); Maritain, The Person
and the Common Good; Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka,
trans. Andrzej Potocki, Analecta Husserliana 10 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1979); Wojtyla, Person and Community; Alistair McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A
Christian Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990); Crosby, The Seljhood of the Human Person; Crosby, Personalist Papers;
Thomas R. Rourke and Rosita A. Chazarreta Rourke, A Theory of Persona/ism (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2005), esp. 23-61; Williams, Who Is My Neighbor?; Jan Olof Bengtsson,
The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006); Andrew T. Grosso, Personal Being: Polanyi, Ontology, and Christian Theology,
American University Studies, Series VII, Theology and Religion 258 (New York: Peter Lang
Publishing Inc, 2007); Darlene Fozard Weaver, The Acting Person and Christian Mora/ Life
(Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011).
197 For the primary texts in translation, see Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination; Bakhtin, Problems
of Dostoevsky's Poetics; Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays; Mikhail M. Bakhtin,
Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim
Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov, University of Texas Press Slavic Series 9 (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1990); Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, ed.
Vadim Liapunov and Michael Holquist, trans. Vadim Liapunov, University of Texas Press
Slavic Series 10 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1993). For helpful secondary
literature, see Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984); Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World, 2nd
ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The
Dialogical Principle, trans. WIad Godzich (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1995); Graham Pechey, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Word in the World, New edition (London:
Routledge, 2007).
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While Bakhtin's writings at least formally apply to the genres of the novel
and speech, his own work, by his own admission, 'must be called
philosophical' .198 Thus, Bakhtin's work will allow for more 'stretch room'
within his concepts, many of which have no apparent conflict with theology in
the first place.!" The re-translation of these dialogical and personalist thinkers
is necessary for this project exactly where they may fail to be properly
analogically-orientated. It would be unnecessary at this stage to nudge each
thinker in every case closer to the analogical judgment of 'for however great a
similarity, there is an ever greater dissimilarity'. That is, in some cases the
presupposition concerning theological dialogue will be one of a more univocal
bent between God and the human person; in other cases the concern may not
necessarily be theological at all (and therefore may be more 'equivocal'), but
will still maintain their usefulness in this study. For now it will suffice to
remember that the dialogical personalism I am advocating is only possible as
an analogical quest; in other words, there is much more that could be said and
other avenues to follow as possible analogues, but in the meantime, this
attempt, however much it may bear marks of the divine, may very well fail.
In earlier chapters (especially Chapter 3 and in the introduction to the
present chapter) I considered the temptations toward radical equivocity in the
writings of Levinas, Lyotard, and Ranciere; however, I would argue that the
primary theological-philosophical temptation is that of univocity, I locate this
original temptation in the first temptation offered to Adam: 'and you will be
198 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human
Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis," in Speech Genres and Other Late
Essays, 103. Bakhtin says it is philosophical 'mainly because of what it is not: it is not a
linguistic, philological, literary, or any other special kind of analysis (study). The advantages
are these: our study will move in the luminal spheres, that is, on the borders of all the
aforementioned disciplines, at their junctures and points of intersection' (ibid.).
199 See the introduction in Ruth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled Author
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-24; Alexandar Mihailovic, Corporeal
Words: Mikhail Bakhtin's Theology of Discourse (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1996); Susan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, eds., Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling for
Faith (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 200 I); and Peter Slater, "Bakhtin on
Hearing God's Voice," Modern Theology23, no. 1 (January 2007): 1-25. There has also been
a rise in biblical studies making use of Bakhtin's work: W. L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word:
TheBible as Literature According to Bakhtin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Robert
Polzin, Moses and the Deuteronomist: A Literary Study of the Deuteronomic History
(Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); Barbara Green, Mikhail Bakhtin and
Biblical Scholarship: An Introduction (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000);
Roland Boer, ed., Bakhtin and Genre Theory in Biblical Studies (Atlanta, GA: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2007).
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like God, knowing good and evil'. 200The Promethean temptation ethically is,
as a metaphysical desire, the longing for such a univocity; it is also,
simultaneously and paradoxically, to desire one's place in creation as radically
sundered from and apart from God201 in a moment of equivocity, and in this
case we see that without a proper analogical account, violent dialectics of
univocal-equivocal oscillations arise. The univocal-Promethean desire (i.e.
sin) seems primary. It may be for this reason that in the locus classic us of the
question on analogy in the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas spends more
time thwarting the claims of univocity.i'" Therefore, in the light of the horrors
of the twentieth century attempts to become like God, many of the
philosophical and theological responses to personhood have tended in the
opposite (and thus reactionary) direction of radical equivocity, radical
heterogeneity, and the like. Having more fully attended to the equivocal
response of Levinas in Chapter 3, the present chapter will thus devote more of
its critique to that of univocity, or for this discussion, that of monologue.
The 'monologic world', Bakhtin says, is where an idea is forcibly placed in
the mouth of the hero, the place where the idea 'gravitates toward some
impersonal, systemically monologic context' .203 Moreover, because
everything is reduced to a single voice, the monological temptation means that
the world itself becomes 'a voiceless object of that deduction,.204 In other
words, both the person and the world become lost within the univocal logic of
personal 'monologic,.20s Yet monologue itself can be a wolf in sheep's
clothing. Martin Buber warns against 'monologue disguised as dialogue, in
which two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in
strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the
torment of being thrown back on their own resources'v'" And this he calls the
I· I' f" d . t ", 207'ster mg qua ity 0 mo em exis ence .
200 Genesis 3:5.
201 Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea, 403.
202 See ST, I, q. 13, a. 5.
203 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, 79.
204 Ibid., 83, emphasis in original.
20S For other places where Bakhtin outlines the 'monological', see Bakhtin, Speech Genres
and Other Late Essays, 161-3; Bakhtin, Dialogic imagination, 342-() .
. 206 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man (London: Routledge, 2002), 22.
207 Ibid.
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The plan of this section will be as follows: I will examine 1) the lateness of
the response; 2) the limitations of dialogue in relation to truth in conversation
with Balthasar, Thomas Aquinas, and Bakhtin; and finally, 3) the the
dialogical possibility for the communio personarum.
1) To begin, we must note that the response of the person arrives 'too late'.
That is, as human persons, God has already enacted this response through
God's Word, 'to the creature through the creature' of the divine word made
flesh, to recall Hamann. Hans Urs von Balthasar says, 'A response that always
comes too late because the deed God carried out in Christ, the bearing away of
my sins, has already taken place, before any response was possible, before a
response could even be considered' .208 Accordingly, St Paul tells us, 'God
shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for
us .... while we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his
Son' .209 The response of Jesus Christ as the Father's Word in the Spirit is that
which both 'surpasses and anticipates us' .210 It is Christ's own 'response'
alone, therefore, that 'can at once be and bear witness to the truth, because he
is the only one who comes from the Father, is sent by him, and "exposits" him
(In 1:18)'.211 Moreover, this bearing witness is more than that which is
contained within words: 'it includes a personal commitment, a personal
answerability for what one declares to be true' .212 Thus the personal work of
the Son in this act of bearing witness is every much as a part of this act as is
hi b I . 213IS own ver a testimony.
The answerability of the human person-this cannot be emphasized
enough-always falls, therefore, within the prior answer of the Word-made-
flesh. Our own truthful words participate in the living Word (Logos), and our
own deeds participate in the life of this living Word. Our answerability thus
analogically participates in that of Christ's own testimony. What's more, the
208 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, trans. D. C. Schindler (San Francisco,
CA: Ignatius Press, 2004), 101.
209 Romans 5:8,10.
210 Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 101.
211 Balthasar, Thea-Logic, 2004, II:14. See the translator's note concerning the word Ausleger
and its variations, Ibid" II:II n.1.
212 Balthasar, Thea-Logic, 2004, 11:18, emphasis mine.
213 See Ibid" 11:18-19,
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response of the person is itself within Creation which itself is held together in
this same Word (ColI: 14-17).
With this in mind, in a short piece entitled 'Art and Answerability'r'!"
Bakhtin inveighs against 'mechanical' understandings of the whole, which
cannot properly account for the 'answerability' of one's life. The mechanistic
approach attempts to de-unify the whole person externally in an effort to defer
responsibility, as 'answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame' .215For it is
'only in the individual person' that an integration of science, art, and life can
be achieved in the 'unity of answerability'ri" Similarly in Karol Wojtyla's
Person and Act,217 he argues against both empiricists and idealists, stating that
the unity of the person is not found in the body itself or in the psyche, but in
the locus of moral action.218 Without this unity, the mechanistic approach
externalizes the connection by disassociating life from art and art from life:
one flees from one's own life into art and makes excuses (and vice versa). In
response to this escapist mode of life, Bakhtin says, 'The individual must
become answerable through and through: all of his constituent moments must
not only fit next to each other in the temporal sequence of his life, but must
also interpenetrate each other in the unity of guilt and answerability'r'!"
Commenting upon this aspect of answerability in Bakhtin, Michael Holquist
states, 'the uniqueness of the place I occupy in existence is, in the deepest
sense of the word, an answerability: in that place only am I addressed by the
world, since only I am in it. Moreover, we must keep on forming responses as
long as we are alive'.22o
Our response comes 'too late' indeed, but this should not hinder our
responsibility to answer in the particular situatedness of our location, which is
214 Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 1-3.
215 Ibid., I.
216 Ibid.
217 Translated from the Polish Osoba y czyn into English as The Acting Person. This title, by
all accounts, is misleading as it over-looks the tension in the subject-act polarity in the original
title. For more on this as well as the generally unreliable status of the English translation, see
Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of
Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1993), 59-QOn.6; and the note that spans George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of
Pope John Paul II (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 174-5.
218 Wojtyla, The Acting Person, 189-219; Weigel, Witness to Hope, 176.
219 Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, 2.
220 Holquist, Dialogism, 30.
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both wholly embodied221 and gendered. 'Life by its very nature is dialogic',
Bakhtin says. 'To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to
heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates
wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit,
with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this
discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human Iife, into the world
symposium,.222 To answer the call not only enlivens the world around us
(even giving 'voice' to it), but doing so faithfully also recognizes the
community of persons, multiple associations, and networks which also inform
each and every one of us. But more on this below.
2) Dialogue cannot be constitutive of Revelation, otherwise it would betray
the univocal logic of the 'two relating to a third', which we showed in the
previous chapter to not be properly analogicali" Rather, dialogue itself must
remain analogical, or as Holquist puts it, 'dialogism is dialogic' 224in the same
way that we have argued that 'analogy is analogous' .225 That is, dialogue, just
like analogy, must be properly ordered to a primary analogate. Revelation, and
therefore truth itself as the person of Christ, contra process theology, does not
'happen' in the encounter between Christ and the worId226 (aside from, of
course, the communication of idioms of the humanity and divinity in the
person of Christ); as Balthasar puts it, 'There is nothing between God and the
221 Mounier, Personalism, 10-11.
222 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, 293.
m This is to be distinguished from other kinds of 'mediating', suspending thirds which do not
sublate toward a moment of impersonal univocity. Two forms of this are) Buber's 'eternal
Thou' and Bakhtin's 'superaddressee' and 2) the third emerging in a fruitful we beyond the
l=-thou, both of which are attended to below.
224 Holquist, Dialogism, 181.
225 See McInerny, Studies in Analogy, 95-104; McInerny, The Logic of Analogy, 4. See
Chapter 5, section a) above.
226 To take just one example out of many, see Catherine Keller, On the Mystery: Discerning
Divinity in Process (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). I would easily affirm most of
the first chapter ('Come, My Way: Theology as Process') but not ultimately the conclusions of
the second chapter ('Pilate's Shrug: Truth as Process'). For careful accounts of God's divine
impassibility, see Thomas Weinandy, Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the
Incarnation (Petersham: St. Bede's Publications, 1985); David Bentley Hart, "No Shadow of
Turning: On Divine Impassibility," Pro Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (2002): 184-206; Paul L.
Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006). Hart puts it well: 'No: love is not primordially a reaction, but
the possibility of every action, the transcendent act that makes all else actual; it is purely
positive, sufficient in itself, without the need of any galvanism of the negative to be fully
active, vital, and creative. This is so because the ultimate truth of love is God himself, who
creates all things solely for his pleasure, and whose act of being is infinite' (Hart, "No Shadow
of Turning," 195).
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creature that might correspond to the "interpersonal milieu" of the
dialogicians, for God does not need man to speak to him in order to be an 1'.227
While worldly truth is indeed in process, it only is so insofar as it participates
in the replete fullness of the Triune life which sustains it in and through the
second person of the Trinity. Contra Hegel, God does not need the world to be
God (' ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott' in Hegel).228 Recognizing this allows
Creation to be the full gift it really is, without pagan necessity.
What is required is the space of analogical distance, for without it, one
veers too close to a flat identification between the world and God. Paul
Fletcher, in a critical account of Alastair McFadyen's work on dialogical
personalism, shows that McFadyen, too, assumes a tidy, direct identity
between human persons and the divine persons. As Fletcher rightly remarks,
There is not here any concession to the doctrine of creation and,
accordingly, to the fact that the structure of divine-human dialogue
might be understood as a gift that maintains a distance between God
and humanity while, at the same time, enigmatically marks the
immediacy of God. The distance and closeness of God is, of course,
analogous to intersubjective dialogue but this analogy must incorporate
the manifest dissimilarity of relations because of the status of the
participants. In this sense, the commitment to the distinction between
immanent and economic Trinities provides something more than a
heuristic device: it offers something like the co-ordinates by which the
earthly pilgrimage can be negotiated?"
It is for this reason that David Bentley Hart also says that the distinction
between the immanent and economic Trinity must itself be the distance of
analogy."?
At a more technical level, Balthasar elaborates why dialogue cannot be
understood univocally within the dialogical principle. 'Human beings share a
common language, even if each person can leave his own creative stamp on it.
But between God and man-when it is a matter of genuine personal self-
227 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2004, II:66-7.
228 'For God is likewise the finite and I am likewise the infinite; God returns to himselfin the I
as what sublates itself as finite, and he is God only as this return. Without the world God is not
God'. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Vol I: Introduction and the
Concept of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 308n.97,
emphasis in original.
229 Paul Fletcher, Disciplining the Divine: Toward an (Im)political Theology (Surrey: Ashgate,
2009),92; commenting upon McFadyen, The Call to Personhood, 275. Iam indebted to John
W. Wright for bringing Fletcher's helpful text to my attention.
230 Hart, The Beauty Of The Infinite, 165--{).
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disclosure and not just a vague, closed knowledge about the other-the only
language possible is the Word of God, and this language is possible only if
God freely chooses to make himself intelligible to man in his Word by
interpreting to him the Word that he speaks' .231 Again, this hearkens both to
Hamann's dialogue of 'to the creature through the creature'P' and Yannara's
account of dia-logic. The failure of the above dialogical (or even 'process')
accounts is that they assume that 'the reciprocal revelation in love becomes
coextensive with the understanding we can achieve on the basis of nature'r'"
In other words, contrary the intention of the dialogicians' attempt to uphold
the status of the person, their unrecognized univocal presuppositions flatten
out the difference between divine and human persons.
Christologically speaking, to ascribe such a flat personalism between Christ
and human persons would be to analogously repeat the heresy of
monophysitism, which assumes that there is only one 'nature' in Christ and
thus the union of the Son happens at the 'level' of nature.234 A proper
Christian personalism, therefore, would uphold with Thomas Aquinas and the
tradition that the union took place in the person of Christ.235 But again, one
must be careful and not reduce this to a 'pure' personalism outside of the
analogical interval, for even the person of Christ in the incarnation does not
236 b h f h . 237 0 h . hassume a person or a man, ut t e nature 0 umanity. t erwise t e
errors of Eutyches and Dioscorus (one nature 'out of two natures as opposed
to two natures 'in' one person) or Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia
(separating persons of God and man) lead to there being two 'persons' in the
person of Christ.238 Both cases, and that of the anthropological reductive
tendencies of the dialogicians (at least the Christian ones like Ebner according
to Balthasar) cannot fully account for the truth of the person because of a
231 Balthasar, Love Alone Is Credible, 47-8, emphasis in original. Balthasar specifically warns
against the work of Emil Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung (Zurich: Zwingli- Verlag, 1938).
232 Balthasar remarks that Hamann and Kierkegaard were among the few 'witnesses' who did
not reduce the reception of the Word of God to mere subjectivity (Balthasar, Love Alone Is
Credible, 48).
233 Ibid., 47.
234 Cf. ST, III, q. 2, a. I.
235 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2.
236 On not assuming a person, see ST, III, q. 4. 2; on not assuming a man, see ST, III, q. 4, a. 3.
237 ST, III, q. 4, a. 2 s. c.
238 ST, III, q. 2, a. 6; q. 4, a. 2. For a thorough accounting of the heresies relating to these
figures see Riches, Christ, the End of Humanism.
238
misunderstanding of the analogical ordering contained within the relationship
of one's nature to their unified personal center. Thomas says that a suppositum
and nature really differ in that which possesses matter and form, which means
that one would commit an error to say that 'this man is his manhood'i+" But in
the divine person of Christ, the nature and suppositum are the same (but
different 'only in our way of thinking'); although 'person' still has a different
meaning from 'nature',240 for, insofar as human nature docs not exist
separately on its own, it was assumed 'in something more perfect, viz. in the
Person of the Word,.241 A person reduced to its subjectivity or reciprocity is
still a reduction to a nature, which is unacceptable both for the human and for
the divine person of the Logos, the latter of which is the filial relation of the
Son to the Father as the single, unified, person of ChriSt.242 To flatten out
nature and person in God, therefore, would amount to modal ism. Dialogue
happens at the level of the relation, that is, the person who 'has' a nature.
What the above amounts to for Balthasar, is that the dangers of thinkers
such as Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Ferdinand Ebner ultimately
'slide into a mere two-way monologue (with a religious background, to be
sure)'-this impulse itself stemming from an either/or decision of the
excluded middle.243 A dialogue will never continue on as a dialogue if it
persists as a relation between two 'points of reference'r'" that is, dialogue is
never a mere duologue.
239 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2.
240 Ibid. Likewise, see Balthasar's comments: 'This relationship is the reason that it is, on the
one hand, "impossible to think of a hypostasis without a nature" and that no nature, on the
other hand, can simply coincide with its hypostasis. Both concepts necessarily exclude one
another, even in God'. Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, 223; quotations are from St Maximus
Confessor, Opuscula, [PG 91 :246a]. Karol Wojtyla remarks that in the early centuries of
Christianity, 'what was especially needed was a concept of person and an understanding of the
relation that occurs between person and nature'. See his 'Thomistic Personalism' in Person
and Community, 165-75 at 166.
241 ST, III, q. 2, a. 2 ad 3.
242 ST, I, q. 40, a. I and ad I.
243 Balthasar, Theo-Logic, 2004, 11:62, and see 50-9 for his consideration of Rosenzweig,
Buber, and Ebner. He also rehearses his examination of these figures from a different
standpoint in Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Prolegomena, trans. Graham
Harrison, vol. I (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1988),632-43.
244 On this see Michael Welker, "Relation: Human and Divine," in The Trinity and an
Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghome
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 157-67.
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What is missing, therefore, is a better analogy of personal dialogue which
Balthasar locates in the paradigm of 'fruitfulness' .245It is in fruitfulness that
he sees 'a moment of genuine imago Trinitatis'.246As Balthasar puts it, 'On
the intellectual plane, the dialogicians content themselves with reflecting on
the original distance and relation between man and woman ... , without
attending to the organic and personal fruitfulness of the twO'.247 Emmanuel
Levinas helpfully articulates this reality as one of fecundity, which is what he
calls our 'relation with such a future [that is] irreducible to the power over
possibles'r'" Fecundity names the adventure where the discontinuity
engendered from the fruitful third remains nonetheless a part of one's own
future, one's shared search and desire.i"
More attention should have been paid, for Balthasar, to the fruitfulness in
the Logos' involvement with personal encounter. It is the kind of fruitfulness
that Catherine Pickstock sees prefigured in an analogous sense in Plato's
Symposium, in the emergence of the third which moves beyond the deadlock
of a binary reciprocity: 'What any two desire in desiring a union is not merely
this union, but always also the fruit of this union in whatever sense, something
that is both them and neither of them: a baby, a work of practice or
understanding, a new ethos that others may also inhabit' .250Levinas adds:
'That infinite being not be a possibility enclosed within the separated being,
but that it be produced as fecundity, involving, therefore, the aIterity of the
Beloved, indicates the vanity ofpantheism,.251 The infinity of the other in this
dialogical we is what Levinas Moving beyond the realm of pure self-reference
(of aVT6~) into that of the self-donative love of the person252 involves,
245 See the helpful discussion in John O'Donnell, "The Trinity as Divine Community: A
Critical Reflection Upon Recent Theological Developments," Gregorianum 69, no. I (1988):
5-34 at 29-32.
246 Balthasar, Theo-Logie, 2004, II:60.
247 Ibid., II:60-1, emphasis in original.
248 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 267.
249 Ibid., 268. In this sense, Levinas is more properly 'analogical' when speaking about the
fruitfulness of fecundity.
250 Catherine Pickstock, "Eros and Emergence," Telos 127 (Spring 2004): 97-118 at III.
Pickstock arrives at these insights independently from Balthasar's prompting, although
Balthasar himself also refers to the Platonic 'begetting in the beautiful' (Balthasar, Theo-
Logic, 2004, 11:62).
251 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 269.
252 Kenneth L. Schmitz, "Selves and Persons: A Difference of Loves?," Communio 18, no. 2
(1991): 183-206. The article explores the tension between the two, suggesting that we are
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therefore, a reference to the interpersonal we of dialogue. In light of the
outward mission of fruitfulness, Balthasar speaks of the child as the personal
gift of the parents as born in mutual love. 'In this sense the child can be seen
as an image of the Holy Spirit, the "We" of the ever-greater fruitfulness of the
love of the Father and the Son. In one place, Balthasar speaks of the Holy
Spirit as the "We, the eternal dialogue of the Father and the Son" .253
To be sure, in Balthasar there are multiple analogies for the person and
understanding his or her analogical place within the whole. Not only is
Balthasar's anthropology self-described as a 'meta-anthropology' where the
person both 'sums up the world and surpasses it,,254 but he also employs the
similarly 'fruitful' analogy of 'person as mission' or 'vocation' in his Theo-
Drama (and here Buber is seen in a more positive light, where 'all revelation
is vocation and mission,).255 Like Thomas' identification of the divine persons
with their relations, for Balthasar, 'in Jesus, his Person is one with his
mission-within the reciprocal relationship he enjoys with the Father who
sends him and the Holy Spirit who fosters communication between them'.256
Due to the infinite fecundity of the fruitfulness of the Trinity, in the created
sphere there are countless images of such human transcendence which
'burst[ s] the closed model', 257 and so much more could be said about
Balthasar's emphasis on mission. In a statement with which Balthasar would
surely agree, Levinas says, 'Fecundity is part of the very drama of the 1'.258
'called to be both substance and person, both self-reference and self-donation' (Ibid., 201,
emphasis in original).
253 O'Donnell, "The Trinity as Divine Community," 31; citing Hans Urs von Balthasar,
Spiritus Creator (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1974), 225. O'Donnell also highlights the
work of Heribert Muhlen who articulates a dialogical 'we' as analogous the person of the
Holy Spirit (O'Donnell, "The Trinity as Divine Community," 30). See Heribert Miihlen, Der
Heilige Geist Als Person (MUnster: Aschendorff, 1963); idem, Una Mystica Persona
(Munchen: Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, 1967).
254 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "A Resume of My Thought," in David L. Schindler, ed., Hans Urs
Von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1991), 3; as cited in
Schindler, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and the Dramatic Structure of Truth, 257-8, and see 294.
See also Bieler, "Meta-anthropology and Christology: On the Philosophy of Hans Urs Von
Balthasar."
255 Cited in Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1988, 1:636. The Ronald Gregor Smith translation reads:
'All revelation is summons and sending' (Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor
Smith, 2nd ed. [London: Continuum, 2004], 87).
256 Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1992, III:5 11.
m Ibid., III:526. Levinas also links fecundity to transcendence. See Levinas, Totality and
In.f,nity,274-77.
25 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 273.
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For now I will close this section with a summary of his own thoughts on
the matter: 'Participation in the mission of Christ [... ]-that would be the
actual core of the reality of the person,.259 That is, to be devoted to one's role
to such an extent that one enters it and 'become[s] absorbed in it',260 which
happens in a paradoxical rhythm of both being and becoming.i"' It is in the
person of Christ wherein the 'I' -name of the I and Thou relationship is
'uniquely and ineffably one', not merely by earthly means, but in an ever-
greater way.262 Based upon the analogical participation of the 'One in whom
person and mission are identical', they live out their being within creation by
living out their 'personalizing mission' so that 'they may fulfill their election;
thus they can become what in God's sight they always are and always have
been'.263
3) In this final section, I tum to the vocation of the human person within
the 'called' body of human persons. I will be primarily following the thought
of Karol Wojtyla / Pope John Paul II264 in his articulation of the communio
personarum. The main point of reference is the Vatican II document Gaudium
et Spes §24,265which points to Christ's prayer of unity in John 17, which
states that the prayer 'has opened up new horizons closed to human reason by
implying that there is a certain parallel between the union existing among the
divine persons and the union of the sons of God in truth and love'. 266The
fruitfulness of divine persons must always be affirmed as unified in one God
in the love that God is, which itself is communicated to us from the Father to
the Son in the Spirit. The human person, therefore, can only discover the truth
of him- or herself in an act of self-donation. The greatest commandment to
259 Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," 18-26 at 25.
260 Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1988, 1:68.
261 Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1992, III: 159.
262 Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1988, 1:645~.
263 Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 1992, III:270.
264 For helpful secondary sources on the thought ofWojtyJalJPII. see Schmitz. At the Center of
the Human Drama; John M. McDermott. ed., The Thought of Pope John Paul II: A Collection
of Essays and Studies (Rome: E. P. U. G., 1993); Rocco Buttiglione, Karo/ Wojtyla: The
Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul Il, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Aran
Murphy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997); Weigel,
Witness to Hope.
265 Weigel points out that there is an 'intense focus on the human person, evident in both
Dignitatis Humanae and Gaudium et Spes' (Weigel, Witness to Hope, 171).
266 Flannery OP, Vatican Council II, 925.
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love God and one's neighbor thus entails that 'God desired that all men should
form one family and deal with each other in a spirit of brotherhood'ri'"
The final sentence of §24 states: 'man can fully discover his true self only
in a sincere giving of himself .i'" Wojtyla finds inspiration in this, remarking
that this provides the core of how one is involved in an act of self-
determination by paradoxically giving oneself away. lie says, 'it is precisely
when one becomes a gift for others that one most fully becomes oneself .269
When the person, as a "suppositum that experiences itself as incomplete'V''
then takes action by transcending oneself in a giving of him- or herself over in
morally good actions, they 'become good' and find their own self-fulfillment
in this act.271 As Kenneth Schmitz remarks, 'Only in transcendence do we go
beyond ourselves toward the promise of each one's unique humanity. Part of
our fulfillment consists in a horizontal transcendence, that is, in our going out
to the things around us, in coming to know them, in interacting with them and
being affected by them. But such horizontal transcendence is only a condition
of our fulfillment: it is not its key'. 272
That is, the horizontal transcendence of the interpersonal, self-donative
relation is only made possible by the 'third', which is in fact not a third, but
first: the vertical transcendence of the person of the Logos within all of our
encounters. Peter Slater provides commentary on this logic in the work of
Bakhtin: 'The interlocutory third is not a numerical third any more than
dialogue need be only between two people. What is "third" in every dialogic
process, in addition to authors and readers, or speakers and hearers, is most
often in the background. It is not a dialectical third correlating two parties to
make one composite party. It is a consummating third fulfilling those
encountering each other historically in their differences as well as their
commonalities' ,273 This third, contrary to Hegel, is not synthesizing, but is a
consummating divine third who 'does not merge or absorb the dialogue
partners. It "overshadows" us physico-spiritually, sustaining and respecting
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
269 Wojtyla, 'The Personal Structure of Self-Determination', in Person and Community, 194.
270 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 233.
271 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 235, 233.
272 Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 86.
273 Slater, "Bakhtin on Hearing God's Voice," 9.
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our differences' .274At the same time, it is a consummating third who is
kenotically self-donative, even when grace for ourselves is lacking and our
self-fulfillment is therefore wanting. Bakhtin says: 'God is now the heavenly
father who is over me and can be merciful to me and justify me where I, from
within myself, cannot be merciful to myself and cannot justify myself in
principle, as long as I remain pure before myself. What I must be for the other,
God is for me' .275Failing our own ability to respond even to ourselves, God
has already answered, making our own answers possible, akin to Buber's
'eternal Thou,276 or Bakhtin's 'superaddressee'r'"" In this sense, God's
paradoxical continuous-yet-ever-greater in-breaking into our lives shows us
the patience needed both to overcome our own alienation from ourselves, but
also our alienation from others. What is required, and what stands in contrast
to alienation, is personal participation.i"
It is not enough to be a member of one's communities, as if common
interests were enough to maintain cohesive unity;279 what is needed, on the
contrary, is an emphasis on the other as neighbor and friend. Wojtyla says, 'To
participate in the humanity of another human being means to be vitally related
to the other as a particular human being, and not just related to what makes the
other (in abstracto) a human being. This is ultimately the basis for the whole
distinctive character of the evangelical concept of neighbor'. 280Participating
in the humanity another person necessitates a porous regard for the other and
for oneself in a way that one also sees oneself as a neighbor. What this means
is that, insofar as we participate in each other's humanity, we must recognize
that we cannot subsist on our own in an autonomous, self-constructing way.
Bahktin's concept of 'transgredience' (or 'extralocality') is helpful here:
274 Ibid.
275 Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" in Art and Answerability, 56.
276 Buber, I and Thou, 14, 61, 64, and passim.
277 Bakhtin, "The Problem of the Text" in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, )26. 'The
aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a
certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such)-he is a constitutive aspect
of the whole utterance, who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it' (Ibid., 126-7). For
an account comparing Buber and Bakhtin, which points this connection out (amongst others),
see Maurice Friedman, "Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the
Word That Is Spoken," Religion & Literature 33, no. 3 (Autumn 200): 25-36.
278 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Person and Community, 238. See also
idem, 'Participation or Alienation?' in Ibid., 197-207.
279 Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 88.
280 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Person and Community, 237, emphasis
in original. For a brief discussion of participation, see Weigel, Witness to Hope, 176.
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'What enables us to cross boundaries is our answering others and addressing
them in specific contexts resonant with myriad ramificarlons'r''"
What 'transgredience' refers to is that we cannot see ourselves without
another's perspective: we cannot see the back of our head when getting a new
haircut (without the second mirror being held up behind us), we cannot notice
all of our insecurities or lack of empathy for each other (' Doctor, you really
showed no regard for the patient after the surgery'), in other words, we do not
exist sub specie aeterni to ourselves, to repeat Kierkegaard.i'" One cannot be
'transgredient' to themselves, as Clark and Holquist put it.283 It is not,
therefore, that we merely let each other know about the piece of fuzz sticking
humorously to their hair, or that we need just point out one another's flaws in
an effort to 'inform' them ('just so you know ... '), which itself easily slides
into insulting pedantry; but constructively, in the sense of an upbuilding, that
which is transgredient has 'the function of consummating'. 284 A single
consciousness of one person does not suffice: 'Aesthetic activity proper comes
into effect with the moment of creative love for the content (the life) which
has been co-experienced, i.e., of that love which brings forth an aesthetic form
for the co-experienced life that is transgredient to that life'. 285Participating in
the humanity of the other builds each other up by respecting the freedom and
dignity of each person such that their gifts are recognized and their capacity to
flourish is upheld. Examples which beautifully reflect this reality are the
L' Arche communities (as started by Jean Vanier),286 the writings on disability
and friendship by Hans Reinders,287 and the Economy of Communion as
281 Slater, "Bakhtin on Hearing God's Voice," 5. For helpful remarks on the concept of
transgredience, see Holquist, Dialogism, 32-3; Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical
Principle, 95.
282 Seren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. and ed. Howard V. Hong
and Edna H. Hong, vol. I, Kierkegaard's Writings XII (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1992), esp. 362, 30 I, 305-9, 329, and see 81, 171, 192.
m Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, 79.
284 Bakhtin, 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity' in Art and Answerability, 26-7, emphasis
in original.
285 Bakhtin, 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity' in Ibid., 86, emphases in original.
286 Jean Vanier, The Challenge of l'Arche (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982); Jean
Vanier, Community and Growth, 2nd ed. (New York and Mahway, IN: Paulist Press, 1989);
Jean Vanier, An Ark for the Poor: The Story of L 'Arche (Toronto: Novalis, 1995); Jean
Vanier, The Heart of L 'Arche: A Spirituality for Every Day (London: SPCK Publishing,
2013).
287 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship. I am indebted to Kenneth Oakes for bringing
this important book to my attention.
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begun by the Focolare movement.i'" In providing a gift to one in need,
forgiving a sin, loving the other, no matter how stubborn they may be on any
particular issue: what all these having in common 'is, on the one hand, the
transgredient gift bestowed upon a recipient of the gift, and, on the other, the
profound relation which this gift bears to the recipient: not he, but for him.
Hence, the enrichment in this case is formal, transfigurative in character-it
transposes the recipient of the gift to a new plane of existence' .289 The call of
the other in such a relationship is answered kenotically but also therefore
emergently: the conjoining of the two, three, or more in dialogue creates
something new - 'wherever two or three are gathered in my name'. 290
The particular community of people that makes up such a reality cannot be
a mere multiplicity; only a community which participates in each other's
humanity is thus under a 'specific unity of this multiplicity.?" What is
connected within this community of many, as mentioned above in our
discussion of 'fruitfulness', 'is no longer a relation to a thou but a relation to a
we, although it can easily be resolved into a number of relations to thou'S'.292
The communio personarum is that community which unites the I-thou
relationship in an abiding 'mutual affirmation of the transcendent value of the
person (a value that may also be called dignity) and confirm this by their
acts' ,293 Following St Paul, we become incorporated into becoming sons and
daughters 'by adoption'j'" through the filial relationship of the Son to the
Father who breathes the Spirit upon the Church. But it is precisely 'the
Incarnation which makes the human family a "we" at the deepest level. From
the beginning, the Incarnation is a work of reuniting what was divided. Christ
bears all men within himself. When the Word became flesh, it did not simply
take on a body; as Saint Hilary said, the Incarnation is a concorporatio, a
2R8 E.g., see the essays in Luigino Bruni, ed., The Economy of Communion: Toward a Multi-
Dimensional Economic Culture (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2002); Thomas J. Norris,
The Trinity-Life of God, Hope for Humanity: Towards a Theology of Communion (Hyde
Park, NY: New City Press, 2009).
2H9 Bakhtin, 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity', in Art and Answerability, 90, emphasis
in original. Bakhtin is speaking about the 'hero' here, but it is clear that these elements
transcend themselves into other contexts beyond the novel.
290 Matthew 18:20.
291 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community', in Person and Community, 238, emphasis
in original.
292 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 242, emphasis in original.
293 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 246, emphasis in original.
294 Romans 8:15-23.
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taking on of all flesh' .295United in and through the Word, the communio
personarum partakes of the mutual en-fleshment of Christ by the gift-giving
and truth-advocating act of the Spirit who, in an out-pouring upon believers,
causes the following to ignite: 'All who believed were together and had all
things in common; they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute
the proceeds to all, as any had need,.296 A new communal dialogue is born at
Pentecost. Holding things 'in common', therefore, entails the notion of a
'common good' where 'many Fs are related to a single value' .297Not only
does Christ come in the form of a servant, but we see here that the Spirit
emboldens believers to engage one another in an act of personal service as
well (we recall here the 'dative' grammatical case of giving).
The concept of the common good is itself a reality that functions
analogously (the 'analogy of proportionality' applies well here), bringing a
different realization of the we in the common goods within marriage, a nation,
and humankind in general. 298 Moreover, in dialogue with the common good,
each we becomes even 'more fully expressed and more fully actualized'. 299
Wojtyla voices a word of warning here: the idea of community should not be
used univocally, since it may be applied to different kinds of realities, for even
between the I-thou relationship and a we there remains 'a difference of
profiles that seems to extend to the very roots of the two relationships'. 300 That
is, there can be many I-thou relationships within a single we: students and
teachers within a Church; a priest visiting a sick parishioner within the same
congregation; this same parish within the larger body of Christ; etc.
Furthermore, even though the profiles of the I-thou and the we 'are distinct
and mutually irreducible to one another, in the experience and development of
communal life they must permeate and mutually condition one another'. 301
Different communities with overlapping and mutually reciprocal relationships
may therefore (ideally) arise: dialogically, viz., with the common good in
295 Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, A Theory of Personalism, 31.
296 Acts 2:44-5.
297 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Person and Community, 247.
298 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 249. See also Maritain, The
Person and the Common Good; Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, A Theory of Personalism, 77-
86; Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 50-6.
299 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Person and Community, 250.
300 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 252.
301 Wojtyla, 'The Person: Subject and Community' in Ibid., 254.
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sight, the communio personarum participates in and through (dia) the infinite
dialogue of the Word (Logos) in the love that the Father has for the Son as
communicated and given by the Spirit. Therefore, the communio personarum
recapitulates the cases of the 'nominative' (through the vocative address of
naming), accusative (regarding oneself as created and as other). and 'genitive'
(sharers o/being), all of which is upheld by the gift of creation in the 'dative'.
Such a community of human persons does exist here-but not fully quite yet,
for even the I-thou relationship 'does not exist in us an already accomplished
fact' .302 But, these relationships are a risk worth taking, and it is worth
weathering the long journey of a road that, although in its earthly form it
remains incredibly broken, it is still a beautiful road, for even now, it is
coloured by a world of persons, each made toward the image and likeness of
God. As a beautiful reality, it is worth remembering with Plato that 'all that is
beautiful is difficult' .303 Christ crucified finally consummates this as true.
In this chapter I have traced the form of dialogue from its pre-Christian
beginnings in Plato to its reception and transfiguration in the form of a
theological call and response, itself understood as an analogical exercise. I
have shown that human persons themselves are dialogical as analogically
ordered to the ever-greater, tri-personal God. The analogy of I-tholl-we in
part reflects the fruitfulness of the triune life, although it mirrors it only very
dimly, refracted by sin and death. And yet, while 'properly human action in its
true nature is action-in-response', 304 our response arrives on the scene late, but
it does not come too late: Christ's prior response makes our O'hTI response
possible to a call that bids us, in a 'life in death', toward the true dialogue of
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
302 Wojtyla, 'Participation or Alienation?' in Ibid., 203.
303 Plato, Greater Hippias 304e.
304 Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 119.
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Conclusion: An Entreaty
This thesis has been an exercise in martyrdom. Mere human language has
within it a powerlessness which has the capability to bear false witness, to lie: I
the tongue, a small thing, can tum large ships like a rudder and spark evil
fires. 2 Yet it also has the ability to participate in bearing truthful witness.
Specifically, this thesis has wrestled with the issues of telling the truth about
persons, both human and divine, via the path of analogy and dialogue. To be a
witness to truth (a martyr), while it is a gift from God, it is also a task3-a task
which I hope I have begun to make gestures toward in this project.
The first part of this thesis considered three ways in which the human
person has been denounced falsely under the heading of slander and
accusation. Christ stood accused before Pilate (the angry mob is us), yet the
real judge is Christ, who is the only one who can testify to himself in the truth
because he is the truth, the way, and the life. Secondly, turning to the Dreyfus
Affair, I took a closer look at the logic of accusation. There is, first, the kind of
slander leveled at Alfred Dreyfus; then, there is the kind of accusation made
famous in Emile Zola's 'J'Accuse ... !', a kind of accusation which, while it
implicates people under its banner, in fact is seated within a deeper witness to
the truth. Moses writes about and testifies to the truth: the Pharisees stand
accused beneath its testimony. On the heels of the Affair, Charles Peguy
reflects fervently about the mystique of the Dreyfusards. This serves as the
beginnings of an analogical, 'middle-voiced' logic" which suspends the person
(not conceptually nor reducing it to a politique) in all his or her dignity.
Chapter 3, thirdly, proceeds by completing the analysis of accusation by
looking closely at the logic of accusation 'in the accusative' in the writings of
Levinas. His philosophical work serves both as a warning against forms of
hyper-alterity which evacuate the person to save the person, as well as an
occasion to reconfigure the discourse along more original forms of speech in
that of the gift (the dative). The logic of the gift (the 'dative'), therefore,
I See Henry, I Am the Truth, 6-9.
2 James 3:3.
3 Weaver, The Acting Person and Christian Moral Life, 131-60.
4 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Cosummation of Philosophy (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), passim, but see esp. 107, 152, 156-7,244-6.
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serves as the impetus for the distance articulated within the tradition of
analogous theological speech.
The primarily constructive work of the thesis takes place in second half
(Part II), which begins with an articulation of the person as analogical. Chapter
4 begins with a metaphysical reduction to being, the via resolutionis, which is
discovered to be simultaneously the event of the discovery of the person as the
primary analogate of being. This affirmation is made as an act of judgment
known as a 'reflexive reversal', one that I attend to throughout the remainder
of the thesis: viz., the path of knowledge gives way to the real metaphysical
order of things such that the former, while first in our knowledge, becomes
affirmed last in the logical order of Creation. In order to 'arrive at the arrival'
of the person, therefore, we showed how the person is a legitimate 'perfection
term' in the work of Thomas Aquinas, untangling the braid of absolute/relative
terms, as well as the metaphysical knot of the formal/material constitution of
the person. In order to 'arrive' at the person, I look at the logic of
recapitulation in St Irenaeus of Lyons, for it is in this logic where we see the
true person revealed and incarnated in the God-Man of Christ. It is in this one
person, arriving 'later' than the first Adam, who himself becomes 'first'.
Every answer to the human question of, 'Who is the person?' is thus preceded
by the answer of the person of Christ who reveals 'man to himself. 5
The concern of Chapter 5 is to go deeper into the analogical logic of the
person and the question of the analogia entis is shown to be co-extensive to
the analogia personae. I first take a look at the myriad issues surrounding
analogy in Thomas Aquinas, paying careful attention to how one 'arrives' at
analogy, affirming that the teaching on analogy is both epistemological and
metaphysical, with an emphasis on the metaphysical reality giving way to the
gnoseological. To understand this movement is also to affirm that the 'dative'
case referred to above also transposes the 'accusative' into a new key: the key
of relationality, or put more precisely, of being first related analogically to
God in and through the person of Christ who recapitulates the truth of the
human person. This is because analogical speech, as part of the theological
5 Gaudium et Spes §22 in Flannery OP, Vatican Council II, 922.
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tradition of naming God, is not merely about speech, but ultimately about
somehow analogically speaking of a real God. The logic of analogy itself has
been under debate among Thomists, so in this regard I show primarily three
things: 1) that the analogy of proportionality does not speak for Thomas; 2)
that analogy is based ultimately on the notion of causality, and therefore 3) on
participation. The middle section of this chapter counters Christos Yannaras'
polemic against what he sees as 'Western' forms of analogy. I show, following
various Thomists from the last century (primarily the work of W. Norris
Clarke) that, in fact, the Thomist tradition has the same deep participatory
logic that is based not upon a rationalist 'essentialism', but upon the tradition
which says that God is the subsistent act of being itself (ipsum esse
subsistens). The emphasis falls here upon existence, or the esse of God as 'to-
be'. The last section of the fifth chapter provides a look at the Analogia Entis
of Erich Przywara. While I do not contrast the analogia entis with the
analogia fidei in the well-known debate with Barth, instead I show
constructively how the analogia en/is, as co-extensive with an analogia
personae, is ultimately grounded in an understanding of the primary task of
the person to be that of the 'dative' case of service.
It is from within the understanding of the adequation toward being as an act
of personal service that provides the framework for the conclusion on the final
chapter on dialogue. In Chapter 6, I extend the analogy of the person by
framing the person as 'dialogical', that is, as existing primarily through a dia-
logos both with the logos of Creation, but ultimately and primarily in and
through the Logos of the second person of the Trinity (this move pushes once
again the logic of the 'reflexive reversal'). The first two sections look at the
form of dialogue itself, founded first in Plato. The form reflects the shape of
reason as a 'conversation' or internal dialogue, but more crucially, it reflects
the active, personal form of the person of Socrates. Yet, the Socratic dialogues
are known for their perplexing, aporetic endings. To that end, I examine the
function of aporia, leading, by way of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Derrida,
to a discussion of death. What matters is not that the aporia is a puzzle, an
impasse, or the occasion to ruminate about the possible impossibility of one's
being-toward-death; rather, the Christian form of dialogue is always involved
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in a moment of 'life in death', looking back toward the crucified Christ in
order to live forward in a non-identical repetition of service in the life of the
Church.
The last three sections of this chapter follow the dialogical contours of 'the
call and the response'. I follow both Jean-Louis Chretien and Johann Georg
Hamann in an aesthetic encounter with Creation, moving in the next section
toward a dia-logos with Creation inspired by the work of Yannaras, pushed
toward a 'reflexive reversal' toward the Christie dia-logos. The final section
attempts to articulate the response of the person, constructively and lived-out
concretely. But again, following the logic of recapitulation, the person of
Christ responds first for us, despite the fact that for us chronologically he was
not 'first'. The remainder of the chapter thus interweaves two important
dialogical thinkers through its tapestry: Martin Buber and especially Mikhail
Bakhtin. The interaction is not extensive, but what I hope to have shown is
that there are some real resources here that remain, despite the appropriate
hesitations from Hans Urs von Balthasar which I highlight. For, Balthasar
helps us to remember the properly analogical logic of dialogue: it must stay
ordered within a causal relationship to a primary analogate; otherwise, to
assert that the truth of Christ itself is dialogical is to fall into a reductive,
univocal trap. Following Balthasar and Karol Wojtyla / Pope John Paul II,
finally, I look at the analogy of dialogue considered under the paradigm of
'fruitfulness'. In Wojtyla, this becomes an emphasis on the communio
personarum, a community of human persons engaged in dialogue both with
each other in an I-thou profile, but also in the fruitful blossoming of anew,
emergent 'we'. This community emerges through the mutual participation in
each other's humanity through the service, primarily, of giving oneself over to
the other in love.
This thesis began with the claim that, while my project will be devoted to
the articulation of the person, it is also deeply committed to in no way defining
the person. It is my claim that the logics of slanderous accusation and the
group of thinkers devoted to a 'radical' heterogeneity of the person have
actually gone the farthest to pinpoint the person. The first group reduces the
person to 'nothing but' any number of non-human things while the second
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group ironically tidies up the person by never having actually to meet one.
Perpetual deferral can be useful as an ontic, analogical principle-and this is
why Bakhtin remains theologically astute: he respects these logics as created
logic," and only speaks about them as a potential first principle by speaking
analogously about a 'third' voice who does not accuse in closing off the
narrative, but loves in open-ended responsibility for the other." However,
when never-ending deferral becomes ontologized, despite the claims toward
'openness', it becomes precisely its opposite. In sum, the use of analogy
begins a constructive counter-project in that it founds the person not in a
definition, but in the Creator who the ultimate, ever-greater three-personed
God. Moreover, the truth of persons-both divine and human-is enlightened
by paying attention to the real dialogical way in which they relate. But again,
the analogical interval must be maintained: to reduce human dialogue to the
divine dialogical triune life is ultimately a monological move. One bears
witness to the truth of the person by first bearing witness to Christ, who is
himself the concrete analogia entis, but who lives perichoretically in the
Triune life by regarding his Father in the gift of the person of the Spirit.
To conclude this thesis, one last concrete example is necessary. Christ
entreats us to follow him in a particular way in the Gospel of Matthew,
recapitulating the themes outlined above. He says that on the day of judgment,
we will be judged by how we have treated him: 'I was hungry and you gave
me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger
and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not give me clothing, sick
and in prison and you did not visit me'. 8 Christ was then asked, 'Lord, when
was it that we saw you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in
prison, and did not take care of yoU?,9 And Christ responds, 'Truly I tell you,
just as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to me,.IO
Thomas Rourke and Rosita Chazarreta Rourke show that in this passage, we
see that 'Jesus Christ is the ultimate "You" (in the accusative) to whom all
6 Likewise, Przywara refers to the metaphysics as 'creaturely' and the ana/agio entis as a
'creaturely principle'. E.g., see Przywara, Ana/agio Entis, 3:45-6, 206-8.






love and failure to love is ultimately directed'. II There is no 'as if here, and
their response deserves to be cited in full: 12
No, the statement is more radical asserting that the "You" of Christ is
present in each and every person and is the "term of every act of love
or every refusal to love." The real point of Matthew 25 is to declare
that we touch Jesus personally in all of our contact with other human
persons. This is the "ontological core" of the command to love our
neighbor. As [Jean] Galot summarizes, "The presence of the 'You' of
Christ within each human person, with the right to be loved, is an
ontological presence." What Matthew 25 also underlines is that, as a
relational being, Jesus is never indifferent to any human suffering; it is
the "You" of Christ who is crying out for help. This ontological
presence of Christ is not simply in his disciples and friends who heed
his call. The emphasis is rather on his presence wherever there is
human suffering. Moreover, not even evil behavior changes the
profound respect owed to every human person as a true presence of
Christ in the world. Even those who are in prison for crimes they have
committed bear this presence within them, and Jesus bids us to go and
comfort them as well (Matthew 25:43).13
We end, therefore, with an example of Christ in the 'accusative' of the 'You'.
To answer this call of Christ in us is to 'stand accused' with the same Christie
'you' in each one of us, and especially in our neighbor. In so doing, we
participate in the same 'I' of Christ so that we may be one in Christ, however
analogically, in the splendor of an eschatological we. To engage in the works
of mercy-both spiritual and especially here with respect to the corporeal-
inhabits the lived-out, analogical dialogue of an encounter with Christ where
'standing accused' with Christ is no longer contained within the worldly logics
of accusation and slander, but is a faithful opening to bearing witness to the
way, truth, and the life of the one God who is in three persons.
II Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, A Theory of Personalism, 31.
12 The authors follow Jean Ga10t, The Person of Christ, trans. M. Angeline Bouchard (Rome:
Gregorian University Press, 1981),89.
13 Rourke and Chazarreta Rourke, A Theory of Personalism, 31; the Galot citation is to Galot,
The Person of Christ, 90, emphasis in original.
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